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Foreword
“Developing New Rules in the Old Environment” is the third and final volume in the series of LGI
publications on the state of local government reforms in Central Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. This book describes the current situation in the field of public administration reform
and decentralization in ten countries of the former Soviet Union: Belarus, Ukraine, Russia; the three
Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and the four Central Asian republics of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Each country report provides basic statistical
data, a picture of the local government legislative framework, an overview of local functions and
finances and information on the relationship between local governments and other public
administration bodies.
Unlike the countries analyzed in the first two volumes on Central and Southeast Europe, the process
of decentralization in the ten states covered by this book is almost without exception at a very initial
stage. Ten years after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, national governments in the ten
countries remain hesitant about sharing political and financial decision-making power concerning
the delivery and financing of public services with local or regional representatives elected by and
accountable only to the local population. This is primarily because of lack of experience with any
form of real sub-national democracy and the heritage of the former heavily centralized Soviet system
of administration, but it is also due to factors such as fears of separatism, ongoing territorial and
ethnic disputes and lack of administrative capacity.
Despite the low level of visible progress, all ten countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central
Asia have proclaimed their interest in the decentralization process. This process, however, is often
interpreted as the shift of power from national to local state administration rather than the shift of
functions and resources from state administration to elected local or regional government. This
interpretation is very much a result of an attempt to define “new rules” that would improve the old
administrative system without radical change. It is an attempt to slowly implement public
administration reforms recognized to be crucial for more efficient delivery of less costly public
services and yet considered to be a potential factor for political instability. This book describes how
far this attempt had come by the beginning of 2001, when collection of background information
for individual country studies was completed.
Preparation of Russian and English versions of “Developing New Rules in the Old Environment”
has been a major challenge for LGI, the country teams who prepared individual country chapters
and the country reviewers who commented on the quality of individual studies. This book would
have never been published without Mr. Victor Popa and Mr. Igor Munteanu, the editors who
managed the report-writing process and prepared the introductory chapter. Completion of this
F O R E W O R D
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book would also have been difficult without Ms. Andrea Csanadi, who provided administrative
support on behalf of LGI; Mr. Vladimir Izotov, translator and copy editor of the Russian version;
and Ms. Sarawan Murray, copy editor of the English version. LGI is grateful for excellent work of all
that made this unique publication possible.
Ondrej Simek
Project Manager
OSI Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative
Budapest, August 2001
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Local Government Reforms
in the Former Soviet Union:
Between Hope and Change
Victor Popa & Igor Munteanu
1. Purpose of the Study
This anthology incorporates a rich collection of studies on local governments in the countries of the
former Soviet Union (FSU), which together comprise a vast and diverse region in transition. This set
of studies succeeds two previous volumes published by the Local Government and Public Service
Initiative (LGI) between 1994 and 2001. The first research initiative was launched in 1994, and
addressed issues of local government reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and the second
publication focused more broadly on Eastern Europe.1 Nearly all FSU countries have been included
in this third volume, with the exception of the Baltic states, which were included in the first volume,
the Republic of Moldova, which was included in the second volume, and Turkmenistan.2
The aim of this volume is to provide a detailed overview of the situation of local and regional
administrations in the FSU countries in the context of the decentralization that has occurred since
1991, after which point these countries simultaneously began the processes of nation and state-
building. It should be noted at the outset, however, that finding clear answers to all questions raised
by local government reform in the FSU is an arduous task because of the fluidity of concepts and
institutions that have been designed to oversee the implementation of new and modern forms of
self-government in the area. Another difficulty is clearly linked to the incomplete structural changes
in these countries, or the so-called “burden of transition,” that has been borne by their populations
and local officials.  In highlighting the critical components of transition in the targeted areas of local
public administration, each country chapter has included a detailed review of the existing policies
and initiatives aimed at enhancing the vitality of local governments, accelerating decentralization
practices and the transfer of responsibility for core public service provision to the local level, as well
as increasing legal guarantees for local autonomy.
According to its original terms of reference, this anthology was conceived as a basis for comparative
analysis of various forms of power delegation and legal guarantees for the fulfillment of local autonomy
and as an evaluation of the degree of financial autonomy of the various regional and local public entities
in all FSU states. As such, country studies describe the efforts and aspirations of national govern-
ments in their endeavors to adapt national systems of local public administration to existing European
models or to create their own “patterns” of public administration (at the regional and local levels).
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Apart from the institutional features inherited from the Soviet regime, all FSU countries exhibit a
multifarious set of differences. In fact, they diverge in almost all comparative aspects, including:
degree of ethno-cultural diversity and national identity, proportion of the  titular ethnicity relative
to the total population, degree of economic development (as compared with pre-1991 indicators),
impact of the dominant religion on national politics, type of political regime, state traditions and
specific geo-economic vectors.  Ironically, one can argue that what makes these countries similar is
that their current institutional disabilities, scarcity of economic resources, undeveloped political cultures
and conflicting political and ethnic identities cannot help but magnify their domestic difficulties. It
should be emphasized that individual chapters do not provide fundamental answers to all questions
raised by the contributors, as our principle task is to analyze developments rather than to make
definitive judgements about the evolution in these countries.
The country chapters in this volume are based on a detailed analysis of the legal frameworks and
practices in the FSU countries and of relevant academic literature and public reports. As such, the
work should be viewed not only as a source of information on local government reform in the FSU,
but as a selection of well-documented case-studies from the region in the post-Soviet era. We hope
this anthology will contribute to the acknowledgement of the main challenges facing local governments
in the FSU coutnries and offer a cogent and reliable picture of how local government reform in these
countries can succeed.
2. Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Decentralization
It is widely believed that decentralization of state power and local autonomy will help dismantle
Soviet-era public institutions and support developments towards an effective market economy and
a democratic system of governance, based on administrative and financial autonomy, respect for
human rights and social and ethnic diversity in decision-making processes.
In spite of the positive achievements that have occurred since 1991, local governments have remained
in a nascent state in most FSU countries. As all of the region’s states were formerly both highly
centralized and militarized, threads of their administrative legacies resist decentralization of state
power, and the process is often regarded with skepticism if not distrust. Comparative analysis
provides us with startling examples of how democratic and non-democratic elements exist side by
side at all levels of government throughout the region. While the lack of available resources is often
used as a justification for the failure to decentralize, many politicians still believe that decentralization
is not an indispensable part of democracy-building. In most of these countries, central governments
remain entrusted with essentially the same powers they held prior to independence. Misconceptions
and stereotypes abound in the discourse on decentralization.  As a result, regional and local officials
often fail to grasp the purpose of this type of reform and the absence of expertise on administrative
practices exacerbates the problem.
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Moving beyond Soviet administrative practices has been and continues to be a long and difficult
task, not least because central administrators often staunchly oppose all attempts to increase the
institutional and administrative capacity of local and regional governments. The comparative approach
of this anthology is especially helpful in understanding why these governments have returned to
some of their pre-Soviet patterns of local self-government. In our view, this return is simultaneously
beneficial and detrimental to the reform processes in the FSU. While some obvious benefits result
from this determination to exclude remnants of Soviet-era institutions and mentalities, the negative
impact of this restoration is closely linked to the fact that these countries never possessed the prerequisites
of a modern state.  This “restitution of history” has become a common trend in the CIS as systems of
local and regional governments are designed.
In European legal doctrine, “administrative decentralization” is commonly understood as a delegation
of various administrative competencies from the state authority to the local level to the benefit of
public representatives, locally elected by citizens of the respective communities.3 Similarly, decent-
ralization can also be understood as a technique that allows a legal entity to create another legal entity,
totally distinct from the original, on the basis of either territorial or functional decentralization.4
What seems to be poorly understood throughout the region is the legal nature of this delegation of
competencies. Once granted, the transfer of competencies removes all vertical subordination of local
governments to central authorities within these policy areas. Only by acknowledging this fundamental
principle as a statutory provision in legislation and everyday practice can the administrative
decentralization of competencies from the central to the local level be achieved.
Moreover, from country to country one can find diverging interpretations of “decentralization,”
“municipality,” “self-rule” and even “public administration.” As such, contributors were encouraged
to open their chapters with a discussion of terms and concepts that describe and reflect the substance
of  local and regional governments in their respective countries.
3. Methodology
Although it is difficult to incorpate such disparate experiences into a single methodological framework,
this anthology preserves its coherence by addressing certain fundamental themes and values considered
invaluable to successful and autonomous local government. With this in mind, the  chapters have
been divided into the following sub-chapters:
1. Major general indicators,
2. Legal and constitutional basis,
3. Local politics, decision-making,
4. Functional structure of local government,
5. Public service provision,
6. Local finance, local property,
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7. Relationship between the state administration and local governments,
8. Local government employees,
9. Legal guarantees for local autonomy,
10. Next steps in the transition process,
11. References and annexes.
This approach guided the authors in writing the individual country chapters, in the hope that the
common features and differences analyzed will allow readers to gain a broad understanding of the
dynamics of local government in the FSU area.  However, authors were encouraged to adapt this
research design to address challenges specific to local public administrations in their respective countries.
4. The Political Context
4.1 Territorial Conflicts and Local Public Administration
The territorial organization of self-governments has taken many forms in the countries of the former
USSR. In Russia, the central government has devolved significant authority and resources to the “subjects
of the federation” (republics, regions, and autonomous regions) with the aim of easing separatist demands
and securing the support of regional executive leaders against some of its internal competitors. Further,
some FSU states retained the same territory after the break-up of the USSR, while others experienced
considerable territorial losses. For instance, the Georgian state has lost almost one-third of its pre-
independence territory. Unsurprisingly, violent territorial conflicts have occurred in a number of FSU
countries and challenged the territorial integrity of some of these states (for example, Moldova, Georgia
and Azerbaijan). Several disputed territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan still represent a complicated
international dilemma that remains unsolved in spite of international efforts. As many as 50,000
people have died and thousands more have been wounded or displaced by the civil war that has raged
in Tajikistan, the poorest of the Central Asian states, in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. This political
backdrop cannot be ignored when looking at the state of local public administration in the region.
4.2 Local Democracy
Democratic institutions in the FSU states remain weak and, in some cases, merely replicate the form
of analogous local governments in Western and Central European countries.  Collectivist behavior,
reinforced by the Soviet regime, remains widespread and challenges to authority are discouraged and
often restricted.  Public participation in the political process at the local level remains limited, and
local elections often play a merely decorative role in asserting the influence of the central government.
Local referenda are rare, if permitted at all, further hindering the development of democracy at the
local level.  Where local referenda have in fact been conducted, their impact on local politics has been
minimal at best.
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4.3 Local Elections
Shortly after 1991, elections were held to replace old local and regional political elites, giving the
newly emerging authorities a strong symbolic impetus to convince local communities that things
had changed in a significant way. In spite of the often attractive facade, there remains a sharp
difference between the formal and the practical aspects of local elections in the FSU countries. Apart
from the control exercised by the “public mass media,” central authorities often deliberately create
obstacles designed to keep undesirable candidates off the ballot, while providing administrative
resources and other advantages for their own candidates.  Often, the central administration is deeply
interested in substituting appointment for direct election of mayors and other important public
administrators.  This is particularly the case in major urban areas and capital cities.  For example, the
mayors of Yerevan, Baku and Tblisi are appointed by the presidents of their respective countries, as
are city administrations in Kyrgyzstan. This practice is clearly at odds with the provisions of the
European Charter of Local Self-Government concerning the rights of self-government “to exercise
its competencies by democratically constituted authorities.”5
4.4 Political Parties and Local Governments
The creation of new and democratic local governments began with the expression of the political will
of local communities. It is true that, in most FSU countries, political parties were important but not
indispensable actors in elections. Using the classification employed by the Georgia chapter authors,
political parties in the former USSR can be divided into two main categories:
1. Political parties largely uniting former nomenclatura and/or representatives of specific clans
(regional, family, ethnic). These parties have strong political, economic and, when needed,
physical leverage to accomplish their goals;
2. Political movements and groups with limited membership. These parties are either active
during elections or limit their activities to conducting local disobedience campaigns or protests.
As the experience of Ukraine shows, rural voters are more inclined to vote for non-party candidates
whereas, in regional elections, party candidates have a greater chance of winning the confidence of
the voters. Armenian election regulations did not allow parties to compete in the last local elections
on the assumption that local turnouts should remain a stage for competition of individual programs
and personalities, and not a fief of political struggle. The chapter on the Russian Federation draws a
similar conclusion, namely that in Russia “the political process at the local level is virtually non-
existent and is generally limited to holding local elections and referenda on forming or merging
municipalities.” This is because local units of regional and/or federal parties are almost non-existent
or have been replaced by various cluster-associations such as unions of veterans, single mothers and
disabled persons, which tend to operate almost exclusively in regional capitals and are not represented
at the municipal level.
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4.5 Citizen Participation in the Process of Local Administration
Most existing forms of direct democracy, including referenda, surveys, hearings and public meetings,
are rarely used in practice by local public authorities even when they are clearly allowed by law. The
explanation frequently given is limited finances and/or democratic experience, but the existence of
a large web of sophisticated regulations and normative acts also impedes the exercise of the free will
of the population. The passivity and weak managerial skills of local leaders are also factors that
contribute to limited public participation. In most of the selected countries, it is believed that greater
participation by citizens in the decision-making process may create accessible and meaningful chances
for citizens to influence the policies of the governments that serve them. Unfortunately, the degree
of participation in political decision-making is extremely low in almost all FSU states.
4.6 Ethnicity and Local Government
In addition to the challenges of economic and political transition faced throughout the FSU, with
the sole exception of Armenia, each of the ex-Soviet states has numerically and politically significant
minority populations. For example, ethnic Russians make up approximately thirty-five percent of
Kazakhstan’s population and twenty percent of Kyrgyzstan’s. Almost ten million Russians live in
Ukraine today.  A large number of Tajiks live in the Samarkand and Bukhara areas of Uzbekistan,
perhaps outnumbering Uzbeks there.  Almost thirty percent of Uzbeks live in northern Tajikistan
and southern Kazakhstan and many Kazaks live in the Tashkent region. With such overlapping and
diverse populations, many of them concentrated in cross-border “ethno-cultural pockets,” there is
considerable potential for the spread of ethnic conflict from one country to another.
4.7 Hardships and Institutional Constraints in Transition
The turning point in establishing new systems of local public administration begins with the exact
delimitation of functions and competencies of the respective local governments. Some states have
attempted to formulate a strict list of domains where local competencies are recognized as authoritative.
For instance, Russian legislation lists at least thirty separate fields that are entirely delegated to local
governments. Irrespective of the number of categories, it should be noted that federal law recognizes
a specific “local public area of interest,” on the basis of which local governments may manage their
own affairs to the benefit of local communities. In most FSU states, the basic functions of self-
governments are regulated by specific legislative norms, although several important exceptions will
be considered in this volume. While several principles of local self-administration have been adopted
by these countries, the usual practices do not fully correspond with these principles, relying more on
those habits and customs that have been internalized for decades.
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5. Models of Local Public Administration Systems
In spite of the almost unanimous ratification of the European Charter on Local Autonomy, several
of the charter’s core principles have yet to be implemented.  As a result, even the conceptual basis
established for local governments in the CIS area appears to differ dramatically from country to
country, notwithstanding regional differences which further complicate the picture.  A comparative
analysis will provide readers with an overview of the status of local government reform in the post-
Soviet states and will highlight at least three major patterns in the evolution of public administration
reform throughout the region. These patterns should not, however, be viewed as rigid constructions
but rather as groupings of similar case studies.
1. Formally Decentralized Local Public Administration—is characterized by an expressed
commitment to administrative decentralization, based on the autonomy of territorial communities
that are legally entitled to resolve various issues of local or regional interest. We are aware that, in a
strict sense, hardly any FSU state meets the criteria of a “decentralized state.” Formally, however,
some of these states more closely resemble this pattern than others.
2. Mixed Systems of Local Public Administration—can be seen as a combination of both trends,
centralization and decentralization, in which representative authorities and local executive bodies
gain a relatively high degree of administrative autonomy from the state and regional bodies, but
remain under the patronage of the state. This patronage is enforced through a wide range of
“delegated functions or duties” accorded to local government entities (municipalities, villages, raions)
for certain state-guaranteed obligations or services or through “delegated officials” appointed by the
central government to play a supervisory role within a designated area. Such institutional arrangements
can be found in Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia.
3. Centralized Systems of Local Public Administration—refers to the undisputed acceptance of the
principle of administrative centralization. Its distinctive feature is that local public authorities are
mandated to serve the function of provisionary “state authorities at the local level.” This, in turn,
creates a kind of “hierarchical pyramid of competencies” subordinated to the highest authority in the
state. This kind of “vertical subordination” exists in its most rigid form only in Belarus, where specific
constitutional provisions have merged local executive organs into a single executive system,
subordinated directly to the president. This “instrumentalization” diminishes the role and substance
of local executive bodies. A similar pattern is identifiable in the local and regional systems of public
administration in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan.
A. Formally Decentralized Systems of Local Public Administration
The case of the Russian Federation is particularly illustrative because of the existing legal delimitation
of the state administration and self-government authorities. Although the Russian federal system
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seems highly complex and unregulated, the Russian state has adopted a number of regulatory acts
pertaining to the most important principles of administrative decentralization. Chapter 8 of the
Russian constitution regulates the affairs of the local self-government and incorporates principles
and legal guarantees that, in theory, ensure the autonomy of local communities in resolving local
problems. The constitution provides for the establishment of various organizational models of local
public administration and for a certain degree of financial autonomy. Legal rights to manage municipal
properties are also granted to local public administrations, and the constitution stipulates that the state
will transfer necessary funds in cases where it delegates additional responsibilities to local governments.
However, federal law does not specify exactly which organs of local government are entitled to autonomy
and therefore their number can be can be arbitrarily increased or decreased by regional authorities.
This constitutional framework makes emerging local governments extremely volatile and controversial
at the regional and country levels.  However, in our view, the most important point is that these constitu-
tional principles have been declared as compulsory attributes by the federation and by every federal
entity. This means that federal bodies are committed to producing their own laws in accordance with
these principles. Of course, in numerous cases, formal principles and norms have been ignored by federal
authorities, as well as by regional administrations. Indeed, as the authors of the Russian chapter argue,
even the best legislation cannot be properly enforced unless it is internalized at the local, regional and
federal levels. A graphical depiction of the decentralized local government model follows below:
Figure 1.1
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B. Mixed Systems of Local Public Administration
This category describes the present situation in many of the FSU countries.  In particular, the Ukrainian
system is most characteristic of this model of local public administration. Constitutionally, Ukraine
is a unitary state. In June 1996, Ukraine adopted a new constitution which appeared to lay the foundation
for decentralization of the public administration. The  document granted the right to self-administ-
ration not only to collectivities of the first degree (communes, cities and raions in cities), but also to
those of the second degree (raions and regions). Each administrative degree was endowed, according
the Law on Local Public Administration (1997), with deliberative authorities, councils elected directly
by the population, executive bodies appointed by these councils and financial competencies.
What makes Ukraine so relevant for a discussion of the mixed administrative model is the existence
of two interrelated conditions for local public administration: (a) compulsory retrieval from the state
budget of those resources spent on the exercise of delegated functions and (b) subordination and
control exercised by the state administration over the fulfillment of the delegated responsibilities. As
a consequence, there is no actual transfer of competencies, but a “delegated competence” transferred
to local representative bodies by state authorities. It is clear that, in as far as the state exercises its
control, it is difficult to call this system “self-administration.” This practice precludes the possibility
of local initiatives and independence in administrative activities. This kind of delegated competence
is popular among numerous FSU countries (including Russia, though it more closely resembles the
formally decentralized model discussed above). This second model can be graphically represented in
the following form:
Figure 1.2
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C. Centralized Systems of Local Public Administration
A number of states, including Belarus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, form a special group
among the FSU countries. Their peculiarity lies in the importance attributed to the role and
responsibility of the central administration in managing the public domain, which makes these
systems highly dependent on changes in the governments of their countries.  In these cases, remnants
of the former system of public administration (i.e., the  “local soviets of people’s deputies,” or locally
elected councilors under the Soviet Union) continue to assert significant influence over local public
administration bodies. Centralized decision-making continues to characterize local public
administration in these countries.
In Belarus, for example, a series of steps were taken, ostensibly to reform the public administration,
including the adoption of a Law on Local Self-administration and clauses in a new constitution
stipulating that all three levels of territorial administration—villages, cities and raions, regions—are
“collectivities with the right to self-administration in all issues established by the law.”  However, in
recent years, the local government reform agenda has sharply diverged from the initial design and
government in Belarus remains highly centralized. Local executives are directly subordinate to the
central government and are obligated to act in accordance with the “highest interests of state.”  Local
representative authorities have been declared “organs of state power” and municipal property is
considered part of state property, and can be redistributed or confiscated at any time by the central
administration. A constitutional provision allows councils at higher levels of government to nullify
decisions made by lower ranking bodies by declaring them illegal.  Furthermore, local decisions can
be nullified even more easily by central executive bodies or decrees issued by the president.
Kazakhstan’s system of local public administration remains highly centralized, based on the argument
by central government officials that all public matters should be conrolled by the central state
throughout the transition period. Although the constitution recognizes local self-administration as
“a particular right of the population to exercise its free will through the aim of  elected representative
authorities in villages and cities,” little progress has been made towards its achievement. In fact, all
executive bodies at the regional, raion and city levels are managed by a single head of administration,
appointed by the country’s president. Under these circumstances, regional administrative leaders act
as personal appointees of the central government and do not constitute in any real way decentralized
regional administrations. As a result, a curious situation has arisen that favors appointed executive
bodies over those directly elected by their communities. This situation is clearly at odds with the
letter and spirit of the European Charter of Local Self-Government.
A similar situation can be found in Kyrgyzstan, where the centralization agenda took the lead in
shaping the current functions and profile of local self-government. Although several provisions of
the Kyrgyz constitution (article 7) laid the groundwork for a clear delimitation of functions between
the state administration and local self-administration, the politics of the central administration ensured
that the state gained the right to create and control all local executive bodies. As a result, the
concentration of power in the hands of the state has diminished the credibility of local representative
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authorities attempting to fulfill their mandate on behalf of their respective communities. Another
peculiar facet of the Kyrgyz system is that chairmen of local councils are also the heads of local public
administrations. Thus, the same person who leads the meetings of a local council is responsible for all
issues pertaining to the specific competencies delegated by the state. Furthermore, heads of raion-
level administrations recommend candidates for local council chairman elections. This model of local
self-rule can be graphically represented in the following form:
Figure 1.3
Centralized Systems of Local Public Administration
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Additionally, the principle of democratic centralism is among the most popular inheritances from
the former Soviet regime and is widely applied in Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and a number of
other FSU countries.  Often, this centralism persists because legislators are afraid or reluctant to
delegate exclusive authority on certain issues to local officials.  Without question, when local executive
bodies are structurally detached from the local councils or subordinated to other hierarchical authorities,
local self-government as we understand it does not exist.
6.2 Mayors and their Technical Staffs
In most FSU countries, mayors are elected directly by their local communities or by their respective
local councils and are responsible for implementing local council decisions for the benefit of the local
public interest. They are responsible to their local councils regardless of how they have been elected
(through direct or indirect elections).  It should be noted, however, that throughout the FSU,
mayors of  capital cities are often directly appointed by the president of the state.  Within the FSU
region, only in Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan are residents of major cities allowed to directly elect
their mayors.
Table 1.1
The Situation of Mayors in the CIS
Country Election City Mayors City Mayors Mayors of Mayors/
of Mayors that Are that Are Country Chairmen of
Heads of Raions Heads of Districts Capitals  Local Councils
Russia According to the existing regulations and legal acts defined by the federal subjects
Ukraine *** *** *** *** *****
***** ***** ***** *****
Belarus **** **** **** ****
*****
Armenia *** *** Municipalities **** Community
are cities council does
and villages  not have
a head
Azerbaijan * * * ****
***** ***** *****
Georgia * * **** ****
**** *****
Tajikistan **** **** **** ****
***** *****
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Table 1.1 (continued)
The Situation of Mayors in the CIS
Country Election City Mayors City Mayors Mayors of Mayors/
of Mayors that Are that Are Country Chairmen of
Heads of Raions Heads of Districts Capitals  Local Councils
Kazakhstan Appointed or elected according to regulations defined by the president.
Currently, there is only one elected mayor.
Uzbekistan **
Kyrgyzstan **** **** **** ***1995–98
***** ***** *1998
* Elected by the council
** Elected by the council
*** Elected directly by the population
**** Confirmed by the president of the country
***** Chairman of the council
Several CIS states have adopted specific statutes on state civil servants, which often constitute the
staff of local mayors. Some of these states have begun to give particular consideration to the management
of civil servants, while other states apply the same rules and regulations to civil servants as to other
public officials working for the state administration.
Table 1.2
The Statute on Local Government Employees
Country Legal Regulation Municipal State Servants
on Public Service Civil Servants
Russia Federal Law on * —
Foundations of
Municipal Service/1998
Ukraine Law on — *
Civil Service/1993
Belarus Law on the — *
General Principles of
the Civil Service/1993
Armenia The law has not yet — —
been adopted
Azerbaijan Law on * —
Municipal Service
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Table 1.2  (continued)
The Statute on Local Government Employees
Country Legal Regulation Municipal State Servants
on Public Service Civil Servants
Georgia Law on — *
Public Service,
31 October 1997
Kyrgyzstan6 Law on Civil Service, — —
1999
Kazakhstan The law has not yet — —
been adopted
Uzbekistan Law on * *
Local Public
Administration
Tajikistan Law on Civil Service — *
As can be observed from the above table, only Russia and Azerbaijan have special statutes on civil
servants employed by local public administration bodies. The government of Kyrgyzstan also has
made some effort to distinguish between municipal and state civil servants. It is not entirely certain
that this organizational separation is more democratic than managing all civil servants as like employees
but it is clear that local civil servants should be accorded the same rights as state civil servants.
6.3 Local Public Finances
The principles of local public administration incorporate the right to possess a certain patrimony,
and to take the initiative in all aspects of managing local public affairs, including the right to dispose
of their own finances according to the law. The weakness of the practical dimension of local financial
autonomy drastically reduces the capacity of the local government, rendering local bodies dependent
on the good will of the regional governments and the central administration. Local public finances
are among the most controversial issues on the decentralization agenda throughout the CIS. Financial
autonomy is continuously obstructed within these states by stipulations in various national laws that
allow central government officials to intervene directly into the most basic local government functions.
There is an intrinsic link between the degree of decentralization of competencies and the financial
autonomy assumed by local governments. The following table offers a closer look at the financial
resources allocated to local governments in the FSU states.
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Table 1.3
Relative Size of Central and Local Government Expenditures
No Country Central Govern- Central Govern- Regional Govern- Local Government
ment Expenditures ment Expenditures ment Expenditures Expenditures
as % of Total GNP as % of as % of as % of
in 1994/1999 Consolidated Consolidated Consolidated
State Budgets State Budgets State Budgets
in 1994/1999 in 1994/1999 in 1994 /1999
1 Russia 32.5/27.5 44.6/48.0 23.8/24.5 31.7/27.5
2 Ukraine 1996=27.5 1995=60.7 1995=39.3 1995=39.3
1999=14.9 1999=54.6 1999=45.4  1999=45.4
3 Belarus 20.0/19.1 50.1/48.0 — 49.9/51.7
4 Armenia 1996=21.9 1996=95.3 — 1996=4.7
1999=24.5 1999=95.3 1999=4.7
5 Azerbaijan 29.4/19.8 81.6/81.7 18.4/30.1 —
6 Georgia 1997=10.1 1997=76.1 1997 =25.6 1999=33.0
1999=6.0 1999=67
7 Kyrgyzstan 11.93/16.45 50.98/85.38 49.02 / 14.62 1997=7.75
1999=7.33
8 Kazakhstan 10.4/17.0 56.0/69.6 44/45.8 30.0/31.0
9 Uzbekistan 17.0/14.7 46.6/45.9 5.4/54.2 0.47/6.7
10 Tajikistan 1996=12.1 1996=58.4 1996=22.6 n/a
1999=11.9 1999=68.0 1999=12.1
Table 1.4 similarly illustrates that local budgets are not self-sustainable and that local governments
are highly dependent on state transfers, subventions and other financial injections from regional or
state budgets. Of course, transfers from the central to local governments are important, particularly
during complex and socially unstable periods of transition. However, the fact that, on average, only
ten percent of local government revenues are collected from local taxes and fees in the local budgets
is a major issue and concern of the local governments in  CIS countries.
Local public budgets in the CIS are generally comprised of local taxes and fees, state subsidies, transfers
from the state budget, special transfers and other financial sources specified in national legislation.
The percentage of local taxes and fees differs greatly from state to state, however.  As Emil Alymkulov
argues in his chapter, only two or three of sixteen potential and lawful taxes are currently collected at
the local level in Kyrgyzstan.  In Russia, local governments are not allowed to collect more than 9.7
percent of their revenues through taxes, although twenty-three types of taxes and local fees existed
as of 1998.
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Table 1.4
Share of State and Regional Transfers in Local Budgets
No. Country % of Local Budgets Not Derived State and Regional Transfers
from State or Regional Transfers as % of Local Budgets
in 1999   in 1999
1 Russia 25.1 74.9
2 Ukraine 75.8 60.7
3 Belarus 17.1 46.8
4 Armenia 81.3 18.3
5 Azerbaijan 49.6 50.4
6 Georgia 28.8 33.0
7 Kyrgyzstan 49.9 50.1
8 Kazakhstan 46.5 54.6
9 Uzbekistan 68.5 76.6
10 Tajikistan 31.3 23.2
The existing difficulties in the field of public finances are related to the limited capacity of local
public authorities in the region to manage financial duties and operate adequate budgets. In effect,
these difficulties have become a genuine threat to political reform in the FSU countries. A careful
analysis of all these difficulties reveals the following typical features:
• Lack of specific abilities and skills necessary to manage, monitor and evaluate local public
finances;
• Lack of technical support necessary for local public authorities to modernize and enhance their
ability to communicate with the public;
• Ambiguous and unstable legislation concerning fiscal matters;
• Financial dependency on regional and state budgets;
• Fragmentation of local public authorities, complicating the relationship between the national
government and local authorities, which are typically too small to effectively provide all public
services necessary at the local level;
• Lack of a system of incentives for local authorities aimed at maximizing local financial autonomy.
6.4 Local Public Property
It is difficult to administer any public domain without a clearly defined patrimony. This point is
generally accepted throughout the volume as a key concept for the transformation of local self-
governments in the FSU. The real difficulty derives from the fact that almost all public goods and
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assets were monopolized by the previous state and party authorities and that, as a first step, it
appeared to be necessary to distinguish the competencies of the local governments from the state
administration in this field. Public property should be viewed as a growing asset in the transformation
of local governments and therefore the management and maintenance of these assets should be
viewed as a business that can be profitable and respectable, generating revenues necessary to meet
social needs. The patrimonial reorganization of local self-governments can be formally divided into
two stages: (a) the clear delimitation of municipal property from state patrimony and (b) the clear
delimitation among various subjects of local self-administration: regions, raions, cities and communes.
The second stage is much more complicated than the first, as the effective transfer of property under
the jurisdiction of local governments requires a coherent implementation strategy.
6.5 Local Public Services
It is widely accepted that the main rationale for the existence of local governments is to enable public
authorities to respond to the general interests of local communities.  Due to their immediate proximity
to people, local governments can in theory serve as the best providers of services at the local level. City
halls are typically better informed about the needs of citizens and consumers than central ministries
and therefore their public services are generally assumed to be more effective and less expensive for
local inhabitants and consumers. The most tangible touchstone of the effectiveness and responsiveness
of any municipal government lies in its ability to deliver basic services. One of the most important
criteria used by the population to evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken by the local governments
is the quality and accessibility of local public services.  For all these reasons, the provision of local
public services could perhaps help more than anything else to strengthen the autonomy and effective-
ness of local governments. Public trust in the democratic process is greater when local public authorities
are accorded real power and financial resources, as more possibilities exist at the local level for people
to influence the government policies that most affect their daily lives.
The mechanisms used to provide various public services in Russia are an interesting topic for further
study, as they are similar to those in place in nearly all FSU states. Health care, for example, is not fully
guaranteed by the state, nor has its provision been transferred to local authorities. Nearly all patients
pay directly for medical services rather than through taxes for state-run services. In the field of
education, local authorities generally lack the necessary funds to ensure proper maintenance of local
schools or the purchase of an adequate number of books, teaching or sports facilities. As a result,
school boards often wind up deciding what kind of taxes are paid by parents. In some FSU states,
central authorities have decided that all social benefits and salaries for teachers and other educational
staff members should be paid through local budgets, though this policy raises huge problems in
terms of finding the necessary funds at the local level to maintain public schools.
While some of these countries have adopted laws regulating the decentralization of public services,
there is little practical understanding of how this should be achieved.  While many public services
can technically be administered at the local level, in practice, confusion abounds over specific
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resonsibilities, and reformers are often unclear as to which criteria should be used to distinguish
between public services that are of  local, regional or national interest. For instance, water supply,
organization of public transportation, preschool education and funerary services are strictly in the local
interest and it would seem that they should be services provided by the local authorities without inter-
ference from the state. With respect to maintenance of public order, the provision of health care,
secondary and higher education and telecommunications, these services exceed the local interest and it
is therefore reasonable to assume that regional and national authorities should be responsible. It is
argued in the Uzbek chapter that because the state guarantees the right to universal free education,
all matters pertaining to education are the exclusive responsibility of the state and therefore only state
authorities may open, close or reorganize educational institutions. It can be argued, however, that this
conclusion should only be drawn for those services that are stipulated through constitutional norms.
6.6 Role Definition, Cooperation and
Legal Guarantees for Local Governments
The vulnerability of public self-administration units can only be reduced through a coherent and
systematic clarification of the legal relationship between central, regional and local public authorities.
In order for local public authorities to be effective, they must be empowered with the right to pursue
local initiatives and self-administrative practices.  In the FSU states, this kind of local democracy,
based on the transfer of state power and property to local governments and the creation of a stable
legal framework for their independence, constitutes the cornerstone of a new philosophy of political
power. In reality, however, decentralization more often than not exists only on paper throughout the
region.
The relationship between public authorities at different levels is highly dependent on the type of
local public administration system—centralized, decentralized or mixed.  In Ukraine, for example,
the relationship between public authorities is developed on the basis of the delegation of competencies.
State authorities cannot verify or limit the range of decisions available to local authorities, they can
only verify their legality.  As such, Ukrainian state authorities can suspend those decisions that are
considered illegal and are thereby empowered with jurisdictional competencies.
Other countries have adopted rules whereby the president directly appoints the heads of the local
administration, with or without formal consent from the local councils. For instance, the state
policies aimed at strengthening the “vertical of power” in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
contribute to the preeminence of the head of state in appointing executive branches, which limits
the independence and mandates of elected local representative bodies.  An interesting argument
made by the authors of the Uzbek chapter is that the persistence of both “written” and “unwritten”
rules through which local authorities are subordinated to the state administration means that the
implementation of even the most democratic principles can help to increase rather than decrease the
feeling of omnipotence among state authorities over local and regional affairs.
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6.7 Legal Guarantees for Local Public Administrations
The degree of protection enjoyed by local governments is directly related to the system of local
public administration adopted by the respective country. In all cases where local self-government is
established on the principles of administrative decentralization, legal guarantees are increasingly
respected, while in genuinely centralized governments, the guarantees are largely formal. Legal
guarantees for local collectivities to explore their own interests through the respective institutions of
local government usually include: (a) guarantees for local government mandates; (b) empowering
local collectivities with competencies and responsibilities sufficient for the administration of a given
territory; (c) recognition of the principles of local autonomy and decentralization of public services,
through constitutional norms and other regulations; (d) protection of the territorial boundaries of
local collectivities, which stipulate local acceptance of any territorial modifications; (e)  ensuring
adequate financial resources to execute the powers granted to local governments; and (g) the right to
defend their legitimate interests in court.  It should be emphasized that most of these guarantees are
addressed in the legislation of the various CIS countries7 through constitutional norms or specific
legislative acts.  Their implementation, however, leaves much to be desired.
7. Conclusions
The search for new systems of self-government originates from the need to craft better solutions to
meet the needs of local communities.  Across the region, difficulties in the process of administrative
decentralization differ in terms of intensity and type. While the initial post-Soviet reforms introduced
modest elements of decentralization and democratization, the reforms that these countries have
implemented have not eradicated the “bad practices” and residual habits that hamper serious systemic
reforms of territorial local public governments. In each of these countries, reform intiatives have been
introduced in order to adapt the system of territorial government to a shifting political climate and
newly emerging functional needs. Frequently, this strategy has been thwarted by resistence at the
very core of the reform process—even among those civil servants and high-ranking officials responsible
for implementing decentralizing policies. Apart from lacking the coherence and dynamism necessary
to create new and effective institutions to serve the public interest at the national and regional level,
central authorities in FSU states have little confidence in the capacity of local governments to serve
local public communities, to provide public services or to strengthen local democracy.
In conclusion, it should be stressed that public administration reform, which is both a political and
a legal process with considerable social consequences, is not and cannot be viewed as a simple process
—a single decision reflecting the benevolence of the state or the inclination of the government to
satisfy the requirements of international organizations. In a democratic state, administrative reform is
a highly valuable process that should be viewed as both a political and an administrative priority on
the reform agenda.
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Without question, serious institutional problems may appear even in stable Western democracies.
This is evidence that there is no ideal system of public administration that can simply be replicated
in other countries. The real challenge for architects of administrative decentralization in the FSU
states is to search for the characteristics of successful local governments that best fit with the social,
political, cultural and administrative realities of their respective countries.
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Notes
1 Local Governments in the CEE and CIS, 1994: An Anthology of Descriptive Papers.
2 Turkmenistan is not included in the anthology because the designated authors were unable to
cooperate until the very end of the project’s timeframe.
3 Jean Gicquel, “Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques,” Montchrestien, 1989, p. 76.
4 Francis Delperee, “Le nouvel etat Belge,” Labor, Bruxelles, 1986,  p. 133.
5 Article 3, Paragraph 2, Explanatory Report on  European Charter of Local Self-Government.
6 Currently, there is a draft of the Law on Municipal Service which will soon be adopted by the
Kyrgyz Parliament.
7 Two exceptions are provided by Uzbekistan and Belarus that, seemingly, do not possess
appropriate forms of legal guarantees, while their public administration systems are considered
to be too centralized.
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Local Government in Belarus
Miroslav Kobasa, Alexander Karamyshev & Valentin Dritz
1. Major General Indicators
The Republic of Belarus is a young state, created after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its declaration
of state sovereignty was adopted by the Parliament in 1990, followed by the passage of the Constitution
in March 1994. According to the Constitution, Belarus is a sovereign democratic social state in
which the rule of law prevails. The Constitution establishes the separation of powers and the institution
of the presidency as both head of state and the head of executive power in the country. Between
1995 and 1996, the republic experienced a period of political crisis, manifested in the confrontation
between the president and Parliament. In November 1996, President A. Lukashenko initiated a
national referendum in support of his policies, as a result of which a new version of the Constitution
was adopted, stipulating a bicameral Parliament, the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus.
While the president is no longer the head of executive power under the amended Constitution, he
nonetheless retains all of his previous powers in fact, as well as acquiring the right to issue decrees
which have the force of law.
Geographically, Belarus is located in the heart of Europe, between Poland and Russia, and is traversed
by major East-West transportation routes. This is not, however, reflected in the degree to which the
state is included in European coordination and integration processes. The primary goal of national
foreign policy is the development of a united state of Belarus and Russia, pursuant to a declaration
issued on 25 December 1998. This is considered to be instrumental in resolving economic issues as
well as strengthening Belarus’s tottering position on the international stage, in light of existing
instances of authoritarianism and human rights violations.
Currently, the republic is undergoing a difficult economic situation. The standard of living is low
and expected to decline further. Belarus has rejected economic liberalization, instead pursuing a
policy of market socialism, based on strong government intervention and the domination of public
property in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Private ownership of land is permitted to a limited
extent, for individuals only. Commercial organizations wishing to purchase land are dealt with on a
case-by-case basis, usually requiring the president’s permission.
These economic problems are exacerbated by Belarus’s heavy exposure to the effects of Chernobyl,
with over twenty percent of its area subjected to radioactive pollution.
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Public administration in Belarus is divided into four types of administrative-territorial unit, including
the central government; regions and districts; large and medium cities; and villages, townships and
small towns. Many local communities lack independent status, elected bodies or a local budget.
Even where local elected bodies exist, their independence and real impact in resolving local issues are
usually of a token nature, as is the involvement of local residents themselves. The administrative
apparatus dominates the political landscape and is created by the central government according to a
strict hierarchy. The president directly appoints the heads of regional executive committees and
approves the appointment of heads of district executive committees. Local executive bodies are not
accountable to either the local representative branch or local citizens.
2. Legal and Constitutional Basis
An appropriate beginning for a discussion of territorial government in Belarus is the passage of the
Law on General Principles of Local Self-government and Local Economy in the Soviet Union in
April 1990, when Belarus still formed part of the Soviet Union. It should be noted that this law was
relatively progressive for its time, containing noticeable influences from the 1985 European Charter
on Local Self-government. The law reflected the idea of subsidiarity in the distribution of functions
among bodies of different levels, determined principles of financial self-sufficiency, established
judicial protection of the rights of self-government and envisaged the creation of real opportunities
for citizen participation in government. Significantly, the law did not describe local governments as
organs of state authority, but rather as those of the territorial communities themselves.
The Law on Local Self-government and Local Economy in Belarus (hereafter referred to as the Law
on Local Self-government) followed in February 1991. It declared the principles of citizen participation,
social justice, the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, the independence of
local self-governments within their areas of competence and the division of functions between
representative, executive and judicial authorities. Local self-government was defined by the law as
the independent resolution of social, economic, political and cultural issues of local importance either
directly or through elected government and public bodies, based on legislation, in the interests of the
given population and with due consideration of specific local conditions.
However, the actual situation did not correspond with the principles stated above. In Belarus, both
the authorities and social institutions were unprepared for developing efficient legislation on local
self-government. Neither the social nor the political nature of self-government had yet been inter-
nalized by the authorities. Instead, it was decided to make superficial modifications to the previous
system, which was inclined toward centralism. Local citizens continued to be viewed simply as “the
population,” rather than local communities with autonomous interests who were acknowledged as
legal subjects. While the law established forms of direct democracy such as local referenda and citizen
assemblies, no appropriate conditions and guarantees for their realization were created. Local
governments were still viewed as state bodies, and no judicial procedures were stipulated for the
settlement of disputes.
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This model, which was perceived as self-government by the authorities in Belarus, was introduced
in all political units existing at that time: village, towns, cities, districts and regions. Meanwhile, these
units were divided into three tiers, municipal, district and regional. The first tier of local government,
or municipal level, includes villages, towns, cities and city districts. The second tier, or district level,
includes districts and cities divided into city districts, while the third tier, or regional level, is composed
of regions and Minsk, the capital city. The Minsk city government has been assigned the role of
coordinator between the councils and executive committees located in its nine city districts. The law
also allowed the opportunity for some territorial units to be accorded special status by a specific law;
this provision was primarily intended for the capital city.
By 1993, the law had returned to the former terminology with regard to cities. The distinction
between cities of district and regional subordination was reapplied, principally because local budgets
had to a large extent remained dependent on the redistribution of funds from higher-level budgets.
The law did not delineate specific mandates for governments of different levels, focusing more on
rights common to all local governments, in terms of adopting plans and programs for territorial
development, adopting local budgets and administering local property or natural resources. Other
laws regulating government in various areas have also failed to do so.
The distribution of authorities among the three tiers of local government was clarified to some extent
after a government resolution issued on 12 August 1991. This resolution generally defined local
property assets, which were then redistributed by regional councils among the different levels of
government. For instance, the following assets were assigned to the ownership of regional governments:
health care institutions, such as regional clinics, maternity hospitals and TB clinics; cultural facilities,
such as regional scientific and cultural centers, regional libraries, historical and cultural monuments,
drama theaters and music colleges; and educational facilities, such as regional teacher training institutes
and centers for vocational training. In some cases, city and district organizations providing fuel were
also designated as regional property. District property was defined as follows: health care institutions,
such as district and city clinics and polyclinics; cultural facilities, such as clubs, libraries, local museums,
music and art schools for children, parks, pre-school facilities, schools, retail outlets and public
catering facilities; and district and city organizations providing public utilities, water and sewage.
With regard to the democratic aspects of government, the law introduced the concept of a “system
of local self-governance.” This system included local councils, organizations of community self-
government established in neighborhoods, housing blocks and villages as well as forms of direct
democracy, such as local referenda and citizen assemblies.
In June 1991, the Law on Referenda in the Republic of Belarus was adopted. Referenda may be held
to enable citizens to decide upon important issues of public government or to determine public
opinion on a given issue. Referenda may be initiated by five percent of all local citizens or one-third
of all local council members, and are held by local council resolution. The Law on Referenda also
specifies issues not subject to referendum; these include emergency measures for the protection of
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public order, taxes and the appointment or dismissal of council-appointed officials. Currently, the
Election Code of 11 February 2000 regulates issues related to local referenda.
The Law on Local Self-government was intended to strengthen the role of the representative bodies,
local councils, which it defined as the key element in the system of local self-government. Under
socialism, virtually all power had been concentrated in the hands of the executive bodies, which were
creatures of the Communist Party rather than the local councils. The new law expanded the list of
issues designated to the sole authority of local councils and excluded them from the competence of
the local administration. This list included adopting plans and programs for local social and economic
development, approving the local budget and reports on its implementation, establishing procedures
for property management, setting local taxes and creating an organizational structure for administering
the territories. For the first time, the law granted local councils exclusive competence over issues
related to utilizing land and other natural assets, creating enterprises and appointing their managers,
issuing local bonds and conducting auctions.
Rights and guarantees for local council members in the performance of their duties were addressed
by the Law on the Status of Local Council Members, passed on 27 March 1992. Although a special
section of the law was dedicated to the implementation of voters’ demands, this section was removed
in March 1996.
The Law on Local Self-government created certain economic preconditions for the functioning of
local self-government. Following the Law on Property, adopted in 1990, this law defined local
property assets as the following: local budget funds; housing stock and infrastructure; industrial,
construction, transport and other enterprises; health and cultural facilities; and other property. Land
and other natural resources were not assigned to the ownership of local governments, but instead
remained national public property.
The Law on Local Self-government also introduced the term “local economy,” which included local
government owned enterprises and other entities addressing the needs of the local population.
Relations between local self-governments and non-governmental entities engaged in public service
delivery were based on contracts, primarily utilizing incentives such as tax privileges or preferential
rights for the use of local natural resources.
In the budgetary sphere, the Law on Local Self-government proclaimed the independence of local
bodies in drafting and approving local budgets and in determining areas of expenditure and standards
for budgetary allotments. Higher-level bodies were specifically banned from interfering in the process
of drafting or approval.
Local budgets were assigned a number of revenue sources, including personal income tax, local taxes
and duties, profit tax on local government enterprises and payments from them for the use of natural
resources. However, local councils could establish rates only for local taxes and duties and the profit
tax for local government enterprises. Rates for all other taxes were established by law.
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The most significant local revenues came from the share of national taxes, such as the profit tax or tax
on turnover, which were allocated to local budgets according to long-term standards. The percentage
of these deductions was to be defined by higher-level councils.
When formulating local budgets, legally established per capita budgetary standards and other social
standards had to be considered. In order to meet these standards, it was expected that subsidies
would be allocated from the national budget.
The Law on Local Self-government prohibited the withdrawal of any budget surplus, while also
stipulating that local governments be compensated by higher-level budgets for any expenditures
incurred by acts of the higher-level government. The Law on the Budget System, adopted on 4 June
1993, confirmed the autonomy of local budgets. However, the subsequent Law on the Budget
System and State Extra-budgetary Funds, adopted 15 July 1998, notably strengthened centralizing
tendencies in regulating budgets.
Certain additional rights were also stipulated for local governments. For instance, local council
consent was required for the placement of industrial or other facilities within their territory, the use
of local natural resources or changes to territorial boundaries. Local councils are also entitled to
demand inspections of facilities and technologies for environmental purposes, to establish standards
for environmental safety and to suspend or terminate the operation of enterprises which pollute the
environment. The law also stipulated sanctions for the failure to carry out decisions of local self-
government bodies or local referenda.
Thus, the 1991 law contained a significant number of progressive articles. Based on these provisions,
however, authorities in Belarus did not manage to develop an effective system of local self-government.
Instead, many features of the previous centralized system remained intact. Functions were not clearly
distributed among levels of government according to the principle of subsidiarity; the law did not
specify which level of government was directly responsible for functions such as secondary education,
specialized medical service, operation of cultural facilities and local transport. Nor was this issue
addressed in specific legislation, which listed mandates and powers in general terms without indicating
particular levels of government.
Thus, overlapping areas of competence remained from the previous system, in which higher-level
bodies controlled the lower-level ones and took responsibility for the results of their work. Even after
the adoption of the Law on Self-government, local bodies did not achieve real independence, since higher-
level bodies retained the overwhelmingly important functions of control and resource distribution.
It must be underscored that the conceptual basis of this law was far from the conventional notion of
self-government as the autonomous functioning of public legal corporations and citizen associations
within a legal framework. Local communities did not gain all of the necessary attributes to become
full-fledged legal subjects, such as the right to judicial protection against illegal actions by government
bodies. Terms commonly used in many states, such as “community,” “municipality” and “local
54
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
inhabitants,” were not specified in the Law on Local Self-government at all. On the contrary, local
elected bodies were still defined as organs of state authority. Local property also retained the status of
state property and so could be confiscated by an administrative decision and redistributed by
higher-level authorities at any time. Many examples of this have in fact occurred.
In March 1994, Parliament adopted the Constitution, which was approved by national referendum
in November 1996. The Constitution proclaimed the separation of powers, not only for the highest
government bodies but also for local representative and executive bodies. Section 5 on local government
and self-governance specifically addresses this issue. However, the Constitution failed to provide a
clear description of the new model, defining only some of its features. According to the Constitution,
citizens exercise their right to local government and self-government through local councils, executive
bodies, organizations of community self-government, local referenda, meetings and other forms of
direct participation in public affairs. The section also establishes a four-year term of office for local
councils and the list of issues belonging to the exclusive competence of local councils, such as
adopting plans and development programs, approving budgets, establishing procedures for managing
local property, establishing local taxes and duties and organizing local referenda.
The Constitution stipulates the right of higher-level councils to abolish any decisions of lower-level
councils which do not comply with legislation. The head of state also possesses the authority to
suspend illegal decisions by local councils. Decisions made by executive authorities which contradict
existing legislation may be abolished by the local council, a higher-level executive body or the president.
Furthermore, a local council may be dissolved before the end of its term on grounds of their brazen
or systematic violation of legislation. Previously, Parliament was accorded the right to decide upon
dissolving a local council, but that right has since been granted to its upper house, the Council of the
Republic.
In addition to the official draft of Section 5 passed in 1994, independent experts from the Lyva
Sapieha Democratic Reform Support Foundation prepared an alternate version and submitted it to
Parliament. This draft more clearly defined the nature of self-government as an independent
component in the system of public power, making maximum use of the European Charter on Local
Self-government. Drawing on the implementation of the 1991 Law on Local Self-government,
these experts have also prepared a concept paper on local government reform and a package of draft
laws. However, these proposals have yet to be noticed by the governing authorities.
Following the passage of the Constitution, two amended editions of the Law on Local Self-government
were adopted, most recently on 10 January 2000. The current version of the law is entitled the Law
on Local Government and Self-governance (hereafter referred to as the Law on Local Government).
This version contains no significant changes compared to the previous versions and is fully in line
with the government’s policies towards the bureaucratization and centralization of local government.
Changes primarily concerned the relations between local representative and executive bodies. Executive
committees lost their former status as bodies of self-government, instead becoming a component in
the system of the executive power and defined as the “local government.” Local government bodies
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are required by law to act primarily in the interest of the state when resolving local issues. As
mentioned in the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers, the government has the power to control these
local government bodies. Thus, the principle of autonomy is no longer extended to executive bodies,
which are now commonly referred to as the “presidential vertical.” This term, although not entirely
correct from an administrative and legal point of view, reflects the true role of these bodies in the state
mechanism.
The system of local government bodies consists of regional, district, city, town and village executive
committees and city district administrations. The Law on Local Government stipulates centralized
procedures for forming executive committees and appointing their chairmen, and assigns them the
more powerful role in governing local territories.
The system of local self-government includes local councils and organizations of community self-
government (councils and committees formed by neighborhoods, housing blocks, streets and villages,
among others), local referenda, meetings and other forms of direct democracy.
To date, the Law on Local Government has still not resolved the distribution of functions among
bodies of different levels. Given the openly interventionist policy of the state at the local level over
the last five years, any need for such a separation is moot.
A characteristic example of strengthened centralization is the Law on the Budget System and State
Extra-budgetary Funds. As opposed to the previous Law on the Budget System, it draws upon the
concepts of  “lower-level,” “higher-level” and “consolidated” budgets. For instance, regional councils
define the maximum amount of deficit for the consolidated district budgets, which combine district
budgets with those of first-tier local governments. The annual Law on the State Budget defines this
upper limit for consolidated regional budgets, while district councils define the maximum deficit for
local budgets in villages, towns and cities of district subordination.
Within the generally centralized approach, Belarus has developed a specific mechanism for regulating
political territorial organization. Already in 1994, Parliament amended the Law on Local Self-
government, abolishing self-government at the first tier of local government, in towns, villages and
cities of the district subordination. Immediately after its adoption, the Constitutional Court pronounced
this measure to be unconstitutional. Presidential Decree No. 434, issued on 20 October 1995,
stripped over eighty inhabited localities, mainly district centers, of their right to elect their own local
self-governments and have their own budget. Instead, they are governed by the district administration.
This is also the case with some regional cities. This measure ran counter to constitutional requirements
for elected councils in all administrative-territorial units. In June 1996, the Presidium of the Parliament
reviewed the issue of merging councils in the Brest region. It is notable that, out of eleven cases, only
three gained approval for the merger from district and city councils.
The Law on the Administrative-territorial Division and Procedures for Resolving Issues of the
Administrative-territorial Organization of the Republic of Belarus, adopted 5 May 1998, refers to
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“administrative-territorial units” that have local councils, their own budget, et cetera. These include
regions, districts, villages, cities and towns. City districts are not distinguished as independent
administrative-territorial units, as they do not elect councils or possess a budget; however, the city
executive committee establishes a “local administration,” whose competence is defined by the Law
on Local Government. “Territorial units” represent a third category, comprised of territories operating
under a special regime, such as reserves, national parks and other natural assets, or inhabited localities
where subdivisions of the higher-level local government function instead of local councils or local
executive and administrative bodies. Cities of regional or district subordination and towns may have
the status of either an administrative-territorial or territorial unit.
The Law on Local Government provides general economic and social criteria for the towns and cities
of regional or district subordination. A city of regional subordination is defined as an inhabited
locality with a population greater than fifty thousand inhabitants which is also an administrative,
economic and cultural center with a developed industrial and social infrastructure. A city of district
subordination is an inhabited locality with a population of over six thousand inhabitants which has
industrial enterprises and a network of social, cultural and service facilities. A town is a settlement
with a population of at least two thousand people which has industrial and communal enterprises,
social and cultural facilities, retail trading outlets, public catering and public service facilities.
Restrictions have been introduced on the rights of lower-level territorial entities that contradict the
constitutional principle of authority vested in the people. Furthermore, the Constitution regulates
the territorial organization of the state in a sufficiently strict manner. Cities may have the status of an
administrative-territorial unit only; hence, they have the right to an elected council. This also relates
to the towns and villages which, according to the Constitution, have the status of an administrative-
territorial unit.
In July 2000, a special law was passed to address the status of the capital city, Minsk, which is
referred to as the administrative, political, economic and cultural center of the state. City authorities
are enjoined to ensure appropriate conditions for activities of the highest state bodies and national
and international events. The law establishes a number of guarantees for the city to function as
capital, including the allocation of appropriate funds from the national budget and the protection of
investments in the capital by the national government. City authorities have been granted the right
to establish special procedures for entry, the registration of citizens, traffic and other issues. The head
of the city executive committee is a member of the national government. Finally, the city may have
its own charter, a right that is not enjoyed by other administrative-territorial units.
Analysis of national legislation and its implementation leads to the unequivocal conclusion that true
local self-government in Belarus is absent. Moreover, the ten years that have passed since the adoption
of the Law on Local Self-government have been characterized by pronounced anti-reform tendencies.
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3. Local Politics, Decision Making
3.1 Public Participation in Decision Making
Under socialism, official ideology placed great emphasis on creating a democratic image of local
government as an element of the “socialist self-government of the people.” Even local soviets were
described as mass organizations of the working people. In addition, various public bodies were
established within the framework of the party’s ideological influence and control. These included
women’s councils, councils of war and labor veterans, public commissions attached to the local
authorities, comrade courts, voluntary people’s brigades and residential organizations, such as house
or street committees. These organizations assisted in maintaining public order, were indirectly involved
in the distribution of material comfort, such as housing for the needy, or engaged in other activities,
primarily educational.
Citizens were given the right to file suggestions or complaints with various state bodies, mainly at the
local level. These government bodies were obliged to review the appeals and respond within one
month.
Voter appeals to candidates seeking local council seats provided a channel of communication between
the population and local authorities. As a rule, these related to specific issues that required solution,
such as constructing schools, maintaining streets and repairing houses. Council sessions approved
plans for implementing the appeals and exercised due control. This mechanism was in effect until
1996.
As already noted, the system of the local self-government introduced by the Law on Local Government
included several forms of public activity, in addition to government bodies. Citizen participation
was promoted by involving existing entities as well as by creating new ones. In practice, Belarus has
numerous forms of community self-government, such as committees established in neighborhoods,
village committees, street and house committees, elders in the rural localities and even elders in
apartment blocks. More details on the types and regional distribution of public organizations of self-
government are presented in table 2.1.
The Law on Local Government stipulates procedures for the establishment and activities of community
organizations of self-government in city neighborhoods and villages. These bodies are elected by
assemblies of residents, which also approve the organizational charters to be registered with the local
executive committee. Major provisions to be included in the charters are specified by the Law on the
Local Government, primarily relating to their mandates, their territorial jurisdiction and participation
by residents in the organization’s activities. The term of office for these community organizations
should not exceed that of the local council. Community organizations have the right to submit
proposals on all activities by local authorities and participate in the subsequent discussion of those
issues.
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Table 2.1
Community Organizations of Self-government by Region
Public Village Street or Elders Village Others Total
Self- Committees Housing Councils (Village Number of
government Block and Community Organiza-
Committees Committees Commis- Council, tions/Mem
sions Neighbor- bership
hood
Council,
Apartment
Block Elders)
Brest 9 1,276 1,812 1,802 2 18 4,919/
oblast 13,822
Vitebsk 1 1,177 1,101 3,299 6 — 5,584/
oblast 10,784
Gomel 318 922 1,992 164 235 — 3,701/
oblast 15,423
Grodno 417 1,208 963 1,087 250 191 4,116/
oblast 12,893
Minsk 456 1,379 757 1,170 141 662 4,565/
oblast 15,368
Mogiliov 45 1,051 672 187 301 7 2,263/
oblast 8,318
City of 53 — 1,852 — — — 2,603/
Minsk n/a
Total 1,299 7,083 9,149 7,709 935 878 27,053/
79,211
In theory, councils may delegate some of their functions to community organizations, such as the
right to lease non-residential premises and the use and repair of local housing stock. However, as
demonstrated by experience, local councils and executive committees would never assign these
institutions the right to independently resolve any issue on behalf of the local government. In
general, these organizations play some role in local government decision-making, for example, through
performing a preliminary review of the allotment of land, projected construction, the lease of premises
or the allocation of retail kiosks. In some instances, these organizations may assign the location for
parking lots, public transport stops and subways. They may also manage social and cultural facilities,
sports fields or historical and cultural monuments. The role of community organizations has not
been expanded further, due to their own lack of professionally trained staff and shortage of funds as
well as conservatism among local government bodies.
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The sources of funding for community self-government organizations, as envisaged by the Law on
Local Government, mainly consist of voluntary contributions and revenues from events as well as
the allocation of budgetary funds. The latter has become their main source of funding. In practice,
a limited amount of resources are issued to lower-level government bodies, such as city district
administrations in Minsk, and are subsequently allocated for specific events planned by community
organizations, in proportion to the size of the population. Legal mechanisms for distributing resources
and settling disputes have not yet been developed.
Under the centralized system of government which prevails in Belarus, there are no objective precondi-
tions for the development of public initiative and the actual participation of citizens in local governance.
According to the Law on Local Government, citizen assemblies have the right to decide upon key
issues of local importance and submit proposals for review by local government bodies. The Law on
National and Local Assemblies, adopted 12 July 2000, addresses this issue in more detail. A citizen
assembly may be convened at the initiative of local councils, local executive committees, local adminis-
trations, community organizations and citizens. An assembly is duly constituted if it is attended by
at least twenty-five percent of all local inhabitants over eighteen years of age or at least two-thirds of
their authorized representatives. Representatives from state bodies, enterprises, organizations and
agencies may participate, but do not possess voting rights.
Participants in the assembly may discuss issues of national and local importance, make recommendations,
establish and dissolve community organizations of self-government, participate in the preliminary
discussion and drafting of local government decisions on key issues of state and social life and assess
local self-government activities.
According to the Constitution, democracy in Belarus is based on a variety of political institutions,
ideologies and opinions. Political parties and other public associations express the political will of
citizens and have the right to participate in elections. The legal basis for political party activity was
specified in the Law on the Political Parties, passed 5 October 1994. However, political parties and
national democratic movements had begun to establish themselves in Belarus very early in 1990 and
were widely represented, not only in Parliament, but also in local governments, particularly in the
capital and some regional centers. They were active even under the majority voting system, since a
significant number of citizens had invested their hopes in these democratic organizations when
overturning the rule of the Communist Party. Local councils would often have party factions,
usually the Belarus Popular Front, which were actively involved in resolving important local issues.
The practice of establishing various member groups within the councils was also widespread. The
sheer size of local councils at that period of time contributed greatly to this situation: Minsk council,
for instance, had 203 members from 1990 to1995.
Of the eighteen political parties which were formerly registered in Belarus, the largest are:
• the Communist Party of Belarus;
• the Party of Belarussian Communists;
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• the Belarus National Front;
• the United Civil Party;
• the Belarus Social-Democratic Party (Narodna Gromada);
• the Women’s Party “Nadezhda” (Hope);
• the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus.
These parties have offices at the regional and local levels. Today, they all more or less overtly form the
opposition to the ruling power.
Currently, political parties have no real impact upon local government activities and do not participate
in the political process at the local level. This is due to the low profile role that self-government plays
in the modern social, political and economic system as well as the system of public authority in
Belarus. Most parties did not participate in most recent elections to the local councils, in April 1999.
Therefore, only three percent of elected council members represent specific political parties; these
parties are generally either loyal to the central authority or classify themselves as “constructive”
opposition. For instance, according to its secretariat, the Party of Belarussian Communists is represented
by 142 council members, twelve district council chairmen and party factions operating in twelve
councils.
The Law on Public Associations, which took effect in October 1994, regulates the activities of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). According to this law, international, national and local associations
may be created in Belarus. However, it must be noted that after the compulsory re-registration of all
NGOs in 1999, their number was reduced by half. Approximately 1,000 associations did not apply
to the Ministry of Justice for registration. Re-registration was conducted based on the findings of a
special commission established by the president and comprised of representatives from various
government agencies, including the Security Council and the State Security Committee. Registration
was denied to 218 associations. In reality, the course pursued by the authorities was designed to
terminate the activity of organizations considered “disloyal.”
After assessing the role of NGOs and various interest groups in local politics, it must be acknowledged
that it is very limited. Entrepreneurial associations have a somewhat higher profile and engage in
activities to protest against specific restrictive practices. These typically take the form of strikes or the
temporary closure of retail outlets.
Although some NGOs are involved in the development of self-government and local democracy,
they are very few. The most consistent one in this regard is the Lyva Sapieha Foundation, with
branches in each of the regions. For several years, the Lyva Sapieha Foundation has organized regular
conferences and seminars on issues of local self-government, attended by international experts. The
Lyva Sapieha Foundation has also done much to popularize the European Charter on Local Self-
government. However, it does not receive any financial support from national or local governments,
nor is it offered cooperation. Local governments usually provide financial support, though in
insignificant amounts, to organizations for veterans and the disabled.
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Mass public events in Belarus are regulated by the Law on Assemblies, Meetings, Street Processions,
Demonstrations and Strikes, passed 30 December 1997. Under this law, organizers of a mass event
must file an application with the local executive committee fifteen days prior to the event. The
application should include the following data: purpose, type, venue, time frame, expected number
of participants, details for the organizers and public order measures. The executive committee
chairman or his or her deputy reviews the application within ten days, and may change the venue
and time. This decision may be appealed in the court. The executive committee is entitled to
prohibit or appoint certain venues for the holding of mass events.
Local authorities very rarely utilize the option of public polls, hearings or examinations. In summary,
it would be appropriate to conclude that over the last ten years, no tradition of collective political
activity oriented towards constructive dialogue between citizens and government has been formed
in Belarus. Evidence for this conclusion is provided in table 2.2.
Table 2.2
Degree of Public Trust in Institutions of Government and Society*
Government and Poll Data
Social Institutions
06/00** 06/00 04/00 11/99 06/99 10/98
Church –0.420 +0.289 +0.298 +0.267 +0.267 +0.329
Army –0.420 +0,238 +0.165 +0.077 +0.085 +0.135
President –0.784 +0.094 +0.064 +0.076 +0.162 +0.258
Non-government +0.509 +0.077 +0.190 +0.155 +0.122 +0.098
research centers
Government –0.547 +0.076 -0.003 –0.042 +0.027 ***
research centers
State-owned media –0.673 +0.038 +0.072 –0.026 +0.091 +0.159
OSCE Advisory and +0.370 –0.017 0.000 –0.045 *** ***
Monitoring Group
in Belarus
Independent +0.113 –0.074 –0.055 –0.091 –0.181 –0.126
trade unions
Non-government +0.415 –0.083 –0.065 +0.088 –0.159 –0.130
media
Government –0.491 –0.125 –0.077 –0.160 –0.198 –0.143
trade unions
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Degree of Public Trust in Institutions of Government and Society*
Government and Poll Data
Social Institutions
06/00** 06/00 04/00 11/99 06/99 10/98
Government –0.653 –0.145 –0.172 –0.124 –0.044 +0.038
Central Electoral –0.725 –0.160 –0.092 –0.110 –0.098 ***
Commission
Entrepreneurial +0.173 –0.164 –0.062 –0.095 –0.254 –0.292
associations
KGB -0.706 –0.204 –0.173 –0.209 –0.165 ***
Parliament –0.765 –0.239 –0.207 –0.215 –0.184 –0.077
(National Assembly)
Parliament –0.059 –0.269 –0.189 –0.284 -0.306 –0.165
(Supreme Council,
13th convocation)
Courts –0.804 –0.281 –0.186 –0.205 –0.186 –0.164
Local governments –0.647 –0.296 –0.310 –0.286 –0.221 –0.131
Police –0.804 –0.343 –0.302 –0.275 –0.293 –0.229
Political parties +0.037 –0.361 –0.315 –0.350 –0.409 –0.320
SOURCE: Independent Institute for Socioeconomic and Political Studies
* The degree of trust is measured by the ratio of responses to the number of respondents, where
1 = “trust,” –1 = “do not trust” and 0 = “difficult to say.” In all cases, approximately 1,500
people were surveyed, with a maximum representation error of less than 0.03.
** The first column features data from a survey of public figures and experts, involving fifty-six
people.
*** These institutions were not included in the survey questions.
Local Referenda. The first Law on Referenda in Belarus was passed in 1991. In this law, referenda
were conceived as a method of adopting an obligatory decision or consulting public opinion on
important issues of local life. Referenda were not deemed to be mandatory for any specific issue.
Certain issues were excluded from consideration by referenda; these included emergency measures
for protecting public order, taxes, the budget and the appointment of local government officials.
The right to conduct referenda was subsequently established in the Constitution. Currently, the
Electoral Code regulates referendum procedures, replacing the previous law on referenda. The
Electoral Code, however, does not stipulate for a consultative referendum.
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Decisions on conducting a referendum fall under the exclusive competence of the local council. The
local council may initiate a referendum through a council decision, whereas previously the support
of only one-third of local council members was required. An initiative group of at least twenty local
members (or as established by law) may initiate a district referendum. The composition of the group
and the issue to be considered by referendum are registered with the executive committee, after the
court gives its approval. The denial of registration may be appealed in court. Whereas signatures
from five percent of the referendum’s original supporters were previously required for a court appeal,
this requirement has now been increased to ten percent.
Issues of national importance may not be decided by referendum, nor may issues related to the
appointment or dismissal of officials within the competence of the local executive committee or its
head.
Not one local referendum has been held in Belarus.
3.2 Citizen Legislative Initiatives
The amended Law on Local Government featured a new provision on legislative initiatives by
citizens on issues of local importance. However, the law did not stipulate procedures for realizing this
form of direct democracy, instead leaving this matter to local councils. Citizens may submit draft
decisions to the local council on issues of local importance. These drafts must be reviewed in an open
council session with representatives of the population present, and the results of the review are
subsequently publicized in the local media.
To date, local councils have not defined procedures for exercising legislative initiatives and no such
practices are in place. This situation reflects both conservatism and passivity on the part of local
authorities and the lack of capacity among citizens for legislative work. Furthermore, the interventionist
approach of the government towards local policies and contradictory legislation also serve as strongly
prohibitive factors.
3.3 Other Forms of Public Participation
Other forms of participation in local affairs have also been legally established. For instance, local
inhabitants may initiate proceedings to dismiss council members who have failed their trust or
discredited their position. A special section of the Electoral Code addresses this issue. Grounds for
dismissing council members include the violation of the Constitution or legislation and actions
which discredit their dignity and position. To begin the proceedings, an initiative group appeals to
the council chairman and requests that a meeting of voters in the particular electoral district be
convened to resolve the issue. While citizens may dispute the refusal to convene such a meeting in
court, they do not possess the right to convene the meeting independently. Council members are
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guaranteed the right to be present and defend themselves at the meeting. In addition, this issue may
not be raised more than two times in one year. Other than these, there are no guarantees. To date, no
council members have been dismissed in this manner.
It must also be mentioned that the Law on Citizens’ Appeals (1996) grants citizens the right to
submit proposals to various government bodies. This method of citizen participation is actively in
use. In general, however, citizen appeals are more concerned with issues of everyday life, such as the
improvement of housing conditions and capital repairs for housing. Topics raised also include the
maintenance of parks and recreation facilities, the construction and functioning of mini-markets, et
cetera. Since local authorities do not always display an adequate level of understanding for these
concerns, citizens often feel that the only way to seek redress is by directly appealing to the president.
It should be underscored that the Law on Citizens’ Appeals contains practically no procedural
provisions. No law on administrative procedures currently exists in Belarus, nor is the adoption of
such a law on the agenda.
3.4 Internal Structure of Local Government Decision Making
As mentioned earlier, the system of local government is structured according to the principle of
separation of powers between representative and executive bodies. This principle extends to both
functional and organizational aspects. Since 1991, however, this principle has undergone a number
of transformations. Initially, the law assigned all authorities to the local councils, while designating
some as their exclusive right. Executive committees were empowered to independently resolve all
other issues within the competence of the local councils, and other bodies created by the councils
were prohibited from interfering in their work. Local councils had the authority to abolish the
decisions of executive committees if they did not comply with legislation. The only further restraining
factor was that executive committees were formed by and politically accountable to local councils.
This system was changed after the adoption of the Constitution, becoming more convoluted. On
one hand, the number of powers assigned to the exclusive competence of the councils was greatly
reduced. On the other, “all issues of governance” were assigned to the competence of the executive
committees. In this context, it was unclear whether executive committees had the authority to adopt
local programs and normative acts independently. In practice, this happened frequently, without
the formal delegation of rights by the council. Finally, executive committees were created through a
centralized process, rather than by the local council.
The law does not currently establish the fundamental principle with regard to the correlation
between functions and the distribution of competencies. However, the law has established a technical
separation of powers between the local council and the executive committee, together with its
chairman. The law prohibits the representative or executive branch of local government from
interfering in issues within the competence of the other branch.
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Authorities granted to the local council include the following: approving development programs,
budgets and local taxes; establishing rules for managing community property; conducting local
referenda; resolving territorial issues; issuing local bonds; and some organizational issues. Local council
decisions are passed by a majority vote, through secret ballot, open ballot or roll call. A two-thirds
majority vote is required for a decision to dissolve the council.
According to law, the council chairman convenes council sessions at his or her initiative or by
decision of the presidium, one-third of council members, the head of the executive committee,
higher-level councils, the president or ten percent of local residents.
Although common practice dictates that council sessions are conducted openly, the law allows the
council to hold a closed session at its discretion. Likewise, the right to hold closed sessions is not
restricted by council rules and regulations. Moreover, the right of local residents to attend even open
council sessions is limited. They are not guaranteed this right by law, and council rules and regulations
usually stipulate that individuals must be invited in order to attend.
The council chairman organizes council activities. This position is distinct from the head of the
executive committee, and the two may not be combined. In regional and Minsk councils only,
candidates for council chairmen may be nominated by councilors. Other councils must elect a
candidate proposed by the chairman of the higher-level council. These procedures were only recently
entered into law, in 2000. Council chairmen currently in office were nominated for their positions
by council members, according to the previous system.
Unlike many other countries, there is no restriction on council members voting on economic issues
that directly or indirectly affect their own interests. Nor are any such provisions included in council
rules and regulations.
Council decisions that bear on the rights, freedoms or obligations of citizens enter into force after
their official publication.
3.5 System of Local Elections
According to the February 2000 Electoral Code, local council elections are held in single mandate
electoral districts, based on universal, equal and direct suffrage through secret ballot. Local council
members are elected for a four-year term.
Elections are called by the president no later than four months prior to the date of elections, and held
no later than thirty days before the expiration of the current council’s term of office. All local council
elections are held at the same time. If a local council is dissolved, local elections should be held within
one month.
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The structure of electoral districts per local council is as follows:
• forty to sixty districts for regional and Minsk councils;
• twenty-five to forty districts for district councils;
• twenty-five to forty districts for local councils in cities of regional subordination;
• fifteen to sixty districts for local councils in cities of district subordination;
• eleven to fifteen districts in town or village councils.
Within the limits specified above, the local council defines the number of electoral districts depending
on the size of the population, area and other local conditions. One council member is elected from
each electoral district.
Local residents who are citizens of Belarus or Russia over the age of eighteen have the right to elect or
be elected to the local council. Elections of council members are free, equal and direct. Although the
Constitution establishes that public associations, parties, labor collectives and citizens possess the
right to nominate candidates for local council elections, the February 2000 Electoral Code
unconstitutionally deprived public associations and citizen assemblies of this right. Just as before,
labor collectives of state-owned enterprises, institutions and organizations play the major role in
nominating candidates. This method has demonstrably ensured the nomination of candidates who
support the official political course.
Elections are recognized as valid with the participation of at least half of all voters. The candidate that
collects a simple majority of votes is considered to have won the elections. If there is no clear winner,
the two candidates with the highest number of votes participate in a second round of elections, held
within two weeks of the first one. These elections are considered to be valid with the participation of
at least twenty-five percent of all voters, and the candidate who receives the highest number of votes
is declared the winner.
In Belarus, the ability of political parties to participate in elections, including those for local councils,
is seriously hindered. In January 1999, the president issued the Decree on Measures to Regulate
Activities of Political Parties, Trade Unions and Other Public Associations, which required parties to
re-register themselves by 1 July 1999, according to much stricter requirements than the 1994 Law
on Political Parties.
Pursuant to the 2000 Electoral Code, only parties registered at least six months prior to elections
have the right to nominate candidates. In addition, these political parties must have established a
local branch in the given area at least six months before elections are called, also registered with the
Ministry of Justice. Table 2.3 reflects the election results.
Table 2.3 does not provide data on the number of members representing political parties. Apparently,
these statistics were not collected, as party participation in the councils is of no interest to central
authorities.
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There is no change in the ethnic composition of local governments, since Belarus has no administrative-
territorial units based on ethnicity. According to the 1999 census, 81.2 percent of the population
are Belarussians. The largest ethnic minorities are Russians, who comprise 11.4 percent of the population;
Poles, who account for 3.9 percent; and Ukrainians, who make up 2.4 percent. Geographically
speaking, Russians are primarily concentrated in major industrial cities, Poles generally reside in the
Grodno region and the western districts of the Minsk and Vitebsk regions, while Ukrainians live in
major cities and districts bordering Ukraine. In Belarus, 69.8 percent of the population is urban and
30.2 percent is rural.
According to the Constitution, citizens have the right to preserve their ethnic background and may
not be forced to disclose it unless they choose to. Thus, statistical data do not usually provide information
on the ethnic affiliation of citizens.
3.6 Local Government Associations
Currently, there is no single association of local governments in Belarus, either at the regional or
national level. Neither the Constitution nor the law explicitly provides for such an opportunity.
During the first years after the adoption of the Law on Local Self-government, attempts were made
to create such associations. However, they faced opposition from the central authorities, who used
the legislative omission as a pretext. In 1994, there was an initiative to create an Association of Belarussian
Cities, which was then denied registration by the Ministry of Justice. The idea of establishing an
association of local authorities is currently being discussed, and there is a small possibility that permission
for this association will be granted by presidential decree.
4. Functional Structure of Local Government
4.1 Local Councils
Council Presidium. The law stipulates for the establishment of a presidium within regional and
district-level councils. Their mission is to organize and convene sessions, to ensure openness, to
inform council members and the general public, to coordinate activity by council commissions and
member groups and to organize control over the implementation of council decisions. In first-tier
local councils, the chairman performs the functions of the presidium.
Council Commissions. Since it is impossible to discuss all issues of local government in council sessions,
permanent and temporary council commissions represent an important instrument of council activity.
Through these commissions, council members are engaged in decision making, organizing the
execution of council decisions and control over the activity of the executive apparatus. The law
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stipulates for the creation of council commissions, but does not provide a specific list of commissions
to be established. Those matters are independently resolved by the councils themselves. According
to the law, commissions are assigned the following major tasks:
• to conduct a preliminary discussion of issues and make recommendations to the council for
subsequent decision making;
• to organize implementation of council decisions;
• to exercise control over the execution of council decisions and decisions by higher-level government
bodies.
Commissions are not independent bodies administering specific areas or industries; no executive
bodies are subordinated to them. They may not be delegated the right to adopt a final decision by
the local council. Commissions are both subordinated and accountable to the local council.
The Law on Local Government does not provide for the opportunity to invite individuals outside
the council to join council commissions. Since 2000, local councils have been permitted to hire
consultants and experts, who then possess a deliberative vote.
The structure of Baranovichi city council, a district-level government, is presented in figure 2A.1.
4.2 Local Executive Bodies
Executive Committee. Executive committees are established in a centralized manner. The heads of
regional and Minsk city executive committees are appointed by the president, while the heads of
other administrative-territorial units are appointed by the higher-level executive committee.
Presidential approval is required for the appointment of heads of district-level executive committees.
By law, the executive committee is composed of deputy heads, an executive officer, the executive
committee secretary ex officio and committee members. All executive committee members are appointed
and dismissed by the head in coordination with the president or the higher-level executive committee.
The executive committee makes decisions within its competence through a simple majority of votes
by committee members. Responsibilities of the executive committee include drafting plans and
programs for local economic and social development, local budgets and plans for managing community
property.
The executive committee is delegated a wide range of organizational and administrative powers. It
organizes the collection and utilization of budgetary funds and makes decisions on issuing local securities
and conducting auctions. The executive committee manages local property and financial resources;
decides upon the establishment, reorganization or closure of community enterprises, agencies and
organizations; and concludes leases and other economic agreements with legal entities or individuals.
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In accordance with legally established procedures, the executive committee organizes state control
over the entire territory for the protection of air quality, water, forests, subsoil assets, animal and plant
life, and may suspend economic activities or construction if environmental or other legislation is
violated. The executive committee is also enjoined to take measures to ensure and protect the
interests of the territory in court and to higher-level government bodies.
The council may assign the executive committee to resolve issues within the council’s competence.
As needed, but no less than once a year, the executive committee reports on its activities to the
council and reports to citizens at labor collective meetings and residential meetings.
Presidential Decree No. 89, passed 27 February 1995, approved the provisional structure for
executive committees in regions, Minsk, cities of regional subordination and districts. A sample
structure is provided in figure 2A.2, using the Baranovichi executive committee as a model.
Head of the Executive Committee. Heads of executive committees occupy the key position in the
system of local government. Before the appropriate modifications were made to the Law on Local
Government, their status was governed by the Regulations on the Heads of the Regional, Minsk,
District and City Executive Committees, approved by Presidential Decrees Nos. 476 and 105,
issued on 20 January 1995 and 18 March 1996, respectively. Heads of regional and Minsk city
executive committees are appointed by the president and approved in local council session. Heads of
district and city executive committees are appointed by the head of the regional executive committee,
and approved by the president and the local council. If the council fails to approve the proposed
candidate, another candidate is nominated instead. If the council fails to approve this candidate as
well, the president or regional head makes the final decision. The head of the executive committee is
appointed for the same term of office as the council.
Heads of the regional-level or district-level executive committee may be dismissed from office by the
president or regional head, respectively, in case of legal violations, systematic failure to perform their
duties, outrageous abuse of their position or other grounds prescribed by legislation.
Executive committee heads have a broad range of organizational, managing and controlling powers
at their disposal. They are responsible for interactions between the executive committee and local
council; define the structure and staff of the executive committee, including its secretariat; oversee
the management of enterprises, agencies and organizations subordinated to the executive committee;
and appoint or discharge their managers. Executive committee heads appoint government representatives
to the managing bodies of joint-stock companies or other communally owned economic entities. In
addition, heads also manage loans for budgetary expenditures.
Heads of regional and Minsk city executive committees are accountable to the president and the
central government, while the heads of district and city executive committees are accountable to the
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head of the regional executive committee. On issues related to council activities, they are accountable
to the local council.
Local Administration in City Districts. The president abolished city district councils and their executive
bodies by Presidential Decree No. 383 on the Reform of Local Government and Self-government
Bodies, issued on 19 September 1995. They were replaced by local administrations, which were
government bodies of general competence. The same decree also approved the Provisional Regulation
on Local Administration. The city executive committee appoints the head of local administration
and his or her deputies. All other officials are directly appointed by the head of the city district
administration.
The city district administration ensures the execution of all government-related functions in the
appropriate territory according to legislation, council decisions and decisions of executive committee
commissions.
In many ways, local government follows a hierarchical structure. Local councils are subject to legal
control by the president and Parliament, and may be dissolved by parliamentary decision. Higher-
level councils coordinate the activities of lower-level councils, regulate their budgets and abolish any
of their decisions which contradict legislation.
As regards the executive branch, local executive bodies are firmly soldered into the mechanism of
state government and are subject to much stronger pressure by the central government and higher
levels of local government. Because the central government has the authority to govern local bodies,
a solid link has been established between the government and regional executive committees, the
nature of which has been shaped by the general emergency regime now prevailing.
In turn, regional bodies may apply different methods of pressure upon lower-level governments.
Even though this right is not stipulated in law, little attention is paid to these practices, especially in
recent times. Regional committees possess effective leverage through the centralized system of
appointing heads of local executive bodies, which ensure their full dependence on higher-level
bosses.
Finally, horizontal relations exist between councils and executive committees. The formal approval
of local councils is required for the appointment of executive committee heads. Within legally
established limits, councils define procedures for managing community property and resolving
other issues of local importance for the executive bodies. However, these horizontal links in the
structure of local government are insignificant.
Schematically, the functional structure of local government may be represented as follows.
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Figure 2.1
Functional Structure of Government in Belarus
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4.3 Local Government Functions
The status of local governments as part of public administration manifests itself in the distribution
of responsibilities. Since public administration is based on the principle of ultra vires, local initiative
is restricted. However, some exceptions have been made for regional councils. Apart from their
directly established rights, they are permitted to adopt other measures that do not impinge on the
independence of other councils.
The Law on Local Government, together with other legislation, regulates the competencies of local
authorities, in particular those of the executive bodies. Their powers are regulated by acts of the
president, the central government and central agencies and primarily concern the performance of
strictly public administration functions, such as registering commercial entities, issuing licenses or
carrying out priority national programs (including distribution of food, import substitution and
others).
Local governments have a wide range of powers, as follows:
• drafting programs for territorial development, housing, roads, social services and the
environment;
• adopting the local budget, local taxes and duties;
• defining the legal regime for local property within legally established limits;
• approving the allocation of enterprises not in local ownership;
• managing and exercising control over the use of land, subsoil assets, forests and other natural
resources;
• organizing construction and repairs of housing, public utilities, shops and service facilities;
• providing tax benefits;
• protecting civic rights and freedoms;
• registering acts of civil status;
• calling people or entities to account for administrative infractions.
Local governments in cities, districts and regions are also responsible for supervising local police and
fire departments.
In addition to the functions listed above, district-level local governments possess the following res-
ponsibilities:
• approving the allocation of mass media and enterprises with foreign capital investment;
• state registration of economic entities and branches of political parties, trade unions and other
public associations;
• licensing wholesale trade, with the exception of alcohol and tobacco, pawnshops, casinos and
bookmakers;
• allocating or resuming plots of land in areas around cities of district subordination, reserve
lands or forests, in coordination with village executive committees; settling land disputes;
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• protecting consumer rights;
• ensuring increased volume of industrial and agricultural production, improved quality and
competitiveness and the increase in commodity turnover; adopting measures for reducing
payment defaults by local economic entities;
• facilitating employment.
Regional governments, particularly regional executive committees, play the dominant role in the
system of local government. Although legally speaking, they do not possess administrative control
over other local governments, in practice, regional governments issue mandatory instructions and
control implementation of all aspects of local government activity at lower levels. In addition, regional
governments are assigned the following functions:
• allotting land plots and settling land disputes;
• approving state registration of holding companies, economic associations and others, within
the framework of anti-monopoly control;
• ensuring state registration of economic entities and local public associations;
• ensuring balanced local budgets by establishing limits on the permissible level of local deficit;
• submitting proposals to the government on amendments to regional boundaries, on establishing
or merging districts and on defining the borders of towns or cities of district subordination;
• regulating pricing within their competence;
• issuing licenses for secondary schools, lyceums and gymnasiums or for wholesale trade in
alcohol and tobacco;
• implementing programs and measures designed to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl
accident;
• maintaining regional health facilities, such as clinics, hospitals and dispensaries;
• carrying out state control over the protection of air quality, water, forests, subsoil assets, plant
and animal life;
• establishing administrative penalties for the violation of public order, if not otherwise regulated
by law.
Regional legislative bodies may also be legally authorized to perform additional government functions.
Local governments have been granted significant rights in the area of environmental protection and
control over natural resources. The Law on Local Government stipulates that local council consent
is required for the allocation of economic and social facilities, the use of resources on local territory and
the resolution of other issues pertaining to economic, social and cultural activities which affect public
interests. For instance, the Law on Environmental Protection, passed 26 November 1992, establishes
that areas used for waste storage or disposal must be identified by regional councils, with the approval
of the lower-level council. According to the Code on Subsoil Assets, local councils decide upon the
allocation of land for mining, construction or the utilization of subsoil structures. Similarly, the
Water Code establishes that the planned location and construction designs of projects affecting the
local water supply must be coordinated with local councils or executive committees.
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Local councils also possess the authority to demand or organize additional environmental or other
expert assessments of projects and technologies. On 18 June 1993, Belarus adopted the Law on
State Expert Environmental Assessment, which defines expert assessment as an essential stage in the
process of planning, designing and decision making on national socioeconomic development (article
2). Any project that is subject to expert assessment may not be funded or executed without positive
findings.
Local councils may establish exclusive standards of environmental safety in the area, following legally
established procedures.
The Law on the Sanitary Epidemiological Well-being of the Population, adopted on 23 November
1993, states that local governments have the right to establish special conditions or regimes for
residential or economic activities in order to prevent and eliminate mass disease and contamination.
According to this law, local councils may apply economic sanctions for the violation of the
environmental safety standards that they have set.
4.4 Control, Audit and Supervision of Local Governments
Internal Control. Local governments directly control and manage a significant number of enterprises
and organizations. These include enterprises which provide housing, public utilities, water, sewage,
heating and electricity. According to a special law, these services must be provided by enterprises in
public ownership, including enterprises in local ownership.
The Law on Local Government has no special provisions on supervising, establishing or electing
control bodies, such as an auditing committee or auditor. Instead, these issues are regulated by the
general legislative provisions which address the control functions of state bodies. Council commissions
ensure control over the implementation of council decisions. Closer operational control over the
activities of subordinated organizations is performed by the appropriate sectoral and functional
divisions of local government. Furthermore, many central departments have approved guidelines for
reviewing and auditing the financial and economic activities of subordinated enterprises. These
guidelines also apply to local government enterprises, since they are considered to be subordinate to
the ministries. In addition, executive bodies appoint representatives to the managing bodies of joint-
stock companies.
State Control. The state primarily controls the legality of local government activities. However, in
issues of control over local budgets or state property, the state also considers the appropriateness and
efficiency of the use of resources.
A variety of government bodies are charged with exercising control; these include the president, the
Council of the Republic, the central government, the state control committee, other central government
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bodies, higher-level councils and executive committees, local councils and the office of the prosecutor.
Courts may also become involved when reviewing complaints and claims. Any of these bodies,
except for the prosecutor’s office and courts, may monitor the efficiency and appropriateness of local
government decisions at their own initiative. However, these findings have no legal weight unless
the council itself decides to revoke the decision or local inhabitants initiate the dissolution of the
council. No other entities have the authority to enforce change, unless the decision contradicts
legislation. Thus, the government bodies mentioned above generally perform follow-up control and
on issues of legality only; that is, they evaluate decisions which are already in effect, quite often ones
that have already been implemented.
Preliminary control is ensured through approval by or coordination with higher or lower bodies; this
is required when forming the executive committee, appointing heads of departments and divisions or
resolving many other issues. Although preliminary control takes legal issues into account, it primarily
considers the extent to which the prospective decision meets local needs. For instance, councils must
approve the merger of administrative-territorial units and identify suitable locations for waste disposal.
The president, the central government, local councils, executive committees, the prosecutor’s office
and the courts all exercise general control over compliance with legislation in all areas of activity.
Other bodies are engaged in control over specific issues, along sectoral lines. These include the State
Control Committee, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry for State Property Management and
other central government bodies. So, for example, the State Control Committee and its regional
bodies control not only budget execution and the appropriate and efficient use of national budget
funds, but also compliance with legislation on finance and tax relations. In addition, these bodies
control the implementation of legislation on the lease and privatization of state property.
Legislation does not determine organizational mechanisms for control over local councils and executive
committees, failing to specify which decisions are to be submitted for review, to whom and according
to what schedule. Legislation establishes only the general authority of national oversight bodies to
request and receive relevant information.
The various oversight bodies have different methods of enforcement at their disposal. The president
may abolish an executive committee act or suspend a local council decision, if they violate legislation.
Higher-level executive committees also enjoy this right; however, the Cabinet of Ministers and the
ministries do not. Local councils have the authority only to abolish executive committee acts if they
do not comply with legislation.
The prosecutor may lodge a protest against a council decision or executive committee act. The
decision or act is then suspended until its review. While the decision is under review, or if the council
dismisses the protest, the prosecutor may appeal to the court and demand that it be declared invalid.
For explicit violations of law which may potentially cause significant damage, the prosecutor may
issue an order demanding the elimination of the violations. The order is subject to immediate
implementation, but may be appealed to the higher-level prosecutor within a period of ten days.
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The Ministry of Finance performs integrated audits of the financial departments and divisions of
regional and city executive committees at least once every three years. First-tier local government
activities are reviewed at least once every two years. This review includes analyses of budget
implementation reports, information on transactions between different level budgets and estimated
administrative expenditures of local agencies. Special attention is paid to analyzing measures aimed
at increasing the efficiency of local enterprises and overcoming losses.
5. Public Service Provision
Local government bodies provide most local public services directly through subordinated enterprises.
Only certain services, such as institutions of higher education and medical clinics, are directly controlled
by central bodies. Nonetheless, local authorities essentially take direction from higher-level bodies,
including the president, the central government and central departments. For instance, the
government has issued instructions for an obligatory increase in the volume of services provided by
local service enterprises. The Ministry of Economy developed a regulation limiting sales prices and
tariffs for public services. Since 1999, these activities must also be licensed by the national Union of
Service Enterprises. In addition, the government has recommended that regional executive committees
include these organizations in regional property.
The situation is similar for other local services. Almost all of them—health care, housing and public
utilities, local transport, social protection, et cetera—are under the control of central departments.
Many executive committee divisions or departments are subdivisions of ministries, as well as being
subordinated to departments of higher-level executive committees.
First-tier local governments provide a very limited range of services, including pre-school education,
primary education, territorial development and a few others. Village councils provide an especially
small number of services. Almost all public services are provided at the second tier of local government,
in districts and cities. Regional governments control or manage some health, educational and cultural
facilities; however, their role in service delivery is generally confined to funding, supervising and
controlling the activity of lower-level governments. For instance, regional budgets finance housing
and public utility organizations through subsidies for covering losses, funds for student transportation
or funds issued for the centralized procurement of coal for heating schools. Regional budget funds
are also used for the centralized procurement of ambulances and expensive medical equipment, as
well as for expenditures on social welfare and other needs.
Local public service providers function primarily as “unitary” enterprises, which manage property
within limits established by the owner, the local government. Their activities largely depend on
budgetary subsidies from the national as well as local budgets.
The private sector plays an insignificant role in public service delivery. Belarus has a small number of
private pre-schools, while cities possess non-government secondary schools. There are also small
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private institutions in health care and a few other fields. All of these operate under the close control
of state bodies. For further detail on the distribution of public services, see annex 2.4.
Public service delivery must be conducted with due regard for a law, adopted on 11 November 1999,
which defines a minimum level of state-guaranteed social protection to provide for the satisfaction of
basic human needs. Requirements are expressed through norms for cash benefits, free and publicly
accessible social services and social benefits. The government establishes standards together with
national associations of employers and trade unions. There are standards for salaries, pensions,
education, health care, culture, housing and public utilities, social support and social services.
Belarus has also adopted the Law on Social Services. These services include the provision of social
support; social amenities; medical, psychological, pedagogical and legal services; and financial support.
All of these are designed to facilitate the social adaptation of citizens facing difficult life situations.
The system of social services is comprised of government bodies, social service centers, hospices,
rehabilitation labor workshops and other organizations. Local governments may also contract with
private companies to provide social services through issuing tenders.
A common method of control over local government activities targeted at the satisfaction of local
needs is competitions. These are organized by regional executive committees to recognize the best
work among cultural, health care, housing and communal service institutions of local government.
For instance, the activities of local medical institutions, primarily district center hospitals, are evaluated
through established indicators. These include payments, food consumption, expenditures per bed
per day, expenditures on medicine, sanitary conditions, laundry services, catering, storage of medicines,
documentation, patient records for pregnant women, child development histories, records of doctors’
calls, records of private doctors’ calls, lists of medical procedures, daily work logs of doctors and
paramedics, death certificates, patient reception records and cases rejected for hospitalization.
Another example of central influence on the development of services may be found in the housing
and public utilities sector. In September 1997, the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities approved
rules for maintenance and territorial development in cities and towns. In compliance with ministry
guidelines, city and district executive committees approve lists of streets, squares and driveways to be
cleaned by local services on a contractual basis. They also approve urban areas to be cleaned by
enterprises, organizations and citizens as well the organizations responsible for sanitary conditions in
gardens, parks, subways and construction sites.
Local authorities approve plans for public utilities and territorial development, control their execution,
manage subordinated enterprises engaged in providing public utilities and territorial development
and take measures to strengthen their material basis. They also ensure the comprehensive development
of the public utilities sector within their jurisdiction.
Local governments must ensure the delivery of electricity, water, gas, heating and sewerage for cities
and other inhabited localities and supervise the networks or facilities for their provision. Local
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executive committees review and comment on plans for the construction of these networks and
facilities by the enterprises of higher-level governments. They also control the construction and
utilization of water purification facilities. Both representative and executive bodies in cities and
districts perform control over the provision of fuel and other public utilities to institutions of
education, culture and social welfare, and repair their premises when necessary. Local councils,
executive and administrative bodies may hire organizations of different types of ownership or
subordination to engage in territorial development activities or the construction of roads.
The production and consumption of services constitutes approximately thirty percent of the
aggregated gross product. This area has seen an outflow of labor resources. The state applies a strict
pricing policy, and has established a list of services with centrally established prices. These include
simple shoe repairs, haircuts, photos for documents and funeral services. Standards of cost-effectiveness
have been established for other services, whose prices may be established independently. These
include mending clothing, furniture or household equipment; repairing radio and electronic
equipment; dry cleaning or laundry; and others.
6. Local Finance, Local Property
6.1 Budget System
The major laws regulating local finance in Belarus are the Law on Local Government, the Law on the
Budget System and State Extra-budgetary Funds and the annually adopted Law on the National
Budget. These laws define own financial resources of local representative and executive authorities,
forms of financial support by higher-level budgets and local government powers and procedures for
developing, approving and implementing local budgets and establishing and utilizing extra-budgetary
funds.
According to the Law on Local Government, local government finances are composed of budgetary
and extra-budgetary funds belonging to local councils or executive committees and their subordinate
bodies, as well as funds belonging to community organizations of self-government. To a large extent,
these funds determine the capabilities of local governments and their degree of autonomy in resolving
the issues assigned to local competence. Extra-budgetary funds are now very limited at the local level;
since 1998, all local council extra-budgetary funds have been incorporated into local budgets and
have essentially lost their extra-budgetary status.
Under current regulations, each administrative-territorial unit with its own local council possesses its
own budget.
The Law on the Budget System establishes a unified budget system, composed of local budgets
together with the national budget. This is ensured by a unified legal framework, coordinated
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budgetary principles and standardized methods for budgetary classification and reporting. These
allow the creation of consolidated budgets within administrative-territorial units. For example, the
district budget, together with the local budgets of villages, towns or cities of district subordination
located within the district, comprise the consolidated district budget. The regional budget, together
with the budgets of its subordinated districts and cities, form the regional consolidated budget. The
Minsk city budget is the only exception, since its city districts do not possess separate budgets.
Table 2.4 below illustrates the share of central and local budgets in the consolidated budget.
Table 2.4
Relative Size of Central and Local Expenditures, 1996–1999
1996 1997 1998 1999
Central government expenditures as a percent of:
Consolidated 50.4 50.4 47.8 47.0
budget expenditures
GDP  23.3 27.3 18.0 17.2
Local budget expenditures as a percent of:
Consolidated 49.6 49.6 52.2 53.0
budget expenditures
Central government 98.4 97.9 109.3 112.2
expenditures
The data above show that over half of all consolidated budget funds are currently channeled to local
budgets, a proportion which has been increasing in recent years. Local budgets play a key role in
financing the two sectors, health and education, which are most in need of budgetary funds. In
1999, funding of these areas accounted for forty-three percent of local budget funds and almost
eighty-two percent of local budgetary funds within the consolidated budget.
Secondly, the size of transfers from the central government in the form of subsidies and subventions
has significantly increased as a proportion of local budget revenues. In 1999, these allocations
amounted to almost one-fifth of local government funds. Subsidies account for the bulk of transfers.
Since 1997, subsidies have been allocated from a special fund for financial support for administrative-
territorial units. This fund is created within the national budget out of revenues from income tax
and VAT, according to standards established annually in the Law on the National Budget. In 1997,
for example, this fund amounted to 36.7 percent of these two taxes, compared to 35.7 percent in
1998 and 30.0 percent in 1999.
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This fund is then redistributed in the form of subsidies to regional-level budgets, including that of
Minsk, based on the need to balance the local budget. The size of regional subsidies is also determined
in the Law on the National Budget. In 1999, they were established in the following proportions:
15.6 percent for Brest oblast, 17.3 percent for Vitebsk oblast, 16.2 percent for Gomel oblast, 17.3
percent for Grodno oblast, 9.9 percent for Minsk oblast, 17.0 percent for Mogilev oblast and 6.7
percent for the city of Minsk.
Subsidies allocated to regional budgets are subsequently distributed among the lower-level budgets.
Since the central budget assumes responsibility for budget deficits of all levels, subsidies designed to
balance revenues and expenditures are now used at every level of local government. Quite often,
these transfers amount to fifty percent of local finances or more.
In addition to subsidies, targeted subventions for administrative-territorial units were introduced in
1998. Subventions were allocated from the central budget to the regional-level budgets for
maintaining housing and public utilities assets transferred to local councils and subsidizing housing
construction. In 1999, these also included subventions for the constructing communal assets.
6.2 Revenues
Legislation indicates only general provisions for the sources of local budget revenues, which are very
diverse. The law also establishes that councils set local taxes and duties and possess certain powers in
regulating rates for other payments.
However, it is not the variety of local revenue sources so much as the breadth of powers assigned to
local bodies that is important. This may be seen by glancing at the structure of local budget revenues
classified by source, as shown in table 2.5.
As demonstrated in the table below, own local revenues for local representative and executive
authorities amount to around one-third of local budget revenues, even though the share of local
taxes and duties is relatively small. Own local revenues have been notably decreasing in district
budgets, and are very low in town and village budgets.
More significant is the role of national tax revenues in local budgets. The major part of local revenues
are accounted for by national taxes which are assigned to local budgets based on annually established
standards, such as income tax, VAT and excise duty on alcohol. The practice of assigning national
taxes to local budgets on a long-term basis was extended in 1997 to include certain excise duties, the
tax on real estate and payments for land or use of natural resources. Except for excise duties, local
councils are allowed to raise or lower tax rates or establish tax privileges.
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Table 2.5
Local Budget Revenues, 1997–1999 [percent]
1997 1998 1999
Total revenues 100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Own local revenues 31.4 30.7 34.5
Local taxes and duties 5.4 4.5 11.1
National taxes assigned to local budgets 22.5 22.0 21.8
on a permanent basis
Current non-tax revenues 0.9 1.4 0.7
Revenues from privatization of community property 0.9 0.7 0.3
2. Nationally regulated taxes transferred to local budgets 47.9 47.8 45.8
based on annually established standards,
on a long-term basis
Transferred to local budgets based 34.3 32.5 33.7
on annually established standards
a) VAT 21.5 18.8 18.2
b) Income tax 9.4 8.7 7.5
Transferred to local budgets on a long-term basis 13.6 15.3 9.3
3. Subsidies and subventions from the central budget  20.7  21.5  19.7
6.3 Expenditures
Local councils, within their competence, independently define areas of local budget expenditures on
social and economic development. Restrictions apply only to earmarked funds transferred from
higher-level budgets. Executive committees are permitted to invest idle funds into economic activities,
securities or other investment projects. Local budgets may also designate specific amounts for the
repayment of loans, debts and interest. The local council may establish the size of any reserve or
earmarked budgetary funds within local budgets.
National legislation also provides a legal framework for inter-budgetary issues that arise in connection
with local budget expenditures. Specifically, if a higher-level body makes a decision that causes an
increase in expenditures for a lower-level government, it must also set aside appropriate compensation
for the lower-level budget. If, when allocating taxes, local councils fail to comply with standards
established by national legislation and higher-level council decisions, these funds will be immediately
transferred to the appropriate budgets.
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The following table highlights the distribution of local budget expenditures by specific area:
Table 2.6
Local Budget Expenditures, 1997–1999 [percent]
1997 1998 1999
Total expenditures 100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Current expenditures 29.9 32.0 35.9
Expenditures for the executive committee  3.3  3.2 3.0
and local council
Law enforcement 2.0 1.9 1.6
Economic development and support 6.4 7.4 6.6
Development of the market infrastructure 0.1 0.1 0.1
Education, health, sports and culture 61.9 59.7 55.2
a) education 31.7 31.2 29.1
b) health 25.4 32.0 20.4
c) sport 0.9 1.0 1.0
d) culture 3.0 2.3 2.8
Other current expenditures 3.0 2.3 8.9
2. Capital expenditures 8.2 8.3 8.9
Capital expenditures for the construction —  — 2.5
of objects transferred from the national budget
6.4 Budget Process
Technically, each local council independently formulates the local budget based on own revenues,
national tax revenues assigned on a long-term basis and subsidies or subventions from higher-level
budgets. However, even though local budget indicators are established by local governments, they
must be congruent with the forecast local budget revenues and expenditures for the coming budgetary
year. These estimates are provided to regional-level governments by the Ministry of Finance, and to
lower-level governments by higher-level ones.
Drafting local budgets falls under the exclusive competence of the executive committee. The final
budget is established after the higher-level council approves standards for allocating national taxes
and revenues to the local budget.
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After being drafted and reviewed by the executive committee, the local budget is submitted for
approval to the local council. The decision of the local council establishes the following:
• revenues and expenditures, according to national budgetary classifications;
• standards for allocating national taxes to lower-level budgets and the level of cash flow;
• subsidies to lower-level budgets.
When formulating local budgets, an important role is played by the average compulsory rate
(coefficient) which is estimated as a national per capita budgetary social standard within the non-
production social sphere (budgetary, non-industrial). This indicator is approved in the Law on the
National Budget and calculated annually based on the following factors: funds spent in each region
for the social non-industrial sphere per resident, the rate of increase for such expenditures by regional
budgets and the projected increase in GDP for the next year. In order to take into account the
differences in the development of the social non-industrial network and the volume of services it
renders to the population, additional coefficients were introduced in 1999 to differentiate the
average national budgetary social standard by regions.
Thus, the 1999 Budget Law of Belarus determined BYR 17,880,000 as the national per capita
budgetary social standard within the non-production social sphere. In addition, the following
correction coefficients were established: 0.965 for Brest, 0.971 for Vitebsk, 0.997 for Gomel, 1.025
for Grodno, 0.981 for Minsk and 1.061 for Mogilev.
The budget is implemented by the local executive committee. Large cities may partially delegate this
authority to their city districts, with respect to funding budgetary institutions within the city
district, based on approved estimated expenditures and according to established procedures.
6.5 Local Taxes
Local taxes and fees were legally regulated in 1993. The list included eleven items: fees for the license
to trade, advertising tax, fees for pets, fees for the sale of beer, tax on the sale of alcohol and tobacco,
fee for the right to use local symbols, fees for filming movies or TV shows, fees for allocating trading
sites, tax on construction in resort areas, resort fees, fees for maintaining pre-school facilities and fees
for urban and suburban public transport.
The maximum amount for local taxes and fees should not exceed five percent of income remaining
to taxpayers.
In 1997, new procedures were introduced for local taxes and duties, which were grouped into six
categories:
• user fees, such as fees for the use of parking lots, for the right to trade, for the right to use local
symbols, for issuing housing orders, for the right to hold auctions, for owning a pet, et cetera;
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• sales taxes, such as taxes on the sale of beer, alcohol and tobacco products;
• fees related to construction and territorial development;
• service fees, such as fees for hotels, restaurants and racecourses;
• fees for advertising on billboards, cars and other vehicles;
• targeted fees, such as the fee for maintaining the municipal police, the fee for upgrading or
maintaining public transport and others.
The law also stipulated that targeted fees and fees for construction and territorial development
should be used solely for their designated purpose. In addition, it established that local councils may
autonomously determine the taxation base, tax rates, methods for calculating taxes or fees and the
schedule for their payment.
In 1998, the right to introduce specific local taxes and fees, as well as the categories of taxes and fees,
was granted exclusively to regional and district-level councils. These councils may also revise the
procedures for collecting payment of each specific type of local tax or fee. Nevertheless, the area in
which local councils may apply these fees at their own discretion has somewhat narrowed.
The major difference introduced in 1998 was that the limits for tax rates to be established by the local
councils were lowered. For instance, in the aggregate of all fees, sales tax on economic entities should
not exceed five percent of proceeds and targeted fees should not exceed five percent of net income.
In 1999, local taxes and fees were elaborated further. Consequently, the list of user fees now includes
the fee for crossing the national borders via border checkpoints. Casinos were eliminated from the list
of service fees, while the list of targeted fees was expanded to include charges for upgrading and
maintaining inter-city buses, trams and trolleys; for maintaining pre-school facilities; and for the
commercial procurement of wild herbs or mushrooms, technical or medical phytogenic raw material
for processing and sales.
Whereas the 1998 Law on the National Budget established only that local councils possess the
opportunity to introduce local taxes and charges, the 1999 Law on the National Budget made their
introduction mandatory for regional and district-level councils.
At first glance, this may be interpreted as evidence of the increasing importance of local taxes and fees
in the structure of local budget revenues. In practice, this is not the case. Rather, this is the result of
strengthened fiscal pressure in a situation of progressing economic crisis.
6.6  Local Economy, Local Property
Economic or commercial entities operating on local territory may assume a diverse range of economic
and legal forms. The organizational and legal definition of economic associations includes the
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following: limited or unlimited liability companies, joint-stock companies, enterprises or associations
of enterprises, manufacturing cooperatives and individual entrepreneurs. With the adoption of the
new Civil Code in 1999, limited partnerships and full partnerships will be added to the list. Within
this classification there are subcategories such as affiliated and dependent companies and unitary
enterprises with the right of economic control and operational management. These entities may be
either state or privately owned.
In terms of their socioeconomic impact, economic entities may be divided into those that are primarily
geared toward local needs and those that are focused on the external market. Local authorities are
motivated, directly or indirectly, to develop all types of entrepreneurial activity, as they provide both
employment opportunities and budget revenue and thus assist in the resolution of social issues
assigned to local competence. Nevertheless, the Law on Local Government mentions only the first
category of economic entity, that is, entities of various types of ownership which satisfy local demand.
As conceived in the law, “local economy” refers to a particular economic unity, whose development
must be assisted through long-term programs and local legislation. In doing so, local governments
should take into account the Law on the Prevention of Monopolistic Activities and the Development
of Competition, passed in 2000. This law establishes criteria for determining the dominance of a
given economic entity in the goods market and prohibits any agreement with local bodies which is
aimed at limiting competition.
One method of supporting small businesses oriented towards the domestic market is the creation of
“business incubators.” Emerging businesses are provided with administrative and production premises
on favorable terms for a certain period of time. These incubators are not yet very numerous; for
instance, Gomel oblast has only two, one in the city of Gomel and one in Mozyr.
Currently, it is practically impossible to solve issues related to the development of local economy.
Moreover, if they are to comply with the instructions issued from the top, local governments must
undertake strict measures against entrepreneurial institutions.
In 1996, the president issued a decree which determined local government responsibility for regulating
pricing in their territories. Regional and Minsk city executive committees set a price range for socially
important goods, jobs and services for local consumption at their discretion. These may include price
ranges for mass-produced bread, milk and baby food; goods, jobs and services for companies with a
local monopoly; heating; public transport; markups for public catering; solid fuel for inhabitants;
and communal services such as water supply, sewerage, heating and hot water.
Pursuant to the decrees and decisions of the Commission on Coordinated Pricing, local executive
committees artificially curb price growth and control production companies to ensure the continued
manufacturing of socially significant goods, such as food, clothes and shoes. These committees
approve maximum levels of profitability, retail markups and tariffs on socially important goods and
public services.
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In accordance with the Presidential Decree on Urgent Measures to Protect the Consumer Market,
oblast executive committees and the Minsk city executive committee are enjoined to perform the
following tasks:
• to establish the maximum norms for sales of goods;
• to restrain or suspend activities by companies that violate legislation on the sale of goods;
• to undertake measures for the immediate sale of perishable goods which are confiscated due to
the violation of procedures for pickup and delivery.
In fact, control over retail and wholesale trade has been tightened. Local governments also have the
authority to license these activities.
In March 1999, the president issued Decree No. 11 on the Regulation of State Registration and
Liquidation of Economic Subjects, requiring most companies to re-register by 1 July 2001. New,
higher and, for many, unaffordable amounts of statutory funds were established. Given this approach,
the number of active commercial companies will notably decrease. Already, as a result of the national
re-registration of companies conducted in 1993 and again between 1996 and 1997, several thousand
companies have ceased to exist.
The legal regulations and functioning of local property in Belarus is beset by several problems. No
special law regulating this type of property has been adopted. Instead, both the Law on Ownership,
adopted in 1990, and the Civil Code, adopted in 1998, are based on the concept of  “multi-level
state property,” whereby national and local property are both subdivisions of state property. By this
definition, local property is the object of close attention by central government bodies, and subject
to administrative redistribution. At the same time, the Civil Code extends general legislation on
private property rights to include local governments. According to the Civil Code, administrative-
territorial units participate in civil and legal relations on an equal footing as other participants, that is,
physical or legal entities. They are accountable for their obligations as property owners, except for
property which is established as exclusively local state property. The state is not accountable for these
obligations on the part of administrative-territorial units. In turn, administrative-territorial units are
not accountable for the obligations of any legal entities which they or the state have created.
Local property consists of the local government treasury and includes local budget funds and other
local assets that are not assigned to local government enterprises. Local property also includes the
assets of local government enterprises.
Belarus passed the Law on Assets in the Exclusive Ownership of the State to define objects which
may not be bequeathed, destatized or privatized unless the law permits otherwise. They may,
however, be leased in accordance with legislation, without the possibility of buy-out by the lessee.
These objects include natural resources, such as agricultural lands and other categories of land
restricted from private ownership; mineral resources; waters; forests; specially protected natural territories
or monuments; air space; public engineering infrastructure for electricity, heating, gas, water supply,
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sewerage, public lighting and the territorial development of cities and towns; property of local
councils and executive bodies on balance sheets; local budgets, extra-budgetary and targeted
budgetary funds. Any deals which result in the alienation of the property of enterprises, institutions
or organizations specified in the law are possible only if this property has been excluded from the list
of property of these enterprises in accordance with legislation.
Local councils establish procedures to form and approve the list of enterprises, institutions and
organizations to be held exclusively in local government ownership. Local property is viewed first and
foremost as a source of local budget revenues and second as a means for satisfying the needs of local
inhabitants. The list of local property is clear evidence of this: it is defined to include “... industrial,
construction and agricultural enterprises, trade companies, ... and other assets needed for the functioning
and development of the respective territories.” Thus, the law does not establish the provision of
public services on a non-commercial, non-profitable basis as the main objective of local property.
The transfer of state property into regional ownership primarily took place in 1991 on a non-
repayable basis, through a government resolution. After this, regional governments distributed local
property among the remaining tiers, retaining most industrial enterprises, sovkhozes and agricultural
and food-processing companies, such as dairies and meatpacking factories.
Local governments apply different methods of control over the activities of local enterprises or
organizations, most importantly over the administration of local assets. Local regulatory acts generally
require consent by the executive committee or by a specialized property administration organization
for dealings which involve the alienation of local assets. In addition, “state representatives” are appointed
to the managing bodies of economic organizations in a manner analogous to the managing bodies for
national assets. They also exercise control over the enterprise’s activities, retaining the best part.
7. Relationship between the State Administration
and Local Governments
The model of public administration created in Belarus has particular characteristics. In fact, if not in
name, the president enjoys supreme administrative power. In November 1996, a new edition of the
Constitution was approved through a national referendum initiated by the president. According to
this version, the president is not formally the head of executive power. That prerogative belongs to the
government, namely, the Cabinet of Ministers. Nevertheless, as head of state, the president has not
only preserved but also expanded his powers—legislative, organizational, staffing and control—over
the functioning of executive bodies. These powers extend to issues of territorial management. The
president has broad rights in regulating the administrative-territorial structure of the state and enjoys
the authority to establish or dissolve oblasts and raions, to determine or change their borders, to create or
dissolve city districts and to combine administrative-territorial units into a single administrative
center.
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The president makes unilateral decisions on allotting land for non-agricultural purposes from the
most arable lands, resorts, national reserves or forested areas with special status. According to his own
decree, the president makes the final decision on the sale of land to any legal entity, including foreign ones.
The president possesses the right to adopt acts with the force of law in the form of decrees, including
instructions and “temporary” decrees which are issued due to “special” need. According to the
Constitution, if a presidential decree or instruction contradicts legislation, the relevant law prevails
only if it had originally granted the president the right to adopt the particular act. For all other issues
not specifically addressed by legislation, presidential decrees must be complied with. In no case,
however, should presidential acts contradict the Constitution. In reality, the situation is quite different:
in 1995, for instance, the Constitutional Court declared eleven presidential decrees to be invalid,
including several acts aimed at the restriction of local self-government.
The Cabinet of Ministers supervises the activities of local executive bodies in virtually every area,
either directly or through central government bodies, such as ministries. The government organizes
control over compliance with the Constitution, laws, presidential acts, government resolutions and
decisions of the prime minister. The government cooperates most closely with regional executive
bodies, sending them the bulk of instructions or compulsory recommendations due to the dominant
role played by the regional tier in the system of local public administration.
Central government interference in local government activity is especially felt in administrative issues
which have social or political priority for the state due to their critical nature. Examples of these
include the prevention of a decline in industrial or agricultural production, salary payments or
housing construction. Only direct instructions from the central government are applied in these
areas. It is also common practice for the government to issue, not demands, but recommendations
that local governments undertake a given measure in an analogous manner to central government
activities. For example, these might refer to the management of local property. In practice, these
recommendations are interpreted as compulsory instructions. Such a course is both easier and safer
under conditions when public administration overall operates under such an extreme regime.
According to the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers, the Cabinet is also authorized to provide local
governments with qualified specialists and establish a system for their training. The central government
should support local bodies in organizing their management, in particular by developing a draft local
government structure. With respect to the relationship between the Cabinet of Ministers and local
councils, the central government is legally obliged to determine, in cooperation with local governments,
procedures for the participation of local councils in implementing national programs.
In January 2000, the president approved a directive on the “style and methods” of government
administration, which sharply criticized Cabinet activities. In terms of territorial issues, the directive
cited the lack of a system for coordination between sectoral bodies and territorial-administrative
divisions. This document thus set the task to improve planning and forecasting, to differentiate
functions more flexibly between central and regional bodies and others. All of this underscores the
serious problems that exist in public administration in Belarus and confirms their institutional
nature, which is shaped by the content of political and social-economic leadership.
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There is no single government institution in Belarus primarily responsible for coordination and
control of local government activities. Instead, these tasks are addressed by different bodies. Local
councils are more or less controlled by the National Assembly. Its lower house, the House of
Representatives, has a standing Commission on State Construction and Local Self-government. The
upper house, the Council of the Republic, is composed of representatives from the territories, and
has a Commission on Regional Policy. The Council of the Republic has the authority to cancel local
council decisions if they contradict legislation, as well as the authority to dissolve local councils.
The presidential administration exercises ideological supervision over local governments, with the
principal aim of ensuring local support for presidential policies. The administration maintains the
“staff policy” of the president at the central and local levels and runs the respective “staff registries.”
A group of chief inspectors for regions and the city of Minsk operate within the presidential
administration to carry out presidential policies and control their implementation.
In addition, a council composed of heads of local executive bodies acts as a standing advisory body
in the president’s office. This body includes the head of state, his chief of staff, the prime minister
and chairmen of regional and Minsk city executive committees. Every year the president includes
chairmen of raion and city executive committees (two from each oblast and the city of Minsk) in the
council. The council is responsible for developing proposals to coordinate the activities of local
executive bodies on issues of social security; for maintaining a balanced approach to regional interests;
and for considering regional interests during the preparation of important social and economic
decisions.
Within the central government, a special state secretariat has been created to address territorial issues.
It is responsible for coordinating between the Cabinet of Ministers and local executive bodies; for
preparing proposals to improve public administration at the territorial level; and for the ongoing
implementation of local economic and social development.
The central system of public administration in Belarus also includes ministries, state committees and
committees within these bodies. These have significant influence over the activities of local
governments, since many local government divisions are simultaneously subordinated to the central
ministries and incorporated with them into a “single” system. This applies to local directorates or
departments of labor and employment, social security, health care, housing and communal services,
the interior and many others.
8. Local Government Employees
Local government employees enjoy the status of public servants, as regulated by legal norms. Generally
speaking, public service in Belarus refers to the activities of all public servants working in state bodies,
enterprises, institutions and organizations. In the narrower sense, public service is the fulfillment of
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duties by certain categories of government officials. Their status is regulated by the Law on Public
Service, adopted in 1993. All employees in executive bodies, except support and technical staff, are
covered by this law. The law indirectly includes local council members, since their duties are registered
as those of public administration employees.
Local executive committees, rather than local councils, determine local government staff. Their
salaries are set by a uniform system of wages, which is established by the government, the Ministry
of Finance and the Ministry of Labor.
Local government employees are responsible for the following tasks: implementing government
policy; maintaining the efficient functioning of government bodies; ensuring the rights and freedoms
of citizens and legal entities; and protecting their interests.
The law also determines the general principles of public service: that rights and legal interests of
citizens have priority over state interests; that public servants may not be summarily removed from
office, in order to preserve continuity and stability within the state; that the decisions of the highest
bodies and officials, adopted within their competence, are binding; equal opportunity for employment
in public service; and political loyalty.
Openings in public service, including those at the local level, are filled on a competitive basis. In
1994, the Ministry of Labor approved provisions for the hiring process. Vacancies may be announced
either to the employees of a given government body only or to the public at large. In the former case,
the head of the government body makes the final decision on hiring a given candidate at his or her
discretion. In the latter case, a special commission, which may include independent experts, is established
to organize the hiring process. The head of the government body decides whether to organize
interviews or exams; legislation does not regulate these issues. It should be emphasized that the
system of hiring public servants can only be called “competitive” in name. In general, it is characterized
by a low influx of young professionals at all levels of public administration, due to very low salaries.
Government employees are guaranteed job tenure; when hired by local executive or administrative
bodies, they sign an employment contract for a period of fifteen years. When offered the job, the
successful applicant must submit an income declaration for the preceding year and the appropriate
portion of the current year. The refusal to submit a declaration or the intentional submission of
incomplete, incorrect or distorted information may be viewed as grounds for withdrawing the offer.
According to the legislation, public servants must observe the following principles:
• to comply with laws and other legal regulations;
• to fulfill orders and instructions from their managers, issued within their competence;
• to adhere to the regulations of the given government body;
• to review applications from citizens, enterprises, institutions and organizations in a timely and
objective manner;
• to maintain state secrets and other information protected by law, even after retirement;
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• to maintain the confidentiality of all information obtained through their official position on
citizens’ private lives and not to demand such information except in legally specified cases;
• to maintain the qualifications needed to efficiently fulfill their duties;
• to adhere to ethical norms and to refuse to carry out orders which contradict legislation.
Every position in public service falls into a specific grade, which is determined according to the
employee’s qualifications and record of service. There are twelve grades of public service, with grade
twelve being the lowest. Chairmen of regional or Minsk city executive committees hold an additional
grade, conferred on them by the president when they are approved in office by their corresponding
council.
An individual may be promoted through the various grades in consecutive order, depending on his
or her position, qualifications, record of government service and previous grade. Higher-grade positions
have precedence over lower-grade positions. Grades are conferred through resolutions issued by
special commissions set up within the government bodies.
Legislation stipulates for the regular assessment of all public servants. Ordinary employees are assessed
once every five years, while heads of local governments are assessed once every two and a half years.
Special assessment commissions are created for this purpose. Heads of regional executive committees
are assessed by a commission established within the presidential administration, while heads of
district and city executive committees are assessed by commissions established by regional executive
committees.
Training qualified managers in the system of public administration is considered to be a political
priority. Educational institutions receive orders from the state to train specialists. The Academy of
Public Administration in the Office of the President is the highest educational institution providing
advanced training for top local government officials, offering a course in Public Administration and
Municipal Government. Chairmen of local councils and heads of executive committees are trained
at the Academy, as well as promising specialists included in the personnel reserve. Top managers
should improve their skills at least once a year. At the end of the training course, they must pass
examinations and receive a certificate.
The NGO sector is not widely involved by the government in training programs for local government
employees. Few public employees participate in conferences and workshops organized by NGOs,
such as the Lyva Sapieha Foundation. Members of local councils, on the other hand, participate in
these events much more actively.
Professionalism among staff is an acute problem in local governments, which lack a supply of trained
young specialists. Turnover among staff in the Minsk city executive committee, for example, is over
thirty percent.
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9. Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
The Constitution contains a number of principles and norms intended to guarantee the development
and strengthening of democracy. These include freedom of speech, freedom of information and the
right to free assembly. Citizens are also guaranteed the right to participate in the administration of
state affairs. However, the Constitution does not possess provisions to clearly determine either the
political and legal nature of local government or its place in the system of public administration. Nor
does the Constitution establish the status of local communities as legal subjects or even discuss the
autonomy of local governments over issues within their competence. Furthermore, there is no
constitutionally established right to judicial protection for self-governments if state bodies pass illegal
acts. Local governments are not even granted the recourse of initiating legal proceedings in the
Constitutional Court.
It should also be noted that even those provisions that are constitutionally established are not always
complied with. Some examples of this are the elimination of self-governments in many administrative-
territorial units, and the transformation of cities and other settlements into the classification of
“territorial units,” which deprives them of elected authorities.
The budgetary autonomy of local authorities is also limited, since higher bodies must play a role in
balancing the budget, by establishing the upper limits of the budget deficit or absorbing any budget
surplus.
Disputes between different tiers of administration may only be reviewed through channels of
administrative subordination—council or executive committee, government or president. However,
as mentioned before, there is no law on administrative procedures in Belarus. In addition, the system
of administrative courts is nonexistent. Instead, administrative disputes between citizens and
government bodies are reviewed in the general courts.
It has recently been planned to introduce the institution of ombudsman in Belarus. The Constitution
establishes the right of citizens to challenge any illegal actions by local governments that violate their
rights. Issues that citizens can bring to court might concern the activities of electoral commissions, the
refusal of an executive committee to register an initiative group for organizing a referendum or the
refusal to allow the organization of public action.
Legislation also provides for criminal or administrative penalties if officials create obstacles to the
realization of the political rights of citizens. This covers a broad range of activities. According to the
Criminal Code, the creation of obstacles to the free realization of a citizen’s right to participate in a
referendum is punishable by a fine, by no more than five years of imprisonment or by no more than
two years of correctional service. Methods of violating these rights include violence, deception,
threats, bribery, forgery, distortion, voting fraud or the violation of confidentiality by an official, a
member of an initiative group or a referendum commission.
96
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
The Administrative Code of Belarus establishes a fine for citizens as well as officials for any violation
of the legislation on referenda. Furthermore, during the preparation and holding of a referendum,
officials can be administratively fined for the illegal refusal to review citizen applications, for violating
the term of a review without proper grounds; for making illegal decisions; or for failing to fulfill prior
decisions on citizen applications. No further sanctions are envisaged by legislation for other violations
of the rights of territorial communities and local governments.
10. Next Steps in the Transition Process
The need for drastic change in the system of local government in Belarus is increasingly evident. This
is widely recognized both by scientists and by practical specialists, many of whom believe it essential
to improve the economic, legal and organizational basis of territorial governance. These experts
propose that an entirely new law on local self-government be adopted, one which corresponds to the
principles of the European Charter of Territorial Self-government. They argue that too much time
has been lost and that fragmentary changes or modifications of the existing system will not bring
about the desired effect.
As for the central government’s stance on this issue, it should be noted that it is currently developing
a state concept for the reform of local government and self-government.
In September 2000, a Congress of Local Councils was held, including councils at all levels of government.
This was a political event rather than an institution envisaged by either the Constitution or legislation.
Congress decisions do not carry any legal weight. Nevertheless, this forum was able to express a
common position held by members of all levels. The necessity of reforms was urgently raised at the
Congress, which supported the development of a concept for reform and a draft code on local
government and self-government. However, the Congress did not determine any specific issues that
would provide the foundation for the concept or the new law. In very general terms, it was agreed
that it was necessary to redistribute authorities and, most importantly, financial resources in favor of
lower-level governments. The resolution issued by the Congress contained general recommendations
for local councils and executive bodies to cooperate better with self-government bodies, to improve
preparation for council sessions, to heighten activity of their members in districts, et cetera.
After the Congress met, the president began preparation of a draft decree on the reform of local
government in Belarus. In principle, the decree should reflect the main principles of the reform
concept. It is not yet clear what direction will be chosen. A special central government body is to be
created in order to coordinate the reform process. From an organizational point of view, key issues to
be included in the presidential decree are the right of local governments to set up national and
regional associations and the principles governing cooperation between government bodies and
these associations during the preparation of local government related decisions.
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In addition, it is hoped that certain measures will be undertaken to increase the financial capabilities
of self-governments in order to somewhat strengthen the role of local councils. Of course, this alone
is not enough. All of these issues require the radical reform of the political, economic and organizational
aspects of territorial government. The existing multi-tiered and dysfunctional model must be replaced,
preferably by a two-tiered territorial government composed of districts and regions. To do so, it has
been proposed that current first-tier administrative-territorial units be enlarged, creating roughly
400-450 units at the new first tier of government. Instead of the existing six regions, eighteen to
twenty oblasts would be established, based on large and medium cities. Alternative structures would
also be acceptable, provided that they followed the same conceptual principles. It is evident that the
central government is not yet ready to take such steps towards administrative-territorial reform, from
the ideological, economic or pragmatic perspective.
It is also unlikely the distribution of responsibilities between local representative and executive
authorities will change in the immediate future. In all probability, council members might have
slightly more opportunity to influence the creation of executive offices. Executive bodies will probably
not be incorporated into the system of local self-government, but will instead retain their status as
central government agencies. In summary, the current functional and organizational isolation of the
two systems of government appears likely to be preserved.
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Annex 2.1
Major General Indicators
Area 20,759,000 hectares/207,600 square kilometers
Inhabited area 1,830,000 hectares
Urban areas 253,000 hectares
Rural areas 1,577,000 hectares
Population (1 January 1999) 10,264,400
Pensioners (end of 1999) 2,630,000
Senior citizens 1,970,000
School-age children (1999) 1,521,800/14.7 percent of the population
Population density 49 people per square kilometer
Major ethnic divisions (according to the 1999 census)
Belarus 81.2 percent
Russians 11.4 percent
Poles 3.9 percent
Ukrainians 2.4 percent
Jews 0.3 percent
Others 0.8 percent
Per capita GDP (1999) BYR 28,336,000
National budget (1999): 47.2 percent of the consolidated budget
Public debt (1 January 2000)
Internal BYR 342.9 billion/5 percent of GDP
Foreign USD 898 million
Unemployment (1999) 2 percent of the economically active population
Inflation 51.2 percent
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Annex 2.2
Population, Settlements and Administrative Units
Table 2A.1
Settlements by Population Size Categories in Belarus (1 January 1999)
Population Size Category Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Settlements Settlements Inhabitants Inhabitants
0–1,000 24,227 99.154 3,129.9 30.5
1,000–2,000 24 0.098 33.1 0.3
2,000–5,000 43 0.176 134.1 1.3
5,000–10,000 51 0.208 398.6 3.9
10,000–50,000 65 0.266 1,134.9 11.1
50,000–100,000 10 0.041 733.5 7.2
100,000–1,000,000 13 0.053 2,971.4 28.9
1,000,000+ 1 0.004 1,728.9 16.8
Total 24,434 100.0 10,264.4 100.0
Table 2A.2
Municipalities by Population Size Categories in Belarus
Population Size Category Number of Percentage of Number of
Municipalities Municipalities Inhabitants
0–1,000 1,460 86.1 3037,700
1,000–2,000 24 1.4 34,500
2,000–5,000 39 2.3 124,300
5,000–10,000 14 0.8 90,700
10,000–50,000 107 6.4 3,251,700
50,000–100,000 31 1.8 2,127,200
100,000–1,000,000 14 0.8 3,107,400
1,000,000 + 7 0.4 10,264,400
Total 1,696 100.0 —
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Average population per local government 11,900 people
Number of municipal governments 1,696
Table 2A.3
Administrative-territorial Structure in Belarus
Local and Regional Governments Average Number of Average Number of
Inhabitants per Unit Settlements per Unit
First tier 200 16
Second tier 58,200 170
Third tier 1,466.3 3,491
Territorial autonomies with special status none
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Figure 2A.3
Administrative Map of Belarus
Grodno
Minsk Mogilev
Vitebsk
Gomel
Brest
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Annex 2.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
• Constitution of Belarus (27 November 1996)
• Law on Local Government and Self-governance (10 January 2000)
• Law on National and Local Assemblies (12 July 2000)
• Electoral Code of Belarus (11 February 2000)
• Law on Administrative-territorial Division and Procedures for Resolving Issues of Administrative-
territorial Organization (5 May 1998)
• Law on the Status of Local Council Members (27 March 1992)
• Law on the Status of the Capital City, Minsk (12 July 2000)
• Law on the Budget System and State Extra-budgetary Funds (15 July 1998)
• Civil Code (7 December 1998)
• Law on Assets in the Exclusive Ownership of the State (5 May 1998).
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Annex 2.4
Responsibilities of Administrative Tiers
Table 2A.4
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Belarus
Functions (Maintenance, All Regional Central Other Forms
Development, Personnel Hiring, Governments or City Administration
Financing from Other Sources) Governments
I .  E D U C A T I O N
1. Pre-school X X X
2. Primary X X
3. Secondary X X
4. Technical X
5. Other X X
I I .  S O C I A L  S E C U R I T Y
1. Nurseries X X X
2. Kindergartens X X
3. Old and disabled
people’s homes
4. Individual services X X
to old and disabled people
5. Special services X X
(for homeless, families
in crisis, etc.)
6. Social housing X
7. Other
I I I .  H E A LT H  C A R E
1. First aid X
2. Health protection X
3. Hospitals X
4. Public health X
5. Other X
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Table 2A.4 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Belarus
Functions (Maintenance, All Regional Central Other Forms
Development, Personnel Hiring, Governments or City Administration
Financing from Other Sources) Governments
IV.  C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E ,  S P O R T S
1. Theaters X X X
2. Museums X X X
3. Libraries X X
4. Parks X
5. Sports, leisure X
6. Maintenance of X X
culture facilities
7. Other
V.  E C O N O M I C  S E R V I C E S
1. Water supply X
2. Sewerage X
3. Electricity X
4. Gas X
5. Heating X
6. Other
V I .  E N V I R O N M E N T,  P U B L I C  S A N I TAT I O N
1. Waste collection X X X
2. Waste disposal X
3. Street cleaning X X
4. Cemeteries X X
5. Environment protection X X X
6. Other
V I I .  T R A N S P O R T
1. Roads X X X
2. Street lighting X
3. Public transport X X
4. Other
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Table 2A.4 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Belarus
Functions (Maintenance, All Regional Central Other Forms
Development, Personnel Hiring, Governments or City Administration
Financing from Other Sources) Governments
V I I I .  U R B A N  D E V E L O P M E N T
1. Town planning X
2. Regional/spatial planning X X
3. Local economic X X
development
4. Tourism X X
5. Other
I X .  G E N E R A L  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
1. Authoritative functions X X X
(licenses, allowances)
2. Other public X X X
administration issues
(registration of voters, etc.)
3. Local militia X X
4. Fire brigades X X
5. Civil defense X X
6. Consumer rights protection X X X
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Local Government in Ukraine
Yury Navruzov 1
1. Major General Indicators
Ukraine is a unitary state and a multinational country, home to representatives of over eighty ethnic
groups and nationalities. The majority of the population is composed of the two largest ethnic groups,
Ukrainians, who account for seventy-three percent of the population, and Russians, who account
for twenty-two percent. Over two-thirds of Ukrainian citizens reside in cities and towns. Over half
of the population is not of economically active age: there are approximately eleven million school-
children and fourteen million pensioners. Further data on the population of Ukraine may be found
in annex 3.1.
Per capita GDP only slightly exceeds USD 1,000, while the official unemployment rate is over
eleven percent. According to some estimates, the “hidden” unemployment rate equals the official
one. During the economic reforms, Ukraine experienced a period of hyperinflation. This has since
been stabilized by monetary methods; in 1998, the inflation rate stood at twenty percent. Annex
3.1 provides indices of social and economic development in Ukraine in more detail.
The average number of inhabitants per administrative-territorial unit is a little over four thousand.
Overall, there are thirty thousand independent settlements and over ten thousand local governments
in Ukraine. It is expected that the number of local governments will be significantly reduced in the
course of administrative reform. Further information on the administrative-territorial structure of
Ukraine may be found in annex 3.2.
2. Legal and Constitutional Basis
2.1 Brief History of Local Government Reform
The Ukrainian state has deep historic roots, although the system of government and public
administration has undergone much change in the twentieth century. In terms of the system of
public administration, the most significant changes occurred in the 1990s. Because these changes
reflected the struggle between reforming and conservative political forces, the evolution of the
system of power and legal environment in Ukraine is characterized by controversy, inconsistency
and complexity.
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The reforms began with the election of the new Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic and members of local councils in March 1990. These changes came about
amidst the general transformation of the Soviet Union as a result of the Law on General Principles of
Local Self-government and Local Economy in the Soviet Union (1990).
At the end of 1990, the new Verkhovna Rada passed the Law of the Ukrainian SSR on Local Self-
government and Local Soviets of People’s Deputies in the Ukrainian SSR. This marked the rebirth
of democratic self-government in Ukraine. The historical significance of this law is that it laid the
foundation for the increased political role of local councils and declared their financial autonomy.
The law also outlined the sub-national tiers of power in Ukraine by oblast, raion and local (city, city
district, town and village) soviets of people’s deputies and their executive bodies. According to the
Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR (1978), these local self-government bodies were responsible for
public administration within the territories under their jurisdiction.
The Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, adopted in July 1990, proclaimed the principle
of the separation of power—legislative, executive and judicial. However, implementation of this
principle began only after the election of the president in December 1991. The new model of state
administration was enacted by the Law on Representatives of the President of Ukraine and the Law
on Local Councils and Local and Regional Self-government in the beginning of 1992. This model
established the “presidential vertical,” or the system of state administration. The executive bodies of
oblast and raion councils were consequently made subordinate to the Cabinet of Ministers and
headed by the appointed representatives of the president. Thus, true local self-government was
retained only in individual settlements and in local councils at the regional level (in oblasts and
raions).
This model remained in place until the pre-term presidential and parliamentary elections held in
1994. When the new balance of political forces came into power, they strengthened the role of local
councils as the basis of public administration, eliminated the “presidential vertical” and restored the
previous model of self-government. Nevertheless, the debate over a balanced model of territorial
administration continued, and the need to adopt a new Constitution became apparent. The process
was a long one, and eventually required a legally unique document: the “Constitutional Agreement,”
signed in June 1995 by the president and Verkhovna Rada and valid for the period of one year. This
agreement established a shared vision of the legislative and executive powers in a future model of
public administration and declared the intention to draft and adopt a new Constitution by June 1996.
The Constitutional Agreement was a political compromise between the advocates of a strong vertical
of executive power and the supporters of an efficient local self-government system. The executive
vertical was restored and local state administrations were established at the oblast and raion levels.
Their functions were twofold: first, to fulfill orders of the central government and second, to
implement decisions of the oblast or raion council. In contrast to the previous model, the administration
head was to be elected by inhabitants of the oblast or raion and subsequently appointed by presidential
decree. At the first tier of local government, in individual settlements, the council chairman was
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elected by the local population, instead of by council members as before. This system of public
administration operated until the adoption of the new Constitution.
2.2 Constitutional Basis
The Constitution of Ukraine was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 28 June 1996. It established
the separation of powers (article 6); the role of the president as head of state (article 102); the role of
the Verkhovna Rada as the sole legislative body (article 75); the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as
the highest body in the system of executive power (article 113); and the Supreme Court of Ukraine
as the highest judicial body (article 125).
Ukraine is declared to be unitary state (article 2), governed in the form of a republic (article 3). The
system of administrative-territorial division consists of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC),
oblasts, raions, cities, city districts, townships and villages (article 133). The ARC is an integral part
of Ukraine; its Constitution is adopted by the ARC Verkhovna Rada and is approved by the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (article 135). The Constitutional Court of Ukraine is declared to be the
only body of constitutional jurisdiction in the country (article 147).
Justice in Ukraine is administered exclusively by courts, whose jurisdiction covers all legal relationships
in the country (article 124). Offices of the Public Prosecutor oversee the balance of interests in legal
relationships (article 121).
2.3 Local Public Administration and Local Self-government
Article 118 of the Constitution establishes that “executive power in oblasts, raions and the cities of
Kiev and Sevastopol is carried out by local state administrations.” Heads of local administrations
oversee local administration activity and are appointed and dismissed from office by the president
upon the recommendation of the Cabinet of Ministers. Article 118 also declares that “local state
administrations are accountable in their activities to the higher executive bodies.” Their functions are
stipulated in article 119 as follows:
• to ensure adherence to the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine, as well as the fulfillment of
central government decisions and presidential decrees;
• to maintain law and order and ensure the observance of the rights and freedoms of citizens;
• to ensure the implementation of national and regional programs for social, economic and
cultural development, environmental protection and others;
• to draft and implement oblast and raion budgets;
• to provide implementation reports on local budgets and programs;
• to coordinate with local self-governments;
• to ensure the execution of other authorities assigned by the central government or delegated
by the corresponding councils.
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Local state administrations cooperate with the oblast and raion councils within their territory. Their
particular interaction determines the mechanism for distribution of competencies between the public
executive bodies and local self-governments.
The political vocabulary was enriched by the distinction between “delegated authorities” and “own
authorities.” The Constitution lists two types of delegated authorities. The first includes executive
authorities of local self-governments of the regional level that are delegated by legislation to local state
administrations. Article 118 stipulates that “local state administrations are accountable to and
controllable by the local councils with regard to authorities delegated to them by the corresponding
raion or oblast councils.”
The second type includes authorities delegated by the central government to local self-governments.
Article 143 of the Constitution stipulates the observance of the two conditions: first, that the state
must compensate for resources spent by local self-governments to fulfill these functions and second,
that local self-governments are accountable to the central government for performance of these
authorities. As currently envisaged by law, the system of delegated authorities means that the parties
involved lack any degree of flexibility. Moreover, local self-governments are not free in their performance
of delegated authorities; it is simply impossible in practice.
In addition, local self-governments have own authorities as determined by the law. Thus, all local
self-government powers in Ukraine can be subdivided into delegated authorities and own authorities.
A simplified structure of executive power in Ukraine is given in figure 3.1. As shown there, the
model of public administration established by the Constitution envisages two types of power at the
oblast and raion levels: bodies of local self-government, or local councils, which are responsible for
political and strategic decision-making, and executive power, or local state administrations, which
implement these decisions.
2.4 System of Local Self-government
For the first time in recent history, the system of local self-government in Ukraine is recognized and
guaranteed by the Constitution (article 7). The Constitution stipulates only the basic features of the
system of self-government, and establishes that further principles of local self-government will be
determined exclusively by the laws of Ukraine (article 92, item 15).
Within the administrative-territorial structure of Ukraine, local self-government bodies may be
found at the municipal and regional levels. The municipal level refers to local self-governments in
individual administrative units, such as cities, city districts, townships and villages. Local self-
government in these units consists of local councils, which form the representative branch of local
authority, and executive committees, which compose the executive branch.
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Figure 3.1
Structure of Executive Power in Ukraine
The regional level is defined as oblasts and raions; local self-government at this level consists of oblast
and raion councils, which represent the common interests of territorial gromadas (communities of
citizens) such as villages, townships and cities. Oblast and raion councils delegate their executive
authorities to their corresponding local public administrations.
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Council Commissions
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Article 142 of the Constitution establishes that the “material and financial basis of local self-governments
includes all assets and real estate, local budget revenues, other funds, land and natural resources
owned by territorial communities.” The state assists in the creation of local budget revenues, supports
local self-governments financially and compensates for expenditures on delegated authorities. Local
self-governments are self-sufficient and independent from the state within their authorities, although
they are accountable to executive bodies for the exercise of delegated authorities (article 143).
The Law on Local Self-government, adopted in 1997, further elaborates the concept of local self-
government. (Hereafter, all references to specific articles of a law in this chapter refer to the Law on
Local Self-government unless otherwise specified.) The territorial gromada is established as the
primary unit of local self-government and defined as the community of inhabitants of a given
village, township or city which constitutes an independent administrative-territorial unit. Article 1
also establishes the local council as the representative body of local self-government, with the authority
“to represent the interests of communities and make decisions on their behalf.” Figure 3.2 illustrates
a model structure of a first-tier local government.
Article 2 presents the concept of local self-government as the “state-guaranteed right and real capability
of territorial communities to solve issues of local importance independently, or through local self-
government bodies and officials, within the framework of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine.”
Thus, communities may exercise their right to self-governance through forms of direct democracy as
well as the establishment of local self-governments.
As seen in figure 3.2, the mayor and local council members are directly elected by local inhabitants.
The elected mayor subsequently establishes the structure and staff of the executive body in
coordination with the local council. The chairman is responsible for chairing council sessions as well
as administering executive activities, but does not possess any other mandate.
According to article 5 of the Law on Local Self-government, the system of local self-government
includes the following components:
• the territorial gromada;
• local councils at the municipal level;
• mayors of municipal governments;
• the executive branch of the local council;
• community organizations;
• raion and oblast councils.
The structure of local self-government at the regional level is shown in figure 3.3. The major
difference between municipal and regional governments is that council chairmen are elected indirectly
in the latter. According to legislation on local elections, all inhabitants of an oblast or raion elect their
local council members, who then elect a council chairman from among their number at the opening
session of the council. This chairman acts as speaker of the council. The council then establishes an
executive office under the chairman to coordinate council commissions. The structure of the executive
office and its senior staff are coordinated and approved by local council members.
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Figure 3.2
Structure of a Municipal Self-government
This system of local self-government, as established by the law, is the exclusive model of political
leadership at the first tier of government. The only exceptions to this are villages with fewer than five
hundred inhabitants, large cities containing city districts and cities with special status. Legislation
provides small villages with the option to vest executive functions in the village head rather than set
up executive committees. The specific features of local self-government in cities containing city
districts and cities with special status are discussed below.
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Most Ukrainian settlements follow a uniform, legally established model of local self-government.
According to the Law on Local Self-government, local councils possess the right to make decisions on
behalf of their communities (article 10), and may form executive bodies such as committees, divisions
and departments to implement their decisions (article 11). These executive bodies are accountable to
the local council, which may exercise control over their activities. The representative and executive
branches of local government act according to the doctrine of separation of powers. The mayor is
elected by the community as the highest public official in the local community (article 12), acts as
speaker of the council and administers the activities of both the local council and its executive bodies,
as stipulated in the Constitution and the Law on Local Self-government. Council secretaries also play
an important role in the political life of settlements.
Figure 3.3
Structure of Local Self-government at the Raion or Oblast Level
In cities which are subdivided into city districts, there are two levels of local self-government, the city
and district levels. The structure of the city self-government follows the model illustrated in figure
3.2. The major difference in the district self-governments is that they lack a directly elected head;
instead, the council elects a chairman from among their number to manage activities of the council
and its executive body. Several cities in Ukraine have recently adopted changes in the structure of
city district administration, generally related to the centralization of government on city territory as
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well as the elimination of city district councils and their executive bodies. These innovations and
prospects for their development are described in more detail in section 10.
In the cities with special status, Kiev and Sevastopol, the system of local self-government coexists
with the system of state administration. For example, the local self-government in Kiev, the capital
of Ukraine, essentially possesses all of the elements found in cities with city districts. The inhabitants
of Kiev elect a mayor, who then manages the Kiev City Council and its executive body. At the city
district level, district councils elect a chairman from their number to act as head. The city state
administration and city district state administrations represent public executive power; their functions
are managed by the mayor and district council chairmen, respectively. The mayor appoints and
dismisses his or her first deputy and other deputies in coordination with the president and the
Cabinet of Ministers, respectively. These appointments are ratified by presidential decree. In addition
to own and delegated authorities, Kiev administration bodies are responsible for the city’s functions
as capital. The Kiev budget is entered in a separate line of the State Budget of Ukraine and has special
requirements for drafting and execution.
Finally, community organizations deserve mention as a component of local self-government.
According to article 14 of the Law on Local Self-government, these organizations may be set up by
citizen initiative or local council decision and may be assigned own authorities, funds and property.
Community organizations play a significant role in the solution of issues of local importance, such as
control over the quality of public services, consumer services and the observance of environmental
requirements and regulations. Since these organizations are established at the initiative of local
inhabitants, they can be classified as a form of direct self-governance.
3. Local Politics, Decision Making
3.1 Forms of Direct Democracy
The Constitution guarantees broad democratic rights to Ukrainian citizens. Article 36 of the
Constitution grants citizens the right to associate freely to form political parties and public organizations,
while article 38 stipulates their right to participate in the administration of public affairs, to take part
in national and local referenda, to elect and to be elected to bodies of public administration and local
self-government. People of Ukraine exercise their power directly and indirectly through public
administration and local self-governments. These provisions are elaborated in the following laws:
• Law on Local Self-government (1997);
• Law on Elections of Local Councils and Village, Township and City Mayors (1998);
• Law on National and Local Referenda (1992).
The Law on Local Self-government specifies several methods of direct democracy, such as local
referenda, general assemblies, local initiatives and public hearings.
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Article 7 of the Law on Local Self-government defines local referenda as a “form of solving issues of
local importance by a territorial community through direct democracy.” Local referenda may be
called to address issues of great importance for a community, such as dismissing the mayor before the
end of his or her term. Decisions made by local referendum are binding on the relevant territory.
General assemblies may be convened to solve issues of lesser impact, but which nonetheless require
that local inhabitants be consulted (article 8). Procedures for general assemblies are defined by
statute of the given community. Decisions made at a general assembly of citizens or their representatives
are regarded as recommendations and are taken into account during the local government decision-
making process. For instance, general assemblies may review draft resolutions to be submitted to the
local council for consideration.
Members of the community have the right to initiate a local council review of any issue related to local
self-government functions; this form of citizen participation is called a “local initiative” (article 9).
The community charter or relevant council decision determines procedures for submitting local
initiatives for council review. Local initiatives must be reviewed by the council in an open session and
the findings are published, as stipulated by the community charter or council decision. A typical local
initiative might be the review of the cost structure of public services or methods for their regulation.
Meetings of council members and municipal officers with community representatives are organized
in the form of public hearings (article 13). Public hearings should be held at least once a year; their
procedures are determined by community charter. Any proposals that result from public hearings must
be reviewed by local self-government bodies. The most popular topics for public hearings in recent
times have been issues of budget drafting and execution.2 Decisions on holding public hearings are made
by the local council. Since there are no clearly defined legal regulations for public hearings, councils
solve any procedural issues independently. Their only requirement concerns criteria for representation.
Other traditional and well-established forms of direct democracy include local elections, the right to
be elected to local councils and the organization of meetings and demonstrations. Less traditional are
mechanisms of informal communication with the citizenry and the organization of joint sports or
cultural events of local importance. Opportunities to involve inhabitants in the management of
public affairs will be discussed in detail in Section 9. In conclusion, it should be noted that the
current level of public participation among Ukrainian citizens is rather low. The only exception is
during elections, which have seen active involvement.
3.2 Internal Structure of Local Government Decision Making
Under the conditions of centralized government that predominated in the USSR, real authority to
influence the social process was vested in local executive bodies. This paradigm remained in the early
stages of Ukrainian independence. With the adoption of the Constitution and the Law on Local
Self-government, however, representative authorities were legally granted precedence over executive
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bodies. Clearly, such cardinal changes in the power structure cannot happen overnight. This will be
a long road, and any progress will reflect the currently dominating political will and the balance of
political forces in society. It is premature to speak about the completion of this process, which is now
ongoing in Ukraine. Consequently, this section will review the general structure of political leadership
at the first tier of local government and the rather fluid decision making pattern before remarking on
the actual state of affairs.
Local council members are elected for a four-year term on the basis of universal, equal and direct
suffrage through secret ballot (article 45). Council members may exercise their powers through
council sessions or standing commissions, which are council bodies formed by members to study,
discuss and draft decisions on certain issues or to exercise control functions (article 47, item 1).
Commission activities are headed by the commission chairman. Commissions have rather broad
authorities, including the right to study the activities of government bodies, committees and
departments under their control and the right to request and receive necessary information from
these bodies and other enterprises and organizations (article 47, item 7). Local councils may also
establish temporary commissions (article 48).
Council sessions are convened when necessary, at least four times annually. Article 46 of the Law on
Local Self-government determines the main procedures for council session activities. Article 26 lists
over fifty responsibilities exclusively assigned to the competence of local councils, which may be
grouped into the following categories:
• to adopt the council agenda, to approve the structure of the executive branch and to appoint
and dismiss its staff;
• to approve development programs, local budgets and budget execution reports, to establish
and amend local taxes and fees and to organize loans;
• to manage and dispose of community property, to oversee the privatization of property, to
regulate the use of land and other natural resources and to approve regulations for territorial
improvement and urban development;
• to establish the municipal militia and other units or services of community and environmental
control.
The executive branch of the local council consists of an executive committee and separate directorates,
departments and services. The executive committee includes the mayor, the deputy mayor, the
executive secretary, heads of directorates, departments, services and other individuals (article 51).
The executive committee is responsible for the preliminary review of draft development programs,
local budgets and other issues to be submitted to the council. It is also responsible for coordinating
the activities of directorates, departments and services (article 52). According to article 53 of the Law
on Local Self-government, executive committees operate primarily through sessions. Heads of
directorates, departments and services are appointed and dismissed by decision of the mayor.
Directorates, departments and services implement decisions, provide public services and maintain
local community interests. Ukrainian legislation regulates their functions by sector. Section 5 discusses
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this issue in greater detail; it suffices to mention here that this sectoral approach impedes the clear
delineation of authorities between local councils, executive bodies of local self-government and
bodies of public administration for most functions.
The model of political governance described above predetermines the mechanisms of decision-
making. According to current Ukrainian legislation, local councils have the right to make decisions in
the interests of local communities. Through the interactions of its standing commissions with various
directorates, departments and services, local councils determine prospects, analyze alternatives and
make political decisions on community development. Executive bodies are enjoined by law to
implement these decisions.
The mayor’s responsibilities are twofold, as chairman of the council and manager of the executive
body. The mayor’s functions as chairman include executing the approved session agenda and
signing council resolutions. Managerial functions include issuing instructions to coordinate the
activities of directorates, departments and services. Special commissions and committees, standing or
temporary, may be established to coordinate individual issues; these commissions include
representatives from all interested parties.
The structure outlined above would indicate sufficient freedom for local self-government bodies to
exercise own authorities. In reality, as will be illustrated in section 5, the bulk of local self-government
activity is focused on implementing delegated authorities. If the degree of freedom depends on the
length of one’s leash, the leash in this instance refers to the financial resources left at the council’s
disposal. Currently, over ninety percent of local budget expenditures are allocated to compulsory,
socially protected expenditures. At the same time, local taxes and fees do not exceed ten percent of
local budget revenues, so all socially protected expenditures must completely depend on transfers
from the national budget. Under such conditions, the executive bodies make decisions de facto,
while the role of council is merely to establish these decisions de jure. In practice, therefore, local
council leadership in determining community development strategies is limited due to the lack of
financial and economic independence. Officially speaking, however, decisions such as approval of
the budget are passed by a majority vote at a council session.
3.3 System of Local Elections
In the course of reforms, Ukraine has transformed from a one-party system to political pluralism.
Officially, fifty-two parties and public associations took part in the elections of January 1998.3  By
August 2000, their number exceeded one hundred. Despite their growth in numbers, only a
handful of parties represent a real political power in society.
At the beginning of the transition period, elections were based on the majority system. The most
recent elections to the Verkhovna Rada in March 1998 were organized according to a mixed majority
and proportional system. Thirty parties and electoral coalitions registered at the Central Election
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Committee (CEC) to contend for 225 seats in Parliament. According to the Law on Elections of
People’s Deputies (1997), representatives of parties which won an electoral margin of over four
percent were eligible for parliamentary seats. According to CEC data, the 225 mandates were
distributed among the leaders of eight parties and coalitions as shown in table 3.1.
Table 3.1
Political Parties in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine4
Political Party Number of Mandates
The Communist Party 84
The People’s Rukh (“Movement”) 32
Coalition of the Socialist Party and the Agrarian Party 29
“For Truth, for the People, for Ukraine”
The Green Party 19
The People’s Democratic Party 17
The All-Ukrainian Association “Gromada” (“Community”) 16
The Progressive Social Party 14
Social-Democratic Party 14
The remaining 225 seats in Parliament were distributed through single-mandate majority districts.
These elections were distinguished by the discrepancy between the results produced by the two
systems of voting, majority and proportional: most seats in the majority districts were won by
independent candidates.5
Procedures for local council elections are established by the Law on Elections of Local Councils and
Village, Township and City Mayors (1998). According to this law, local council elections are based
on a majority system, with candidates nominated by enterprise collectives. Local election committees
register candidates and monitor the election campaign process. Candidates are elected if they receive
over half of the total vote. If none of the candidates obtains a majority of votes, then the election
committee sets another election between the top two candidates. Due to this system of elections,
parties influence local councils indirectly rather than directly.
As a rule, the political platform of a candidate is not a decisive factor for success, although party
influence may be of great assistance during the campaign. This is primarily true of candidates which
are supported by the most influential political parties, listed in table 3.1 above. Political advertising
and direct campaigning are the most efficient mechanisms of party influence on local elections. In
this case, a candidate supported by a given party has the opportunity to utilize the party network
and its additional financial resources. Nevertheless, most candidates technically run as independents,
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despite their party membership. Our research shows that the number of independent candidates for
local councils increases from the oblast to the rural levels. For instance, in the 1998 elections in
Dnepropetrovsk oblast, seventy-five percent of candidates ran as independents for the oblast council,
eighty percent of candidates ran as independents for the Dnepropetrovsk city council and ninety-
five percent ran as independents for township and village councils.
Party influence on the local elections also differs among regions. Parties of communist orientation tend
to prevail in the eastern oblasts, while social democratic parties are more influential in western Ukraine.
Despite the weak influence of parties on the election process, they have significant impact on local
council operations since, after elections, council members unite into factions based on party
membership. Due to the instability of the political structure in Ukraine, members often move from
one party coalition to another.
The size of local councils depends on the population of the administrative-territorial unit (as outlined
below in table 3.2), but cannot exceed two hundred members.
Table 3.2
Size of Local Councils According to Population Size
Population Number of Local Council Members
0–3,000 15–25
3,000–5,000 20–30
5,000–20,000 25–35
20,000–50,000 30–45
50,000–100,000 35–50
100,000–250,000 40–60
250,000–500,000 50–75
500,000–1,000,000 60–90
1,000,000+ 25–120
3.4 Local Government Associations
The Constitution and the Law on Local Self-government stipulate the right of local self-governments
to form voluntary associations. The only stated restriction is that they may not transfer local self-
government authorities to these associations. Communities have the right to pool financial and
economic resources for their joint use, for improving the variety and quality of community services
and for implementing mutually beneficial projects.
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Currently there are over twenty local government associations in Ukraine, based on territorial,
functional and industrial interests. The Association of Ukrainian Cities is the most influential
organization, uniting local self-governments from over 250 cities. Its activities include the following:
• establishing the legal basis for local self-government;
• providing information to improve city government functioning;
• supporting programs for municipal development;
• promoting the interests of municipal servants;
• fostering international cooperation.
The Association of Ukrainian Cities plays an active role in forming the system of governance in
Ukraine. For example, the association developed and adopted the Charter of Ukrainian Cities as well
as producing drafts of several important laws, including the Law on Local Self-government, the Law
on Local Public Administration, the Law on Community Property and others. In recent years, the
Association of Ukrainian Cities has held six national hearings on the most urgent issues of municipal
reform. Due to the activity of association members, Ukraine was represented at the European Association
of Local and Regional Governments.
4. Functional Structure of Local Government
The structure of local self-government consists of three components: the council, its executive
committee and the mayor. Following is a review of their functions.
The local council, acting within its assigned authority, adopts legal acts in the form of council
decisions, which are binding for all enterprises and organizations located within the given territory
(article 59). Council decisions are adopted at plenary sessions and take effect upon their official
publication or as determined in the decision. State control over local council decisions should not
entail the interference of central government bodies in council activities within their authority
(article 20). The mayor may suspend a council decision in the first five days after its adoption and
send it for a second review by the local council (article 59).
The executive committee, acting within its assigned authority, makes decisions in order to implement
local council decisions. If the mayor disagrees with an executive committee decision, he or she may
suspend the decision and submit it for review by the council. Committee decisions adopted within
its authority may be canceled by the local council (article 59). The executive committee consists of
departments, services and directorates.
The mayor issues instructions within his or her competence and signs decisions passed by the council
or by the executive committee.
Local inhabitants are informed of decisions passed by their local self-government. The community
has the right to exercise control over the decisions of the council, executive committee and mayor
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through different forms of community participation in the decision making process. Courts exercise
control over the compliance of local self-government decisions with the Constitution and laws of
Ukraine. Financial activities of local self-governments are controlled by fiscal organizations, such as
the State Treasury and the Control and Auditing Department. There is no administrative control as
such over local council activities by higher-level councils. However, because local executive bodies
are dually subordinated to local councils and to the state administration, they fall under the
administrative control of the relevant divisions of local state administration.
Most local self-government decisions are related to public service provision, necessitating cooperation
between local self-governments and local enterprises. Enterprises in community ownership are
subordinated to local self-governments, accountable to and controllable by them (article 17).
Relationships with enterprises that are not in community ownership are formed on a contractual
basis or regulated through taxation (article 18).
5. Public Service Provision
As mentioned above, local self-government functions are divided into own authorities, performed
on behalf of community inhabitants, and delegated authorities, exercised on behalf of the state. As
seen in table 3A.8, most public services are distributed among different levels of government in
accordance with the principle of deconcentration. The Law on Local Self-government specifies the
authorities of local authorities by sphere of activity. Table 3.3 below lists all functions of local self-
government, grouped by sphere and subdivided into own and delegated responsibilities.
Table 3.3
Local Government Responsibilities in Public Service Delivery
Own Authorities Delegated Authorities
MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Managing and disposing Consultation regarding the nomination
of community property of managers of state-owned enterprises
Establishing procedures and exercising
control over the use of revenues
HOUSING, TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNAL FACILITIES
Managing and maintaining local facilities Supporting the improvement of housing
and communal facilities, transport and
communications
Registering inhabitants in need of housing Control over the operation of local facilities
Registering housing construction cooperatives Protecting consumer rights
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Local Government Responsibilities in Public Service Delivery
Own Authorities Delegated Authorities
Supplying facilities with heating, gas, Registering housing stock, providing social
electricity and water housing and exercising control over
housing registration
Waste collection and utilization, Registering non-residential property
municipal improvement and other real estate objects
Organizing markets
Establishing working schedules
for the given services and a community
transportation schedule
SETTLEMENT CONSTRUCTION AND PLANNING
Organizing construction, renovation and Overseeing maintenance of the land cadastre,
repair of community property objects construction and architectural control
Allocating land for urban planning and Preserving historical, cultural and
development, drafting and approving architectural monuments
general urban development plans
Issuing construction licenses
EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE, CULTURE, SPORTS AND TOURISM
Managing related local facilities Ensuring that education and medical services
are available and free
Establishing conditions for raising children, Developing all kinds of services related
facilitating secondary and vocational education to education, health care, culture,
sports and tourism
Providing free transportation Providing medicine to special categories
for schoolchildren of citizens
Creating conditions for creative activities, Registering children for pre-school and
developing handicraft and home industries primary school, organizing work with youths
and orphans, ensuring state maintenance
for special categories of children
Organizing medical services and catering in Resolving issues concerning the specific rights
organizations of the social and cultural sphere of special categories of the population
(pensioners, youths, the disabled and
students) to use certain facilities
Ensuring conditions for sports
in residential areas
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Local Government Responsibilities in Public Service Delivery
Own Authorities Delegated Authorities
REGULATION OF LAND RELATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Determining rates for the land tax and fees Control over compliance with land and
for the use of natural resources environmental legislation
Approving environmental programs Registering land ownership, organizing the
land cadastre and resolving land disputes
Organizing natural reserves and sanctuaries Taking measures to eliminate the consequences
of catastrophes and natural disasters
Coordinating land development projects
Allocating territory for waste disposal
SOCIAL SECURITY
Establishing additional guarantees Approving employment and social security
programs, organizing public works
Providing assistance to certain Improving the life and financial conditions
categories of inhabitants of special categories of the population and
providing benefits
Organizing hostels, specific medical services, Assistance to victims of natural disasters
catering and ritual services for certain
categories of inhabitants
Control over the provision of social security
to workers and employees, registering
collective agreements
Employment assistance for inhabitants
in need of social protection
LAW ENFORCEMENT, MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER AND PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Establishing a municipal militia Reviewing citizens’ appeals
Rendering assistance to law enforcement Maintaining public order in times of
bodies, courts and lawyers natural disaster
Deciding on the organization of public
meetings and demonstrations
Reviewing issues on administrative violations
Registering acts of civil status, businesses
and public organizations (NGOs)
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As shown in table 3.3, local self-government powers are often vaguely formulated and are not
structured in accordance with the established breakdown of functions. Consequently, it becomes
difficult to clearly distribute responsibilities between local self-governments of different levels in
terms of public service provision. Financial and material resources are correspondingly distributed in
an equally indeterminate manner. Only a small proportion of services has one explicitly defined
provider; generally these are services in the spheres of communal services or education. Annex 3.4
presents the distribution of public services in more detail.
Current legislation grants broad rights to local self-governments in determining the method of service
delivery. They may pool the material and financial resources of different communities in order to set
up additional services and organs (article 60). They may also delegate the provision of some services
to the private sector in the interests of improving quality and more efficiently utilizing community
resources. Additionally, they may choose to provide these services jointly with the private sector.
The existing methods of service delivery may be classified as follows:
• traditional (budgetary organizations or municipal services);
• alternative (contracting to private companies, concessions or consumer associations);
• joint ventures (cooperating with local governments or partnerships with the commercial sector).
Activities such as waste collection, territorial development, maintenance of housing stock, transportation
and communication provide examples of cooperation between local governments and between the
private and public sectors. Mechanisms of cooperation depend on the specific service. For example,
a local government may sign a contract with a private company for the provision of waste disposal
services, in which it specifies the quality and cost of services. These services are paid for by inhabitants;
a special local organization collects payments and transfers them to the private company. In the case
of transportation, local authorities issue licenses to private companies to provide services. The license
specifies all necessary conditions and privileges. The private company then retains the prerogative to
determine service costs and collect fees.
The concept for administrative reform determines two main areas of service provision: state services
provided by public administration bodies and municipal services provided by local self-governments.
Within these two areas, functions are further subdivided.
6. Local Finance, Local Property
6.1 Local Budgets
The system of local budgets differs for the municipal and regional levels of local government. At the
municipal level, local self-governments independently draft, approve and implement local budgets
(article 61). The independence of local budgets is guaranteed by own and allocated state revenues
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and local governments possess the right to independently determine the areas of budget expenditures.
The state supports local self-governments, provides some financial resources to local budgets to cover
basic social needs and exercises control over the legality, appropriateness and efficiency of their use
(article 62).
Local budgets consist of revenues and expenditures. Local budget revenues are divided into funds
for the exercise of own authorities and funds for implementing delegated authorities. In addition,
local budget revenues may be classified as funds for current expenditures (administrative budget)
and development funds (capital budget) (article 63).
Local budget expenditures are allocated to maintain the needs of territorial communities and are
structured similarly to local revenues. Expenditures may be classified as current expenditures for
administration or capital expenditures for development. Administrative expenditures are allocated
to organizations funded by the budget, whereas capital expenditures go towards the financing of
local social and economic development programs, investments and their long-term maintenance.
Local budget expenditures are also classified according to funds spent for the exercise of own
authorities, and funds spent for the implementation of delegated authorities (article 64).6
At the regional level, local self-government budgets are not fully independent. Although raion and
oblast councils approve local budgets, they are drafted and executed by raion and oblast state
administrations. According to the Law on Local Self-government, these budgets are formed from
two sources:
• state budget funds intended for redistribution among territorial communities within the raion
or oblast;
• funds that are transferred to the regional budget through contracts with municipal budgets,
which are intended for the implementation of joint social, economic and cultural programs or
other projects (article 61).7
Table 3.4 below demonstrates the importance of revenues and expenditures of local budgets of all
levels in the consolidated budget.
Table 3.4
Local Revenues and Expenditures [percentage of GDP)]8
1995 1996 1997 1998
Consolidated revenues 37.9 37.1 38.3 35.9
Local revenues (regional and municipal levels) 18.0 14.9 15.5 14.4
Consolidated expenditures 44.9 39.9 44.9 38.0
Local expenditures 17.9 14.9 15.4 14.5
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The state is required by law to compensate local self-government expenditures for the exercise of
delegated state authorities (article 67). Local self-governments are granted the right to participate in
financial relationships, to take out loans, to issue local loans and to establish communal banks (article
70). They are also permitted to create extra-budgetary funds (article 68).9
6.2 Revenues
Local budget revenues are divided into tax and non-tax revenues. The first category includes local
taxes and fees, as well as the share of national taxes allocated to the local budget. The second category
includes all types of transfers from the national and subnational budgets.
The composition of taxes allocated from the national budget is established for oblasts, the ARC and
the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol (in total, twenty-seven territorial units). Between 1995 and 1999,
this rate was established on an annual basis. The aim of these allocations is to ensure financial
equalization and achieve uniformity in revenue sources for different oblasts. The following national
taxes and fees are allocated to administrative-territorial units of the subnational level:
• personal income tax;
• enterprise profit tax;
• excise tax on local goods;
• land fee;
• trade patent fee;
• tax on motor vehicles;
• tax on home industries;
• proceeds from privatization of state-owned and community property;
• stamp duty;
• fines for environmental pollution;
• fees for the maintenance and development of roads.
Only some of these taxes are entirely transferred to subnational budgets; in most cases, local budgets
receive a fixed percentage. For instance, local budgets received eighty percent of the proceeds from
privatization in 1998 and ninety percent in 1999. The Law on National Budget establishes these
percentages annually for three major taxes and fees. These rates may vary between one hundred
percent and ten percent. For example, national taxes transferred to Dnepropetrovsk oblast in 1999
were allocated at the following rates: one hundred percent of personal income tax, thirty percent of
enterprise profit tax and fifty percent of excise tax on local goods. Deductions from taxes and fees
dominate in the structure of local budget revenues, amounting up to eighty-five percent.
The structure of subnational local budget revenues is presented in the table 3.5.
In addition to deductions from national taxes and fees, local budgets also possess local taxes and fees.
The Law on Local Taxes and Fees currently regulates this issue. The list of local taxes and fees was
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established by the Cabinet of Ministers in 1993 and is supplemented by the Law on Taxation
System. They include the following:
• hotel fees;
• parking fees;
• market fees;
• duty on the issue of housing billets;
• fee for pet owners;
• resort fee;
• race course fees;
• duties on horse race prizes;
• duties on bookmaker’s activities;
• advertising tax;
• fee for the use of local symbols;
• fee for shooting videos or films;
• fee for organizing local auctions and lotteries;
• communal tax;
• auto transport tax for border crossings;
• fees for licensing trade outlets;
• tax on the sale of imported goods.
Table 3.5
Structure of Subnational Local Budget Revenues [percent]10
1995 1996 1997 1998
National taxes distributed among territories, 87 88 79 83
including:
Regulated taxes 77 74 65 68
Fixed (allocated) taxes 10 14 14 15
Local taxes and dues 1 2 2 3
State budget transfers 12 10 17 14
Total 100 100 100 100
The law requires local self-governments to utilize all listed local taxes and fees. In reality, only some
of these taxes are economically justified, given the existing tax rates; these revenues generally do not
cover the costs of their collection. The most important local taxes and fees are the communal tax,
market fee, parking fee and hotel fee. These taxes represent an extremely small part of the local
budget structure, accounting for just five percent. Only in a few settlements do local taxes and fees
exceed ten percent of local revenues.
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Market fees and the communal tax are the most stable sources of own revenues, comprising some
eighty percent of all local taxes and fees. Since tax rates are centrally determined, local self-governments
only have influence in assessing local taxes.
The category of own financial resources is key in the system of local finance. These are resources over
which local self-governments have a degree of control and which they can independently plan and
spend. This category includes local taxes and fees, as well as deductions from national taxes distributed
to local governments at established rates. As shown in table 3.5 above, own resources account for less
than twenty percent of total local budget revenues. This number roughly reflects the degree of
independence that local self-governments possess in planning, drafting and using their financial
resources. In other words, the degree to which budget funds are centralized—that is, the degree of
state influence on the financial and budgetary activities of local self-governments—is over eighty
percent.
Table 3.6 below presents the structure of revenues of local budgets, excluding transfers such as
grants or subventions from the state budget.
Table 3.6
Structure of Local Budget Revenues Excluding State Transfers [percent]11
1992 1995
Enterprise profit tax 26.3 41.0
VAT 35.6 34.8
Personal income tax 25.6 9.9
Excise tax 5.4 1.2
Local taxes and fees — 1.5
Other tax revenues 0.5 0.6
Fees, including land fees and proceeds from privatization 2.9 7.2
Other revenues 3.7 3.8
Total 100.0 100.0
3.3 Expenditures
According to current Ukrainian budget classifications, local budget expenditures are divided into
the following items:
• public administration, including expenditures on local self-government and maintaining bodies
of fiscal control and of the treasury;
• national defense, including the financing of local civil defense units;
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• maintenance of public order and protection of rights, including the financing of local
departments of the interior and the state road police;
• education;
• health care, including the provision of services to special categories of citizens;
• social security and social services;
• housing and communal services, including donations and capital repairs;
• culture and arts;
• mass media;
• physical culture and sports;
• construction, including tax credits;
• implementation of land reform;
• transport, maintenance of roads and communications;
• environmental protection activities;
• others, including the contingency fund.
Table 3.7
Structure of Local Budget Expenditures by Type of Local Government, 1997 [percent]12
Oblasts Cities of Raions Cities of Townships Villages
Oblast Sub- Raion Sub-
ordination ordination
1. Social and cultural 38.1 55.1 65.0 66.8 75.6 80.1
expenditures
• Education 12.1 28.1 31.9 58.8 64.9 62.4
• Health care 23.4 25.2 30.1 6.0 7.9 11.8
• Culture 2.6 1.8 3.0 2.0 2.8 5.9
2. Social security 26.6 29.5 28.0 10.2 4.2 1.3
3. Housing and 4.7 6.5 1.8 14.8 9.3 1.0
communal services
4. Administration 0.2 2.5 0.4 4.4 7.2 16.0
5. Assignments to
the state budget 16.7 0 0 0 0 0
6. Budget loans 2.3 0.1 1.0 0 0 0.1
7. Other 5.5 3.7 2.8 2.3 2.1 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
State share in the  34.0 37.0 21.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
funding of local
self-government
expenditures
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The size of expenditures in a given category reflects the current distribution of service provision
responsibilities between the levels of government. Table 3.7 presents the distribution of local budget
expenditures by level of government, according to area of service.
As shown in table 3.7, local budget expenditures have a pronounced social orientation. Over fifty
percent of oblast budget expenditures and over seventy-five percent of city budget expenditures are
related to the provision of services in the spheres of education, health care and social security. At the
lower levels of government, the share of social expenditures in the structure of local budgets is
increasing. In total, over ninety percent of local budget funds at the municipal level are spent to
provide public services to territorial communities.
Expenditures on social security and health protection are mainly funded from oblast and raion
budgets, as well as those of cities of oblast subordination. In contrast, expenditures on education are
higher for municipal self-governments. Table 3.8 below presents the structure of local budget
expenditures from 1995 to 1998. Since existing budget classifications do not specify expenditures
on the capital budget, they are not reflected in the statistical data.
Table 3.8
Structure of Local Budget Expenditures [percent]13
1995 1996 1997 1998
1. Social and cultural expenditures 51 52 53 50
• Education 23 24 26 25
• Health protection 25 24 24 23
• Culture 3 3 3 2
2. Social security 28 27 26 18
3. Housing and communal services 8 7 5 8
4. Administration 3 4 2 3
5. Assignments to the state budget 2 3 6 3
6. Other 7 5 7 18
Total 100 100 100 100
6.4 Budget Process
The Law on the Budget System defines the budget process as the drafting, review, approval and
execution of budgets of all levels. The law also stipulates procedures for fiscal and budgetary control.
The Cabinet of Ministers informs executive bodies in oblasts, the ARC and the cities of Kiev and
Sevastopol of the draft figures for allocations, rates for deductions from state taxes, grants and
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subventions. On the basis of these forecast indicators, the above-mentioned local administrations
prepare draft budgets for the coming year and submit them to the local council for review by 10
December. The local council must then review and approve the local budget before 30 December.14
Control over local budget implementation is vested in the local councils. However, local executive
committees, local state administrations and the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine together perform
control over income and the use of financial resources allocated from the state budget. In recent
times, the State Treasury has been vested with the authority to control cash flow in budgets of all levels.
The government of Ukraine, in particular the Ministry of Finance, has been implementing an active
policy to significantly limit the use of non-monetary settlements in the budget and between budgets
of different levels. Consistent efforts in this area have resulted in a noticeable decrease of barter
transactions in the financial sector and have created an environment for legally prohibiting all forms
of non-monetary settlements.
6.5 Local Property
Currently, there is no separate law which regulates local property rights, although several draft laws
are under review by the Verkhovna Rada. The general framework for community property is determined
in the Constitution and the Law on Local Self-government. Article 41 of the Constitution guarantees
the right of citizens to use objects of community property, while article 60 of the Law on Local Self-
government establishes that the community is the possessor of ownership rights over local property.
Local self-governments have the right to own, manage and dispose of community property on
behalf of their respective community. They exercise this right through local council decisions, such
as programs for the privatization of local property. The specially created community property fund
is responsible for the immediate implementation of privatization programs. Methods of privatization
include the issue of shares, usually for large objects, or sale by auction or tender, usually for small and
medium-sized objects.
Local property includes movable and immovable property; local budget revenues; land and natural
resources; communal enterprises, services and organizations; and housing and communal objects.
Communities may acquire property through transfer from state ownership and or through purchase
by the community. Objects of local property may be united on a contractual basis in order to
implement joint projects. Raion and oblast councils administer objects in the joint ownership of
different communities.
Most local property consists of objects transferred from the state, in a process that was implemented
both slowly and controversially from about 1991 to 1995. At that time, it was possible to transfer
large state-owned social, cultural and communal objects, such as hospitals, into the ownership of
oblast and raion councils. It is now necessary to clarify the status of such objects.
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Legislation allows local self-governments to utilize community property in order to provide municipal
services and create conditions for community development. Local self-governments may accordingly
sell or lease these objects; create new communal enterprises and services based on these objects; or grant
concessions. Forms of cooperation between local authorities and private companies for the common
use of community property have recently been increasing. Legislation requires that all transactions
involving community property should not be to the detriment of local self-government finances.
The process of establishing community property remains incomplete, leaving many issues related to
the administration of these objects unresolved.
7. Relationship between the State Administration
and Local Self-governments
Relations between the state administration and local self-governments are based on the accepted
distribution of authorities to provide own and delegated public services.
Local self-governments execute own authorities autonomously and independently. The state
administration has the authority to control the legality of local self-government decisions and the
suitable use of financial resources, but does not otherwise have the power to control the appropriateness
of local self-government decisions made within their competence. If local council decisions violate
legislation, presidential decrees or government resolutions, then they may be cancelled by the state
administration. Unfortunately, this control is exercised not through the system of administrative courts
(still under construction in Ukraine), but directly by state officials. For example, State Treasury officials
can prohibit the transfer of funds from local budgets if they discover violations of procedures or
mechanisms established by the government.
The state exercises control over the performance of delegated authorities by local self-governments
and allocates funds for their implementation. Executive committees operate under a kind of dual
subordination with respect to their delegated authorities. Since delegated authorities often outnumber
own authorities, the principle of dual subordination prevails in the relations between local self-
governments and the state administration.
In addition, local self-governments at the regional level delegate most of their executive functions to
local state administrations. Raion and oblast councils control the implementation of these functions,
but they are performed by local state administrations.
Thus, the principle of dual subordination permeates the relationship between local self-governments
and the state administration. Most divisions of local executive committees are controlled by and
accountable to both the local council and the respective division of local state administration.
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Let us turn to the example of education in a city of oblast subordination. The city department of
education, a structural division of the city executive committee, is responsible for educational services.
In the oblast, however, this is the responsibility of the education department of the oblast state
administration. Like all services, educational services are divided into own and delegated authorities.
The city department of education is subordinated to the mayor in fulfilling decisions of the city
council, and subordinated to the chairman of the oblast department for implementation of delegated
authorities.
Thus, relationships between the local self-governments and central government bodies are based on
administrative subordination rather than cooperation. Local self-governments are not independent
even when executing own authorities, since their financial resources are controlled by the central
government.
8. Local Government Employees
The Law on Public Service (1993) regulates the legal status of public servants, their conditions of
service, conditions for terminating their service and their material and social benefits. Article 1
defines public servants as persons who hold certain positions in state organs, who fulfill organizational,
administrative, consultative and deliberative functions and who receive salaries from state funds.
Article 4 of the Law on Public Service stipulates that all citizens of Ukraine have equal opportunities
for entering public service. In order to implement state policy on public service, the Chief Department
of Public Service was created under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Service commences with
the administration of the Oath of Public Service of Ukraine (article 17).
Public service positions are divided into seven grades, with the first being the highest and the
seventh being the lowest, according to article 25 of the Law on Public Service. Each grade is sub-
divided into three ranks, with a total of fifteen ranks (article 26). Service is terminated either through
dismissal or retirement (articles 30 and 31). Public servants are restricted from committing
actions prohibited by the Law on Corruption, political affiliation and participating in strikes. The
Chief Department of Public Service is the highest administrative and supervisory body of public
service.
Currently, there is no law that specifically regulates municipal service. The Law on Local Self-
government defines a local self-government official as a person who holds a position in the local self-
government, who fulfills organizational, administrative, consulting or deliberative functions and
who receives a salary from local budget funds. Local self-government employees, including mayors,
have equivalent status to the corresponding grades and ranks of public service.
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Public servants, including municipal employees, are appointed on a competitive basis subsequent to
the public announcement of the opening. A special commission reviews the applications, conducts
interviews and recommends a candidate to the hiring manager. The manager then issues an order
affirming the appointment of the public employee. The new employee must take the Oath of Public
Service within a month of being appointed.
There currently exists a uniform system for the training and continuing education of public and
municipal employees. The main source of public and municipal service professionals is the Ukrainian
Academy of Public Administration, under the Office of the President. Academy graduates receive a
Master of Public Administration degree and are given preference for any openings in public service.
All public employees should undergo refresher courses with special curricula at least once every five
years. For this purpose, every oblast has regional centers for the advanced training of public servants.
Groups are sent for training courses by decision of the government head in coordination with the
manager of a regional training center. On completion of the course, students receive a certificate of
advanced training.
The level of training and qualification directly influences the career of public servants. As a rule,
employees with an MPA diploma and a certificate of advanced training are preferred for promotion.
Party affiliation may also indirectly influence the career of an employee. Promotions are made after
employee assessments, which are regulated by law and required at least once every five years. Assessment
results confirm whether an employee meets the requirements for his or her position. If employees
pass, they may be promoted or listed in the top management reserve; if not, they may be dismissed
from office.
In addition to government and self-government employees, there is a special category of citizens who
receive salaries from the state budget. They are classified as state employees, and include doctors,
teachers, workers in culture and arts and socially protected categories of the population. Their status
is determined in special laws and regulatory documents. Table 3A.7 demonstrates the increase in the
number of public servants in Ukraine between 1994 and 1999.
9. Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
The right of local self-governments to independently execute their responsibilities is guaranteed by
the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. The Law on Local Self-government specifically stipulates the
right of local self-governments and their officials to appeal violations of these rights in court. Acts of
local self-government bodies and officials adopted within their competence are binding for all local
government bodies, enterprises and organizations located within the territory of the local government
(article 73 of the Law on Local Self-government).
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Local self-government bodies and officials are responsible for their activities to their communities. If
local self-governments should violate the Constitution or the laws of Ukraine, the community has
the right to dissolve the local government before the end of its term (article 75). The local council
may be terminated by a local referendum, initiated by the mayor upon the request of at least ten
percent of all local inhabitants. The mayor may be dismissed in case of personal resignation, the
termination of his or her citizenship, a court ruling declaring his or her incompetence, a court
conviction or death (article 79). Based on these grounds, the mayor may be dismissed from office by
local referendum or by a two-thirds vote of local council members. The Verkhovna Rada decides
upon special elections of the local council or the mayor.
It is planned to develop a system of administrative courts designed to protect the rights and freedoms
of citizens on issues related to executive power and local self-government. This system of administrative
courts is expected to consist of the Supreme Administrative Court, local administrative courts and
appellate courts.
10. Next Steps in the Transition Process
No government body has been established to address issues of developing local self-governments
and local public administration. The need to create such a body, whether in the form of a separate
ministry, department or commission, has been actively discussed. Its advocates point to the necessity
to increase coordination of efforts and control over public administration reforms. Their opponents,
on the other hand, fear that this will only reduce the already tenuous autonomy of local and regional
governments.
This issue has been partially resolved by the Presidential Decree on the Establishment of the
Coordination Commission on Administrative Reform in Ukraine, adopted in 1997. The main
outcome of commission’s activities was the adoption of the Administrative Reform Concept, which
determines prospects for the further development of the system of executive power.
According to this concept, administrative reform is to be implemented in three stages. The objective
of the first stage is to develop and adopt concepts and programs for reform (1998–1999). The
second stage focuses on creating the organizational and legislative basis to reform key components of
the public administration system (1999–2001). In the third stage, existing structures will be reformed
and new organizational structures will be created (2001–2004).
The major direction of reform will be to harmonize the distribution of public service responsibilities
between local public administrations and local self-governments, to redistribute financial and material
resources accordingly and to implement administrative-territorial reform. These three directions are
discussed in further detail below.15
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10.1  Distribution of Authorities
Reform of the distribution of responsibilities for public service delivery will be based on the principles
of decentralization and subsidiarity. Major goals of reform in local public administrations will include:
• increased efficiency in the execution of state policy at the territorial level;
• improved quality of state-provided services and the realization of the rights and freedoms of
citizens;
• the harmonization of state and local interests, taking into account specific features of territorial
development;
• support for establishing and developing local self-governments based on the clear differentiation
of their functions.
Oblast state administrations will increase the efficiency of control and supervisory functions while
reducing the number of executive functions. At the same time, they are to reinforce the administrative
and executive functions of raion state administrations. Heads of oblast administrations and their first
deputies will be accorded the status of political officials rather than government employees. Their
responsibilities will primarily be to implement state policy in the given region, with due consideration
of its specific features.
The powers of local self-governments will be extended in order to provide the necessary range and
quality of municipal services. They will receive real independence, autonomy and responsibility in
the conduct of their activities. The number of own local authorities will increase, with a corresponding
reduction in the number of delegated authorities.
In addition, the system of public service will be reformed. Three types of government positions will
be established: political, patronage and administrative. Only officials holding patronage and administra-
tive positions will be considered public servants. For every position, the responsibilities and terms of
reference will be clearly determined. Major goals of public service reform include strengthening
ethical norms, improving the administrative culture within government bodies and increasing public
confidence in government employees. In addition, steps will be taken to improve the system for
recruiting, training, motivating and promoting government employees. Municipal service will also
be established as an integral component of public service.
In order to implement these reforms, the legal environment must be improved through amending
existing legislation and adopting new laws.
10.2  Redistribution of Resources16
Establishing an autonomous system of local self-government system is impossible without the reform
of inter-budgetary relations. The new system will be based on a unified budget, incorporating
certain elements of budgetary federalism, and will require the following reforms:
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• delineating revenues and expenditures of different level budgets;
• delineating central and local taxes, as well as the taxation authorities of different levels of
government;
• allocating a portion of central taxes to territorial communities.
Realizing the proposed changes will require new tools for the establishment of inter-budgetary
relations. Instead of the existing financial equalization mechanisms, which are based on regulated
revenues and norms for deductions, it is now planned to utilize the categories of own and transferred
revenues, which will be fixed for an extended period of time. These mechanisms will increase the
level of self-sufficiency up to eighty or ninety-five percent. Subsidies from the state budget are to
become the main instrument for financial equalization, and will directly fund delegated authorities.
Subventions will acquire the character of investments in territorial development. All other financial
relationships between different tiers of government will take the form of budget loans. This set of
tools for inter-budgetary relations will lead to a more just redistribution of state budget funds as well
as a more transparent and predictable system. Significant efforts will be made to prevent non-
monetary settlements between budgets of all levels.
Own and transferred revenues as well as transfers will be calculated according to an algorithm that
takes into account minimum social standards for the public services provided by the different
governments. Implementation of these reforms clearly requires amendments to existing legislation
and the adoption of new laws.17
10.3  Administrative-territorial Reform18
The administrative-territorial structure of Ukraine will be reformed in order to create conditions for
improving the efficiency of public administration and local self-governments.
In order to increase the efficiency of public administration, it is necessary to develop and implement
a state regional policy, possibly by selecting five to seven pilot regions which possess sufficient
economic and production potential. According to this concept, the number of oblasts and raions will
be reduced. Local state administrations will be the conduits of state regional policy and will attempt to
combine it with the interests of the regions. Issues of regional policy are currently under intense
debate; although several concepts have been drafted, the final model has not yet been adopted.
In another move to increase the efficiency of local government, the number of municipalities will be
reduced. This should be accomplished through the voluntary merging of municipalities. This
process, termed “municipal reform,” will improve the financial, economic, organizational and human
resource capabilities of local self-governments to provide quality services. A concept for its implemen-
tation has already been developed, although the Verkhovna Rada must pass the necessary resolutions
to expedite the process of municipal reform.
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Another major direction of municipal reform is improving the model of self-government within
settlements. Recently, several Ukrainian cities, such as Lvov, Zaporozhje and Mariupol, have introduced
significant innovations into their systems of city administration. These cities, which are divided into
districts, have decided to establish city district administrations in place of city district councils and
executive committees. These administrations have been authorized to execute decisions of the city
council and the city executive committee as well as manage community property located in the city
districts. Heads of these administrations were appointed by the city mayor.
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E-mail: cppinfo@usukraine.kiev.ua
Administrative Reform Research Center
Address: 20 Eugene Pottier St., Kiev
Phone: (+380-44) 446-0452
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Glossary of Terms
Cabinet of Ministers — The highest body in the Ukrainian system of executive power
Local self-government — The right and real capability of a territorial community, guaranteed by
the state, to resolve issues of local importance within the framework of
the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, either independently or through
local self-government bodies and officials
Mayor — The highest official in communities such as villages, townships or cities
Raion and oblast councils — Local self-government bodies that represent the common
interests of territorial communities in raions and oblasts
Representative local self-government body — A council consisting of elected members, with the right
to represent the interests of a territorial community and
make decisions on its behalf in accordance with the law
Territorial gromada — A community of inhabitants united by permanent residence within the
same administrative-territorial unit.
Verkhovna Rada — The Parliament, or legislative body of Ukraine
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Annex 3.1
Major General Indicators
Area 603,700 square kilometers
Population (as of 1 January 1999) 50,100,000
Population density 83 people per square kilometer
Table 3A.1
Population in Ukraine by Place of Residence and Gender, 1989–199919
1989 1991 1996 1997 1998 1999
Place of Residence [millions] 51.7 51.9 51.3 50.9 50.5 50.1
Urban 34.6 35.1 34.8 34.5 34.3 34.0
Rural 17.1 16.8 16.5 16.4 16.2 16.1
Place of Residence [percent of total population]
Urban 67 68 68 68 68 68
Rural 33 32 32 32 32 32
Gender [millions]
Male 23.9 24.1 23.9 23.7 23.5 23.3
Female 27.8 27.8 27.4 27.2 27.0 26.8
Gender [percent of total population]
Male 46 46 47 47 47 47
Female 54 54 53 53 53 53
Population (1998)
Pensioners 14,500,000
School-age children 840,000
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Table 3A.2
Population in Ukraine by Age and Place of Residence, 199820
[thousands] [%]
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
AGE
0–1 437.6 271.8 165.8 0.9 0.8 1.0
1–4 2,004.3 1,257.3 747.0 4.0 3.7 4.6
5–9 3,312.4 2,206.9 1,105.5 6.6 6.5 6.8
10–14 3,888.5 2,629.2 1,259.3 7.7 7.7 7.7
15–19 3,640.1 2,575.9 1,064.2 7.2 7.6 6.5
20–24 3,6281. 2,568.6 1,059.5 7.2 7.6 6.5
25–29 3,429.9 2,451.4 978.5 6.8 7.2 6.0
30–34 3,420.5 2,413.6 1,006.9 6.8 7.1 6.2
35–39 3,949.8 2,867.6 1,082.2 7.9 8.4 6.7
40–44 3,681.5 2,717.5 964.0 7.3 8.0 6.0
45–49 3,516.9 2,605.5 911.4 7.0 7.7 5.6
50–54 2,250.3 1,583.4 666.9 4.5 4.7 4.1
55–59 3,288.7 2,158.6 1,130.1 6.6 6.3 7.0
60–64 2,760.3 1,723.5 1,036.8 5.5 5.1 6.4
65–69 2,574.4 1,497.0 1,077.4 5.1 4.4 6.6
70+ 4,461.9 2,453.4 2,008.5 8.9 7.2 12.3
Total 50,245.2 33,981.2 16,264.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
AGE  CATEGORY
Below economically 10,384.2 6,872.3 3,511.9 20.7 20.2 21.6
active age
Economically 28,208.1 20,222.5 7,985.6 56.1 59.5 49.1
active age
Above economically 11,652.9 6,886.4 4,766.5 23.2 20.3 29.3
active age
Total 50,245.2 33,981.2 16,264.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 3A.3
Major Social and Economic Indicators21
1996 1997 1998
GDP in real prices  [UAH millions] 81,519 93,365 103,869
Per capita GDP [UAH] 1,595 1,842 2,065
Consolidated state budget [UAH millions] 30,218.7 28,112.0 28,441.1
Expenditures [UAH millions] 34,182.8 34,312.7 30,506.4
Deficit [UAH millions] 3,964.1 6,200.7 2,065.3
Investments in the basic capital, 12.6 11.5 12.0
compared to 1996 prices [UAH billions]
Per capita GDP (1998) USD 1,087
Consolidated state budget (1998) UAH 28,441.1 million
Revenues as a proportion of GDP (1998) 27.8 percent
Expenditures as a proportion of GDP (1998) 30.0 percent
Table 3A.4
State and State-guaranteed Foreign Debt [millions USD]22
1995 1996 1997 31 August 1998
8,217 8,839 9,555 10,243
Unemployment rate (1998) 11.3 percent
Inflation rate (1998) 20.0 percent
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Table 3A.5
Consumer Price Index23
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Times [%]
Consumer price index 21.0 102.6 5.0 2.8 1.4 110.1 120.0
Food items 17.9 121.8 4.7 2.5 1.2 114.1 122.1
Non-food items 21.1 112.0 4.7 2.2 1.2 102.9 124.1
Paid services 35.9 92.1 8.8 5.8 2.1 107.9 113.0
Price index of 27.6 37.8 10.2 5.7 1.7 108.3 105.4
capital investments
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Annex 3.2
Population, Settlements and Administrative Units24
Table 3A.6
Number of Administrative-territorial Units by Region
Raions Cities City Townships Rural
Districts Settlements
Total Cities of
Central and
Oblast Sub-
ordination
Autonomous 14 16 11 3 56 957
Republic of Crimea
City of Kiev — 1 1 14 1 —
City of Sevastopol — 2 1 4 1 29
Vinnitsa oblast 27 17 4 3 30 1,467
Volyn oblast 16 11 4 — 22 1,053
Dnepropetrovsk obl. 22 20 13 18 48 1,441
Donetsk oblast 18 51 28 21 134 1,122
Zhytomir oblast 23 9 4 2 45 1,631
Zakarpatje oblast 13 10 3 — 2– 579
Zaporozhje oblast 20 14 5 7 23 921
Ivano-Frankovsk obl. 14 15 5 — 24 765
Kiev oblast 25 25 11 — 30 1,221
Kirovograd oblast 21 12 4 2 26 1,024
Lugansk oblast 18 37 14 4 109 792
Lvov oblast 20 43 7 5 34 1,854
Nikolayev oblast 19 9 5 4 17 908
Odessa oblast 26 19 7 8 33 1,139
Poltava oblast 25 15 5 5 21 1,854
Rovno oblast 16 10 4 — 17 1,004
Sumy oblast 18 15 7 2 20 1,500
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Table 3A.6 (continued)
Number of Administrative-territorial Units by Region
Raions Cities City Townships Rural
Districts Settlements
Total Cities of
Central and
Oblast Sub-
ordination
Ternopol oblast 17 16 1 — 19 1,017
Kharkov oblast 27 17 7 9 60 1,694
Kherson oblast 18 9 3 3 30 660
Khmelnitsky oblast 20 13 5 — 24 1,417
Cherkassy oblast 20 16 6 2 15 826
Chernovtsy oblast 11 11 1 3 8 398
Chernigov oblast 22 15 3 2 30 1,502
Total 490 448 169 121 897 28,775
Average municipal population (1999) 4,433
Table 3A.7
Number of Government Employees Paid from the State Budget, 1994–199925
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1 January
1999
Public administration 147,154 180,556 178,040 251,751 237,027 250,008
bodies, total
Legislative bodies 992 1,295 1,201 1,291 3,500 3,861
Presidential 375 590 590 590 1,513 1,513
administration
Public executive 145,787 178,671 176,249 249,870 232,014 244,634
bodies, total
Cabinet of Ministers 693 790 790 826 1,040 1,047
Staff of ministries, 56,493 75,502 66,419 66,266 61,670 70,496
other central execu-
tive bodies and their
territorial offices
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Table 3A.7 (continued)
Number of Government Employees Paid from the State Budget, 1994–1999
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1 January
1999
Local public — — — 69,811 65,511 64,043
administrations
Financial and 88,590 102,368 109,009 112,924 103,735 108,990
fiscal bodies
Other organizations 11 11 31 43 58 58
Figure 3A.1
Administrative Map of Ukraine
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Annex 3.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
• Constitution of Ukraine (adopted 28 June 1996, at the Fifth Session of the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine)
• Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (adopted 21 October 1998, at the
Second Session of the ARC Verkhovna Rada)
• Law on Local Self-government (1997)
• Law on Elections of Local Councils and Village, Township and City Mayors (1998)
• Law on National and Local Referenda (1992)
• Law on the Capital of Ukraine (1999)
• Law on Local Public Administration (1999)
• Law on the Budget System (1995)
• Law on the National Budget (adopted annually)
• Law on the Taxation System (1997)
• Law on Property (1991)
• Law on Public Service (1993)
• Presidential Decree on Measures to Implement the Concept of Administrative Reform in
Ukraine (1998)
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Annex 3.4
Responsibilities of Administrative Tiers
Table 3A.8
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Ukraine
Functions Cities, Townships, Oblast or Raion Central or Local
Villages Governments Administrations
I . EDUCAT ION
1. Pre-school X
2. Primary X
3. Secondary X X
4. Technical X X
5. Higher X X
I I .  S O C I A L  W E L F A R E
1. Nurseries X
2. Kindergartens X
3. Old people’s homes X X
4. Individual services for elderly X
and disabled people
5. Special services (for homeless, X X
families in crisis, etc.)
6. State housing X X
7. Unemployed X X X
I I I .  H E A LT H  S E R V I C E S
1. Primary health care X
2. Health protection X X X
3. Hospitals X X
4. Public health X X X
5. Drug users X X
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Table 3A.8(continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Ukraine
Functions Cities, Townships, Oblast or Raion Central or Local
Villages Governments Administrations
IV.  C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E ,  S P O R T S
1. Theaters X X X
2. Museums X X X
3. Libraries X X X
4. Parks X
5. Sports, leisure X X X
6. Culture houses X X
7. Protection of cultural heritage X X X
V. E C O N O M I C  S E R V I C E S
1. Water supply X
2. Sewerage X X
3. Electricity X X X
4. Gas X X X
5. Central heating X X
6. Telecommunications X X X
V I .  E N V I R O N M E N T,  P U B L I C  S A N I TAT I O N
1. Waste collection X
2. Waste disposal X
3. Street cleaning X
4. Cemeteries X
5. Environment protection X X X
6. Protection from natural/ X X
man-made disasters
V I I .  T R A F F I C ,  T R A N S P O R T
1. Roads X X X
2. Street lighting X
3. Public transport X
4. Railroads X
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Table 3A.8(continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Ukraine
Functions Cities, Townships, Oblast or Raion Central or Local
Villages Governments Administrations
V I I I .  U R B A N  D E V E L O P M E N T
1. Town planning X X
2. Regional/spatial planning X X
3. Local economic development X
4. Tourism X X X
5. Land surveying X X
I X .  G E N E R A L  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
1. Authoritative functions X X X
(licenses, etc.)
2. Other state administrative X X X
matters (electoral lists, etc.)
3. Municipal police X X
4. Fire brigades X X X
5. Civil defense X X
6. Consumer rights protection X X X
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Notes
1 Head of the Department of Public Administration and Local Self-government, Ukrainian
Academy of Public Administration, Dnepropetrovsk branch; telephone/fax (380-56)744-
3498; e-mail: navruzov@renaissance.dp.ua.
2 The first public hearings in Ukraine on approving the local budget were held in Komsomolsk,
Poltava oblast, in 1999. As of the end of 2000, this type of activity was steadily growing
among urban populations.
3 N. Tomenko, ABC of Ukrainian Politics (Kiev: Smoloskyp, 1998), 71–73.
4 Parliament of Ukraine: 1998 Elections (Kiev: Parliamentary Publishing House, 1998),
30–31.
5 More detailed information about the elections results can be found in N. Tomenko, “Summing
up the Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine,” Politicheskaya Mysl 2 (1998), 107–119.
6 In practice, the budget structure includes sections for expenditures and revenues. Only some
local budgets specify administrative and development budgets. Currently, the drafting of
budgets for own and delegated authorities is not practiced.
7 To date, this legal norm has not been applied. Instead, budget revenues are formed at the
subnational level through fixed and regulated taxes, a mechanism is determined by the Law
on the Budget System (1995).
8 Annual Statistical Report of Ukraine, 1999 (Kiev: Ukrainian Encyclopedia, 2000).
9 Since 1999, all local governments funds kept in extra-budgetary accounts should be reflected
in the local budgets.
10 Annual Statistical Report of Ukraine, 1999 (Kiev: Ukrainian Encyclopedia, 2000).
11 Inter-budgetary Funding in Ukraine: A Reform Program, Conference Proceedings (World Bank,
1999).
12 Inter-budgetary Funding in Ukraine: A Reform Program, Conference Proceedings (World Bank,
1999).
13 Inter-budgetary Funding in Ukraine: A Reform Program, Conference Proceedings (World Bank,
1999).
14 In practice, these legally established terms are often not observed. It should be mentioned that
creation of a political majority in the Verkhovna Rada has produced better compliance with
the terms of approval for the state budget. This also has positive effects for the local budget
process.
15 Administrative Reform Concept in Ukraine (Kiev: 1998), 24–42.
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16 Kravchenko, V. I., Local Finance in Ukraine (Kiev: Znaniye, 1999), 247–282.
17 It should be noted that since mid-2000 up to the time of writing (mid-2001), Ukraine has
significantly changed the system for redistributing budget funds among tiers of government.
For instance, a Draft Budget Code was adopted, a method for calculating subsidies was
developed and is coming into use and the Tax Code is being reformed. These and other
measures help increase the self-sufficiency of local budgets.
18 Administrative Reform Concept in Ukraine (Kiev: 1998), 38–42.
19 Annual Statistical Report of Ukraine, 1999 (Kiev: Ukrainian Encyclopedia, 2000).
20 Annual Statistical Report of Ukraine, 1999 (Kiev: Ukrainian Encyclopedia, 2000).
21 Annual Statistical Report of Ukraine, 1999 (Kiev: Ukrainian Encyclopedia, 2000).
22 “Restoration of Growth on the Basis of Justice: Memorandum on the Economic Development
of Ukraine” in Economies in Countries of the World (World Bank, 1999), 182.
23 Annual Statistical Report of Ukraine, 1999 (Kiev: Ukrainian Encyclopedia, 2000).
24 Data as of 1 January 1999. “Main Social and Economic Indicators for Cities, Members of the
Association of Ukrainian Cities,” Ukrainian City (1999), 3.
25 Economic Reforms Today, 29 (2000), 50.
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Local Government
in the Russian Federation
Galina Kourliandskaia, Yelena Nikolayenko,
Natalia Golovanova
1. Overview of Local Government Reform
1.1 The Russian Federation
The Russian Federation consists of eighty-nine member regions called subjects of the Federation.
For purposes of statistical reporting, these regions are grouped into twelve economic zones. However,
these zones are likely to be replaced by the seven federal districts recently formed for purposes of
political and administrative oversight. Economic and demographic disparities across regions are vast,
as shown in table 4A.1.
Subjects of the Russian Federation include twenty-one republics, six krais, forty-nine oblasts, two
federal cities, one autonomous oblast and ten autonomous districts. Despite the diversity of categories,
all subjects of the Federation have equal status pursuant to the Constitution of the Russian Federation
(1993). However, the Federative Treaty, an integral part of the Constitution, allows for bilateral
agreements between the central government and member regions which grant regions special rights
and obligations. As of October 2000, fifty-one regions had concluded forty-seven such agreements
with the federal government, with the majority of the regions being republics. It should be noted
that the classification of regions as republic, krai or oblast is derived from historical reasons and does
not generally provide any indication of status.
The federal government, recognizing the risks in continuing to develop asymmetric federalism,
eventually revoked most privileges previously granted to individual regions. To signal a return to a
policy of uniform federalism, the State Duma of the Russian Federation passed a law in 2000
mandating that all regions bring their legislation into conformity with the Constitution and with
federal legislation.1  Nonetheless, complete uniformity will be difficult to attain in a country as large
and diverse as Russia.
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1.2 Ethnic Composition of the Russian Federation
The majority of the national population is Russian. With few exceptions, Russians also make up the
majority population within most republics and other ethnic autonomies (see table 4A.2). After
Russians, the most numerous ethnic groups are the Tatars, who comprise 3.7 percent of the population,
and the Ukrainians and Chuvash, who comprise 1.17 percent. No other ethnicity in Russia exceeds
one percent of the total population.2
1.3 Regional Structure
Regions are divided into cities and rural areas (raions). This territorial division was largely inherited
from the former Soviet Union, though several jurisdictions had existed previously. Raions are divided
into smaller units such as sub-raion towns, townships, villages and rural districts. Sub-raion towns
may be composed of townships and rural districts. Rural districts themselves may include several
small rural settlements. The territorial structure of Russian Federation subjects is therefore generally
composed of three or four levels (see figure 4A.1).
Prior to local government reform, the hierarchy of territories reflected the hierarchy of administrative
subordination. With the transition to a more decentralized structure, settlements of all sizes were
granted the right to establish local governments and register as municipalities with equal status to one
another. Reform thus meant the transition from a three-tier hierarchy of jurisdictions within the
regional state administration to a two-tier system made up of the regional government and local
governments, with no administrative subordination between the two. Making this transition has
proven to be difficult. The system of municipalities was superimposed over the previous structure,
which often resulted in peculiar organizational forms in which village-level municipalities are
subordinated to raion-level municipalities.
Since the breakdown of regional territories into municipalities has not yet been finalized, federal
agencies with territorial branches have been slow to revise their internal organization according to the
new municipal division. Both the Ministry of Taxes and Levies and the State Committee for Statistics
(Goskomstat) continue to use the raion breakdown in their reports, whereby raions and cities are the
smallest units of territorial division.3  Data on municipalities are therefore unavailable unless municipal
boundaries coincide with former raion and city boundaries. The total number of officially registered
municipalities can be obtained from the federal Registration Chamber, but all other data on territorial,
demographic and economic characteristics are available from the Goskomstat only in the old territorial
breakdown.
Table 4A.3 summarizes the data on varieties of territorial units and municipalities in the Russian
Federation. For data on urban and rural settlements, see table 4A.4.
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1.4 Territories with Special Status
Two regions, the federal cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, enjoy special rights with respect to
local self-government. Both city governments are entitled to determine the property, budgetary ex-
penditures and revenue sources of local governments within their jurisdiction. Saint Petersburg has
jurisdiction over one hundred local governments, which enjoy very little autonomy; Moscow has none.
In addition, about forty territories are classified as restricted access territories (“zakrytye administrativno-
territorialnye obrazovanya ,” or ZATOs) and fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government
(the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Nuclear Energy). By federal law, ZATOs can be urban
or rural settlements whose territorial boundaries may overlap regional or raion boundaries. The
boundaries and administrative subordination of ZATOs are determined by the federal government,
as are the rights and responsibilities of regional governments with respect to the ZATOs located in
their territory. ZATOs are financially independent from the regional governments, as they receive
intergovernmental transfers directly from the federal government. ZATO residents can also form
local governments. Generally speaking, regional laws apply across the entire territory of the region,
including ZATOs, with the exception of fiscal laws; in fiscal matters ZATOs are federal territories.
Until recently, ZATOs were allowed to retain all taxes collected in their territories, including the
regional and federal tax shares. Starting from 2000, all ZATOs but two are mandated to remit federal
taxes, as well as levies accruing to earmarked budgetary and extra-budgetary funds of the federal or
regional government, to the respective government or fund in accordance with the federal and
regional legislation. Any financing gaps between the expenditure needs and revenues of ZATOs are
covered directly from the federal budget. At present, the Russian government is debating whether to
drastically reduce the number of ZATOs and cancel their preferential tax treatment. Should these
plans be carried out, most ZATOs will lose their special status and become ordinary municipalities.
1.5 Brief History of Local Government Reform4
1.5.1 The Soviet Period
The first step towards democratizing local government was taken at the end of the 1980s, while
Russia was still a member of the Soviet Union. In an experimental move, some raions were allowed
to field more candidates than were vacant offices in the 1987 elections to local soviets. Altogether
26,000 candidates competed for 4,700 councilor seats in the pilot raions, which made up about five
percent of total raions.
In all other respects, local governments remained part of the same centralized administrative hierarchy,
which was completely subordinated to the party apparatus. The pertinent features of local govern-
ments in the early years of transition were that:
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• No distinction was made between the local and the state levels of government;
• Local government jurisdictions exactly replicated existing administrative-territorial divisions;
• Local governments were subordinated to state and party authorities.
The next landmark event was the amendment of the Constitution of the Soviet Union and the Law
on Elections of USSR People’s Deputies in 1988. The most important amendments in terms of local
government were those which established the right of voters to nominate candidates, guaranteed the
right of local soviets to exercise control over local state agencies and limited the term of the officials
appointed by local soviets.
The first law to use the term “local self-government” was the Law on General Principles of Local Self-
government and Local Economy in the USSR (9 April 1990), which opened the door for sweeping
changes to the local government role in developing a civil society. Most importantly, this law
established:
• guarantees that local authorities are autonomous, independent and elected by popular vote;
• the scope of competencies of local soviets;
• the transfer of communal property to local soviets;
• revenue sources of local soviets, including fixed shares of federal tax revenues and a list of own
taxes, levies and duties to be introduced at the discretion of the local soviet.
The stipulation that local authorities be elected by popular vote applied only to representative bodies.
The basic unit of local self-government established by this law coincided with lowest administrative
tier that existed at the time, which was a rural district, a township, a sub-raion town or a city district.
The first law on local self-government to come into force after independence was passed on 6 July
1991, while Russia was still part of the Soviet Union. The progressive feature of this law was the
requirement that not only representative bodies but also heads of local administrations be
democratically elected. This law also decreed the dissolution of the executive committees, or lowest-
level tiers in the hierarchy of state power.
1.5.2 The Post-Soviet Period
In the early years of independence, the legal framework for local self-governance in Russia evolved
primarily through amending the Law on Local Self-government in the Russian Federation (1991).
The harmonization of this law with other legislative acts, particularly the Law on the Tax System in
the Russian Federation (27 December 1991) eventually diluted the effect of the law, limiting the
autonomy of local authorities over local revenues.
The dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation and the passage of the new
Constitution in 1993 marked the beginning of a revolutionary phase in the development of local
self-government in Russia. The “municipal revolution” originated in the center, fueled by a desire to
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counterbalance the growing political opposition of the regional elite. New departments of federal
agencies were specifically commissioned to provide support to the lowest tier of the state hierarchy,
the autonomous local governments. These local governments and their leaders, independent from
regional administration, represented invaluable allies to Russian reformers charged with implementing
the often unpopular policies of the federal government.
The Constitution was followed by a number of other laws, also initiated at the central level, to
establish procedures for the formation and operation of local governments. All of these laws were
directed at strengthening the autonomy of the lowest tier of public administration. After establishing
a federal relationship between the central and regional levels of government, the central government
curtailed regional rights over local governments by establishing a similar, though weaker, federal
relationship between the center and the regions at the sub-national level.
The majority of regions benefited from the federalization of their relations with the center, but were
reluctant to relinquish power over sub-regional territories. They preferred paternalistic relations with
the local governments to decentralization; rather than employ their newly assigned methods of control,
legislative initiative and law enforcement, they opted to reinstate the vertical axis of executive power.
One of the first actions taken by President Vladimir Putin following his inauguration on 31 December
1999 was to dismiss one of the key advocates of local self-governance in the federal administration
from his position as head of the Department of Local Governments in the Office of the President.
The Department itself was dissolved soon afterwards.
By strengthening the vertical axis of power, the policies pursued under President Putin from the
start of his term echoed the governors’ preference for centralization. The Office of the President
became the source of legislative initiatives and administrative decisions that led to reinforcement of
administrative methods of control in the Russian Federation at all levels of power.
2. Legal and Constitutional Basis
2.1 Constitutional Basis of Local Government
The Constitution lists local self-governance among the fundamental institutions of the constitutional
order, along with state power, a federal system of government, republican rule and other provisions
of chapter 1 of the Constitution.
In addition, this chapter lists local government bodies among the institutions through which the
people exercise their will, together with direct democracy and democracy exercised via bodies of state
power. This chapter also provides for municipal ownership of land.
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Article 12 unequivocally determines that “local self-government bodies do not form part of the system
of state power.” The Constitution instituted a legal regulatory framework in place of the previous
administrative subordination of local authorities to regional ones.
Chapter 8 of the Constitution is entirely devoted to local self-governance. The four articles of this
chapter provide the following guarantees:
• Local communities possess autonomy in addressing issues of local importance;
• Local self-government may follow a diversity of organizational models;
• Regional authorities must take into account the preferences of local communities when
determining the boundaries of local government jurisdictions;
• Local governments possess financial autonomy (albeit limited), with discretion over the
management of municipal property and the implementation of local budgets;
• Adequate funding is guaranteed for the performance of additional state functions delegated to
the local government by the decision of federal or regional state authorities;
• Local governments will be reimbursed for the costs of implementing federal mandates.
According to the Constitution, the establishment of general principles of local government organization
is the joint responsibility of the federal center and the regions.  To fulfill this responsibility, federal
authorities have passed a number of laws on local government organization. These include:
• Law on General Principles of Local Self-government (28 August 1995);
• Law on the Constitutional Right to Local Government Elections (26 November 1996);
• Law on Electoral Rights and Referenda (19 September 1997);
• Law on Local Government Finance (25 September 1997);
A more detailed list of legislation on local government is presented in annex 4.3.
2.2 Legal Basis of Local Government
The fundamental principles of local self-government in Russia are set forth in the federal Law on Local
Self-government in the Russian Federation.  This law is distinct from its Soviet predecessors in that it
determines the general principles of local self-governance, rather than a system of local government bodies.
The law defines the municipality, the primary unit of local government, as any populated territory
(city, town, township or any combination of these on a contiguous territory) which is self-governed
and possesses municipal property, a budget and an elected local government body. In conformity
with the Constitution, the law allows self-governments to be established at a variety of territorial
levels from raions to towns or villages, irrespective of population size.
This law also grants uniform legal status to all local governments, thereby establishing one of the
distinctive features of the Russian model of local self-governance. All local governments—raions,
towns and townships in rural districts—enjoy the same institutional and administrative rights,
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without subordination of one municipality to another. Accordingly, the entire territory of the
Russian Federation should be divided into local government jurisdictions without overlapping.
This model of municipal equality distinguishes Russia both from the previous Soviet system and
from the majority of former Soviet Union countries who chose to build the institution of local self-
government upon the foundations laid in the pre-reform period.
Finally, the law details the scope of regional authority with respect to local self-governance and lists
the responsibilities of local governments. Many of the responsibilities are stated as the obligation to
maintain infrastructure facilities that were transferred to municipal ownership, rather than the
obligation to perform local functions. Unlike many countries with strong institutions of local
government, local governments in Russia are responsible for the delivery of public services such as
education and health care. However, the law allows local governments to limit service delivery
according to the capacity of its inherited social infrastructure facilities. Therefore, the assignment of
expenditure responsibilities between the regional and local governments depends on the delineation
of property between the two levels of government.
2.3 Legal Basis of Local Elections
A major objective of federal policy on local self-government was to encourage the regions themselves
to hold municipal elections and adopt the necessary laws to develop systems of local government.
In late 1996, the federal Law on the Constitutional Right to Local Government Elections (henceforth
referred to as the Law on Local Elections) was passed to prevent a surge of regional resistance to the estab-
lishment of local self-governments.  The provisions of the law essentially constituted federal intervention
in affairs of those regions that failed to comply with the federal legislation. Where regional administrations
did nothing to organize local elections, the right to convene elections was assigned to the courts.
Rules governing the conduct of local elections were outlined in a separate annex to the law.
In the fall of 1997, the federal Law on Electoral Rights and Referenda was passed to guarantee the
right of citizens to hold local elections on the basis of the Law on Local Elections even in the absence
of regional laws.
2.4 Legal Basis of Local Finance
In their efforts to develop local self-governance, federal authorities attempted to ensure the financial
autonomy of local budgets.  Revenue sources for local budgets were determined in 1991 by the
federal Law on Taxes. However, revenue from the local taxes and fees enumerated in this law rarely
covered more than twenty percent of local expenditure needs, even including the usually insignificant
share of federal taxes permanently assigned to local governments. The regional government had to
cover the resulting financing gap with intergovernmental transfers.
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Local governments were heavily dependent on regional administrations due to the regional authority
to regulate local revenues. The Law on Local Government Finance in the Russian Federation sought
to ensure stable revenues for local budgets by restricting the latitude of regional administrations in
disposing of their revenue sources. The law was passed in September 1997 only after the president
overcame the veto of the Upper Chamber of the Russian Parliament, which is composed of governors
and the heads of regional representative bodies.
The Law on Local Government Finance is an important milestone in the establishment of a full-
fledged institution of local finance. In its provisions, the law establishes the following:
• principles for the municipal budget process;
• maximum levels of municipal debt;
• limits on the ability of local authorities to undertake financial risks, such as speculating in stock
markets or contributing local budget funds to bank capital;
• the right of municipalities to set up their own treasuries and tax administrations;
• a fixed proportion of federal taxes to be shared with local governments, applied on average
within a region;
• requirements that intergovernmental transfers from regional to municipal budgets be calculated
according to a formula, and that allocation of equalization transfers and proportions of shared
tax revenue be determined according to a standard methodology.
• prohibition of the reduction of transfers to municipalities if own municipal tax revenues are
greater than predicted.
Due to the vast disparity in revenues across regions and across municipalities, the Law on Local
Government Finance has unfortunately failed to ensure financial autonomy for most local governments.
In drafting the law, federal advocates of local self-government were primarily seeking to ensure the
financial sovereignty of their protégés, large cities whose mayors wield political clout. They proposed
a draft law requiring that every local budget be assigned the same fixed rate of shared federal taxes.
But since the tax base is distributed unevenly across municipalities, assigning uniform shares to all
municipalities would only have perpetuated the existing inequality, leaving regional governments to
carry out fiscal equalization at their own discretion and from their own sources.
Eventually, the adopted version of the law established fixed rates of shared taxes to be averaged over all
municipalities within a region.  Accordingly, regions may establish different rates for different munici-
palities, potentially allowing richer municipalities to retain no federal taxes whatsoever, while allowing
poorer localities to retain one hundred percent of the regional share of federal taxes. Hence, budget
revenues are equalized among municipalities through re-directing financial revenues from rich to
poor municipalities, while transfers from the regional budget are used for narrowing the remaining
disparity.
Furthermore, the Law on Local Government Finance does not establish standards for regions to
distribute funds received from the federal government for equalization purposes.  Nevertheless,
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these grants are substantial; in subsidized regions those resources may exceed by far the total tax
collections in that jurisdiction.
2.5 Recent Amendments to the Law on Local Self-government
The federal Law on Municipal Service completed the legislative framework of local self-government,
as conceived by the Yeltsin administration. However, at the very start of the Putin administration in
2000, the Law on Local Self-government was significantly amended. The core of the amendments
was a reversion to vertically imposed administrative control over the public sector.
Article 49 of the amended Law on Local Self-government establishes that the Russian president or
regional governor is entitled to dissolve the local council, discharge the mayor, convene new elections
and appoint an interim mayor in cases where the court finds that local government decisions violate
the Constitution, federal or regional legislation and the mayor or local government do not remedy
the decision in question.
Prior to these amendments, the law had provided for dissolution of the local government body and
dismissal of the mayor, but the previous procedure was more complicated and necessitated additional
court proceedings. Unfortunately, the new authorities have opted to strengthen administrative
levers rather than improve enforcement of court rulings.
2.6 Regional Legislation on Local Government
According to the principal of joint jurisdiction set forth in the Constitution, regional-local relations
are established by regional laws within the framework of existing federal legislation. The Law on
Local Self-government lists issues to be regulated by regional laws, including the following:
• procedures for determining the territorial boundaries of municipalities;
• procedures for holding municipal elections;
• procedures for the registration of municipal charters;
• procedures for the transfer of property to municipalities;
• regulation of the fiscal relations between the region and its municipalities and the equalization
of the fiscal capacity of municipalities;
• delegation of certain state powers to local government bodies and the transfer of the financial
resources necessary to support their execution;
• municipal services and other issues.
The development of regional legislation on local self-government has been in progress since 1996
and is far from complete. In reforming local self-government, different regions have displayed
varying attitudes towards relinquishing administrative control. These can be broken down into the
following three responses.5
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• Constructive Response
This category includes those regions which recognize the advantages of developing independent
public administration at the local level and have unconditionally complied with the
implementation of local self-government according to constitutional principles. In most of
those regions, municipal elections had been held prior to adoption of the Law on Local Self-
government. Their legislators have been very active in developing laws on municipal issues, in
many cases preceding federal legislation. This group of regions includes Leningrad, Tyumen,
Vologda, Astrakhan, Irkutsk, Voronezh, Nizhni Novgorod, Saratov, Pskov and Kaluga oblasts
and Khanti-Mansi autonomous okrug.
• Obstructive Response
This category includes regions where self-government is either nonexistent or confined to the
level of small townships and deprived of any legal basis. Issues assigned to local self-governments
by federal legislation are instead handled by territorial branches of regional state administrations
in cities and raions. In some cases, mayors may be elected in cities and raions, but are subject to
removal from office by the regional government, which also retains the authority to annul
their decisions. Legislation on municipal issues in these areas is either in its infancy or in conflict
with federal legislation. In some regions, local government bodies do not exist, nor have they
been even provided for in regional legislation.
Until recently, this group of regions included the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of
Tatarstan, the Udmurt Republic, the Republic of Komi, the Ingush Republic, the Karachai-
Circassian Republic, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Republic of Sakha, the Republic of
Khakassia, the Republic of Tyva, Kursk oblast, Novosibirsk oblast and the Jewish autonomous
oblast.  Most of the regions in this group are ethnic autonomies. Their leaders avoid publicly
refusing to comply with the Constitution, instead emphasizing the need to maintain control
over territories or arguing that the population lacks managerial personnel and is generally
unprepared for new forms of government organization.
• Undecided Response
This group consists of regions which view local self-government as an inescapable evil. Although
they refrain from committing any outright violations of federal legislation, they employ
numerous delaying tactics to slow the process down. Local government bodies were not
formed in these jurisdictions until 1997. Relevant legislation is in its inception and is heavily
borrowed from other regions rather than a product of local effort. This is a fairly large group of
regions, which have increasingly tended to join one or the other of the categories.
Since the attitudes of regional authorities vary so widely, the quality of regional legislation on
local self-government leaves much to be desired and often contain norms that run counter to
the Constitution and federal legislation.
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2.7 Violations of the Constitution and Federal Legislation in Regional Laws
The development of local self-government in Russia has been marked by frequent and grave conflicts
between regions and municipalities. The primary reasons for these conflicts are:
• the unwillingness of regional leaders to share instruments of power such as property, taxes and
other financial resources as well as decision-making authority in the areas of business and economics;
• lack of regional administrative experience and governing skills required under the newly
decentralized conditions;
• conflicts between the interests of rich and poor municipalities;
• traditional subordination of lower-level to higher-level governments.
Regions resort to methods both legal and illegal in order to resolve these conflicts to their advantage.
The most frequent violations contained in regional legislation on local self-government are as follows:
1. Restrictions on electoral rights. These include:
— the introduction of voter and candidate qualifications for residence, age and property, in
contradiction to federal legislation;
— the authority of the regional government to discharge heads of local self-government.
2. Restrictions on local self-government autonomy in matters outside regional competence. These
may include:
— establishing an exhaustive list of municipalities that may be set up in the region;
— regulating the structure and operation of bodies of local self-government;
— setting restrictions on the disposal of municipal property;
— limiting local options in formulating and executing local budgets.
3. Delegation of local government powers to regional state administrations.
4. Delegation of state administration responsibilities to local government bodies without the
requisite financial support.
5. Removal of entire territories from the scope of legislation on local self-government, for instance
establishing “regional districts,” as in Saratov oblast.
6. Changing the territorial boundaries of local self-governments without regard for public opinion.
7. Making one municipal entity subordinate to another, primarily in financial matters.
These violations can be encountered in the legislation of the vast majority of regions in one form or
another. In all fairness, it should be noted that many violations of federal legislation which occur in the
course of developing the regulatory and legislative framework of local self-government may be attributed
to the novelty of this issue in Russia, the centralist political mentality fostered during the Soviet era
and the lack of skilled experts in public law and public finance. Inconsistencies within the federal legis-
lation itself also contribute to this problem.  Not infrequently, articles in one federal law may contradict
other laws on local self-government, or even, as in the Law on Local Self-government, another article
within the same law.
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2.8 Protection of the Constitutional Right to Local Self-government
During the Yeltsin regime, the right to local self-government was frequently defended in the Russian
Supreme Court and Constitutional Court. This typically occurred when the claims of local authorities
received high-level attention and were utilized as a precedent to prevent the recurrence of similar
situations in the future. In the vast majority of cases, however, small municipalities found it extremely
difficult to assert their rights in the face of omnipotent regional bosses, who often had control over
even the branches of federal agencies in their region.
The following cases demonstrate different resolutions of these conflicts between local and regional
authorities at the federal level. In 1994, the governor of Yaroslavl oblast dismissed mayors in some
cities and raions, replacing them with appointees. At the initiative of the regional branch of Democratic
Russia, a liberal political movement, a protest was registered in court. The Yaroslavl regional court
found the claim to be valid and the governor’s actions to be unlawful. Regional authorities lodged an
appeal with the Russian Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court upheld the original ruling.
The Udmurt law, adopted in April 1996, allowed local self-government to be replaced by the state
administration and bodies of state power to be appointed at the city, raion and sub-raion level. President
Yeltsin and several State Duma members questioned the unconstitutional organization of sub-national
bodies stipulated by this law, and it was eventually challenged in the Constitutional Court.
The decision of the Constitutional Court in January 1997 contained two provisions of profound
importance for the development of local self-government:
1. Local government powers cannot be assigned to regional state administrations;
2. Regional state administrations shall be set up according to same general organizational principles
as other bodies of state power in the Russian Federation; that is, they shall be elected by the
citizenry of a particular jurisdiction.
On 15 January 1998, after considering other infringements by regions on the principle of local
administration, the Constitutional Court ruled that a body of public power should be of either state
or municipal nature, depending on the scope of issues falling under its competence. The Constitutional
Court thus reaffirmed that government bodies which create the local budget, introduce local taxes
and establish procedures for managing municipal property shall be recognized as bodies of local self-
government, regardless of their name. As such, they are separate from bodies of state power and are
formed through elections by local residents.
2.9 Territorial Structure, Levels of Self-government
Before the launch of local government reform, Russia possessed a rigid administrative hierarchy in
which smaller territorial units were subordinate to the larger territorial units in which they were
located. Depending on area, population size and density and administrative and territorial status,
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sub-regional units made up the following hierarchy: regions—raions and cities subordinated to regions—
cities subordinated to raions—townships and rural districts. The recently created municipalities were
formed at different tiers of the former administrative and territorial hierarchy, depending on the region.
In some regions, they were established at the level of former cities and raions, in others at the level of
rural districts and in others a combination of the two. In some regions, former raions were transformed
into territorial branches of the regional administration, making up a second tier of the regional state
administration (region—raions and cities). In other regions, raions became municipalities, often with
a two-tier structure themselves (cities and raions—townships and rural districts). It is possible to
distinguish the following three basic types of local public administration (see figure 4A.3):
• Type I.
A one-tier regional state administration together with one-tier local government administrations.
In this model, local government bodies are generally made up of large cities and raions and
enjoy full fiscal rights stipulated by federal legislation. Regional authorities determine regional-
local fiscal relations through deciding upon transfers and local shares of tax revenues. In a
number of regions, municipalities consist of sub-raion cities and rural districts, in which case
the regional authorities must deal with hundreds of sub-raion municipalities.
• Type II.
A two-tier regional state administration together with one-tier local government administrations
where local governments are deprived of important rights.
This structure is similar to the previous one with the exception that municipalities formed at
the sub-raion level are deprived of some powers established by federal legislation, particularly
budgetary rights. The authority to set local taxes is vested in territorial branches of the regional
administration, which do not have elected bodies. Municipal budgets are incorporated in the
regional budget in the form of expenditure plans.
• Type III.
One-tier structure regional state administration together with a two-tier local government structure
in which some local governments are subordinate to others, in violation of federal legislation.
The first tier of local governments is comprised of big cities and raions; the second level of sub-
raion cities and other populated areas within cities or raions. Both first and second-tier
governments are elected by local residents. First-tier local governments engage in direct financial
relations with the regional authorities. In contrast, financial relations between second-tier local
governments and regional authorities are indirect, mediated by the first-tier local governments.
First-tier local governments are responsible, among other things, for the distribution of regional
grants to second-tier governments and for dividing the local shared revenue from regional or
federal taxes. In this model, first-tier local governments essentially perform the function of the
regional state authorities.
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If the second-tier municipalities cover the entire territory in the jurisdiction of the first-tier
municipality, the latter is usually made responsible for maintaining social infrastructure facilities
that service the entire area. In these cases, local taxes are usually established by the second-tier
municipalities. Sometimes, however, smaller municipalities delegate their taxation authority to
the raion-level municipality, in which case the raion typically sets uniform tax rates for all
municipalities located within its boundaries.
In cases where the boundaries of the first and second-tier municipalities do not coincide
exactly, the first-tier municipality is responsible for performing all local government functions
outside the jurisdiction of the second-tier municipality. Local taxes in this case are established
by local self-governments of both levels. This model was dubbed the “matrioshka-doll” system.
The above-mentioned types of municipal organization can be combined within regions. For example,
Tyumen oblast has 295 municipalities; of these, four are large cities, two are raions, and the rest are
small townships. In Vladimir oblast, eighteen municipalities at the raion level have a “matrioshka-
doll” structure, while the remaining seven municipalities follow the one-tier model. The second-tier
municipalities in the Vladimir oblast are individual areas that have opted for local autonomy. However,
regional authorities are unwilling to recognize them as full-fledged participants in intergovernmental
fiscal relations and deal with them through the first-tier bodies of local self-government.
At present, there are about 29,500 local administrations in Russia, of which 12,261 are officially registered
as municipal entities.6 Of these, only 11,691 have elected representative authorities,7 only 1,209 munici-
palities are endowed with municipal property and only 4,500 have fully independent budgets.8
3. Local Politics, Decision Making
3.1 Local Politics
With the exception of central regional cities, where local and regional politics are closely interwoven,
the political process at the local level is virtually nonexistent, generally limited to the organization of
local elections and referenda on forming or merging municipalities. Regional and federal parties are
not usually represented at the municipal level, nor are most non-governmental organizations (unions
of veterans, single mothers, families with many children, the disabled and others all operate almost
exclusively in regional capitals). Debate over local policy issues occurs between the local administration
and the regional authorities, rather than between the local administration and political parties or local
interest groups. The reason for this state of affairs is clear: financially, local governments in Russia are
strongly dependent on the governments of higher levels and therefore seek to please the regional
bosses rather than voters. Due to the lack of local financial autonomy, a local government which does
not fulfill its election promises to the local constituency may always assign the blame to the failure of
the regional administration to provide adequate funding. The strength or weakness of local policy
makers is thus determined almost exclusively by their ability to negotiate with the region.
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Regional grants are traditionally allocated to localities to maintain existing social infrastructure facilities
inherited from the old system, such as schools or kindergartens. Therefore, local leaders refuse to close
down vacant or underused facilities, even in dire financial circumstances, since any reduction in the
number of social facilities on the local government’s balance sheet deprives them of leverage to
increase regional grants in negotiations with regional authorities.  Preservation of existing facilities at
any cost becomes the single most important policy objective of local governments regardless of their
actual usefulness to local constituency. This topic becomes central during election campaigns. Between
elections, local officials are accountable to the regional authorities rather than to voters.
The financial dependence of local governments on higher authorities greatly contributes to widespread
public indifference to local politics.  This lack of interest is also rooted in habits established during the
era of party rule, with its absence of public participation in political life and lack of interest groups
formed by citizen initiative rather than directives from above.
One major problem stemming from low voter interest is that it is almost impossible to dismiss mayors
that do not live up to voter expectations. This is most serious in regions with municipalities at the
village level, where the lack of expertise in public administration is most strongly felt, for instance in
Tuyment and Astrakhan oblasts. In Astrakhan oblast, the level of unemployment in many small
villages is nearly one hundred percent and local tax collections are nil. In order to ensure the right of
all settlements to create local governments, the salaries of local officials are paid from the oblast
budget. Unemployed villagers therefore have very strong incentive to establish a local government,
as it means the creation of jobs in the local administration. Afterwards, villagers often become dis-
satisfied with their mayors but find it easier to express their dissatisfaction through written complaints
to the regional authority than through holding new elections. Until recently, regional authorities
were not entitled to dismiss mayors elected by popular vote. Cases of early dismissals of mayors by
voters themselves are few, another indication that the evolution of civil society and local self-governance
in Russia is still in its early stages.
3.2 System of Local Elections
The legal basis of the local election process is established by the federal Law on Guarantees of
Electoral Rights and Referenda (1997) and the Law on Local Elections (1996).
Starting from 1994, local elections were held at different times in different regions. The date of the
first election was usually set by the regional government, with subsequent elections scheduled in
accordance with municipal charters.
Terms of office for local councils differ by region and municipality, usually as established by regional
legislation. The mandate for local councils is typically four years, but in some regions it may be two
years for selected municipalities (Republic of Mordovia, Primorski krai, Vladimir, Irkutsk, Kamchatka,
Pskov and Tver oblasts, and Koryak autonomous okrug). In the Republic of Tatarstan, Stavropol krai
and Tver oblast, the mandate for some local councils is five years.9
182
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
In most territories, elections to local representative bodies were held under a majority electoral system
with one-mandate electoral districts. In twenty-eight regions, multi-mandate electoral districts were
set up, while Krasnoyarsk krai and Sverdlovsk oblast used a mixture of the two systems, where some
representatives were elected according to a proportional voting system based on electoral slates.
Most candidates run for office as independents. Although there are no legal constraints on the
participation of political parties in local elections, they play a role only in local elections of regional
capital cities. The most active of these parties are the local branches of the Communist Party (CPRF)
and the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).10 Nevertheless, in some regions, including
Voronezh, Rostov and Saratov oblasts, political parties do have a strong presence at the local level. In
Saratov oblast, for instance, the political scene at all levels is dominated by the administrative party of
Governor Ayatskov, which has absorbed the regional branches of such nationwide parties as “Our
Home is Russia,” the Russian National Congress and the Democratic Choice of Russia. The only
other party that won seats in the 1996 local elections in Saratov oblast was the CPRF (three seats in
Saratov City Duma). In Rostov oblast, one out of fifty-five municipalities is headed by a member of
LDPR, three by members of CPRF. The mayor of Rostov City was supported by Yabloko during the
elections, though he himself is not a member of Yabloko.
The main criteria for voters in electing mayors and local council members are personal characteristics,
such as the occupation of the candidate or past experience in government administration. Among
candidates running for a seat in the representative branch of government, there are many teachers,
medical doctors and directors of enterprises.
3.3 Public Participation in Decision Making
Referenda and citizen assemblies are stipulated in article 4 of the Law on Local Self-government as
forms by which citizens can directly express their will. The municipal charter establishes procedures
for holding local referenda or assemblies in accordance with regional legislation. According to article
22(5), “a decision made by local referendum does not require approval by bodies of state power, state
officials or local self-government bodies. If a regulatory act must be issued in order for such a decision
to be implemented, the relevant local government body shall pass the required act.” Procedures for
holding referenda are also addressed in the Law on Guarantees of Electoral Rights and Referenda.
In addition, article 25 of the Law on Local Self-government grants citizens the right to legislative
initiative on issues of local importance: “Bills on issues of local importance submitted by the citizenry
to local government bodies are subject to mandatory consideration at open sessions attended by
representatives of the public, and the results of such consideration shall be made public.”
Despite their statutory right to participate in decision making, however, citizens very rarely display
legislative zeal. Legislative attempts often encounter administrative difficulties as well. For instance,
alternative municipal charters were drafted in at least eleven out of forty-one municipalities in
Saratov oblast, but none of these drafts was presented in an open session or put to the vote.
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3.4 Ethnic Issues, Multicultural Government
At present, there are two federal laws that regulate the rights of ethnic groups in the Russian
Federation, the Law on Ethnic and Cultural Autonomy and the Law on Guarantees of Indigenous
Minorities’ Rights. Both laws are of a general, declaratory nature, so many subjects of the Federation11
adopt their own legislative acts on ethnic issues.
There are two forms of ethnic self-governance in Russia: extra-territorial (ethnic cultural associations)
and territorial (local ethnic autonomies).12  Ethnic cultural associations (ECA) are public associations
of citizens who regard themselves as part of a certain ethnic community, based on the principles of
self-organization and self-government. Some subjects of the Federation (Republic of Bashkortostan,
Republic of Tatarstan and Republic of Komi) have passed their own laws on ECAs. ECA activities
focus on educational, ethnic and cultural issues, for instance teaching national languages, organizing
centers of national culture and handicrafts and publishing newspapers in national languages.
Local ethnic autonomies are organized where small indigenous groups (mostly peoples of the North,
Siberia and Far East) live in compact communities. Local ethnic autonomies, usually small villages or
sub-raion rural districts, are not given municipal status but are instead designated as “units of territorial
public self-government.” However, ethnic municipalities also exist in many regions, such as Evenk
raion in the Republic of Buryat, Kalevala raion and Vepsskaya Volost in the Republic of Karelia and
ethnic uluses in the Republic of Yakutia. The status of an ethnic self-government is conferred on a
village or a raion by regional legislation.
Ethnic territorial autonomies may be granted certain privileges by regional law, such as a lower tax burden
or admittance to regional universities and colleges without examination requirements. The Primorski krai
government has created reservations, called “life-support territories,” for sparsely populated ethnic groups.
Recent years have seen the rebirth of Cossack traditions. Cossack communities operate both as ethnic
cultural associations and as territorial self-governments. In Rostov oblast, for example, Cossack groups
act within the framework of a territorial self-government. In other regions, the Cossack movement
has taken the form of an extra-territorial association called the Cossack Battalions.
The case of Chelyabinsk oblast illustrates the lengths to which regional administrations are willing to
go in order to keep the increasingly powerful ethnic movements under control. In the summer of
2000, the administration of Chelyabinsk oblast attempted to dismiss the head of the regional
Cossack Battalion, Ataman Loshankov, and appoint its own candidate. To this end, the oblast
administration convened a conference of local Cossack atamans, even though the right to convene
such conferences belongs exclusively to battalion atamans, pursuant to the Charter of Cossack
Associations. Not surprisingly, the atamans who attended the conference were loyal to the oblast
administration, and voted to dismiss Loshankov. Ataman Loshankov did not acknowledge his
dismissal as legal and appealed against the oblast decision in court.  However, the federal law on the
Cossack movement has been tabled in the State Duma for five years, and without it, the courts are unable
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to deliver any conclusive rulings. In the meantime, the oblast administration launched another move to
win full control over the Cossack movement in the region by decreeing that all local Cossack atamans
must pass an attestation procedure on pain of dismissal, and that the attestation committee shall be
appointed by the oblast government. At the time of writing, the outcome of this situation was unknown,
but the political fight between Loshakov’s supporters and the oblast administration was in full swing.
3.5 Local Government Associations
According to article 10 of the Law on Local Self-government, “municipal entities shall have the right
to establish societies in the form of associations or unions in order to coordinate activities and more
efficiently exercise their rights and interests.  These shall be subject to registration in accordance with
the procedure established for non-profit organizations. Associations and unions of municipal entities
cannot be assigned local self-government powers.”
Until 1998 there were three pan-Russian organizations operating in Russia: the Union of Russian
Cities, the Union of Small Russian Cities and the Russian Union of Local Authorities. Various
associations have also been set up on a territorial basis (the Ural Cities association) or on a regional
basis (Association of Municipalities in Orenburg oblast).
In 1998, a Congress of Municipalities of the Russian Federation was founded by thirty-nine unions
and associations and has become the largest and most influential association of local governments in
Russia today. The Congress participates in formulating draft federal budgets, federal laws, federal
programs and other regulatory and legislative instruments on issues of local self-government. In
addition, the Congress takes part in sessions of the European Union Chamber of Local Governments.
4. Functional Structure of Local Government
The following definition of the constitutional term “local self-government body” is provided in the
glossary of the Law on Local Self-government: “Local self-government bodies refer to elected and other
bodies empowered to solve issues of local importance which do not constitute part of state administration.”
This definition is based on the provisions of the Constitution which state that:
1) Local self-government shall be exercised by citizens through their direct will and through
elective and other bodies of local self-government;
2) Bodies of local self-government shall have autonomy in managing the municipal property, in
formulating, approving and executing their local budget, in establishing local taxes and fees,
and in deciding on other issues of local importance;
3) Bodies of local self-government are not incorporated into the system of bodies of state power.
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Hence, bodies of local self-government can be elected or appointed. According to the Law on Local
Self-government, an elected representative body, usually a local council, is mandatory for a settlement
to be recognized as a municipal entity or self-governing territory, although citizen assemblies are also
permitted to exercise the powers of representative bodies.
A municipal charter may provide for a position of mayor, an elected official to direct the execution of
local self-governance in the municipality. There is no federal law on appointed bodies of local self-
government or on the internal organization of executive bodies of local self-government.
The Constitution charges the Federation and its subjects jointly to establish the general principles of
state administration and local government organization. Though somewhat vague, this wording is
usually interpreted to mean that the regional and federal state authorities follow one structure of
administration, with regional government bodies reproducing the major features of federal
government bodies. The structure of local governments, on the other hand, is determined entirely at
the discretion of the population, according to article 131 of the Constitution. Thus, both federal
and regional legislation establish only general principles of organization for local self-government,
while actual structures may vary among municipalities.
4.1 Local Councils
According to the Law on Local Self-government, the name of the representative local government
body is established in accordance with the laws of a respective region, subject to ethnic, historical and
local traditions. Common names include City (Raion) Duma, Council of Representatives and Council
of Deputies. (In this text all representative local government bodies will henceforth be referred to as
local councils). A local council consists of representatives elected on the basis of universal, equal and
direct suffrage in compliance with federal and regional legislation.
The following responsibilities fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of local councils:
• to adopt local laws;
• to approve the local budget and report on its execution;
• to adopt plans and programs of local development and approve reports on their implementation;
• to establish local taxes and fees;
• to establish procedures for the management and disposal of local property;
• to monitor activities of local governments and officials.
4.2 Mayors
In addition to other elected local government officials, the municipal charter may stipulate an official
to head the executive branch of local government. Titles vary, but the position is most frequently
referred to as “mayor” or “head of local administration” (henceforth “mayor” will refer to all heads of
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local government administrations). Mayors may either be elected by citizens or chosen by the local
council from among its members.  If elected directly by the citizens, the mayor may be entitled under
the municipal charter to be a member of the local council and preside over its meetings. Both the scope
of mayoral responsibilities and the term of office are established by municipal charter. The mayor is
directly accountable to citizens and may also report to the local council if prescribed by the charter.
4.3 Different Structures of Local Government
The Law on Local Self-government provides for the following models of local self-government:
• A local council and an elected mayor who is not a member of the local council;
• A local council and a mayor who is a member of the local council;
• A local council, the chairman of which is the mayor;
• A local council, an elected mayor who is not a member of the local council and a municipal
manager hired by the mayor with the consent of the local council;
• A local council and a municipal manager hired by the council on a contractual basis;
• A citizen assembly and elected elders;
• A local council with committees to oversee individual areas of executive activity and no mayor.
The Law on Local Self-government delegates to regions the right to establish the legal framework for
local administrations, including their powers, procedures for establishment, terms of office, organization
of activities, names of bodies, officials and elected persons of local self-government. Although the
structure of local governments may vary from region to region, in practice the distribution of power
tends to be similar. Most regions follow the “strong mayor/weak council” model, which can take
many forms. A classic version is when the elected mayor also chairs the local council.  Another variant
is when the mayor is elected by the local council from its members. The “weak mayor/strong council”
is a less common pattern, encountered mainly in rural areas. The combination of citizen assemblies
and elected elders is encountered only in rural settlements with a small population, generally at the
sub-municipal level. The hiring of managers on a contractual basis occurs rarely and is the exception
rather than the rule.
Quite frequently mayors are to all intents and purposes appointed by regional governors. Mayors in
Saratov oblast, for instance, are elected by the local council but nominated by the governor. Not once
have council members voted against candidates proposed by the governor. If the candidate is not a
council member at the time of elections, he or she is appointed to act as the head of local government
until council elections are held.
As of 1 September 2000, over 12,261 municipalities13 were registered in Russia, of which only 11,691
have elected representative bodies.  In over 7,000 municipalities, the mayors were elected directly by
the citizenry by secret ballot. In more than 3,600 of these municipalities, the mayor both manages
the local administration and presides over council sessions as a member of the local council. In 4,519
municipalities, elected officials were chosen from among local council members, including nominees
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proposed by the regional government administration.14  In eighty-nine municipalities throughout
five regions, the head of the local government is hired by the council on a contractual basis.15
4.4 Local Administration
By the definition accepted in Russia, a body of local self-government is an agency exercising powers within
the territory of a city, urban or rural settlement or raion. The term “local administration,” though not
found in official documents, is quite common in practice and refers to appointed executive  bodies
of local self-government, usually formed by the council or mayor to address issues of local importance.
Federal legislation offers no guidelines on how to delineate representative and executive powers at
the local level, so regions address this problem in different ways, usually leaving it to the discretion of
the municipality. Typically, the local administration is headed by a mayor.  However, in some cases
the executive branch does not exist and executive functions are performed through local council
committees and a municipal manager. Cases when the only body of local self-government is a starosta
(elder) elected by a gathering of the people are only common in small rural settlements.16
The internal structure of local administrations is left by federal legislation to the discretion of the local
government. However, the functions of local administration departments (units, committees, et
cetera) are largely determined according to a list of local functions assigned by the federal legislation
to the competence of local self-governments. Since these local functions are primarily determined by
the availability of objects of local infrastructure in the municipality, such as schools or medical clinics,
the list of local administration departments essentially replicates the list of municipal property, but
can also include departments that are responsible for non-mandatory functions that a municipality
has assumed at its own initiative.
The term “issues of local importance” as used in the Constitution is further specified in a list of thirty
items in article 6(2) of the Law on Local Self-government. The article states that “issues of local
importance shall mean issues of securing vital activities of the population of a municipality defined
as such by the charter of a municipality in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
this federal law and laws of subjects of the Russian Federation.” Issues of local importance, as estab-
lished in the federal legislation, can be divided into four groups:
1. Provision of essential services such as health care, education, social and consumer services,
water and energy resources supply, et cetera;
2. Ensuring appropriate living conditions through the maintenance of public order, information
services, improvement of land and public transport.
3. Developing legislation to protect the rights of local citizens. This includes the development of
norms equally binding for all natural and legal persons, bodies of government and public organi-
zations within the municipality, including the regulation of the social and economic development
of the municipality, the establishment of procedures for the use of natural resources, et cetera.
4. Adopting legislation to ensure proper use of municipal property.
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According to federal legislation, local councils have exclusive jurisdiction over the legislation of
universally binding rules and norms (items three and four in the above list).  The competence of local
administrations may include items one and two, as well as managing and disposing of municipal
property and preparing draft budgets and resolutions for consideration by the local government.
Typically, a large municipality will have the following departments:
• a budget or financial department, responsible for formulating a draft budget and submitting
it to the representative branch for consideration;
• a legal department, responsible for internal control of all documents prepared by the local
administration, such as draft resolutions;
• a department for municipal property management;
• an economic department in charge of economic forecasting;
• a department of capital investments, responsible for drafting economic development programs
and control over their execution.
Some municipal governments contain the following departments:
• a department of municipal contracts in charge of tenders;
• a public relations department.
In addition to these departments, many local administrations also have line departments responsible
for particular functions, such as a department of education, a department of public transport, et
cetera. Analysis of local budgets has shown that, without exception, the largest expenditures are in
the fields of education, health care, maintenance of housing and utilities and welfare. Hence, the
most frequently encountered departments in local administrations are often line departments.
Because federal legislation defines “issues of local government importance” in terms of facilities rather
than services, the functions of a particular local government is largely dependent on its territorial
status. Most municipalities at the sub-raion level do not possess health care facilities and consequently
do not include health care among their local government responsibilities or provide funding from
the local budget.
This uneven distribution of local government functions is not so pronounced in regions with
municipalities at the city or raion level, since raions typically contain health care institutions in central
cities as part of the traditionally existing infrastructure. Nor is there generally a disparity in the field
of education, even among sub-raion municipalities, since educational institutions normally service
smaller segments of the population and are more evenly distributed across the territory than health
care institutions. However, specialized schools providing services to residents of several municipalities
may give rise to uneven distribution of functions.
One of the major local government functions, especially in terms of the cost involved, is the execution
of federal mandates. Federal mandates are federal laws that establish specific social guarantees for
certain population groups in the form of benefits and subsidies. Execution of federal mandates is
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delegated by federal legislation to the regional level, which transfers it to municipalities without the
requisite funding, even if funds have been distributed to the region for that purpose. The most
significant federal mandates are child benefits, to be paid monthly to needy families with dependent
children, and subsidies for disabled persons and war veterans.
It should be noted that the Law on Local Self-government classifies the provision of social support to
local residents among issues of local significance. However, in the case of child benefits and other
federal mandates, local governments do not have discretion over the intended beneficiaries or the
amount of the subsidy, both of which are established by federal legislation. Although over one
hundred federal mandates are imposed upon local governments, the biggest costs for sub-national
governments are associated with the mandates to the three above-mentioned categories.  Responsibility
for these expenditures may be variously assigned; some regions recognize these federal mandates as a
regional responsibility, while others delegate them to the local level. As long as the problem of
unfunded federal mandates remains unresolved by the federal government, lawsuits from the
population continue to accumulate.
If a municipality has a “matrioshka-doll” structure or possesses sub-municipal local governments
within its territory, the local administration may have departments within its organizational structure
responsible for dealings with second-tier local governments.
In recent years, it has become increasingly common to contract municipal service provision out to
private sector enterprises and local administrations have accordingly set up departments of municipal
contracts. Some municipalities may also establish departments of public works to address employment
maintenance or job creation problems.
In cases where the cost of certain municipal services must be covered by the population in full or in
part, municipalities must establish prices and tariffs. Thus, city and raion administrations will often
have pricing and tariffs departments to prepare proposals for council approval. The prices most
frequently regulated by local governments are rent for housing, water and sewerage tariffs, heating
fees and public transport fares.
4.5  Local Administration in the City of Petrozavodsk: A Case Study
One example of local administration organization is presented in the chart below, which shows the
structure of local government in the City of Petrozavodsk, the capital of the Republic of Karelia. Local
government in Petrozavodsk follows the “strong mayor/weak council” model. The mayor is the head
of local government and has the city administration and four deputy mayors subordinate to him.
The city administration carries out general administrative functions (general office functions,
information and analysis, internal audit) and oversees the operation of the local police, civil defense
and military draft boards. Neither civil defense nor the military draft is recognized as a local government
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function under current federal legislation. In practice, however, the federal Ministry of Defense
delegates these functions to local governments, which must then provide funding from their own
budgets. Regional and local police departments are also traditionally agencies of the federal Ministry
of Interior and are not directly subordinated to local governments.  In 1998, however, the Republic
of Karelia was a pilot region in a national experiment which subordinated local police forces to local
governments, and since then policing has been a local responsibility in Petrozavodsk.
Each deputy mayor is responsible for a separate group of functions. The deputy mayor for economic
affairs is responsible for the operation of the budget department, the economic department, the
department for municipal property and the department for protection of consumer rights. In addition,
he is responsible for the trade, public catering and consumer services department, the foreign trade
department, the labor department, the tax inspectorate and the chamber of commerce. The line
department for trade, public catering and consumer services is an unusual feature in municipal
government, since these are services normally provided by the private sector. Nevertheless, under
current federal legislation, local governments are responsible for ensuring that local residents have
access to these services through either the public or private sector. The presence of a foreign trade
department testifies to the fact that the city has contacts with foreign investors. Due to the economic
and legal framework in Russia, foreign investors must seek to establish contacts with local administ-
rations in order to secure all the necessary permits and tax breaks. City administrations do not
commonly possess tax inspectorates, usually agencies of the federal Ministry of Taxes and Levies.
Although local tax inspectorates are not divisions of regional or local government, they may work
closely with cities and raions and depend on local governments for housing, office space and communal
services. The Law on Local Government Finance allows local governments to set up local tax offices
for the purpose of collecting local taxes but local governments seldom exercise that right, preferring
to rely on federal tax agencies. The City of Petrozavodsk is a rare example of a municipality with its
own tax revenue unit.
The deputy mayor for urban infrastructure supervises the municipal housing department, the service
procurement department and the department for communal services (water, central heating, electric
power, gas, public transport and parks). Some activities related to municipal housing have been
privatized, such as housing maintenance or servicing of television aerials, and are now contracted out
to private companies, hence the necessity for a service procurement department.
The deputy mayor for social policy oversees departments and committees for education, health care,
culture, athletics, welfare and sanitation, all of which are assigned to local governments by federal
legislation. This deputy mayor is also in charge of the Military Commissariat, which is another
example of the unlawful delegation of federal functions to local governments.
The first deputy mayor oversees the departments of urban planning and environmental control.
The City of Petrozavodsk is currently participating in a World Bank project of divestment and
municipalization of housing previously owned by state enterprises, and the first deputy mayor is also
responsible for coordinating local efforts to this end.
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Figure 4.1
Local Government Structure in Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia
Mayor
City Administration:
• General Office
• Information and
Analysis Department
• Audit Department
Deputy mayors:
• First Deputy Mayor
• Deputy Mayor for
Economic Affairs
• Deputy Mayor for
Urban Infrastructure
• Deputy Mayor for
Social Policy
City Council:
• Chairman
• Deputy Chairman
• Standing Committees
• Office of the Council
First Deputy Mayor:
• Department for Urban Planning and
Land Use
• Land Committee
• World Bank Project Implementation
• Department for Environmental Control
• Administrative Committee
• Commission on Emergency Situations
Deputy Mayor for Urban Infrastructure:
• Housing Department
• Department of Communal Services
• Department for Service Procurement
Deputy Mayor for Social Policy:
• Department of Education
• Health Care Department
• Department of Culture
• Department of Athletics
• Department for Youth Policies
• Department of  Welfare
• Military Commissariat
• Department of Sanitation
Deputy Mayor for Economic Affairs:
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• Department of Foreign Trade
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• Tax Inspectorate
• Chamber of Commerce
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4.6 Organization of Local Administrations by Sector
Although each municipality may determine its structure of local administration, in practice the
prevailing model of administrative organization both at the regional and local levels follows the
sectoral, or line department, model inherited from the Soviet era. The salient feature of this model is
that budget appropriations are remitted to the accounts of the line departments. Each line department
has its own share of the budget and is normally free to chose suppliers and determine the terms of the
contract. In a system where budgets are allowed to operate under a deficit, heads of line departments
are assured that the actual overall revenues will not cover all expenses that were approved for the current
year. They therefore conclude contracts for the maximum amount of work in order to pressure the
administration to finance the already signed contracts. Whether funding is provided depends on the
negotiating skills of the department heads. In the case of a strong negotiator, the contracts will be
financed at the expense of other departments and programs. Otherwise the contracts remain and
deferred payments accumulate. Before funds may be spent on current budget expenditure needs,
they must first go to repay overdue liabilities carried over from the previous year, by which time the
current expenditure needs exceed the remaining funds by far.
The sectoral model of administration is cost-driven and inefficient, creating disincentives for line
departments to reduce expenditures and improve management.
One method of preventing line departments from spending appropriated funds without approval
is transition to a system of centralized procurement. In the case of centralized procurement, each line
department submits a detailed request for funding to the procurement office of the local administration,
which screens them for adequacy, needs, et cetera. Once all the requests are pooled into a consolidated
plan, similar items are grouped together and procured through tenders. Many local governments
have realized considerable savings through centralized procurement. The City of Omsk, for instance,
was able to save from ten to thirty percent of previous-year expenditures on certain items. Consequently,
the new system is gaining popularity among local governments, although the transition is often
hampered by opposition from the line departments.
5. Public Service Provision
Local governments are responsible for the following, according to current federal legislation:
• maintaining municipal housing;
• establishing and maintaining municipal educational institutions;
• establishing and maintaining municipal health care and sanitation institutions;18
• establishing and maintaining municipal law enforcement authorities;
• regulating planning and development;
• organizing, maintaining and developing municipal services such as electricity, gas, sewerage,
heating and water supply;
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• organizing subsidized fuel deliveries to households and municipal institutions;
• constructing and maintaining local roads;
• improving land and municipal parks;
• waste disposal;
• funeral services and cemetaries;
• establishing and maintaining municipal archives;
• public transport and communications;
• fostering the provision of trade, catering and consumer services;
• effectively managing cultural institutions;
• conserving historical and cultural monuments in municipal ownership;
• organizing and maintaining the municipal information service;
• effectively managing municipal mass media;
• effectively managing athletic institutions;
• welfare services and promotion of employment;
• protecting the environment;
• organizing the municipal fire department and promoting fire safety.
As shown above, municipalities are charged with the responsibility to finance and deliver a fairly
wide range of public services. However, this list of functions is not mandatory for each and every
municipality, since the basket of public services offered by local governments in Russia traditionally
depends on the availability of the relevant social infrastructure facilities. Likewise, the delineation of
service provision responsibilities between federal, regional and local authorities depends on the
distribution of property in social infrastructure facilities among the three levels of government (see
table 4A.8).
At present, 11,209 of the 12,261 municipalities registered in Russia own municipal property.19
Among these:
• 8,608 own municipal schools and kindergartens;
• 7,694 own municipal health care institutions;
• 7,859 own municipal housing and non-residential buildings;
• 4,714 own municipal enterprises.
The remaining 1,052 municipalities do not own municipal property and thus should not have been
registered as municipalities under current federal legislation.
Since social infrastructure facilities are scattered unevenly across jurisdictions, different municipalities
deliver different sets of services. For instance, general and specialized hospitals are usually located in
regional and raion centers.  Although these hospitals provide services to residents of neighboring
municipalities, they are funded by the city where they are located.  Cities are usually willing to fund
these facilities, since the size of regional grants is directly dependent on the number of public
institutions supported from the local budget. However, because the grant is based on number of
facilities rather than services provided, the grant is remitted as a general purpose grant with no strings
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attached, meaning that the local government is not obliged to spend fixed amounts on medications
or other supplies. In practice, local governments never allocate a sufficient sum for these purposes,
since that would amount to wasting local funds on cross-subsidizing residents of other municipalities.
In some cases where the failure of local governments to support inter-municipal service provision
becomes too visible, regional governments assume responsibility for the facility in question.
Table 4A.6 gives an overview on the degree of decentralization in public service provision throughout
Russia. In general, the share of local budgets in consolidated regional-local expenditures on health
care is noticeably higher than average in regions where there is significant fragmentation of local
jurisdictions. Because the bulk of health care expenditures are on the maintenance and operation of
hospitals, which are unevenly distributed among the many municipalities, regional governments
must often assume funding responsibility. This disparity is not so great in the case of schools and
cultural institutions, which are more evenly spread across localities.
5.1 Methods of Local Service Delivery
Public services may be either provided by municipal institutions and communal enterprises or
contracted out to private companies. Most communal enterprises have been privatized and now
officially belong to the private sector. Remaining municipal property essentially consists of institutions
that provide free or heavily subsidized services, such as schools, kindergartens, hospitals and out-
patient clinics, municipal housing stock, libraries and public conference halls. All of these institutions
create expenditures, not revenue. Privatized communal enterprises such as public transport companies,
customer services and public utilities also continue to depend on local government support, despite
charging user fees. Quite often local government subsidies are their main source of income. For
instance, public transport companies typically cover only thirty to forty percent of their costs through
fares, while the balance is covered by the local government.  Communal enterprises that remain wholly
publicly owned usually operate separately from the local administration, on a contractual basis.
Neither the revenues nor the costs of such separate municipal enterprises are shown in the local government
budget. Revenues raised by municipal enterprises are considered to belong to the enterprise rather
than the local government, and the same applies to expenditures. The local government budget only
shows any subsidies allocated to municipal enterprises to cover their financing gap. Municipal enterprises
are rarely net revenue earners; if they are and have for some reason failed to hide their revenues in
extra-budgetary funds, their net revenues are shown under “revenue from the use of state and municipal
property” in the municipal budget.
Services of municipal schools are not entirely provided free of charge, as gifts to teachers and “voluntary
donations” by parents for school repairs and equipment purchases have become common practice.
Directors of prestigious schools have also been known to solicit bribes for admitting students.
Teachers’ salaries, although regulated by federal law, are normally paid from local budgets, and
teachers’ strikes due to non-payment of wages have become a frequent occurrence.
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The situation in the field of health care is no better. Lack of funds limits the range of medicines
purchased by municipal hospitals and most medications, X-ray film, blood supplies and expensive
imports must be paid for by patients. It has become usual for hospitals to create commercial departments
to earn money for hospital maintenance. And even though this extra money is earned using hospital
facilities and equipment, municipal authorities have no share in the profit and exercise no control
over the targeted use of these funds. Desperately short of funds, local administrations leave hospitals
to their own devices.
One of the components of the housing and utilities reform included municipalization of enterprise
housing followed by the privatization of municipal housing to tenants. However, rents remain low,
even in the privatized housing stock, and do not generate sufficient funds to pay for maintenance.
Local budgets therefore continue to bear the heavy burden of subsidizing both municipal and
privatized housing.
At present, the federal government is carrying out reform of the housing and communal utilities
sector to gradually increase the share of housing costs covered by households and reduce the amount
covered by local governments. Ultimately, the goal is to have households cover all costs related to
maintenance and repairs of housing, engineering service lines and utility systems.
Thus, by subsidizing prices and tariffs for housing and utility services, local governments are imple-
menting federal legislation which on the one hand mandates that they organize fuel provision to
households and maintain municipal housing, power, gas, heat and water supply systems and sewerage,
while on the other hand it stipulates that the cost of those services shall not exceed a specified,
though gradually increasing, share of household income.
From time to time, user fees for public utility services such as gas, water, power and heat supply are
increased. According to the Russian Government Decree on Improvement of Payment Systems for
Housing and Utilities, local governments approve rates and tariffs for all housing and public utility
services except for electricity and gas tariffs, which are established by regional heat and power commissions.
Although prices for electricity and gas are regulated, local governments must also subsidize those
public goods by covering the difference between regional and local tariffs from their budgets. Since
household incomes are low, the common practice is to establish lower tariffs for residents and higher
ones for businesses, thus subsidizing residents to the detriment of producers. This policy obviously
weakens the competitive strength of local products and in the long run undermines the revenue base
of local budgets. Moreover, since local governments themselves are consumers of gas and electricity,
they have accumulated extensive debts to gas and power suppliers, resulting in increasingly frequent
gas and power cuts, sometimes to the point of disconnecting entire cities and townships, as in
Primorski krai.
Local authorities could have realized significant savings had they refused to subsidize housing and
public utility services and instead provided targeted subsidies to users. However, targeted subsidies
to users (rather than subsidies to producers) have not been widely practiced in Russia so far, giving
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rise to absurd situations. For example, the housing and utility subsidy provided to tenants in municipal
housing stock is currently calculated according to area.  Hence, the greatest housing and utility
subsidies are paid to tenants of the largest apartments, while less affluent families occupying smaller
apartments receive much smaller ones. Residents of rural areas where there is almost no municipal
housing and a much lower level of income receive no subsidies at all for housing maintenance and
repairs. They receive only fuel (coal, wood and mazut) at subsidized prices, that is, assistance in kind
calculated according the number of eligible beneficiaries (old age, veterans, et cetera) rather than the
area that requires heating.
The militia is historically a federal agency with local branches funded through the Federal Ministry
of the Interior, although municipalities are free to set up their own municipal law enforcement
authorities. In 1998, an experiment was conducted in a number of pilot municipalities to test a
proposal to delegate local police to local governments. The experiment, which involved ten regions
(all municipalities in the oblasts of Novgorod and Saratov and the Republic of Karelia and selected
municipalities in other participating regions, primarily large cities) was quite successful. The cities of
Volgograd, Omsk and Perm have accumulated noteworthy experience in creating municipal police
forces. Although this experiment was not extended to other regions, due to opposition from the
Ministry of Interior, some of the pilot regions still continue to maintain public order through local
authorities. In Tyumen oblast, for example, funds to support local police officers were transferred to
local budgets, and local administrations now enter into contracts with regional police headquarters
on the protection of public order in their jurisdictions.
In a new form of service delivery, not yet common, several municipalities may jointly support a
facility that provides services across municipal borders. Gatchina raion in Leningrad oblast, for
example, established contracts with neighboring municipalities to co-finance a specialized medical
center servicing the entire area.
In general, the quality of services is controlled either by administrative oversight, in the case of
municipal enterprise services, or as specified by the contract, in the case of a private enterprise.
Traditionally, consumer complaints have played an important role in monitoring the quality of
public services.
Municipal contracts provide an extremely attractive option for private companies. In view of non-
payments due to the economic crisis, enterprises view municipal contracts as an ultimately profitable
business despite the delays in payment (see section 5.6). Although municipal contracts bring no tax
benefits to the private company involved, the option to pay taxes in kind is a major benefit. Both
suppliers of municipal enterprises and institutions as well as enterprises that have contracts with the
local administration may enter into in-kind offset arrangements. The advantage of this arrangement
for enterprises is that their products are valued at fixed prices which often exceed the market value by
far. Local authorities view the arrangement as a means of collecting at least some form of tax from
taxpayers as well as an opportunity to overstate expenditures in hopes of obtaining a greater regional
transfer in the following year.
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5.2 Local Government Involvement in Profit Enterprises
The Law on Local Self-government gives local self-governments the right to establish for-profit
enterprises, agencies and organizations, and deal with issues of reorganizing and liquidating such
enterprises. More and more local governments in Russia are setting up municipal companies purely
for profit reasons. Local governments are usually nominal owners, often with only a permit for
operation serving as their contribution to the stock, but occasionally they may establish companies
entirely at their own initiative. For example, the administration of Pryamitsino Township in Kursk
oblast started a mushroom growing and handicraft business. Income from this venture, in addition
to funds raised from the citizenry, was dedicated to building a local gas supply pipeline and housing
repairs.
In the mid-1990s, many municipalities established municipal banks.20 But with their small levels of
capital and inadequate management, these banks were not able to survive the increase of mandatory
reserves required by the Central Bank after the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia.
Local administrations have also shown a tendency to contribute municipal property (land or buildings)
to the authorized capital of profit enterprises. The Office of the Public Prosecutor blocks these
attempts on grounds of incompatibility with federal legislation. After protest by the public prosecutor,
the Duma of Togliatti City repealed a resolution whereby local administration officials were allowed
to include municipal property in contributions to the authorized capitals of new companies of
various ownership and legal forms. Where other local governments have made similar attempts,
criminal proceedings were instituted against mayors for exceeding their authority and illegally
participating in entrepreneurial activities.
Although it is not illegal for Russian municipalities to engage in commercial activities directly or
through municipal enterprises, existing limitations make it difficult without violating the law. In
addition, revenues from such activities are a liability for local governments, as their inclusion in the
budget may lead to a reduction of financial transfers from above. In order to hide commercial
revenues, municipalities generally set up various extra-budgetary funds not reflected in budget
execution reports. Hence there is no reliable information about the true range of commercial activity
among local governments. Revenues stated under the category “revenue from the use of state and
municipal property” do not normally exceed one to five percent of total local revenues.
5.3 Distribution of Power between Local and Regional Governments
The unclear division of powers between regions and municipalities has become a pressing issue in
Russia. It is not infrequent for regional administrations to intervene in the activities of local governments
and trespass on their lawful jurisdiction by arbitrarily limiting their scope of competencies, by
depriving them of powers and financing or by delegating regional state functions without the
requisite financial support.
198
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
Maintenance of municipal educational institutions at the sub-raion level is considered to be a local
function; however, general administration of education is traditionally assigned to the raion level,
where educational authorities provide methodological guidance in keeping with federal Ministry of
Education guidelines. Formally, these authorities are subdivisions or territorial branches of the
regional administration in raions, but in practice this is an example of dual subordination to the
regional government and the federal Ministry of Education. The same is true of municipal health
care institutions, except that funding of hospitals is more often assigned to the raion or regional level
by the regional legislation.
Only rarely do regional and local administrations enter into contracts to determine the exact
responsibilities of each party for the delivery of services that fall under joint jurisdiction. Under such
a contract a municipality would assume responsibility to provide the premises for a branch of the
federal Ministry of Welfare, while the region would ensure timely payments of benefits to eligible
groups and wages to the employees of the local welfare office.
Most regional experiments in voluntary or compulsory delegation of local powers to the regional
level derive from the desire to restore the vertical hierarchy of government administration where the
raion center and raion would have the same department of education, department of social security,
financial service and tax service. The fact that this runs contrary to federal legislation on local govern-
ment does not hinder regional authorities.
5.4 Municipal Property
Municipal property is recognized as a form of property by the Constitution, which establishes that
local governments operate and manage municipal property on behalf of the owners, that is, the local
residents. Property rights in general are governed by the Civil Code of the Russian Federation
(1994, 1995). Municipal property rights are further addressed by the Law on Local Self-government,
as public property is one of the financial foundations of local self-governance.
Article 29 of the Law on Local Self-government contains an open list of the types of assets that can
be held in municipal ownership. These include local budget and extra-budgetary funds; local
government assets; municipal lands and natural resources on municipal property; municipal enterprises
and organizations; municipal banks and other credit and loan institutions; municipal residential and
non-residential building stock; municipal institutions of education, health care, culture or sports;
and other movable or immovable property. There are no restrictions imposed on the types of
property that may be owned by municipalities.
Article 215(3) of the Civil Code states that municipal property can be assigned to municipal enter-
prises or institutions or operated directly by the local government.  Article 124(2) of the Civil Code
states that municipalities shall be governed by the same regulations that apply to other legal entities,
unless the law or the special nature of local government require otherwise. In fact, in their capacity as
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economic agents, local governments have special features that distinguish them from other legal
entities. First, the owners of municipal property are local residents, therefore local governments should
not engage in activities that put the municipality at risk of insolvency. Secondly, since local governments
establish the rules that apply to all local businesses, they have to potential to create conditions giving
a competitive advantage to municipal enterprises. Hence, legislation imposes certain limitations on
uses of municipal property by local governments and on the possibility to foreclose on municipal
property.
Because of the special significance of land and other natural resources, foreclosure on this type of
municipal property is permitted only in cases explicitly stipulated by law. Also, the Civil Code
distinguishes between municipal property managed directly by local governments and municipal
property assigned to legal entities founded by local governments.  Local governments may establish
two types of legal entities. One type is municipal enterprises created to generate profit, not necessarily
to provide public services. These are separate institutions operating under the supervision of the local
government, which oversees the targeted use of funds and has a share in the profits. The other category
includes municipal institutions, spending organizations that provide public services on a free-of-
charge or heavily subsidized basis. If a local government defaults on its obligations, it can be held liable
only with the property that was not previously assigned to any other legal entity, whether municipal
enterprise or municipal institution. If a municipal enterprise founded by the local government defaults
on its obligations, then the local government cannot be held liable and vice versa. If a municipal
institution defaults on its obligations, it can be held liable only with its financial assets. If these assets
do not suffice to meet the obligation, the subsidiary liability is passed on to the local government.
Municipal institutions are often permitted to engage in profit making activities. In contrast to
municipal enterprises, they are not required to share any profit earned with the local government.
Property purchased by this profit becomes their own and is accounted for on a separate balance sheet
of the institution in question.
To limit the engagement of local governments in private sector risks, Article 66 of the Civil Code
prohibits local governments from participating in joint-stock companies and partnerships. However,
the same article allows municipal enterprises or institutions to do so, provided that they have permission
from the local government and that the law does not provide otherwise. Local governments are thus
permitted to engage in corporate profit-making activities through intermediaries that they have
established.
In order to possess property, a locality must officially registered as a municipality. After registration,
the municipality has the right to create or acquire property in any way permitted by law, like any
other owner. With the ongoing transition from the single system of state property to the coexistence
of diverse forms of property, most municipal property was acquired through transfers of federal or
regional property into municipal ownership. Article 5 of the Law on Local Self-government stipulates
that transfers of federal property to municipalities are regulated by federal laws, while transfers of
regional property to municipalities are regulated by regional laws.  However, transfer of property to
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municipalities began prior to adoption of the Law on Local Self-government. Earlier transfers came
under a different set of regulations, the most important of which were:
• Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on Delineation of State Property
in the Russian Federation between Federal Property, Property of a Subject of the Federation,
Including Krais, Oblasts, Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrug, the Cities of Moscow
and Saint Petersburg, and Municipal Property, 1991.
• Order of the President of the Russian Federation on Approving the Statute on Determining
the Composition of Federal, State and Municipal Property Item by Item and the Procedure
for Property Right Registration, 1992.
• Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation on Procedures for Transferring
Cultural and Communal Facilities Held in Federal Ownership to the Property of the Subjects
of Russian Federation and Municipalities, 1995.
When these regulations were passed, local governments existed as multi-tier hierarchies. Property
rights were transferred to raion administrations as the first and highest level of local government,
placing sub-raion cities, townships and rural districts at a disadvantage. Since local government
reform established equal status for all municipalities, many of these earlier property transfers need to
be revised in line with the new distribution of spending responsibilities. Stavropol krai provides one
example of the problems that arise when the transfer of property does not correspond to new municipal
boundaries. During the bulk of property transfers in the early 1990s, the property in Stavropol krai
was transferred to raions. Later, local governments were organized at the sub-raion level, but most
property remained in the ownership of former raions, now territorial branches of regional administration.
Most poor municipalities that lack revenues to support facilities have agreed to assume property
rights in order to receive regional funding.  However, a few of the richer municipalities have refused
to accept schools and hospitals, since they do not receive support from the krai budget due to their wealth.
6. Local Finance
The principal law governing financial systems at the local level is the 1997 Law on Local Government
Finance.  The development of local self-government in the Russian Federation was not supported
by the transfer of genuine fiscal autonomy to the local level. Although local governments form their
own budgets, their autonomy over revenues is very limited. Yet in the majority of regions, a sizeable
portion of consolidated budget expenditures has to be paid by municipalities. In 1999, the municipal
share amounted to twenty-eight percent of the national consolidated budget and fifty-three percent
of the sub-national budget (see table 4A.7). As local tax and non-tax revenues can cover only a small
portion of local spending needs, the resulting financing gap is covered by the regional governments
through grants and shared revenues from federal and regional taxes (see table 4A.8). In 1999, about
twenty-four percent of local budget expenditures were financed with grants (transfers, subsidies,
subventions and mutual settlements) from higher-level budgets (see table 4A.8); when combined
with shared taxes, they accounted for roughly sixty-nine percent of local budgets (see table 4A.9).
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As the local proportion of shared taxes vary from year to year, local governments cannot predict the
amount of revenue that will be available to them, and in effect bear no responsibility for forming and
executing their budgets, or for the quality and quantity of services provided to the public.
6.1 Expenditures
6.1.1 Structure of Expenditures
The largest areas of expenditure in local budgets are housing and utilities, education and health care
(see table 4A.10).  The size of expenditures on housing and utilities is due to housing rents and
utility charges, which are heavily subsidized by local governments. Since these subsidies apply only
to municipal housing, they comprise a major share of expenditures only in large cities with substantial
housing stock.  In rural areas, the majority of houses are privately owned, so housing and utilities
represent a much smaller share in total local spending.
In rural municipalities, the largest expenditures, accounting for more than half of all budget resources,
are in the field of education. Since hospitals are for the most part located in large cities, rural
municipalities spend less on heath care, mainly providing paramedic and obstetric services.
6.1.2 Expenditure Norms
In contrast to legislation in other countries, Russian legislation, particularly the Budget Code, refers
to federal expenditure norms to be observed by all levels of government when formulating budgets.
But the system of norms has not yet been developed, let alone approved. Although the Russian
Ministry of Economy and sector ministries have not given up attempts to develop such a system, it
will be difficult at best to develop a uniform system of expenditure norms for a country as vast as
Russia. Only a few expenditure norms have been established at the federal level so far. With few
exceptions, these have not been mandatory spending standards, but rather guidelines used by
higher levels of government to allocate equalization transfers to localities.
At present, the only effective norm established at the federal level is the Russian Government Decree
on the Uniform Schedule of Wages for Workers of Budgetary Institutions. Workers of budgetary
institutions are employees of all institutions funded from the budget at any level, including the local
level, except for the administrative staff of governments.
6.1.3 Federal Mandates
Local autonomy over expenditures is narrowly constrained by federal mandates that entitle various
population groups to benefits and subsidies. These entitlements are prescribed in over 150 federal
legislative acts, forty-five of which were passed before 1992. Local authorities are mandated to pay
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thirty-seven types of subsidies from local budgets, with eligible groups comprising a large proportion,
if not the entirety, of the local population.
Responsibility for most of those entitlements and subsidies was assigned to local governments by
federal legislation from the outset. The funds required for these federal mandates are estimated to
outrun all revenues of most municipalities, including transfers. For instance, according to the estimates
made by the officials of Kirovsky raion in Leningrad oblast, the funds needed to finance the mandates
would more than exhaust all available municipal budget revenues. Total reported budget revenues
in 1997 were sixteen percent less than the total estimated cost of federal mandates.
The Law on Local Government Finance provides that “local self-government bodies shall be entitled
to execute any decisions of the state administration that result in increased expenditures or lost
revenues for the local budgets within resources provided in compensation.” However, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, local authorities fail to establish the inadequacy of funds provided
“in compensation,” since this can be proven only where funds are transferred for particular purposes.
In practice, the funds required for compensation are merely “taken into account” when establishing
the local proportion of shared tax revenue or in determining total transfer amounts. Meanwhile, local
authorities face lawsuits for non-payment of entitlements, often losing their case in court.
Examples of federal mandates include:
• subsidies relating to payment for housing, utilities, electricity and fuel;
• subsidies for fuel purchases by disabled persons;
• wages for teachers, doctors and certain other categories of budget employees;
• monthly cash compensation to teachers for the cost of book purchases;
• provision of free medicine to certain population groups;
• payment of monthly child benefits;
• payment of benefits to persons with custody of children;
• free meals in schools and hospitals;
• free milk products for children under two years of age;
• free prostheses for disabled persons;
• funeral subsidies;
• subsidies for telecommunication, municipal transport and certain other services for World War
II veterans, old-age pensioners, families of World War II victims, victims of the Chernobyl
disaster, families with many children, heroes of the Soviet Union and of the socialist labor
movement, blood donors, military servicemen, police officers, customs officers, prosecutor’s
office workers, court officers, tax police officers and traffic police officers.
6.2 Revenues
The standard classification of government revenues and expenditures currently in effect lists the
following categories of local government revenues:
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• local taxes and fees;
• permanently assigned taxes and fees;
• shared tax revenues (at rates decided annually);
• non-tax revenues;
• grants from higher-level budgets:
— transfers,
— subsidies,
— subventions,
— mutual settlements.
6.2.1 Local Taxes and Fees
Prior to 1998, local governments were entitled to levy twenty-three local taxes (see table 4A.11).
However, a regional sales tax was introduced in 1998, replacing sixteen of the local taxes. Local
governments were instead assigned sixty percent of sales tax collections, which often fail to compensate
for the loss of revenue from the repealed taxes. Revenues from local levies in 1999 amounted to
thirteen percent of all revenues for municipalities.
Even prior to the introduction of the regional sales tax, local taxes failed to ensure fiscal autonomy for
municipalities, since the rates of taxation were virtually legislated by the federal government. Further-
more, the list of local taxes was exhaustive, barring municipalities from introducing new taxes at their
own discretion. Local governments could exercise some autonomy in determining the tax base and
rates for a very limited number of taxes, such as the tax on the construction of manufacturing
facilities in health resort areas and fees for the right to engage in trade, parking, racecourse participation,
the right to shoot movies and TV films, street cleaning and setting up gambling establishments.
The fee for street cleaning, levied on gross sales of enterprises, has become a significant source of own
budget revenue for a number of municipalities. In some cases, revenues from this tax amounted to
twenty-five percent of all tax collections, clearly more than was spent on street cleaning. In 2001, the
Russian government is planning to repeal all turnover taxes, including this one, and compensate for
the resulting revenue losses by assigning five percent of collections from the enterprise profits tax to
municipalities.
Article 15 of the Russian Federation Tax Code, which determines the list of local taxes and fees, has
not gone into effect. However the list, which contains only five local taxes, is indicative of the intentions
of federal legislators towards local taxes. Local taxes specified in the article are:
• land tax;
• personal property tax;
• inheritance and gift tax;
• advertisement tax;
• local license fees.
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This article also stipulates that once a region institutes the immovable property tax, local governments
in its jurisdiction will cease to levy the land tax and personal property tax.
6.2.2 Non-tax Revenues
The main sources of local non-tax revenues are:
• revenues from use of municipal property and activities;
• revenues from sales of municipal land and intangible assets.
These revenues are an independent source of local budget revenues. Starting from 1999, the budget
classification treats part of the revenues from sales of public property as a source of deficit financing,
since these are non-recurring revenue sources.
In addition to the local tax and non-tax revenues mentioned above, the Law on Local Government
Finance allows local governments to collect “self-imposed charges” or voluntary lump-sum
contributions from citizens in accordance with the municipal charter. Due to the system of budget
reporting, it is difficult to estimate the significance of these contributions in total revenues. If any
municipalities collect these contributions, they are most likely used as a revenue source for forming
extra-budgetary funds rather than as a source of budget revenues.
6.2.3 Federal and Regional Tax Revenues Permanently Assigned to Local Budgets
According to the Law on the Tax System, the following federal tax revenues are assigned to localities
on a permanent basis (the percentage of the tax granted to local governments is given in parentheses):
• royalty for use of subsoil resources (local government share fixed according to type of resource);
• stamp duty (one hundred percent);
• state fee (one hundred percent);
• inheritance and gift tax (one hundred percent);
• income tax on individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activities (one hundred percent).
Regional tax revenues assigned to localities under this law include:
• enterprise property tax (fifty percent);
• sales tax (sixty percent).
Assigned tax revenues in 1999 amounted to 13.7 percent of all revenues for municipalities.
6.2.4 Shared Tax Revenues
Shared taxes are a principal tool of intergovernmental fiscal regulation at the regional level and
account for the largest amount of revenues distributed from regional budgets to localities. Local
revenues from shared taxes are general purpose grants extended from a higher-level budget, similar
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to subsidies or equalization transfers. Regional governments determine both the applicable taxes and
the proportion of tax to be shared between the region and municipalities.
Regions may choose to divide their share of the following federal taxes with localities:
• value added tax;21
• personal income tax;
• enterprise profit tax;
• excises assigned on share by federal authorities to subjects of the Russian Federation.
They may also share the following regional taxes:
• enterprise property tax (within the fifty percent share assigned to the regional level);
• forest tax;
• payments for water;
• education tax;
• sales tax (within the forty percent share assigned to the regional level).
Under the Law on Local Government Finance, the region may distribute its shared federal taxes
differently among its municipalities, but the total share of localities in a particular federal tax should
not fall below an established minimum which varies by type of tax:
• fifty percent of the personal income tax;
• five percent of the enterprise profits tax;22
• ten percent of VAT;
• five percent of excises on alcoholic beverages;
• ten percent of excises on other goods.
However, the minimum requirements above do not assist municipalities in estimating their next year
revenues from tax sharing, since regions may allocate these percentages differently among municipalities
at their discretion.
The Law on Local Government Finance requires that the local proportion of shared taxes be determined
by formula and that shared taxes and equalization transfers be allocated to municipalities using a
standard methodology. These requirements imply that both regional/local tax sharing and equalization
transfers to localities from the regional government are general purpose regional grants, but transferred
to localities through different channels. In practice, however, these requirements are not enforced,
and regional authorities make no attempt to allocate those funds using a single equalization method-
ology.
6.2.5 Special and General Purpose Grants
Grants to localities from the federal and regional budgets include equalization transfers (subsidies),
subventions and mutual settlements.
206
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
Equalization transfers are distributed to localities for the sole purpose of equalizing fiscal capacity,
meaning that local governments are free to spend these revenues at their own discretion. Regional
governments determine the size of the transfers and sources of revenue for the equalization fund
within the regional budget.
Under the Law on Local Government Finance, equalization transfers should be allocated across
municipalities using a fixed formula with parameters including population size, the proportion of
various age groups (such as school-age children and pensioners) in the municipal population, per
capita fiscal capacity before equalization and other local features. However, in the majority of regions,
distribution of equalization transfers is negotiated rather than formula-driven.
Subventions are distributed to municipalities from the federal or regional budget for specific purposes.
These are subject to repayment in case of failure to use them for their intended purpose within the
established time limit. Federal legislation does not specify purposes for regional subventions to localities
or procedures for distributing subventions among localities.
Regions rarely use subventions as a means of transferring financial resources to municipalities as the
inadequacy of transferred funds would be immediately apparent. Instead, they excuse themselves by
claiming that the execution of federal and regional mandates was taken into account in determining
the size of equalization transfers distributed to local budgets. In cases where they are utilized,
subventions from regional budgets are provided primarily for the execution of federal mandates,23
and occasionally for the execution of regional mandates.24
Mutual settlements are another variety of special purpose grant, transferred to municipalities by
regional governments in order to reimburse them for cost increases or revenue losses caused by regional
government decisions made during the budget year, after local budgets were approved. Grants
provided to local budges under this category include funds to cover costs of housing maintenance,
utilities and other facilities transferred to municipalities.  Municipalities may also receive additional
earmarked assistance under this category, not provided for in the budget, to finance other expenditures
or write off debts on budget loans. There is no prescribed method of allocating those additional
financial resources across municipalities.
6.3 Methods of Grant Allocation
The method of allocating intergovernmental transfers to municipalities varies across regions. Most
regions estimate local expenditure needs and revenue capacity and allocate transfers to cover the
resulting financing gap. The region and individual local governments then negotiate the actual
figures, with the local government claiming higher expenditure needs and lower anticipated revenue
than the regional estimates. In this process, both parties usually refer to historic tax collections and
expenditures or estimates derived from previous years’ data.
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This approach clearly discourages local tax efforts and prudent use of local resources. Moreover, it
creates incentives for local authorities to hide revenues in extra-budgetary funds rather than report
them, and negotiate in-kind offsets with potential taxpayers to boost spending. Soft budget constraints
permit local authorities to retain inefficient public facilities, overstaffed budget organizations and
inefficient technologies for public service provision.
Another problem concerns the use of regional expenditure norms for the estimation of local expenditure
needs by the regions for allocating equalization transfers. Several regions, including Leningrad,
Sverdlovsk and Moscow oblasts, have established these norms in regional legislation. The norms
generally represent maintenance standards for service-providing institutions rather than standards
for providing public services to consumers. For instance, instead of financing norms per student,
there are expenditure norms per school that are applied regardless of whether a particular school is at
all needed. In addition, since expenditure norms are demand driven, they disregard the actual
affordability of norm-driven expenditures. Consequently, the expenditure needs based on norms
often exceed the available resources, and regions must eventually reduce expenditures after they
have been calculated by a lengthy and labor-intensive process. The failure to comply with norms
that were fixed as laws also creates social tensions.
Some regions have attempted to develop formal methodologies to assess local expenditure needs and
revenue potential on the basis of certain objective criteria rather than the data on previous years’
actual expenditures and revenue collections. In contrast to the federal government, which first
turned to transparent formulas for allocation of transfers in 1994 and has since made impressive
progress, most regional governments do not realize the need to formalize intergovernmental fiscal
relations or else lack the expertise required to develop an appropriate methodology.
In June 2000, the federal Ministry of Finance approved a document entitled “Provisional Methodo-
logical Recommendations for Russian Federation Subjects on the Regulation of Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations” (hereafter referred to as the “Recommendations”) and circulated it to the financial
departments of regional governments. The Recommendations were developed by the Ministry of
Finance in cooperation with independent experts25 and were based on the best practices of Russian
regions in formalizing intergovernmental fiscal relations, for example, Leningrad oblast and Vladimir
oblast; international practices; and the requirement for formalized allocation of grants set forth in the
Law on Local Government Finance.
The Recommendations advise regional administrations to use the following guidelines for allocating
grants:
1. Formula-based equalization of per capita fiscal capacity should be employed rather than the
principle of balancing own revenues and “needs” of local governments.
2. Revenue capacity should be estimated based on the taxable resources of a municipality rather
than past revenue collections.
3. When measuring per capita fiscal capacity, objective differences in demand for public services
and their costs should be considered.  These include the demographics of a population, the
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cost of living, the duration of the heating season, population density, et cetera. Expenditure
needs should no longer be estimated based on the existing social infrastructure.
4. The total sum of shared taxes and equalization transfers intended for municipalities should be
estimated during a single process.
These principles allow regions great flexibility in selecting formalized distribution methods. Using a
formalized methodology to allocate grants will ensure predictability of transfer amounts, save time
spent in negotiating local budget targets and create incentives for local governments to raise additional
revenues and use budget resources more prudently.
It should be emphasized that, under the current federal legislation, regional governments are free to
choose the method of intergovernmental fiscal relations within their boundaries; the federal government
may only advise. Nevertheless, many regions have shown interest in the new methods and are
already planning to utilize formula-driven allocations in 2001.
6.4 Budget Process
In municipalities, the local administration, or executive branch, is responsible for formulating the
annual budget and submitting it to the local council, or legislative branch, for approval. Any second-
tier municipalities have no own revenue sources and formulate expenditure requests to be submitted
to the higher-level government for approval. The approved expenditures are then financed from the
budget of the higher municipality.
During the year, local councils normally review the budget several times and adopt amendments to
the budget law. Usually, there is no formal calendar for such budget reviews.
As local budget revenues are strongly dependent on shared taxes and transfers from the regional
budget, local budgets can be approved only after the approval of the regional budget. Since the
regional budgets are often approved after long delay, local budgets are adopted late as well, at the end
of the first or even the second quarter of the next budget year.
6.5 Budget Execution
There is no universal method of control over budget execution in Russia. While local authorities are
capable of influencing levels of tax collections in their jurisdictions to a limited extent, they do not
possess formal levers. Local tax collection is left to federal authorities (tax inspectorates in cities and
raions), who are primarily concerned with collecting federal taxes.26 Failure to execute the revenue
side of the budget leads to incomplete execution of the expenditure side. This is conducive to
manipulations with expenditures whereby some expenditure items are executed in full and others
not at all. The untargeted use of budgetary and extra-budgetary funds also occurs frequently.
Failure to execute the budget incurs no legal consequences whatsoever.
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The flexible nature of fiscal relations between regional and local governments is another example of
soft budgetary constraints. Even in regions where the budget law prescribes the use of a formalized
procedure for allocating grants, actual appropriations often differ from the formula-based amounts,
or the formula is only applied to selected municipalities. Furthermore, budget items such as budget
loans or mutual settlements allow regional governments to distribute additional financial resources at
their own discretion and make it possible for municipalities to receive additional financial assistance
depending on the negotiating skills of their mayors. This creates incentives to overspend by
accumulating deferred payments, a policy which increases the possibility of additional financial
assistance from regional budgets.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Budget Code, a single all-encompassing treasury system of budget
execution shall be established starting from the year 2000.27 It is hoped that a transition to the
treasury system will automatically solve many of the problems originating from soft budgetary
constraints, but the creation of such a system is an expensive project and likely to take several years.
7. Relationship between the State Administration
and Local Governments
As noted earlier, the Constitution assigns the general principles of local self-government organization
to the joint competence of the Russian Federation and its subjects. Federal legislation thus establishes
a basic framework for municipal organization, and determines issues that fall within local government
competence. However, in most cases local competence is confined to service delivery. Standards of
service provision fall under the competence of the federal government, while control over local
compliance is delegated to the regions.
The Constitution assigns the responsibility of regulating many important issues of developing
municipal institutions to regional authorities. Most of these issues are related to establishing a legal
framework for the development of local self-government within regional boundaries, such as adopting
the law on local self-government, approving local territorial boundaries, establishing the framework for
municipal elections, registering charters, transfering property, et cetera. Regional authorities have no
formal right to interfere with the operation of local governments, with the exception of fiscal matters.
7.1 Regional Infringements on Local Governments’ Rights
Regional infringements upon the basic rights of local self-governance commonly take the following
forms:
• establishing municipal boundaries without prior consent;
• adopting the Model Charter of a Municipality as regional law;
• stipulating that the mayor be elected only from among candidates nominated by the regional
governor;
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• requiring that appointed heads of municipal line departments be approved by the regional
governor or the head of the respective regional department.
In most subjects of the Federation, local self-governance was developed in conformity with the
preferences of regional authorities. Consequently, municipalities and their boundaries were established
according to the will of regional authorities.  Any local attempts to establish new municipalities
without approval of regional authorities are nipped in the bud.
7.2 Intergovernmental Relationships in Public Service Provision
According to federal legislation, local government authorities are free to decide on methods of service
delivery for public services that fall within their competence. Municipalities may determine personnel
policy with respect to municipal employees and employees of local budgetary institutions. The only
exceptions are heads of local line departments, who must usually be approved by officials of the
relevant regional department.
Salaries for municipal employees are established by local administrations within the limits imposed
by the regional law on municipal service. Salaries for employees of budgetary organizations are set in
accordance with the federal Uniform Schedule of Wages for Workers of Budgetary Institutions.
The sole exception is financial bodies of local self-government. Before the end of 1998, financial
bodies of all levels of government were to be part of a single vertical system of the federal Ministry of
Finance, with all salaries paid out of the federal budget. The Law on Local Government Finance
empowered municipal entities to pay their financial staff out of local budgets. Some wealthy municipalities
did so out of the desire for autonomy. However, even after the vertical Ministry of Finance system
was abolished, the majority of municipal financial bodies remain on the payroll of regional authorities,
thus perpetuating their heavy dependence on regional authorities. Formally speaking, however,
their dependence is voluntary, since their choice was driven by the desire to save their own budget
resources (if a municipality relinquishes funds for its financial bodies from the regional budget, it is
not formally entitled to compensation).
Local governments are also dependent on regional authorities for the monitoring of local compliance
with federal standards in providing basic public services such as education, health care and welfare.
Local compliance is controlled by the relevant line department in the regional administration.
Standards in the field of education include:
• curricula;
• number of hours per subject;
• number of students per class;
• teaching load (in hours);
• sanitary standards for classrooms;
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• teachers’ salaries;
• accounting and reporting requirements.
Standards in the field of health care include
• a set of basic medical services;
• quality of medical services;
• medications;
• conditions of medical institutions;
• qualifications for medical personnel;
• salaries of medical personnel;
• accounting and reporting requirements.
Regional grants to localities earmarked for particular spending purposes also enable regional authorities to
exercise control over local spending. Earmarked grants are usually appropriated for the execution of state
powers delegated to localities, target programs or capital construction projects. Frequently they are extended
for paying wages, particularly teachers’ and doctors’ salaries, if local authorities refuse to pay, claiming
that the local function of maintaining institutions refers only to premises and equipment, not salaries.
7.3 Fiscal Relations between Regional and Local Authorities
As noted earlier, local governments are heavily dependent on regional authorities for the transfer of
intergovernmental funds. A survey of local budgets conducted in 199928 revealed that only two
municipalities covered their expenditures exclusively from local and permanently assigned revenues
without additional financial assistance from the regional government. These were Kirishi raion and
the city of Svetogorsk in Leningrad oblast, neither of which are among the richest municipalities in
Russia. The fact that there are almost no self-sufficient municipalities in Russia is the result of
insufficient local and assigned revenues, as well as the fact that regional governments derive advantages
in exercising firm financial control over localities. In order to increase their share of tax collections,
local governments apply informal pressure on taxpayers, resulting in larger regional tax collections.
7.4 Local Governments and Branches of Regional and Federal Authorities
Since functional responsibilities are divided between regional and local authorities according to
ownership of social infrastructure facilities, it is quite common for a territorial branch of the regional
administration to be responsible for projects or facilities in a particular municipality. If there are no conf-
licts between regional and local authorities on the ownership of social infrastructure facilities, bodies
of local self-government and territorial branches of state power operate in parallel and autonomously.
Territorial branches of regional state administration are found at the raion level only when local self-
government is established at the sub-raion level. In such cases, the regional center may delegate
responsibility for relations with local governments to the territorial branch.
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In other cases, regional and federal authorities delegate the responsibility for partial maintenance of
state agencies to local governments. Those agencies typically include registry offices and military
registration and enlistment offices. Officially, both kinds of institutions are a federal responsibility,
but local governments are inevitably involved by sitting in conscription commissions, arranging
seeing-off ceremonies for draftees, wedding ceremonies, et cetera. Employees of those agencies are
usually on the payroll of a higher-level budget, while other operating costs are covered from local
budgets. Often, localities have to cover a number of additional expenses, for example the transportation
of draftees to the place of service. It is also common for agency employees to be provided with
housing from the municipal housing stock.
In theory, delegation of these responsibilities must be accompanied by the transfer of necessary
funding to local governments. In most cases, however, the regional government does not earmark
funding to support these services, instead claiming to have taken additional expenditure needs into
account when allocating transfers. Local governments argue that these funds are inadequate and that
they are in effect co-financing the above-mentioned agencies.
Similar situations occur in the relations between local governments and territorial agencies of other
federal ministries, such as the State Committee for Statistics, the Ministry for Taxes and Duties, the
Ministry of the Interior, courts and the Office of Public Prosecutor. In addition to the above-mentioned
methods of co-financing federal functions from local budgets and extra-budgetary funds, officials of
these federal agencies depend on local authorities for housing, fringe benefits, vehicles, office equipment,
et cetera. This creates a system of dual subordination which nevertheless has many advantages for the
local governments: the presence of these agencies allows them to encourage efforts to increase collections
from local taxes and fees; to increase local shares of federal and regional taxes to the detriment of
higher-level budgets; to collect additional statistical information; and to influence decisions made by
bodies of the interior, rulings of courts and public prosecution offices.
7.5 Control, Audit and Supervision of Local Governments
7.5.1 Regional Supervision
The Constitution introduced a fundamentally new type of intergovernmental relations, as regulatory
interactions replaced direct administrative subordination. However, many regional officials often
manifested fierce resistance to the idea of local self-governance and did not abandon the administrative
approach in their relations with lower-level governments. These authorities were unable or unwilling
to make use of new control mechanisms which emphasized legislative activity and enforcement of laws
through the courts. In Yakutia, for instance, there are no elected officials or local government bodies.
In the Republic of Tatarstan, local self-government is set up only in rural areas, not in cities. This resistance
to the new model explains why governors embrace a “return to the vertical hierarchy of power;” most
of these governors support the recently amended Law on Local Self-government, which establishes
broader rights to dissolve local councils and dismiss mayors if local legislation is found to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, federal legislation or legislation of subjects of the Federation.
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Since the amended law went into effect shortly before the time of writing, it would be premature to
discuss its effect on local self-governance in Russia. The recent removal of the mayor of Ufa City in
July 2000 by the Bashkir President cannot be treated as a typical example of the new law in practice.
As in Tatarstan, local self-government in Bashkortostan mainly operates at the sub-raion and village
level; cities and raions are governed by state authorities that are appointed and dismissed by the
government of the Republic.
Otherwise, provisions of the Law on Local Self-government still apply whereby local self-government
bodies are independent and accountable only to the law and their constituency. The amended law
also entitles the federal government and regions to delegate certain federal or regional powers to local
governments and monitor their execution, provided that they also transfer the necessary material
and financial resources. Ryazan oblast in 1996 passed a regional law that delegated the function of
civil status registration to local governments. Among its provisions, this law established conditions
for regional oversight over the execution of this function by local authorities. This case is rather
exceptional, however; in the vast majority of regions, delegation of regional functions to local governments
exists de facto, not de jure, and issues of administrative liability for undue performance of delegated
functions remain unresolved.
Although the Law on Local Self-government declared extensive local autonomy, both financial and
administrative, the legislative trend in recent years has been to clamp down on local autonomy,
particularly in the financial sphere.  With the adoption of the new Tax Code, the local tax base has been
drastically reduced. At present more than seventy percent of local budget revenues come from federal
and regional shared taxes and local governments are utterly dependent, financially and administ-
ratively, on regional authorities.
7.5.2 Financial Audit
Independent financial audit of local authorities has not yet gained ground in Russia. Regional and
local financial bodies ceased to be departments of the federal Ministry of Finance in 1998, and are
now subordinated to the regional or local government. However, as part of the Russian state
administration, regional administrations must follow directives from the federal center, including
the Ministry of Finance. Federal approval of regional budgets is not required, but regions must
submit reports on the execution of consolidated (regional plus local) budgets to the Ministry of
Finance. Both the adoption and execution of local budgets are considered by federal legislation to be
matters of local significance; municipalities need only report to their residents. Therefore, although
regions require local budget data for their consolidated budget reports to the Ministry of Finance,
they technically have no right to request the local government to file budget execution reports.
Nevertheless, local governments have continued to file local budget execution reports with regional
financial authorities. In addition to local budget execution reports, regions also require that local
governments submit their draft budgets for the new fiscal year in order to allocate equalization grants.
The federal Budget Code establishes the regions’ right to request this information, but also states
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that any local government not wishing to compete for regional grants is not required to report budget
information to regional authorities. However, local governments seldom refuse do so. One of the few
exceptions is Rostov oblast, where a number of municipalities refused to report their detailed budgets.
When pressured by the regional administration, they submitted only aggregated totals, arguing that,
according to the principle of autonomy, they are not required to report this information and that the
federal Ministry of Finance has no legal right to request such information from the regions.
The Russian Budget Code stipulates the right of local councils to exercise financial control during
discussion, approval and execution of local budgets. It also grants local councils the right to create
auditing commissions to perform “external” audits of local budgets. Local governments do establish
auditing units, but it would be an exaggeration to call them external. Occasionally, local governments
initiate external audits, hiring independent auditing firms with a view to making their territories
more attractive to foreign investors. Such cases are few and far between, and typically occur in
regional centers (Novgorod, Tver, Nizhni Novgorod, Samara and Saint Petersburg).
Under the Budget Code, regional authorities are entitled to monitor local spending only where local
governments are grant recipients, a right that only applies to funds received from the regional budget.
However, regional authorities rarely exercise any control over local spending even on such a limited
scale.
7.5.3 Legal Control
The Office of the Public Prosecutor in Russia is a single federal system of state administration, whose
territorial branches monitor the compliance of regional and local regulatory and legislative acts with
federal legislation. If the Office of the Public Prosecutor discovers infractions of federal legislation, it
will lodge a protest with the relevant government and specify measures to be taken and deadlines for
action. Should the government fail to enact the prescribed measures, the Prosecutor’s Office will
initiate court proceedings.
Presently, the Public Prosecutor’s Office plays a fairly active role in ensuring compliance of local
government acts with federal legislation. The violations discovered are often a product of imperfect
federal and regional legislation that does not clearly delineate functions between federal authorities,
regional authorities, raion branches of regional administrations and local governments. Many infringe-
ments have to do with financial matters, such as the distribution of proceeds from the privatization
of municipal property or the funding of federal mandates, especially child benefits. Litigation
initiated by the Tver City Duma over funding of child benefits reached the Supreme Court of Russia.
In the end, the court affirmed a regional court decision stating that the benefits shall be financed
from the regional budget through earmarked transfers. However, the Supreme Court ruling failed to
become a precedent to be used in similar cases, as case law is virtually nonexistent in Russia. Courts
are also equally ready to pronounce judgements against local governments. For instance, the Tver City
Duma has had to revoke its decision to cancel entitlements to free public transport for employees of
certain federal agencies, a decision originally made due to inadequate funding from the federal budget.
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In 1998, prosecutors found cases of municipalities in Pskov oblast introducing local taxes and fees
not provided for in federal legislation, thus violating the Law on Local Self-government. It was also
discovered that various organizations and profit enterprises in a number of municipalities were
exempt from payment of taxes and fees to local budgets for no lawful reason. Mayors of twelve
municipalities issued regulations and orders to ban or restrict export of food products from their
municipalities. In Pskov oblast, raion and city prosecutors are regular participants in sessions of local
councils and meetings with mayors, and therefore can promptly make comments and proposals on
draft legal acts and issues under consideration.
Among the gravest infringements found by the Office of the Public Prosecutor thus far are efforts by
certain regions to abolish local self-government within their jurisdictions. In the spring of 2000, the
government of Kursk oblast attempted to abolish all 511 municipalities and introduce state government
in their stead on the basis of “voluntary waivers” of self-government by the citizenry. For localities
that chose to retain local self-government, the procedure for mayoral elections was to be amended so
that the mayor was elected exclusively by the local council from members nominated by the governor.
Regional legislators revoked the decision upon appeal by the regional prosecutor, preventing the
necessity for court action.
8. Local Government Employees
8.1 Municipal Service
According to article 4 of the Law on Local Self-government, the regulation of municipal service falls
under the competence of the state administration. Article 3 establishes that citizens of the Russian
Federation have equal opportunity to municipal employment.
Before the adoption of the Law on Foundations of Municipal Service in the Russian Federation
(hereafter referred to as the Law on Municipal Service) employees of municipal government organiza-
tions fell under the scope of the federal Law on Foundations of the State Service in the Russian
Federation, despite the fact that local government is outside the system of state administration.
The adoption of the Law on Municipal Service in early 1998 meant that employment in the local
government brought the same high level of benefits and social insurance as employment in the state
government (the law only applies to hired and appointed municipal employees). However, as there
is no single register of positions for municipal employees, it may be difficult to compare positions in
municipal and state administration if an employee moves from municipal to state service.
Municipal employees fall into the following categories:
• elected officials;
• full-time employees;
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• part-time employees;
• appointed officials;
• staff of local governments;
• staff of local budgetary institutions.
8.1.1 Elected Officials
The term “elected official” primarily refers to the mayor and local council members. Although the
law provides for the existence of other elected officials, in practice they are rarely encountered, if at all.
Elected local officials are not currently required to meet any professional qualifications. (According to
the Constitution only a federal law can establish restrictions on citizens’ rights, and federal laws do
not currently address this issue). Nor is there any restriction on a person simultaneously holding
several elective offices. The only restriction imposed by federal legislation on elected local officials is
that they cannot simultaneously perform the functions of hired or appointed municipal employees.
Some regions (Rostov and Ryazan) have introduced a ban on combining an elective local office with
membership in the regional legislative assembly, although no such federal restriction exists.
Under the same law, local government officials are subject to early termination by regional authorities
if a court finds a breach of law or of the provisions of municipal charter. In practice, elected local officials
are rarely removed from their posts due to a court ruling. When a mayor is removed, it is usually a
mayor who had effectively been appointed by the regional governor in the first place. No correlation
has been established between the reelection of mayors or local council members and their administrative
performance, as the majority of municipalities have not yet held new elections.
Members of local councils can be either full-time employees on the government payroll or part-time
officials who do not receive compensation for their position and continue to perform their previous
jobs. Full-time officials are commonly prohibited from holding another income-generating office.
Elected officials are generally accorded immunity from legal prosecution by regional legislation.
Additional social guarantees for elected local government officials may be established in regional
legislation.
8.1.2 Appointed Officials
The Law on Local Self-government provides the following definition: “municipal service shall be
understood to mean full-time professional employment in local government bodies for exercise of
their powers.” Hence, municipal service applies only to employment in local self-government bodies,
as opposed to other public institutions. It is a full-time job paid for from the budget, though not
necessarily the local budget.
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The Law on Municipal Service also states that legal regulation of municipal service shall be prescribed
in the municipal charter as required by federal and regional laws. These regulations include qualification
requirements, municipal employee status, terms and conditions of municipal service and administra-
tion of municipal service. Regional laws usually establish limitations on the level of wages for municipal
employees.  Since the majority of municipalities are subsidized from the regional budget, the regional
government wishes to prevent municipal employees from earning more than their regional counterparts.
8.1.3 Local Government Staff
The status of all staff working under contracts is addressed by the federal Labor Code and similar
regulations. Personnel departments of local administrations or councils are responsible for hiring
their employees, whose professional requirements are established according to the municipal charter.
Individuals not working in local administrations but providing technical support to local self-
government activities are not considered to be municipal employees.
In order to ensure equal opportunity for municipal employment, vacant municipal positions must
be publicly announced according to procedures stipulated in the municipal charter.
8.1.4 Staff of Budgetary Institutions
Under Russian legislation, individuals employed by budgetary institutions do not fall into the
category of municipal employees. Terms of their remuneration, social guarantees, et cetera are established
in the Law on the Uniform Schedule of Wages for Workers of Budget Organizations. Hence, salaries
paid to budgetary institution employees by local governments cannot be below the federal statutory
level. However, local governments are entitled to pay fringe benefits to budgetary institution employees
in addition to their regular salaries. The federal schedule of rates sets basic rates and allowances for
employees if a budgetary organization is located in the Far North or equivalent territory. Local
authorities are entitled to pay local allowances to employees of municipal budgetary institutions
(primarily schools, outpatient clinics and hospitals) in addition to their wages, but rarely exercise
their right due to lack of financial resources.
8.2 Problems of Political Affiliation
The Law on Municipal Service stipulates that municipal service employees may not have a political
party affiliation. According to the law, municipal employees may not use their official position in the
interests of any political party, nor may they set up political party groups within local government
bodies. To date, party struggle at the local level has not posed a major problem, since most elections
are not held by a party system and municipal election by party is not even provided for in legislation.
Thus it is rare that elected officials, let alone administration employees, represent a political party.
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8.3 Personnel Training
The new role of local governments in Russia necessitates qualified personnel, modern information
technologies, new methods of work and workflow organization.
Training and re-training of local government employees may take place in both traditional state-
owned educational establishments and new training institutions such as colleges and long-distance
training and consulting centers. Municipalities, regions and the federal government are all contributing
to the creation of a pool of information to assist local policy-makers. The outcome of their efforts
includes periodicals for local governments, publishing houses that specialize in literature for local
governments and dissemination of software and information systems.
Nevertheless, these elements do not yet form an integrated system of professional training, information
and methodological support for local governments. State establishments of higher education for
training personnel in local self-government are available only in forty-two out of eighty-nine regions,
with no professional training of municipal personnel occurring in the other regions.
The following figures describe the current state of professional qualification and training among
municipal service employees. A total of 386,300 people were employed in Russian local self-
government bodies in 2000, of which 177,600 were appointed or elected officials.
Of the elected officials (five percent of total officials):
• 64.2 percent had received higher education,
• 33.6 percent had received a secondary school education,
• 2.2 percent had not finished secondary school.
Of the appointed officials (94.5 percent of the total officials):
• 51.7 percent had received higher education,
• 46.0 percent had received a secondary school education,
• 2.2 percent had not finished secondary school.
Of the total number of municipal officials with higher education, only 1.5 percent had been trained
in public administration.
9. Next Steps in the Transition Process
The Putin administration, elected in March 2000, proposed the following amendments to the Law
on Local Self-government to the State Duma:
1. Enhanced responsibility of the representative and executive branches of local self-government
and mayors for violations of the Constitution, federal legislation and regional legislation;
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2. Transfer of regulatory authority over local self-government organization to the federal level,
not only in frontier territories and ZATOs, but also in federal cities, capitals, regional administra-
tive centers and cities with a population over fifty thousand;
3. Elimination of raions from the category of municipal entities.
The second and third amendments, though rejected by the State Duma, explicitly indicate the
attitude of the new presidential administration towards local self-government. The rationale offered
for these amendments was the need to enhance local government accountability for violation of the
Russian Constitution and the desire to bring local governments closer to the citizenry. However,
pursuant to the approved amendment, the accountability of local governments will be enhanced
not through strengthening and improvement of the judicial system, but through strengthening
administrative responsibility of local heads to the regional administration.
Had the status of federal territories been conferred on regional administrative centers and cities with
a population of over fifty thousand, these cities would have been removed from the jurisdiction of
regional authorities. Consolidated regional budgets would thus have lost the largest and richest
municipalities to the serious detriment of regional finance, depriving regions of funds for equalizing
the fiscal capacity of municipalities in their jurisdictions.
The compulsory transfer of local self-government to the sub-raion level would have essentially led to
elimination of local self-government, since the lack of own revenue makes small cities and rural
districts fully dependent on raion and regional authorities. Hence, the proposed amendment infringed
upon the constitutional right of citizens to local self-governance. Moreover, it conflicts with article
131 of the Constitution, which establishes that the territorial boundaries of local government shall
be determined in consultation with the public.
To all outward appearances, the consolidation of vertical power will be a popular policy under
President Putin, while the development of local self-government and formation of a civil society in
Russia will be at risk.
At the same time, the Development Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2010 formulated by
the Putin government, also known as the Gref Program, contains a number of optimistic provisions
for the development of local self-government. Among its provisions, the Strategy advocates:
• maximum development of local self-government, including the gradual transfer of some state
powers;
• decentralization of public administration functions and appropriate delineation of budgetary
sources and responsibilities;
• federal protection of the rights and interests of local self-government and greater federal
guarantees of local autonomy in addressing local issues;
• decentralization of the Russian budgetary system to ensure greater fiscal autonomy;
• financing of federal mandates from the federal budget;
• adhering to the principle of “to each budget their own taxes” rather than utilizing shared tax
revenues;
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• the final reform of mechanisms for allocating transfers, including the conversion to a formula-
driven system.
It is hard to predict which of the two tendencies—centralization or decentralization—will eventually
prevail. Despite growing public awareness, the higher demands on governments by the citizenry
and the diminished degree of awe for official status in recent years, the beginnings of civil society in
Russia are still too weak to be effective. Whether the institution of local self-government will survive
is fully dependent on the political course taken by federal authorities.
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Contacts for Further Information on Local Government in Russia
Office of the President of the Russian Federation
Department of Regional and Local Policies
Address: 4, Staraya Ploshad, 103132, Moscow, Russia
Phone: (+7-095) 206-4848
Fax: (+7-095) 206-2030
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
Address: 9, Iliynka, 103097, Moscow, Russia
Internet: http://minfin.park.ru/IspSub/budj_exec.htm (Budget Execution Reports)
Ministry of Ethnicities and Migration Policy of the Russian Federation
Address: 19, Trubnikovskiy Per., 121819, Moscow, Russia
Phone: (+7-095) 203-1088
Fax: (+7-095) 202-4490
Congress of Municipalities of the Russian Federation
Address: 21, Novy Arbat, 20 floor, 129090, Moscow, Russia
Phone: (+7-095) 203-9712,  (7-095) 291-3623
Fax: (+7-095) 291-3621
E-mail:  komo@kmo.ru
Internet: http://www.kmo.ru/
Union of Russian Cities, Center for International Cooperation
Address: 22, Schepkina Str., Office 16, Moscow, 129090, Russia
Phone: (+7-095) 281-2379
Fax: (+7-095) 281-2379
E-mail: centre@urc.ru
Internet: http://www.urc.ru/sections/int_eng.htm
Center for Fiscal Policy
Address: 11a, Novinskiy Boulevard, 121099, Moscow, Russia
Phone: (+7-095) 777-6582
Fax: (+7-095) 777-6583
E-mail: pcenter@fpcenter.org
Internet: http://www.fpcenter.org
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Annex 4.1
Major General Indicators
Size of territory 17,075.4 thousand square kilometers
Population density 8.6 people per square kilometer
Population 145,559.2 thousand
Number of students
in general education schools 20,879.4 thousand
Major ethnic divisions (1994)
Russians 83.0 percent
Tatars 3.8 percent
Ukranians 2.4 percent
Other (ethnic groups comprising 11.0 percent
less than two percent of the population)
Per capita GDP 31,227,800 RUR
Inflation rate (consumer prices) 36.5 percent
Unemployment rate 12.6 percent
SOURCES: Goskomstat. Russia: Statistical Yearbook, 2000; Social and Economic Situation in Russia,
Volume 12, 1999; Russian Economic Trends, September 2000.
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Table 4A.2
Major Ethnic Groups in Russian Regions, 1989
Regions Title Ethnicity Russians Other Ethnicities
[% of Total  [%] [%]
Population]*
NORTH
Republic of Karelia 10.0 73.6 16.4
Republic of Komi 23.3 57.7 19.0
Arkhangelsk oblast 92.1 7.9
Nenets AO 11.9 65.8 22.3
Vologda oblast 96.5 3.5
Murmansk oblast 82.9 17.1
N O R T H  W E S T
City of St. Petersburg 89.1 10.9
Leningrad oblast 90.9 9.1
Novgorod oblast 94.7 5.3
Pskov oblast 94.3 5.7
CENTER
Bryansk oblast 96.0 4.0
Vladimir oblast 95.8 4.2
Ivanovo oblast 95.8 4.2
Kaluga oblast 93.8 6.2
Kostroma oblast 96.3 3.7
City of Moscow 89.7 10.3
Moscow oblast 93.5 6.5
Oryol oblast 97.0 3.0
Ryazan oblast 96.1 3.9
Smolensk oblast 94.1 5.9
Tver oblast 93.5 6.5
Tula oblast 95.4 4.6
Yaroslavl oblast 96.4 3.6
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Table 4A.2 (continued)
Major Ethnic Groups in Russian Regions, 1989
Regions Title Ethnicity Russians Other Ethnicities
[% of Total  [%] [%]
Population]*
VOLGA–VYATKA
Republic of Mari El 43.3 47.5 9.2
Republic of Mordovia 32.5 60.8 6.7
Chuvash Republic 67.8 26.7 5.5
Kirov oblast 90.4 9.6
Nizhny Novgorod oblast 94.7 5.3
C E N T R A L  B L A C K  E A R T H
Belgorod oblast 92.9 7.1
Voronezh oblast 93.4 6.6
Kursk oblast 96.9 3.1
Lipetsk oblast 97.4 2.6
Tambov oblast 97.2 2.8
V O L G A  R I V E R  B A S I N
Republic of Kalmykia 37.7 45.4 16.9
Republic of Tatarstan 48.5 43.3 8.2
Astrakhan oblast 72.0 28.0
Volgograd oblast 89.1 10.9
Penza oblast 86.2 13.8
Samara oblast 83.4 16.6
Saratov oblast 85.6 14.4
Ulianovsk oblast 72.8 27.2
NORTH CAUCAUSES
Republic of Adygeya 22.1 68.0 9.9
Republic of Dagestan 27.5 9.2 63.3
Ingush Republic 74.5 13.2 12.3
Kabarda-Balkar Republic 48.2 32.0 19.8
Karachai-Circassian Republic 31.2 42.4 26.4
Republic of North Osetia 53.0 29.9 17.1
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Table 4A.2 (continued)
Major Ethnic Groups in Russian Regions, 1989
Regions Title Ethnicity Russians Other Ethnicities
[% of Total  [%] [%]
Population]*
Krasnodar krai 86.7 13.
Stavropol krai 84.0 16.0
Rostov oblast 89.6 10.4
URALS
Republic of Bashkortostan 21.9 39.3 38.8
Udmurt Republic 30.9 58.9 10.2
Kurgan oblast 91.4 8.6
Orenburg oblast 72.2 27.8
Perm oblast 83.8 16.2
Komi-Perm AO 60.2 36.1 3.7
Sverdlovsk oblast 88.7 11.3
Chelyabinsk oblast 81.0 19.0
W E S T  S I B E R I A
Republic of Altai 31.0 60.4 8.6
Altai krai 89.5 10.5
Kemerovo oblast 90.5 9.5
Novosibirsk oblast 92.0 8.0
Omsk oblast 80.3 19.7
Tomsk oblast 88.2 11.8
Tyumen oblast 72.6 27.4
Khanty-Mansi AO 1.6 66.3 32.1
Yamal-Nenets AO 6.1 59.2 34.7
E A S T  S I B E R I A
Republic of Buryatia 24.0 70.0 6.0
Republic of Tyva 64.3 32.0 3.7
Republic of Khakassia 11.1 79.5 9.4
Krasnoyarsk krai 87.6 12.4
Tajmyr AO 15.7 67.1 17.2
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Table 4A.2 (continued)
Major Ethnic Groups in Russian Regions, 1989
Regions Title Ethnicity Russians Other Ethnicities
[% of Total  [%] [%]
Population]*
Evenk AO 15.3 67.5 17.2
Irkutsk oblast 88.5 11.5
Ust-Orda Buryat AO 36.3 56.5 7.2
Chita oblast 88.4 11.6
Aginsk-Buryat AO 54.9 40.8 4.3
FAR  EAST
Republic of Sakha 33.4 50.3 16.3
Jewish AO 4.2 83.2 12.6
Chukotka AO 9.8 66.1 24.1
Primorski krai 86.9 13.1
Khabarovsk krai 86.4 13.6
Amur oblast 86.8 13.2
Kamchatka oblast 81.0 19.0
Koryak AO 25.1 62.0 12.9
Magadan oblast 75.2 24.8
Sakhalin oblast 81.6 18.4
Kaliningrad oblast 78.5 21.5
* The title ethnicity is the indigenous ethnicity which gave its name to the ethnic autonomy.
Only for ethnic autonomies.
SOURCE: Russia: Statistical Yearbook, Goskomstat, 1999.
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Annex 4.2
Population, Settlements and Administrative Units
Figure 4A.1
Territorial Division of Regions
Subject of the
Russian Federation
Cities Raions
City Districts Sub-city
Townships
Sub-raion
Towns
Sub-raion
Townships
Rural Districts
Townships
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Table 4A.4
Settlements by Population Size Categories in Russia
Urban Settlements as of 1/1999
Number of Residents Number of % of Total Number of % of Total
Settlements Residents
0–3,000 559 18.6 980 0.9
3,000–5,000 443 14.7 1,743 1.6
5,000–10,000 716 23.8 5,086 4.8
10,000–50,000 949 31.6 20,265 19.0
50,000–100,000 174 5.8 11,972 11.2
100,000–1,000,000 152 5.1 41,921 39.3
1,000,000+ 12 0.4 24,644 23.1
Total 3,005 100.0 106,611 100.0
Rural Settlements as of 1998
Number of Residents Number of % of Total Number of % of Total
Settlements Residents
0–1,000 144,534 94.5 20,415 52.3
1,000–2,000 5,718 3.7 7,759 19.9
2,000–5,000 2,069 1.4 6,127 15.7
5,000+ 601 0.4 4,762 12.2
Total 152,922 100.0 39,063 100.0
SOURCE: Russia: Statistical Yearbook, Goskomstat, 1999.
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North
1. Republic of Karelia
2. Republic of Komi
3. Arkhangelsk oblast
4. Nenets AO
5. Vologda oblast
6. Murmansk oblast
North West
7. City of St. Petersburg
8. Leningrad oblast
9. Novgorod oblast
10. Pskov oblast
Center
11. Bryansk oblast
12. Vladimir oblast
13. Ivanovo oblast
14. Kaluga oblast
15. Kostroma oblast
16. City of Moscow
17. Moscow oblast
18. Oryol oblast
19. Ryazan oblast
20. Smolensk oblast
21. Tver oblast
22. Tula oblast
23. Yaroslavl oblast
Volga–Vyatka
24. Republic of Mari El
25. Republic of Mordovia
26. Chuvash Republic
27. Kirov oblast
28. Nizhny Novgorod oblast
Central Black Earth
29. Belgorod oblast
30. Voronezh oblast
31. Kursk oblast
32. Lipetsk oblast
33. Tambov oblast
Volga River Basin
34. Republic of Kalmykia
35. Republic of Tatarstan
36. Astrakhan oblast
37. Volgograd oblast
38. Penza oblast
39. Samara oblast
40. Saratov oblast
41. Ulianovsk oblast
North Caucauses
42. Republic of Adygeya
43. Republic of Dagestan
44. Ingush Republic
45. Kabarda-Balkar Republic
46. Karachai-Circassian Republic
47. Republic of North Osetia
48. Chechen Republic
49. Krasnodar krai
50. Stavropol krai
51. Rostov oblast
Urals
52. Republic of Bashkortostan
53. Udmurt Republic
54. Kurgan oblast
55. Orenburg oblast
56. Perm oblast
57. Komi-Perm AO
58. Sverdlovsk oblast
59. Chelyabinsk oblast
West Siberia
60. Republic of Altai
61. Altai krai
62. Kemerovo oblast
63. Novosibirsk oblast
64. Omsk oblast
65. Tomsk oblast
66. Tyumen oblast
67. Khanty-Mansi AO
68. Yamal-Nenets AO
247
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N  T H E  R U S S I A N  F E D E R A T I O N
East Siberia
69. Republic of Buryatia
70. Republic of Tyva
71. Republic of Khakassia
72. Krasnoyarsk krai
73. Tajmyr AO
74. Evenk AO
75. Irkutsk oblast
76. Ust-Orda Buryat AO
77. Chita oblast
78. Aginsk-Buryat AO
Far East
79. Republic of Sakha
80. Jewish AO
81. Chukotka AO
82. Primorski krai
83. Khabarovsk krai
84. Amur oblast
85. Kamchatka oblast
86. Koryak AO
87. Magadan oblast
88. Sakhalin oblast
89. Kaliningrad oblast
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Annex 4.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
• Federal Law on General Principles of Local Self-government (28 August 1995)
• Federal Law on the Constitutional Right to Local Government Elections (1996)
• Federal Law on Local Local Government Finance (1997)
• Presidential Decree on Guarantees of Local Self-government (1993)
• Federal Law on Municipal Service (1997)
• Federal Law on the Tax System (1991)
• Tax Code (1998)
• Budget Code (1998), effective from 1 January 2000.
• Federal Law on Electoral Rights and Referenda (19 September 1997)
The following laws were revoked in 2000:
• Law on the Budget System and Process in the Russian Federation (1991)
• Law on Budgetary Rights and the Use and Formation of Extra-budgetary Funds (1993)
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Annex 4.4
Responsibilities of Administrative Tiers
Figure 4A.3
Different Organizational Types of Public Administration in Russia
Regional
State Administration
Regional
State Administration
Regional
State Administration
Local Self-government
Bodies
Local Branches of Regional
State Administration
(City, Raion)
Local Self-government
Bodies
(City, Raion)
Local Self-government
Bodies
(Sub-raion)
Local Self-government
Bodies
(Sub-city, Sub-raion)
I II III
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Table 4A.5
Specific Functions of Local Government Tiers in Russia
Functions Local Regional Central Remarks
I .   E D U C A T I O N
Pre-school (Kindergartens) X
Primary X
Secondary X
Technical X X X The delineation of
functions depends on
ownership of relevant
facilities
Higher X X
I I .   S O C I A L  W E L F A R E
Welfare homes X
Personal services for X
elderly and handicapped
Special services (for X
homeless, families in
crisis, etc.)
Social housing X
Social benefits X X X The execution of federal
and transfers mandates is delegated to
the regions. Some regions
delegate them to local
governments, some do not.
I I I .   H E A LT H  S E R V I C E S
Sanitary control X X X
Hospitals X X X The delineation of
functions depends on
ownership of relevant
facilities
Policlinics X X X
Physical fitness X
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Table 4A.5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Local Government Tiers in Russia
Functions Local Regional Central Remarks
IV.   C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E
Theaters X X* Federal  institutions
Museums X X X*
Libraries X
Parks X
Maintaining buildings X
for cultural events
V.   H O U S I N G  A N D  U T I L I T I E S
Water supply X
Sewage X
Electricity X
Gas X
Central heating X
Refuse collection X
Refuse disposal X
Cemeteries X
Street cleaning X
Subsidies for housing X
and utilities
Environmental protection X X X
V I .   T R A F F I C ,  T R A N S P O R T
Roads X X X Depending on the status
of roads (federal, regional,
or local)
Public lighting X
Public transport X X
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Table 4A.5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Local Government Tiers in Russia
Functions Local Regional Central Remarks
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
District and town X
planning
Local economic X X
development
Tourism X
GENERAL  ADMIN ISTRAT ION
Authoritative functions X X X
(licenses, etc.)
Other administrative X X X
matters (electoral
register, etc.)
Local police X Ministry of Interior
(police) is a federal agency,
but  the maintenance of
law and order in
communities is listed
among local functions.
Localities may establish
their own  law
enforcement divisions.
Local fire brigades X Fire control is included
among local functions,
but fire brigades are part
of the federal Ministry
of the Interior
Civil defense X
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Table 4A.6
Decentralization of Public Services: Regional and Local Proportion
of Total Sub-national Expenditures on Four Major Functions, 1999
Region Housing and Education Culture and Art Health Care and
Utilities Physical Fitness
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
Regional  Local Regional Local Regional Local Regional Local
Russian Federation 26.3 73.7 24.1 75.9 43.3 56.7 42.4 57.6
NORTH
Republic of Karelia 14.9 85.1 17.8 82.2 49.8 50.2 39.5 60.5
Republic of Komi 3.4 96.6 10.1 89.9 26.3 73.7 66.1 33.9
Arkhangelsk oblast 7.5 92.5 8.1 91.9 28.9 71.1 35.7 64.3
Vologda oblast 3.5 96.5 24.0 76.0 41.7 58.3 37.8 62.2
Murmansk oblast 1.4 98.6 5.1 94.9 28.4 71.6 30.0 70.0
Nenets AO 34.2 65.8 41.7 58.3 49.0 51.0 82.1 17.9
N O R T H  W E S T
City of St. Petersburg 97.9 2.1 99.4 0.6 99.0 1.0 99.4 0.6
Leningrad oblast 2.1 97.9 11.5 88.5 30.4 69.6 47.3 52.7
Novgorod oblast 14.5 85.5 9.9 90.1 16.2 83.8 50.9 49.1
Pskov oblast 15.6 84.4 18.1 81.9 42.7 57.3 40.1 59.9
C E N T E R
Bryansk oblast 8.4 91.6 9.8 90.2 28.5 71.5 44.7 55.3
Vladimir oblast 1.3 98.7 4.3 95.7 19.1 80.9 25.0 75.0
Ivanovo oblast 0.6 99.4 8.1 91.9 31.2 68.8 26.7 73.3
Tver oblast 2.3 97.7 9.3 90.7 31.2 68.8 39.8 60.2
Kaluga oblast 4.9 95.1 18.8 81.2 40.6 59.4 32.4 67.6
Kostroma oblast 21.0 79.0 11.4 88.6 30.4 69.6 30.8 69.2
Moscow oblast 5.5 94.5 11.9 88.1 14.9 85.1 19.0 81.0
Oryol oblast 49.6 50.4 20.7 79.3 37.2 62.8 36.2 63.8
Ryazan oblast 15.8 84.2 13.4 86.6 30.1 69.9 41.1 58.9
Smolensk oblast 7.1 92.9 16.9 83.1 32.4 67.6 23.4 76.6
Tula oblast 5.1 94.9 8.3 91.7 26.4 73.6 24.0 76.0
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Table 4A.6 (continued)
Decentralization of Public Services: Regional and Local Proportion
of Total Sub-national Expenditures on Four Major Functions, 1999
Region Housing and Education Culture and Art Health Care and
Utilities Physical Fitness
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
Regional  Local Regional Local Regional Local Regional Local
VOLGA-VYATKA
Yaroslavl oblast 2.2 97.8 12.4 87.6 31.8 68.2 26.6 73.4
Republic of Mari El 7.9 92.1 25.0 75.0 40.4 59.6 30.9 69.1
Republic of Mordovia 22.7 77.3 15.7 84.3 39.8 60.2 32.4 67.6
Chuvash Republic 9.3 90.7 10.0 90.0 34.8 65.2 21.9 78.1
Nizhny Novgorod oblast 3.3 96.7 14.1 85.9 18.1 81.9 10.4 89.6
Kirov oblast 7.4 92.6 7.0 93.0 20.5 79.5 28.0 72.0
C E N T E R - B L A C K  S O I L
Belgorod oblast 14.3 85.7 19.5 80.5 31.2 68.8 38.9 61.1
Voronezh oblast 7.3 92.7 10.9 89.1 22.8 77.2 27.3 72.7
Kursk oblast 10.3 89.7 12.6 87.4 63.6 36.4 43.4 56.6
Lipetsk oblast 2.5 97.5 9.3 90.7 29.0 71.0 33.7 66.3
Tambov oblast 1.3 98.7 9.6 90.4 28.2 71.8 40.2 59.8
V O L G A  R I V E R  B A S I N
Republic of Kalmykia 50.2 49.8 10.6 89.4 33.1 66.9 77.2 22.8
Republic of Tatarstan 13.9 86.1 9.2 90.8 44.3 55.7 28.2 71.8
Astrakhan oblast 10.2 89.8 18.2 81.8 45.1 54.9 34.4 65.6
Volgograd oblast 6.0 94.0 13.5 86.5 30.8 69.2 16.8 83.2
Samara oblast 3.3 96.7 40.6 59.4 28.8 71.2 75.9 24.1
Penza oblast 16.2 83.8 44.1 55.9 56.9 43.1 55.7 44.3
Saratov oblast 5.6 94.4 14.9 85.1 38.2 61.8 29.7 70.3
Ulianovsk oblast 20.4 79.6 26.3 73.7 55.0 45.0 50.5 49.5
NORTH  CAUCAUSES
Republic of Dagestan 21.7 78.3 14.9 85.1 35.1 64.9 81.0 19.0
Kabarda-Balkar Rep. 53.5 46.5 24.7 75.3 40.8 59.2 40.6 59.4
Republic North Osetia 11.9 88.1 19.8 80.2 72.9 27.1 54.3 45.7
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Table 4A.6 (continued)
Decentralization of Public Services: Regional and Local Proportion
of Total Sub-national Expenditures on Four Major Functions, 1999
Region Housing and Education Culture and Art Health Care and
Utilities Physical Fitness
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
Regional  Local Regional Local Regional Local Regional Local
Ingush Republic 87.9 12.1 46.6 53.4 56.4 43.6 68.3 31.7
Krasnodar krai 11.0 89.0 7.9 92.1 23.3 76.7 23.2 76.8
Stavropol krai 35.6 64.4 15.3 84.7 23.1 76.9 24.3 75.7
Rostov oblast 2.3 97.7 8.3 91.7 62.9 37.1 34.5 65.5
Republic of Adygeya 11.9 88.1 28.6 71.4 51.8 48.2 42.6 57.4
Karachai-Circassian Rep. 34.1 65.9 10.5 89.5 31.2 68.8 41.5 58.5
URALS
Rep. of Bashkortostan 50.4 49.6 26.2 73.8 58.8 41.2 38.0 62.0
Udmurt Republic 9.0 91.0 9.7 90.3 22.9 77.1 28.1 71.9
Kurgan oblast 5.1 94.9 17.1 82.9 23.5 76.5 34.1 65.9
Orenburg oblast 37.7 62.3 45.0 55.0 60.4 39.6 56.2 43.8
Perm oblast 2.6 97.4 9.6 90.4 29.1 70.9 26.1 73.9
Sverdlovsk oblast 2.0 98.0 19.0 81.0 29.6 70.4 44.6 55.4
Chelyabinsk oblast 5.2 94.8 12.8 87.2 29.2 70.8 16.8 83.2
Komi-Perm AO 8.3 91.7 11.1 88.9 27.8 72.2 45.7 54.3
W E S T  S I B E R I A
Altai krai 5.9 94.1 8.9 91.1 26.1 73.9 21.7 78.3
Republic of Altai 30.3 69.7 21.8 78.2 24.0 76.0 55.7 44.3
Kemerovo oblast 2.3 97.7 11.9 88.1 17.0 83.0 18.3 81.7
Novosibirsk oblast 0.0 100.0 6.9 93.1 49.8 50.2 27.0 73.0
Omsk oblast 32.9 67.1 42.1 57.9 61.1 38.9 46.3 53.7
Tomsk oblast 3.9 96.1 19.5 80.5 30.9 69.1 39.5 60.5
Tyumen oblast 19.3 80.7 19.9 80.1 50.7 49.3 62.1 37.9
Khanty-Mansi AO 12.1 87.9 9.5 90.5 8.6 91.4 14.2 85.8
Yamal-Nenets AO 1.5 98.5 13.8 86.2 21.8 78.2 34.6 65.4
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Table 4A.6 (continued)
Decentralization of Public Services: Regional and Local Proportion
of Total Sub-national Expenditures on Four Major Functions, 1999
Region Housing and Education Culture and Art Health Care and
Utilities Physical Fitness
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
Regional  Local Regional Local Regional Local Regional Local
E A S T  S I B E R I A
Republic of Buryatia 3.9 96.1 9.0 91.0 39.3 60.7 37.7 62.3
Republic of Tyva 13.9 86.1 11.6 88.4 33.7 66.3 46.1 53.9
Republic of Khakassia 10.8 89.2 13.2 86.8 26.5 73.5 29.7 70.3
Krasnoyarsk krai 5.3 94.7 8.3 91.7 25.6 74.4 17.1 82.9
Irkutsk oblast 3.4 96.6 6.5 93.5 63.6 36.4 19.0 81.0
Chita oblast 3.9 96.1 17.1 82.9 37.7 62.3 44.1 55.9
Aginsk-Buryat AO 17.2 82.8 12.7 87.3 67.4 32.6 90.2 9.8
Tajmyr AO 77.1 22.9 16.2 83.8 20.2 79.8 78.2 21.8
Ust-Orda Buryat AO 66.4 33.6 7.9 92.1 14.6 85.4 38.4 61.6
Evenk AO 6.3 93.7 27.4 72.6 50.7 49.3 60.4 39.6
F A R  E A S T
Republic of Sakha 9.4 90.6 23.5 76.5 49.7 50.3 42.5 57.5
Primorski krai 1.4 98.6 11.3 88.7 18.4 81.6 36.2 63.8
Khabarovsk krai 25.5 74.5 8.4 91.6 32.6 67.4 33.8 66.2
Amur oblast 0.0 100.0 23.3 76.7 14.0 86.0 32.9 67.1
Kamchatka oblast 4.5 95.5 11.4 88.6 27.8 72.2 26.1 73.9
Magadan oblast 6.2 93.8 8.9 91.1 36.4 63.6 38.6 61.4
Sakhalin oblast 5.4 94.6 6.4 93.6 38.0 62.0 25.0 75.0
Jewish AO 9.7 90.3 11.8 88.2 17.5 82.5 76.6 23.4
Koryak AO 8.6 91.4 15.9 84.1 25.6 74.4 18.7 81.3
Chukotka AO 7.4 92.6 7.6 92.4 17.4 82.6 37.1 62.9
Kaliningrad oblast 4.8 95.2 5.7 94.3 36.9 63.1 31.6 68.4
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on RF Ministry of Finance data.
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Table 4A.7
Federal, Regional and Local Shares of Total Budget Expenditures, 1999*
Year Consolidated Federal Government Regional Government Local Government
Government Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
Expenditures [% of Consolidated [% of Consolidated [% of Consolidated
[% of GDP] Expenditures] Expenditures]  Expenditures]
1997 32.5 44.6 23.8 31.7
1998 27.9 45.9 24.2 29.8
1999 27.7 48.0 24.5 27.5
* In Russia social insurance, unemployment and medical insurance funds are separate funds,
excluded from budgets of all levels and are therefore not covered in this table
SOURCE: Calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.
Table 4A.8
Structure of Local Government Revenues in the Russian Federation, 1999
Revenue Sources RUR billion [%]
Total Local Revenues 346.3 100.0
 of which:
Tax Revenues 245.9 71.1
Local taxes and fees 45.5 13.1
Permanently assigned shared taxes and fees1 47.4 13.7
Shared taxes at annually fixed rates 153.0 44.2
Non-tax Revenues 12.4 3.6
Revenues of Earmarked Budgetary Funds 2.6 0.7
Intergovernmental Grants 84.0 24.3
Subsidies and transfers 54.2 15.7
Subventions 9.4 2.7
Other 20.4 5.9
Other Grants2 1.4 0.4
1 Tax revenues assigned to localities on a permanent basis under the Federal Law on the Tax
System in the Russian Federation.
2 Grants from state extra-budgetary funds and public organizations
SOURCE: Calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.
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Table 4A.9
Sources of Local Government Revenues, 1997–1999
Year Own Local Tax Revenues1 [%] Shared Revenue from Taxes and Grants2 [%]
1997 25.1 74.9
1998 30.3 69.7
1999 31.1 68.9
1 Own local tax revenues include local taxes and fees, permanently assigned shared taxes and
fees, non-tax revenues and revenues of earmarked budgetary funds.
2 Grants include intergovernmental grants and grants from state extra-budgetary funds and
public organizations.
SOURCE: Calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.
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Table 4A.10
Structure of Local Government Expenditures by Function and Type of Settlement,
1998 and 1999
Function 1998 1999
Cities Raions Towns Town- Rural Share of Share of
ships Districts Function Function
in Total in Total
Sub- Sub-
regional regional
Spending Spending*
Public government 3.9 7.2 4.5 6.8 12.1 5.3 5.7
Law enforcement, 1.6 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.5
public order
Industry, energy, 1.4 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.4
construction
Agriculture and fishing 0.8 5.3 0.4 0.4 1.1 2.1 1.8
Public transport roads, 4.9 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.1 3.4 3.1
telecommunications
Housing and utilities 34.3 23.5 37.0 28.1 10.4 29.9 27.1
Education 24.3 28.9 35.8 45.5 56.6 27.8 27.8
Culture and art 1.6 3.0 1.4 2.5 8.1 2.3 2.5
Health care and 15.6 14.6 10.7 9.9 8.8 14.8 15.6
physical fitness
Welfare 5.4 7.4 3.1 1.7 1.7 5.7 5.4
Other expenditures 6.4 6.0 3.9 3.9 0.8 5.9 4.2
Total expenditures 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Only aggregated data for all local governments are available for 1999.
SOURCE: Calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.
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Table 4A.11
Own Revenue Sources of Local Governments, 2000
Tax Tax Imposed by: Tax Base Set by: Tax Rate Set by: Payments Accrue to:
a) Personal Federal Federal Regional and Local  budget
property tax* government government local authorities
for the entire RF
b) Land tax* Federal govern- Federal Regional and Shared among
ment for the government local authorities federal, regional
entire RF and local
governments
in the proportion
of  30:20:50
c) Registration Federal Regional and Regional and Local budget
fee for indivi- government local authorities local authorities
duals engaged for the entire RF
in entre-
preneurial
activities
d) Tax on const- Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
ruction of
manufacturing
facilities in
health resort
areas**
e) Health resort Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
fee
f ) Fee for the Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
right to engage
in trade**
g) Special pur- Local authorities Federal Local authorities Local budget
pose fees for government within federal
individuals and (12 minimum limits (0–3%)
businesses for monthly wages)
support of the
police service,
improvements
of territories,
education and
other purposes
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Table 4A.11 (continued)
Own Revenue Sources of Local Governments, 2000
Tax Tax Imposed by: Tax Base Set by: Tax Rate Set by: Payments Accrue to:
h) Advertisement Local authorities Federal Local authorities Local budget
tax government within federal
(cost of services)  limits (0–5%)
i) Tax on resale Local authorities Federal  Local authorities Local budget
of motor government within federal
vehicles, (transaction limits (0–10%)
hardware and amount)
personal
computers**
j) Charge on Local authorities Federal Local authorities Local budget
dog owners** government within federal
(minimum limits (0–14%
monthly wage) per annum)
k) License fee for Local authorities Federal Federal Local budget
the right to government government
trade in wine (minimum (25–50%
and vodka monthly wage) of minimum
products** monthly wages)
l) License fee for Local authorities Federal govern- Local authorities Local budget
the right to ment  (value of within federal
hold local goods put up for limits (0–0%)
auctions and an auction or an
lotteries** issue amount of
lottery tickets)
m)Fee for Local authorities Federal Federal Local budget
issuance of an government government
authorization (minimum (0–75%)
to a municipal monthly wages)
apartment**
n) Fee for park- Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
ing of motor
vehicles**
o) Fee for the Local authorities Federal govern- Local authorities Local budget
right to use ment (value of within federal
local symbols** sold products)   limits (0–0.5%)
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Table 4A.11 (continued)
Own Revenue Sources of Local Governments, 2000
Tax Tax Imposed by: Tax Base Set by: Tax Rate Set by: Payments Accrue to:
p) Racecourse Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
participation
fee**
q) Racecourse Local authorities Federal Local authorities Local budget
prize fee** government within federal
(prize amount) limits (0–5%)
r) Charge on Local authorities Federal govern- Local authorities Local budget
individuals ment (payment within federal
participating for participation limits (0–5%)
in racecourse in the game)
totalizators**
s) Fee for Local authorities Federal govern- Local authorities Local budget
exchange ment (transaction within federal
transactions**  amount) limits (0–1%)
t) Fee for the Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
right to shoot
movies and
TV films**
u) Fee for street Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
cleaning**
v) Fee for setting Local authorities Local authorities Local authorities Local budget
up gambling
business**
w) Housing Local authorities Federal Local authorities Local budget
and social government within federal
infrastructure (volume of sales) limits (0–1.5%)
maintenance
fee**
* According to the General Part of the Tax Code, as soon as representative branches of regional
governments introduce the Immovable Property Tax in their jurisdictions, taxes referred to in
a) and b) will cease to be levied.
** Pursuant to Federal Law No. 150 of July 31, 1998, as soon as representative branches of
regional governments introduce the Sales Tax in their jurisdictions, taxes referred to in d), f), i),
j), k), l), m), n), o), p), q), r), s), t), u) and v) will cease to be levied.
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Notes
1 As of October 2000, only the republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan retained individual
privileges not stipulated in the Constitution.
2 Goskomstat, 1994 Census.
3 The only exception is the federal Ministry of Finance, which gave up its regional, city, and
raion offices with transition to the decentralization of local government. All local branches of
the Ministry of Finance were officially transformed into the financial departments of regional
or local governments.
4 This section draws heavily on S. Mitrokhin, “Implementation of the Municipal Project in
Russia: Some Aspects of Federal Policy,” 1999, which contains a comprehensive review of
local government reform history in Russia.
5 This classification was proposed in Zamotayev (1999).
6 Goskomstat, Forming Local Self-governance in the Russian Federation, 2000.
7 In the Ingush Republic, for example, heads of municipalities have been appointed by decrees
of the President of the Republic.
8 According to Goskomstat data, 11,809 municipalities have local budgets. However, the
majority of them have no power to introduce local taxes in their jurisdictions.
9 B. Ovchinnikov, “Municipal Elections: Tendencies and Patterns,” 1999.
10 G. Luhterhandt-Mikhalyova, “Political Parties in the Regions and at the Municipal Level,
1999.
11 For example, the Karelia Republic, the Buryat Republic, the Sakha (Yakut) Republic, and
Primorski krai.
12 D. Grushin, “Ethnicities and Local Government,” 1999.
13 Goskomstat, Forming Local Self-governance in the Russian Federation, 2000.
14 For example, in Saratov oblast.
15 For example, in some municipalities in Voronezh oblast.
16 The experience of the Tula oblast where elders were recently elected in most of the sub-raion
settlements is described in Morozhikhin and Morozhikhin, Self-governed Village, 1999.
17 City of Petrozavodsk Administration,  http://www.petrozavodsk.ru.
18 Health care is financed by the municipal, regional or federal budget as well as from the
mandatory medical insurance fund. This dual financing scheme generates difficulties in
delineating powers.
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19 Goskomstat, Forming Local Self-governance in the Russian Federation, 2000.
20 This refers to commercial banks established with assistance from municipal capital. One example
is Dom-bank, which operates in Domodedovo raion of Moscow region. The raion
administration originally held a small share (one percent) in the bank capital. The administration
and committee for property management presently hold a controlling block of shares (fifty-
two percent).
21 Starting from 2001, all VAT revenues are due to be consolidated in the federal budget.
22 Starting from 2001, municipalities will receive five percent of collections from the enterprise
profits tax.
23 In Vladimir oblast, subventions from the oblast budget in 1999 were provided primarily for
payment of child benefits to low-income families, while in Leningrad oblast they were
designated for subsidies to eligible groups for housing, utilities and free medicine.
24 In Leningrad oblast, subventions to local budgets in 1999 were used to support the State
Service of Medical and Social Examination. In Altai krai local budgets received subventions for
maintenance of inter-raion budget agencies.
25 Fiscal Policy Center, Georgia State University, under the Fiscal Reform in Russia Project
sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development.
26 One exception is the City of Togliatti in Samara oblast. The municipality introduced a tax on
imputed income (the tax was in fact a property tax on small business), and set up municipal
tax service for collection purposes. The service operated quite successfully.  However, after
implementation of the law on imputed income across the entire Federation the local tax on
imputed income was abolished, although its federal version was difficult to administer and
inefficient. In the end, the municipal tax service had to be dissolved.
27 Since local government bodies are distinct from the state administration, it is important to
distinguish between a single treasury system and a single treasury set up as a federal entity.
28 This study was undertaken by the Georgia State University under the Fiscal Reform in Russia
Project sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development.
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Local Government in Georgia
David Losaberidze
Konstantine Kandelaki
Niko Orvelashvili
1. Overview of Local Government Reform
Local government has posed one of the most significant problems in building the Georgian state.
Unlike Parliament and the government, both of which relatively well established by legislation, the
structure of local governments remains vague, due to the lack of any tradition of self-government in
Georgia.
The only early example of self-government in Georgia is Tbilisi, where the institution of city elders
(Tbileli Berebi ) was in place from about 1080 until 1122. Although city government emerged in the
twelfth century, its development was hampered by invasions of nomadic tribes such as the Mongols,
the Temur-Leng and Turkmens.  Since roughly the same time, however, forms of community self-
government have existed in the mountainous regions, which, unlike other districts, have continuously
maintained institutions of elders (khevisberi ).
After the annexation of Georgia by the Russian empire, the country was ruled first by military and
then by civil Russian administration from 1801 to 1829. In 1841, limited self-government was
introduced in Tbilisi. Georgian villages began to convene village assemblies in 1865, in a move
similar to the peasant reform carried out in central Russia. About seven hundred of these assemblies
appeared, made up entirely of family elders. However, no truly democratic elective bodies functioned
in Georgian villages until 1917.  In 1874, municipal reform was carried out in the cities, leading to
the introduction of elective city councils (satatbiro) between 1874 and 1888 in Tbilisi, Kutaisi,
Gori, Akhaltsikhe, Poti and Batumi.
Local administration was chosen by representative bodies; the mayor was elected by the city council
and the village headman (mamasakhlisi ) by the village assembly.  However, the election base was
limited to five percent of the population due to stringent social, age and property requirements.
Furthermore, local administration functioned as a local branch of the central government rather than
a local self-government body.
It was only after the February 1917 revolution in Russia, during the short-lived independent
Georgian Republic, that attempts were made to democratize government and introduce principles
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of local self-governance. The first elections to local and municipal self-governing bodies were held in
1919. These attempts ended when Russian Bolsheviks invaded Georgia in 1921.
During the Soviet era, institutions of local self-governance existed only in the form of puppet
organizations. Neither the Constitution nor legislation acknowledged the concept of self-government.
The monopolistic party system and fully centralized budget precluded the need for local initiative
and local soviets of people’s deputies carried out local government at all levels as bodies of state
power. Furthermore, there was no separation of competencies between different administrative
levels. According to the Constitution, all soviets had similar competencies and responsibilities, resulting
in numerous legal battles during perestroika.
The Law on the Transition Period, adopted 14 November 1990, was the first of several laws designed
to replace the Soviet system, among which were the following:
• Several amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, passed throughout
1990–1991;
• Law on Elections to the Local Bodies of State Power (adopted 24 January 1991);
• Law on Local Administration during the Transition Period (adopted 29 January 1991);
• Law on Prefectures (adopted 23 April 1991).
Local administration from 1990 to 1991 generally functioned on two levels.  The first level was
constituted by villages, settlements and towns. The representative body was the local council
(sakrebulo), elected for a three year term. The head of local administration (gamgebeli) was nominated
by the prefect and confirmed by the local council.
The second level consisted of districts and cities with special status. At this level, local councils were
elected for a three year term. In addition, a prefect was appointed by the Chairman of the Supreme
Council (later the president of the republic) to head the district executive branch and act as the
representative of the central government for a four-year term. As the highest regional state official,
prefects had supervisory powers over local authorities, including village and town councils, and were
entitled to annul local council decisions without appeal.
The law also specified the following categories of local government: district, town, city district,
community, settlement and village.
After the coup of 1991, the office of the prefect was abolished and regional authority was transferred
to district heads of local administration. The 1921 Constitution, reinstated in 1992, has not affected
the development of local self-government.
The current state of local self-government is complicated by unresolved issues of territorial organization.
This problem is regarded as sensitive by political circles, ethnic minorities and the public and has
frequently turned critical in recent years. Widespread ethnic prejudice and unresolved socio-economic
problems create additional difficulties for the state.
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Relations with regions not populated by ethnic minorities are equally complex due to the following
reasons:
• strong ideological opposition;
• tribal traditions, which became increasingly entrenched in certain regions in the 1990s;
• intensified confrontation between the mafia and local and central nomenklatura;
• widespread apathy and distrust of the state due to events of the last decade (the coup d’etat,
civil war and ethnic conflicts);
• economic crisis due to the disintegration of the Soviet economic sphere and the total lack of
preparation for competition in the global market;
• political crisis caused by an inefficient and underdeveloped state system and a government
which lacks a clearly formulated strategy in several critical areas;
• lack of priority given to issues of local government since, during independence, those in power
felt that Georgia faced other more pressing problems;
• the scope of the problem. Because politicians found self-government to be so difficult to solve,
they failed to develop basic principles of local self-government or a model of territorial
organization for its implementation.
It should be noted that the Georgian government was both unstable and unpopular between 1992
and 1995 and at present. This, combined with the overall ignorance of the population in self-
governing issues, paints a bleak picture for local self-government in Georgia.
2. Legal and Constitutional Basis
2.1 Territorial Structure, Levels of Self-government
The current system of local governments delineates two tiers of self-government. The first is made
up of the smallest administrative units: villages, communes, small rural towns and district-level cities.
Elected bodies at this level enjoy a relatively full degree of autonomy, with the power to create
executive bodies and supervise their activities.
The second tier consists of districts and cities with special status (Batumi, Rustavi, Sokhumi, Poti,
Kutaisi and Tskhinvali). This tier acts as mediator between the regions and the central government
and possesses greater powers. This level is centrally-governed, not self-governed: elected bodies may
monitor the activity of executive agencies such as the city hall (gamgeoba), but these executive
officials are appointed by and accountable to the central government.
Tbilisi has special status as the capital city, as established by the Law on the Capital of Georgia. The
representative body is the Tbilisi local council, which is elected by proportional ballot. The executive
branch is composed of the mayor, the premier and district gamgebeli, who are nominated by the
mayor and appointed by the president.
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Local self-government bodies in mountainous territories have additional powers as determined by
law.
At all levels of government in Georgia, central and local, town and district, elected representative
institutions are forced to coexist with executive bodies not under their control.
The most important change in territorial structure was the creation of regions headed by the state
commissioner, also commonly referred to as the governor.  The institution of the governor is established
by presidential decree rather than by legislation. Governors currently head the nine regions of
Georgia (Kakheti, Shida Kartli, Kvemo Kartli, Mtskheta-Tianeti, Meskhet-Djavakheti, Imereti,
Samegrelo and Zemo Svaneti, Ratcha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti, Guria).
The relationship between regional and local levels of government is illustrated in figure 5.1 below.
It should be noted that the Organic Law on Local Government and Self-governance addresses local
government at the first level, rather than self-government in general, and does not provide for any
elective bodies at the regional level. As mentioned above, there is a need for a constitutional Law on
Administrative-territorial Organization of Georgia to regulate territorial organization and relations
between the central government and autonomous republics in the future.
Figure 5.1
Relationships between Different Tiers of Government
Central Government
Governors, Mayor
Local Councils
Local Councils
Executive Branch
(Gamgebelis, Mayors)
Executive Branch
(Gamgebelis, Mayors)
Regional level
(Regions, Tbilisi)
District level
(Districts, cities
with special status)
Communal level
(Villages, communes and towns)
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2.2 Legal Basis of Local Government
Unfortunately, the legislative foundation for local government in Georgia is underdeveloped and
often self-contradictory due to frequent amendment. For instance, the Law on the Structure and
Operation of Executive Power has been amended twice since its adoption in 1990. Furthermore,
several essential areas lack any legislative basis; key fields such as regional organization and the office
of regional state commissioner are determined by presidential decree, not parliamentary legislation.
The 1995 Constitution failed to stipulate a model for administrative-territorial organization. Instead,
its second clause postpones settlement of the issue until restoration of the country’s territorial integrity.
Meanwhile, the system of local government is determined by the Organic Law on Local Government
and Self-governance, adopted in October 1997. Despite many juridical flaws, this law provided the
basis for the development of a relatively efficient system of self-government. The Organic Law on
Local Government superceded several contradictory normative laws passed between 1991 and
1997 (in total, three laws, one resolution and eleven decrees).
The Law on the Capital of Georgia followed on 18 February 1998. Despite these positive steps
forward, requirements for local elections were not specified until late summer. The Law on Local
Council Elections was signed by the president of Georgia on 4 August 1998, at the same time as the
Law on the Status of Local Council Members.
The year 1999 witnessed the passage of the Law on the Social, Economic and Cultural Development
of Mountainous Regions and the Law on Direct State Governance. The process of dividing financial
and budgetary responsibilities between central and local governments began with the adoption of
the Law on Financial Bodies of the Local and State Governments.
Finally, both the Law on Public Service and the Law on Corruption and Conflict of Interest in
Public Service regulate government activities in general, including those of local governments.
While a system of local government has developed at the communal and district levels over the past
three years, the status of the regional level remains ambiguous. The office of regional state commissioner
has no legal basis and may be considered unconstitutional. The only law to address the subject is the
Law on the Fund for State Commissioners.
2.3 Functions of Local Government
Local councils at all levels of government are responsible for the following:
• reviewing and approving the local budget, making any necessary amendments, approving the
budget execution report and supervising budget execution;
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• approving long-term social and economic development plans and supervising their
implementation;
• levying and rescinding local taxes and fees and determining tax exemptions;
• supervising the activities of executive bodies and council officials and evaluating their annual
reports;
• electing the council chairman and secretary, forming council committees, electing committee
chairmen, approving committee staff and making any necessary changes;
• confirming elected council members and removing them from office before their terms are up;
• reviewing reports from heads of any local government bodies created by the council or officials;
• adopting local government resolutions, amending them and supervising their implementation;
• establishing rules for the ownership, use and disposal of local self-government property;
• founding and liquidating local services and relevant enterprises;
• creating local government housing and construction funds and regulating their disposal;
• approving programs for the revitalization and development of community services and
supervising their implementation;
• establishing a local information service;
• resolving issues of local importance concerning education, health care, culture and sports;
• regulating the provision of social services;
• approving agreements and contracts made on behalf of the local self-government.
In addition to these responsibilities, second-tier local governments (districts and cities with special
status) and the councils of Tbilisi are charged with the following duties:
• ensuring the observance of human rights, legality and public law and order, and evaluating
reports from relevant bodies and officials;
• monitoring the use of natural resources in accordance with Georgian legislation;
• approving measures for environmental protection and ecological safety;
• approving measures for the protection of cultural heritage;
• ensuring the implementation of state programs;
• approving programs to provide a social safety net and promote employment;
• approving measures to relieve the consequences of catastrophes, acts of God and epidemics.
3. Local Politics, Decision Making
3.1 Local Politics
As the political and economic elite realize the necessity of legitimizing their power, elections have
become a trophy for democratic legitimacy in recent years.
The nomenklatura employs classic clientele methods in its relations with the population, either using
intimidation or offering economic compensation in order to win elections (for example, paying
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salaries and pensions, distributing food products or repairing roads). In areas where civil society is
weaker, such as ethnic enclaves, or areas under the control of local autocrats, such as regions, the
population tends to comply with the nomenklatura and vote as instructed.
Illegal methods are used increasingly often; these include distributing gifts among constituencies
prior to elections, stuffing ballot boxes and bribing members of electoral commissions. Reports and
press releases from local and international monitors provide numerous examples of these violations as
well as examples of obstruction by authorities, particularly police, during virtually every election.
Observers are barred from monitoring voting, campaigning frequently continues on election day,
individual voters cast their ballots repeatedly at different polling stations, registration procedures are
violated and the tallying of votes is rigged.  Particularly in regions, the local population votes for local
nomenklatura, primarily out of reluctance to offend the parties in power.
Nonetheless, voters express their dissatisfaction by the post-Soviet trend whereby citizens vote
against the government rather than for a candidate, by the decrease in voter participation since 1990
and by the increase in people who do not trust local government (from fifty-three percent in 1996
to sixty-seven percent in 1998).
Party politics has a pervasive influence on local self-government. Political parties in Georgia, though
diverse, can be divided into two main groups:
• Political parties created around former nomenklatura or representatives of certain regional or
family clans. These parties have strong political and economic leverage at their disposal, extending
to physical force when necessary;
• Political movements and groups with low membership. These parties are active only during
elections or limit their activities to local civil disobedience campaigns and other ineffective
protests.
Party corruption, present at every level, is at its most blatant during elections. Examples range from
purchasing votes to falsifying election results during counting.
Civil society is dependent on western donor assistance and does not significantly influence public
opinion. However, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have begun to play a greater role in local
self-government. This is primarily true of large cities, but has slowly spread to the regions in the past two
years. Community organizations have started to emerge and some, such as the Varketili organization based
in a district of Tbilisi, have seriously affected local policymaking and even regulate certain services.
Some local self-government bodies have begun to coordinate their activities and international
organizations have been promoting the establishment of local council associations. The Association
of Georgian Councils was founded in 1999, with the help of the National Democratic Institute
(NDI), while the smaller National Association of Sakrebulos was created at the initiative of the
district city of Gori. Association activities have thus far been limited to regular assemblies and the
distribution of methodological literature.  Limited financial resources and lack of experience among
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local councils negatively impact the quality of activities. Nevertheless, this type of association has
great potential for exchanging best practices in self-governance, improving personnel skills and
developing joint programs.
3.2 Internal Structure of Local Self-government
Local councils in cities with special status consist of thirty members, while the Tbilisi city council
consists of fifty-five. The composition of the remaining local councils is defined according to
population by the following scale:
Table 5.1
Number of Local Council Members According to Population Size
Population Number of Council Members
0–500 5
500–1,000 7
1,000–2,000 9
2,000–5,000 13
5,000–10,000 17
10,000–30,000 19
30,000–50,000 21
50,000+ 25
Local council officials include the chairman, secretary and chairmen of local council commissions. In
addition, the Tbilisi local council possesses deputy chairmen of local council commissions and
chairmen of political factions.
Local council members elect a council chairman from among their number.  The chairman is chosen
by a majority vote of members present at the meeting, provided that the votes equal at least one third
of total membership (at least one half in Tbilisi). The council chairman is responsible for:
• directing council activities and preparing for, convening and chairing council meetings;
• representing the local council to other organizations;
• coordinating the activities of standing and temporary council commissions;
• signing local council decisions;
• other duties in accordance with council provisions and existing legislation.
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The council chairman nominates a candidate for the position of secretary, who may then be elected
by a majority of members present at the meeting (in Tbilisi, the candidate must receive over half of
the total votes).  The local council secretary fulfills the chairman’s responsibilities in the chairman’s
absence or in case of his or her resignation. In addition, the secretary performs other activities at the
direction of the council or chairman within council regulations. The secretary may become a full-
time salaried council employee at the council’s decision.
Local councils create standing or temporary commissions as needed. Neither the functions nor
number of standing commissions are regulated by law. In Tbilisi only, the number of standing
commissions may not exceed five. Chairmen of local commissions must be elected from local council
members, but outside individuals may be invited to be commission members. Commission activities
are regulated by council provision.
According to legislation, local council meetings should take place at least once every three months.
Extraordinary meetings may be called by chairmen, mayors or the premier of Tbilisi.  They may also
be requested by least one third of the local council or at least one fifth of all voters (at least 10,000
voters in Tbilisi), in which case the chairman is obliged to convene the meeting within a week of the
demand.
Issues are decided by open vote, except for votes of no confidence or other personal matters.  Most
local council decisions are passed by a majority vote of members present, provided that at least half
of the council is present. All meeting proceedings are recorded in the local council minutes.
3.3 Local Elections
Local council members are elected by universal, direct, equal and secret vote. Most local council
elections are held in multi-mandate electoral districts according to a proportional electoral system.  In
territories with fewer than two thousand voters, however, elections are held according to a majority
electoral system. The term of office for local councilors is three years.
In Georgia, local elections were most recently held on 15 November 1998. These were the third
such elections after 1919 and 1991, excluding the purely formal elections of the Communist era.
Local government bodies were elected throughout Georgia, with the exception of the Abkhazia
Autonomous Republic and the Tskhinvali region (the former South Ossetia Autonomy). Overall,
1,031 local councils were elected, 654 at the communal level and 378 at district level, with a total of
10,693 council members.
All Georgian citizens of at least eighteen years of age who had been registered in the local government
territory for at least three months had active voting rights. Passive voting rights were granted to
citizens who were at least twenty-one years old, registered on the territory of the corresponding
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council and had permanently resided in Georgia for at least five years. Military personnel participated
only in elections at the second tier of local government. Internally displaced persons were not eligible
to take part in local elections.
Parties and coalitions may nominate candidates. In local councils where elections are held according
to a majority system, candidates may be nominated by voter initiative groups of at least five citizens.
In order to participate, political parties are required by law to present electoral lists in at least half of
the districts holding elections according to the proportional system, a total of 189 local councils. Due
to this requirement, the number of participating parties decreased. The Central Electoral Commission
eventually registered eleven political parties and two coalitions consisting of six parties.
In comparison with the 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections, the 1998 local elections were
relatively fair, notwithstanding several infringements. The governing party, the Citizens’ Union of
Georgia, had an unexpectedly poor showing in the local elections. Although they won over half the
total number of seats, they failed to win a majority in thirty-three out of sixty-five districts and five
cities with special status. This is an indication of the party’s low popularity as well as the fact that
opposition parties have mastered the same illegal tactics employed by the governing party in the
1995 elections. In addition, the opposition utilized the rhetoric of social populism and the population’s
negative attitude towards any political force in power. Finally, because the ruling party viewed local
elections as less significant, they did not mobilize all its forces or rig election results on the same scale
as in parliamentary or presidential elections. Consequently, opposition parties won majorities in the
capital and four other major cities (Kutaisi, Rustavi, Batumi and Poti).
Despite numerous violations, the 1998 local elections clearly represented a step forward for democratic
development in Georgia. For the first time since independence, the principle of self-government was
implemented in the country, as elected rather than appointed executive bodies emerged at the first
level of government.
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4. Functional Structure of Local Government
4.1 Local Administration Functions
The local administration is responsible for the following:
• ensuring observance of public law and order;
• ensuring protection of human rights and legality;
• managing and disposing of local government property;
• regulating use of natural resources, protecting the environment and preserving the ecological
balance;
• resolving issues of land use in subordinate territories;
• organizing waste disposal and recycling;
• organizing sanitation, anti-epidemic and veterinary measures;
• defining special protected environmental areas and preserving institutions of cultural heritage;
• overseeing issues of education, child care, health care, culture, sports and tourism;
• developing and maintaining power, gas, water supply and land improvement systems;
• constructing, maintaining and repairing regional roads;
• overseeing local communication networks created by local funds;
• providing social insurance and employment;
• providing relief for consequences of catastrophes, acts of God and epidemics;
• assisting in the organization of civil defense;
• creating and financing social and economic development programs;
• mobilizing human and transportation resources in cases stipulated by the law of Georgia;
• mobilizing local reserves for the Georgian armed forces;
• providing assistance to the Military of Defense by organizing military assemblies or training
and supplying military units with agricultural products.
The above-mentioned responsibilities may be divided by mutual agreement between the local
administration and other local government bodies.
4.2 Structure of Local Administration
The executive branch of the local council is the directorate, which may consist of a gamgebeli, a first
deputy gamgebeli, a deputy gamgebeli, a head of apparatus and directors of local services.
Communal directorates are generally comprised of three to seven members. Directorates are not
established in communities with fewer than three thousand inhabitants; instead, those functions are
executed solely by the gamgebeli. At this level, the gamgebeli is elected by the corresponding local
council from its members, acts as council chairman and is accountable to the local council. The
directorate structure is defined by local council provision. Upon resignation or dismissal of the
gamgebeli, the given directorate is dissolved.
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At the district level, directorates are a division of state administration that also perform the executive
functions of local government. Directorates of cities with special status are made up of seven to
fifteen members, and raion or district directorates of five to eleven members. The gamgebelis of both
are appointed and dismissed by the president of Georgia, who also approves the directorate structure.
Gamgebelis at this level are accountable to both the president of Georgia and the local council.
Gamgebelis at both levels are charged with the following duties:
• to oversee preparation of the draft local budget and submit it to the local council forty-five
days before the budgetary year;
• to submit social and economic development plans to the local council;
• to submit corresponding legislation to the local council;
• to implement local council decisions;
• to approve the appointment and dismissal of heads of territorial divisions of state agencies.
In addition, gamgebelis of the second level must:
• maintain public order in the district;
• monitor issues of legality and human rights in the district.
The directorate formulates the draft budget, prepares social and economic development programs
and grants preliminary approval to economic transactions for sums over GEL 5,000 (approximately
USD 2,500). All directorate decisions are approved by a majority of officials present. The first
deputy gamgebeli oversees economic affairs and fulfills the gamgebeli’s duties in his or her absence,
while deputy gamgebelis head different branches of executive activity.  Local governments also
establish agencies to manage various functions within local government competence. The heads of
such agencies are appointed by the gamgebeli in coordination with the local council.
All local government bodies and officials may initiate legislation within their defined competence.
Second tier gamgebelis draft legislative statements after consulting members of the directorate. The
directorate may draft legislative statements only in cases specified by law or the local council.
The executive branch in Tbilisi is structured somewhat differently.  Because the city is divided into
eleven city districts, the municipality of Tbilisi consists of the directorates of Tbilisi and its districts.
Local self-government is implemented only through the Tbilisi municipality council; there are no
representative bodies in the city district governments
Other Tbilisi government officials include the city government premier, deputy premier, gamgebelis
of Tbilisi districts and heads of individual city communal and public services, who are nominated by
the mayor of Tbilisi and approved by the local council. The only exceptions are the city premier and
city district gamgebelis, who must be approved by the president of Georgia. The structure and
operation of Tbilisi government are defined by law and presidential decree. The government implements
local council and municipality decisions and formulates capital budget projects and social and economic
development programs.
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The mayor is a citizen of Georgia and a resident of Tbilisi appointed by the president of Georgia.
The mayor is responsible for the following:
• submitting an organizational chart of the city government for approval to the local council;
• submitting candidates for city premier and city district gamgebeli for approval to the president
of Georgia;
• appointing and dismissing deputy premiers, heads of apparatus and heads of Tbilisi city
services in coordination with the local council;
• appointing and dismissing heads of other public services;
• suspending implementation of city government provisions when necessary and requesting
their annulment from the local council;
• suspending or annulling decisions of the city premier and gamgebeli;
• consenting to the appointment and dismissal of heads of territorial divisions of state agencies.
The Tbilisi City government is led by the city premier, who is accountable to the president of
Georgia, the local council and the mayor. The city premier is responsible for the following:
• submitting programs of social and economic development to the local council in coordination
with the mayor;
• formulating draft legislation and submitting it to the Tbilisi local council;
• fulfilling mayoral duties in the mayor’s absence.
There are no more than three deputy premiers, each of whom direct branches of local administration.
Provision of public services is directed by department heads, who are responsible to the mayor, the
city premier and the local council.
Organizational support is provided by the local government apparatus, or administrative staff. This
is led by a head of apparatus, who is appointed and dismissed by the gamgebeli in coordination with
the local council. The head of apparatus submits the administrative staff structure to the local
council, while the gamgebeli appoints staff employees.
4.3 Control, Supervision and Audit of Local Governments
Control over local government activity may be divided into three categories: public control over local
councils, local council control over the executive branch and central government control over local
governments.
1. Public control over local councils.
Local council members are obliged to meet with voters at least once every three months and
report on their activities at least once a year.  Local council meetings are open to the public.
Closed meetings may be if held they involve information which is secret or restricted by law.
According to the new Administrative Code, citizens may request any necessary public
information from government agencies and attend non-closed council sessions. In practice,
citizens do not exercise these rights.
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2. Local council control over the executive branch.
Gamgebelis report on their activity to local councils once a year. In addition, the local council
creates a commission on oversight, made up of at least three council members, in order to
supervise executive activities. This commission monitors the registration and collection of
taxes, the legality of expenditures and their correspondence to the local budget and reports on
its activity to the local council every three months. The commission also presents an annual
report to the local council during approval of the local budget execution report.
3. Central government control over the local government.
The central government has the most effective means of control at its disposal. Legislative
control is exercised by the prosecutor’s office, economic control by the chamber of control and
control over specific functions by the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Internal
Affairs or the Ministry of Finance. Courts play a very limited role in resolving conflicts between
central and local governments. In practice, all such cases are decided by the president of Georgia.
The mechanisms of control available to the central government far outweigh the others. Although the
mayor of Tbilisi, for example, is accountable both to the president and to the local council and citizens
of Tbilisi, voters and the city council have no legal mechanisms to influence city hall, apart from generally
defined rights. Presidential displeasure, on the other hand, means possible removal from office.
However, the state government is not willing or able to exercise control over local government finances,
either over local budgets or the use of transfers from the central budget. No state or independent
auditing system exists, a situation conducive to corruption and the resulting depletion of already
limited finances.
4.4 Relationship Between Elected and Appointed Local Government Bodies
According to current legislation, local councils monitor the activity of local administrations and local
officials and review annual reports from heads of local services.
Communal local councils approve the directorate structure and candidates presented by the mayor.
In theory, a local council may issue a vote of no confidence in the gamgebeli, a directorate or a directorate
official. A motion of no confidence may be put to council vote at the initiative of one third of its
members; the motion passes if supported by one half of the local council. The local council is also
authorized to suspend or revoke decisions of the directorate or gamgebeli.
In exceptional circumstances, a district local council may apply to the president of Georgia to dismiss
its gamgebeli by majority vote. A motion of no confidence may introduced against the gamgebeli at
the request of at least one third of the council members or against the directorate or a directorate
official at the request of at least half the council. The decision is passed if supported by a majority vote.
Upon a vote of no confidence, the directorate or directorate official is considered to have resigned.
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Within a week of being presented with a local council resolution, the gamgebeli is authorized to send
it back to the local council with suggested revisions. The local council must vote upon the
recommendations within a two-week period.  If they are not passed, the local council votes again on
the original version and may adopt it by a simple majority vote.
The Tbilisi mayor has the special right to appoint an acting deputy premier, head of apparatus or
heads of local services for up to six months if the council does not approve the mayor’s candidate after
two attempts and fails to elect their own candidate within two weeks.
In reality, these mechanisms of control do not function, especially at the district level. District
gamgebelis and mayors of cities with special status are appointed by the president and represent the
governing coalition. Although local governments have passed votes of no confidence, not one has
received presidential approval.
Local councils are thus unable to implement effective control over the executive branch. At the
district level, high administration officials are appointed by the central government. At the first level,
they are a member of the majority party.  Therefore, they retain their local council membership even
when faced with votes of no confidence and have the opportunity to retrieve their status through
party deals within the council.
Executive authorities are indifferent to political debates in the local council. This is true not only of
the regional state commissioners, who are not formally accountable to local councils, but also of heads
of district administrations. It has become common practice for both to disregard local council decisions
and occasionally apply their own pressures on local council policy.
The following contradictions to the European Charter of Local Self-government are inherent in the
current state of local self-government in Georgia:
• Heads of district-level local governments are appointed by the president rather than elected by
the population or local councils, in contradiction to article 2(3);
• No elected representative bodies function at the regional level, while the governor’s authority
is steadily expanding, in contradiction to article 2(3);
• Local representative bodies are unable to deal with many issues within their competence, in
contradiction to article 6(4);
• Central government control over local self-government institutions runs counter to legal
requirements, in contradiction to article 2(8);
• The government delegates a range of responsibilities to local self-governments without assigning
the requisite financial resources, in contradiction to article 2(9).
Although Georgia has not yet joined the European Charter of Local Self-Government, it must still
observe European conventions as a member of the Council of Europe. However, the overwhelming
majority of Georgian authorities remain unconcerned about this issue. Meanwhile, in the absence of
real legal instruments, local councils respond to blatant violations of principles of self-government
with hopelessness and pessimism rather than active protest.
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5. Public Service Provision
Local governments encounter a host of problems in the provision of public services, among which
are the following:
• Local self-governing bodies are poorly informed and lack skilled staff.  Thus, even the small
role assigned to them by legislation is often beyond their reach;
• Many bureaucrats derive advantages from the current situation and are thus unwilling to
implement any real reforms;
• Local governments face pressing financial difficulties due to the lack of funds and their obligation
to pay a high proportion of local revenues to the central budget;
• The cost of public services is very high and quality very low. No optimal model exists for
allocating human, material and financial resources and concepts of strategic planning and
market demand analysis are alien to local officials;
• The majority of the population of Georgia cannot afford these services;
• There are no truly independent alternative systems, such as various specialized services, agencies
and companies.
Private initiative is weak and the government does little to encourage it. This situation stems from the
Soviet era, when the propaganda of a socially oriented society and the monopolization of all vital social
functions by the Soviet system created the illusion that the state would act indefinitely as the agent
of public good.
Political circles in Georgia have recently begun to emphasize the need to decentralize public services. The
process of privatizing communal services is already underway, with former directors generally becoming
the new owners. However, the Georgian government must create the legal basis for effective reform of the
state system in the near future to meet the requirements of international financial and political organizations.
Also, the unclear division of competencies between various governmental agencies has led to bitter
confrontation, a trend which promises to continue in the future.
In view of these problems facing local government, the present stage of development remains unclear.
5.1 Distribution of Functions
Some types of public services are shared between the central and local governments. Examples of
these include health care and education. Both federal and municipal programs exist in these fields;
federal programs are financed directly from the central budget, while the local government may
fund additional programs or extend federal ones. The remaining expenses are covered by consumers.
The local government budget partially covers expenditures on public service. However, the central
government retains control over the most important functions, such as health care, education, public
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safety and tax collection. Few local self-government agencies are able to develop independent programs
due to lack of funds. Even when services are partially financed by local budgets, the central government
still has the legal and political leverage to implement its own public service policy.
Two types of executive institutions exist at the district level, municipal agencies and territorial ministry
agencies. The first category includes housing departments and municipal transport, while the second
includes the police department and department of education. Heads of both types are members of
the directorate and are accountable to the gamgebeli, the representative of the central government.
Only heads of municipal agencies, however, are accountable to the local council. Heads of territorial
ministry agencies often refuse to provide documentation or necessary information to the local council.
For several years, the state budget continued to finance enterprises formally subordinated to local
self-governments, mainly communal facilities. Heads of these enterprises consequently ran up unjustified
expenses, since any debts were covered by the state budget. In 1999, this rule was abolished. As
these enterprises gradually became private companies, the government was able to divest itself of
unprofitable enterprises. The new owners of privatized services are generally the former heads of
administrations or their relatives and quality of service is very poor. There are no accurate statistical
data on how many enterprises were privatized.
The concept of transferring control over local services from the district to the regional levels has
privately been gaining currency among the nomenklatura. If the district administration becomes an
elected body, one of the conditions of Georgia’s entrance into the European Community, the central
government will doubtless attempt to assume real means of management, as is already the case at the
first level of local government.
6. Local Finance, Local Property
6.1 Budget System
Throughout the 1990s, Georgia had no considered economic or fiscal policy at the central or local levels,
resulting in state budget deficits for the past six years.  Consequently, the system of local finance developed
haphazardly as the government passed various legislative acts to ratify already existing practices.
The budget system in Georgia is defined as the consolidated state and local government budgets.
Prior to 1997 the state budget was defined as the consolidation of the central budget, budgets of
special state funds and communal budgets; currently, the state budget consists of only the central
budget and budgets of special state funds. In fact, Georgia has a four-tiered budgetary system. The
first tier consists of the state budget, the second of consolidated budgets of autonomous republics,
the third of budgets of districts and cities with special status and the fourth of communal budgets.
At present the state budget, communal budgets and budgets of the autonomous republics are
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independent of one another. Local budgets have own revenues and discretion over expenditures
with the exception of special purpose transfers and loans from higher-level budgets.
The budgetary system prior to 1997 is too dissimilar to the current system to allow comparison of
specific budgetary items. Therefore, this discussion is limited to a detailed analysis of data after 1997.
6.2 Legal Guarantees of Financial Autonomy
The 1996 Law on the Budget System and Budgetary Powers (hereafter referred to as the Law on the
Budget System) significantly increased the degree of local government autonomy in determining
and implementing financial and fiscal policy. In order to ensure the integrity of the Georgian budget,
local governments are legally required to adhere to common principles such as budget classifications,
general forms of budget documentation, general principles of the budgetary process and the common
monetary system.  Nevertheless, local governments are guaranteed an adequate measure of independence
by article 8 of the above-mentioned law.
The law also stipulates that the state budget of Georgia, budgets of territorial units and budgets of the
Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Adjara are independent of one another. Budgets at all levels
have the authority to regulate sources of revenue relevant to own and long-term economic norms defined
by the law. Full discretion over their use is granted to the highest authorities of Autonomous Republics
of Abkhazia and Adjara and local representatives elsewhere in Georgia. State government bodies are
not allowed to interfere in budget rights of lower authorities. Certain agencies, such as the State Chan-
cellery, the Ministry of Finance or the State Prosecutor’s Office, have the right to interfere in financial
activities of local self-governments only if the State Audit Chamber has found serious breaches of law.
Article 29 (2) of the Law on the Budget System also stipulates that local authorities and administrative
bodies of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Adjara and other territorial bodies of Georgia
independently draft, adopt and implement relevant budgets.
6.3 Current State of Financial Autonomy
Unfortunately, the legislative basis of local finance in Georgia is highly unstable. The Law on the
Budget System, for instance, has been amended nineteen times since its approval. The same is true
of the Law on Long-term Economic Norms for Distribution of State Taxes to Budgets of Territorial
Units and the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Adjara (henceforth referred to as the Law on
Distribution of State Taxes). Although the ostensible purpose of the law is to establish long-term
norms, it is amended annually, sometimes twice or more per year. This instability greatly diminishes
the actual level of local autonomy.
Under current legislation, local representative bodies adopt rules for the formulation, consideration
and term of approval of the local budget within general limits established by the law. However, both
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the central and local budget processes rarely correspond to legally stipulated conditions. Violations
have become so common that they no longer attract notice.
The local administration is responsible for formulating and executing local budgets, while
representative bodies are authorized to supervise budget execution and make any necessary
amendments to budget revenues and expenditures without increasing the marginal quantity of the
budget deficit. Moreover, if local budget expenditures exceed revenues, the local administration
may sequester up to ten percent of the local budget without council permission. To sequester more
than ten percent of the budget requires local council consent. If revenues exceed expenditures
during implementation of the budget, the remainder is handed over to the relevant local administrative
departments or agencies, to be used at their discretion rather than transferred to the budget.
The greatest constraint on the financial autonomy of local governments is the reliance of local
officials on the central government that has appointed them. Accordingly, local governments do not
submit to supervision by representative bodies, and local interests are not always reflected in local
financial and fiscal policy.
Despite these shortcomings, local authorities are relatively financially independent from the central
government, as evidenced by the decrease in transfers from the central to local government over the
past three years (see table 5.3). While all sixty-one territorial units of the budget system received
transfers in 1998, two units (Poti and Rustavi) were not allocated transfers in 1999. In that year,
thirteen budgets covered expenditures with own revenues. Although fifty-nine out of sixty-one
local governments will be assigned transfers, there is no explicit policy on subsidies. Nor is there
detailed information on the actual distribution of subsidies among regions.
Table 5.3
Share of State Subventions in Local Budget Revenues,
1997–1999
1997 1998 1999
[USD [%] [USD [%] [USD [%]
millions] millions] millions]
Local budgets, including 158.6 100.0 177.2 100.0 161.1 100.0
subventions from the state
Local budgets, excluding 120.4 75.9 152.2 85.9 140.7 87.4
subventions from the state
Subventions from the state budget 36.5 23.0 21.7 12.2 17.9 11.1
Bank loans 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.6
Other sources of income 0.7 0.5 2.3 1.3 1.5 0.9
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If the central government even slightly increases the percentage of general state taxes to be paid to
local budgets, an overwhelming majority of districts will no longer depend on transfers from the
central budget. However, the central government is unlikely to relinquish this important mechanism
of control over local self-governments and bureaucrats are equally unwilling to lose illegal income
received from transfers. In addition, the former Soviet mentality is entrenched in local governments,
which continue to request transfers regardless of need.
6.4 Revenues
Revenues of municipal governments are classified as follows:
1. State tax revenues
2. Local tax revenues
3. Revenues from local levies and other non-tax revenues
4. Revenues from privatization of state property
5. Other non-classified revenues
6. Transfers from the central budget
7. Loans from the central budget
1. State tax revenues
State taxes are shared among central and local budgets according to the Law on Distribution
of State Taxes. This income source is currently composed of ten taxes, which altogether made
up 62.4 percent of local budget revenues in 1998 and sixty-seven percent in 1999.
2. Revenues from local taxes
Local representative bodies may introduce five local taxes and establish their rates within margins
determined by the Tax Code. These taxes are levied on economic activity, gambling establishments,
resorts, hotels and advertisements. This type of revenue comprised only 5.9 percent of local
budget income in 1997, 4.7 percent in 1998 and 4.9 percent in 1999. The tax on economic
activity is the most significant local tax, since all economic agents must pay one percent of their
total revenue. More detailed statistical data on local tax revenue are unavailable. The small share
of local taxes in local budget revenues is another factor limiting the degree of financial autonomy.
3. Revenues from local levies and other non-tax revenues
Local levies in Georgia are governed by the Law on Principles of the Levy System and the Law
on Local Levies. A local levy is defined as an obligatory payment to the local budget by natural
and legal persons, for the right to carry out certain activities for a period of time established by
local authorities. Local levies are imposed on the following activities: trade, public advertising,
use of restricted public places, local transportation, initiating construction or renovation of a
building, parking and tenders.
Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the total amount of all local levies, let alone a breakdown
of revenues according to specific levies. The only available data are presented below as the
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share of levies and non-tax revenues in total local revenues (table 5.4). At present, this amount
is negligible, comprising only 2.86 percent of total local budget revenue in 1999. These levies
have the potential to be used far more effectively. Against the current background of corruption,
however, collections of levies are more likely to find their way to individual officials’ incomes.
Table 5.4
Local Budget Revenues, 1997–1999
Type of Revenue 1997 1998 1999
[USD [%] [USD [%] [USD [%]
millions] millions] millions]
Total own tax and non-tax revenues 124.3 78.3 155.7 87.8 144.2 89.5
1. State tax revenue 95.2 60.0 110.7 62.4 107.8 66.9
VAT 4.3 2.7 16.7 9.4 15.9 9.9
Excise 2.8 1.8 1.6 0.9 3.9 2.4
Customs duty 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.4 4.0 2.5
Profit tax 19.5 12.3 20.9 11.8 17.6 11.0
Income tax 37.1 23.4 34.2 19.3 30.0 18.6
Land tax 11.6 7.3 14.2 8.0 12.3 7.7
Tax on the use of natural resources 2.0 1.3 1.5 0.8 2.6 1.6
Tax on environmental pollution 0.0 0.0 4.8 2.7 8.3 5.1
Property tax 12.1 7.7 13.5 7.6 12.2 7.6
Tax on the transfer of real estate 5.1 3.2 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.6
State fee 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2. Local tax revenue 9.4 5.9 8.4 4.7 7.9 4.9
3. Local levies and other 4.1 2.6 8.1 4.6 4.6 2.9
non-tax revenues
4. Revenues from privatization 9.8 6.2 18.3 10.3 15.8 9.8
5. Other unclassified revenues 5.9 3.7 10.2 5.7 8.0 5.0
Total transfers and loans 34.4 21.6 21.5 12.2 16.9 10.5
from the central budget
6. Transfers from the central budget 33.4 21.0 20.5 11.6 15.9 9.9
7. Loans from the central budget 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.6
Total local budget revenues 158.7 100.0 177.2 100.0 161.1 100.0
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Other non-tax revenues include rent for state or municipal property and dividends from
partially or fully-owned municipal enterprises. Exact statistics of these revenues do not exist.
Nevertheless, given that central budgets do not receive any of these revenues due to corruption,
we may venture a guess that local budgets do not either.
4. Revenues from privatization of state property
Funds from the privatization of state or municipal property also form a small share of local
budgets, comprising 6.18 percent in 1997, 10.32 percent in 1998 and 9.84 percent in
1999. The process of privatization of small and medium enterprises in Georgia is essentially
finalized, so revenues from this source will significantly diminish or disappear altogether.
5. Other non-classified revenues
This type of revenue includes the repayment of loans by sub-budgets as well as other income
not classified elsewhere in the budget. Considering that this type of revenue forms five percent
of total revenues, more precise data should be available, but unfortunately are not.
6. Transfers from the central budget
Transfers from the central budget have been tending to diminish, a clear indication of progress
in developing local financial autonomy. The majority of administrative-territorial units are
capable of balancing their budget with own revenues and therefore should not be financially
dependent on the central government. Assistance from the central government is necessary
mainly in mountainous regions and administrative units with problems due to natural, social
or migratory circumstances that are too great to resolve solely with own revenues.
Under current policy, however, fifty-nine out of sixty-one administrative-territorial units
receive transfers from the central government. Consequently, districts in true need do not
receive appropriate assistance, since most funding has been diverted to districts better equipped
to solve budgetary difficulties on their own.
7. Loans from the central budget
Unlike transfers, loans were extended to only sixteen districts, making up 0.6 percent of total
local revenues. Five to ten years ago, loans were non-repayable, following practices established
under communism.  Over the last three years, however, the practice of loan redemption has
been instituted, mainly due to pressure from the International Monetary Fund.
6.5 Expenditures
Because indices of several expenditures do not exist, this section examines current indicators only.
The Georgian Parliament has not yet approved the execution of the 1999 state budget, since the
Extraordinary Parliamentary Commission is still reviewing the legality of several incurred expenses.
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This makes it difficult to analyze the financing of various expenditures.  Nevertheless, it is clear from
available data that neither central nor local budgets have an investment character: state expenditures
over the past three years have not gone to capital expenditures, bonds and covering of internal debts.
Sub-budgets have been allocated insignificant credits from major budgets.
In addition, expenditures do not always match revenues. Although environmental taxes comprised
6.76 percent of total local revenues in 1999, expenditures on the environment only make up 0.01
percent of total expenditures.
Under current legislation, authorities in territorial units implement the budget with the assistance of
local finance and tax departments. The budget is implemented according to monthly and quarterly
schedules of revenues and expenditures. This schedule is prepared by local finance and tax services
or, if they do not exist, by the head of local administration. Budget implementation should correspond
to the budget approved by the representative body of local authorities.
Representative bodies elect inspection commissions from their number to oversee the legality of local
budget implementation. The commission monitors the collection of revenues according to schedule
as well as the legality of incurred expenses and their correspondence with the local budget.
Local administrations are obliged to present a report on the execution of the consolidated budget  in
the relevant territory to the Department of Statistics and Chamber of Control, the highest state
controlling body. The frequency of budget reporting and forms for all levels of budgets are jointly
determined by the Ministry of Finance and the State Department of Social-Economic Information.
Table 5.5
Central and Local Expenditures, 1999
Consolidated Central Budget Local budgets
Central and Local
Budgets
[USD [%] [USD [%] [USD [%]
millions] millions] millions]
Total expenditures 942.0 100.0 624.0 100.0 159.9 100.0
Education 89.8 9.5 17.6 2.8 45.6 28.5
Social assistance 203.1 21.6 172.6 27.7 6.9 4.3
Family assistance 3.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.6
Health care 24.4 2.6 10.8 1.7 8.0 5.0
State or municipal programs 9.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 3.6
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Table 5.5 (continued)
Central and Local Expenditures, 1999
Consolidated Central Budget Local Budgets
Central and Local
Budgets
[USD [%] [USD [%] [USD [%]
millions] millions] millions]
Culture and sports 35.6 3.8 17.6 2.8 10.3 6.5
Culture 13.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 8.5 5.3
Sports 2.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.1
Economic services 72.6 7.7 0.0 0.0 47.2 29.5
Utilities and communal flats 42.5 4.5 3.5 0.6 25.1 15.7
Water supply 3.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.6
Veterinary services 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3
Agriculture 12.1 1.3 10.7 1.7 0.1 0.1
Transport and communications 27.6 2.9 24.7 4.0 0.1 0.0
Management of roads 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1
General administration 27.7 2.9 0.0 0.0 18.0 11.3
Legislative and executive bodies 21.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 13.8 8.6
Supreme councils of autonomies 6.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 4.2 2.6
Administrative duties 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4
Land use and land cadastre 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2
Tax collection 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2
Other state administrative affairs 19.7 2.1 0.0 0.0 12.8 8.0
Military commissariat 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2
and civil defense
Law-enforcement bodies 77.0 8.2 52.2 8.4 12.2 7.6
Archives 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Registry offices 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Other expenditures 366.1 38.9 314.3 50.4 10.1 6.3
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6.6 Budget Process
The local and central budget processes are regulated by the Law on the Budget System. Local repre-
sentative bodies are authorized to adopt their own provisions on the budget process within limits set
by the law.  As this occurs rarely, local budgets are generally formulated, considered, approved and
amended as specified in the above law.
Draft budgets are prepared by financial departments; if they do not exist, that task falls to the local
administration. Local authorities draw up drafts of district, city, community, village and settlement
budgets and a draft of the consolidated budget for the territorial unit.
At the beginning of each budget year, the financial department presents forecast indicators of
expenditures and revenues of territorial unit budgets to the local administration. Based on this infor-
mation, municipal governments decide on the parameters for revenues and expenditures for the new
budget year. The financial department accordingly draws up a detailed draft budget with specified
revenue sources and expenditures and submits it to the municipal government.  Once approved by
the local administration, the budget is sent to local representative bodies for adoption.
In order to prevent budget deficits, the law stipulates that local budgets must contain a reserve fund
composed of excess revenue, for financing extraordinary expenses during the year.  If the reserve fund
is utilized, it must be replenished at the first opportunity, as the balance is carried over to the following
year.  This requirement is a theoretical one: as a rule, it is the marginal deficit that is determined rather
than the budget reserve. With few exceptions, budgets of all levels in Georgia have accumulated
alarmingly large internal and foreign debts. Foreign debt alone exceeded GEL 2 billion in 1999, a
year in which GDP was equal to GEL 2.5 billion. Internal debts are currently being tallied.
The Georgian government allocates almost no grants from the state budget, since the state itself relies
on grants and other forms of assistance from international organizations and foreign governments.
The central government does grant subventions, subsidies and transfers from sub-budgets in order
to finance special purpose programs. Municipalities may only apply for loans from the Georgian
investment market after submitting the necessary information to the State Chancellery and receiving
presidential approval.
Heads of local administrations seek to obtain transfers from the central government by any means
possible. The Autonomous Republic of Ajara, for example, appropriated state taxes collected on its
territory, violating the Law on Distribution of State Taxes. Presented with a fait accompli, the central
government legalized the appropriated revenues after the fact. The municipality of Tbilisi, citing the
precedent of Ajara, demanded and received a similar privilege. While other municipalities retain sixty
percent of taxes on profit and income, Tbilisi retains eighty percent. In practice, therefore, there is no
distinction made between legal and illegal methods of distributing funds between different level
budgets. In these circumstances, personal relationships between municipal heads and higher-level
governments count for everything.
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Municipalities distribute transferred revenues at their own discretion, though not always within
their rights according to law.
6.7 Trends in Local Finance
The generally accepted reason for the lack of state revenues is rampant corruption, which ruins the
state financially while corroding its legal and ethical foundations. It will be worthwhile to discuss
measures to increase local and central budgets only when the government manages to defeat corruption
and decrease its influence over the economy and other public processes.
Data on the mobilization of revenues in the central and local budgets paint a clear picture, which
hardly needs comment.
Table 5.6
Share of State and Local Budget Revenue in GDP, 1997–1999
1997 1998 1999
[USD [%] [USD [%] [USD [%]
millions] of GDP millions] of GDP millions] of GDP
GDP 4,519.0 100.0 4,863.0 100.0 5,475.0 100.0
Consolidated state and local budgets 599.6 13.3 606.3 12.5 488.1 8.9
State budget (and special funds) 456.4 10.1 428.9 8.8 327.0 6.0
Local budgets 158.6 3.5 177.4 3.6 161.1 2.9
The practice of selling government bonds is not yet established in Georgia.
Regardless of several serious shortcomings, the banking system is the most developed and progressive
sub-system in Georgia. Municipalities extend loans very rarely and for minor sums. More significant
was the municipal practice of issuing guarantees on large commercial loans, a flawed practice which
is now used less frequently.
The Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings has many serious flaws and is awaiting drastic amendment in
Parliament. Currently, bankruptcy proceedings are initiated in the local courts; higher courts may be
involved only after the local court issues a ruling.
State and municipal property are not yet clearly differentiated, although steps have recently been
taken to this end.  For example, the Presidential Decree on the Transfer of State Property to Local
Authorities took effect from 25 May 1999. The Law on Financial Bodies of Local and State
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Governments, adopted 22 June 1999, is another progressive law which should positively affect the
development and improvement of local management systems.
Meanwhile, municipally-owned enterprises have become less prevalent. The General Administrative
Code, effective from January 2000, obliges government bodies to solve their economic problems
through public tenders and contracts, rather than by creating enterprises.
Table 5.7
Ownership of Enterprises, 1999
Number of  Total Enterprises Percent of Total Enterprises
Total enterprises 12,596 100.0
Privatized 9,747 77.4
State-owned 2,411 19.1
Municipally-owned 111 0.9
Other 327 2.6
In conclusion, local authorities undoubtedly have a certain degree of financial autonomy, though by
no means large. The only prospect for further development of local financial autonomy is through
considered initiatives, complementary to state interests, at the central level. Unfortunately, this is a
rare occurrence in Georgia.
7. Relationship Between the State Administration
and Local Governments
According to legislation, local self-government bodies and officials are delegated responsibility for
executing certain state government functions, but the central government retains control of important
services. The relevant minister and the head of the state department appoint and dismiss heads of
territorial divisions of central agencies, their deputies and other public servants in coordination with
the local government body.
When appointing heads of the district police, the department of education or the department of
health care, for example, the ministries do not confer with either the local council or the gamgebeli,
although the gamgebeli’s approval is required by law. Conflicts between heads of territorial offices of
the central government and heads of district administration sometimes occur, even though gamgebelis
are appointed by the central government and therefore represent the ruling party. These conflicts
spring from personal incompatibility, which usually originate in the agencies’ intentions to impose
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full control over the district. In most cases, similar appointments are made through informal agreements
with the head of local administration.  Many heads of territorial offices of the central government
consequently belong to local nomenklatura.
The status of these territorial agencies represent another gray area in the system of government.
Although they are territorial divisions of central ministries, not executive branches of the local government,
they are supervised by district gamgebeli and their heads are represented in the directorate.
At the first level of self-government, the local council has the authority to appoint and dismiss local
officials, including mayors and heads of local self-governments. This should not be taken to indicate
that self-government is implemented to a higher degree at the first level, since meager local budgets
and a real lack of rights nullify the significance of this authority.
Conflicts between various levels of government are solved by the Georgian president and the
judiciary system within its sphere of competence. There few precedents of settling conflicts through
legal mechanisms, however. The central government does not typically interfere in the everyday
activities of local self-governments unless a particular self-government body has violated the interests
of the Tbilisi nomenklatura or has blatantly flouted law. Consequently, local administrations, which
are staffed mainly by local nomenklatura, are able to use their offices in favor of local mafia clans.
According to legislation, the state office coordinates local government activities. Legislative disputes
among the various state divisions are resolved by the relevant ministers and heads of departments. If
they are not able to reach an agreement, the president of Georgia settles the affair.
Finally, the regional state commissioners, or governors, are steadily increasing their power in regions.
Gamgebelis are increasingly resentful of the governors’ right to nominate heads of district administrations,
as they prefer not to have a mediator in their often informal relations with the central government.
A governor’s power often depends on personal factors, with certain governors delegated a wide range
of authority from the center. The population has a mixed attitude towards this institution, and confidence
in the governor seems to be dropping, in many cases transforming into intense dislike. Some regions
have witnessed serious confrontations between the governor’s staff and local political forces.
In conclusion, self-government bodies, particularly elected ones, have no real power despite their
legally granted rights.
8. Local Government Employees
The rights and responsibilities of local council members are defined by Georgian legislation. Council
member status begins upon certification and ends on the first meeting of the newly elected council
or on early termination from office. The vote of a council member may not be influenced. Local
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council members receive no compensation and execute their responsibilities while continuing their
former employment.
In the past, council members and candidates possessed the same immunity as a member of Parliament
whereby they could not be charged with criminal offenses, arrested, searched or imprisoned on the
relevant local territory without a warrant signed by the local council chairman. If caught committing
a crime, the individual no longer possessed immunity and the council chairman was immediately
informed.  This immunity was frequently abused during election periods, so the Parliament of
Georgia rescinded this article in 1999.
Local councilors also face certain restrictions.  A councilor cannot concurrently fill a position requiring
nomination or approval by Parliament, the president or supreme representative bodies of autonomous
republics. Nor may a councilor hold positions in the Office of the Procurator, the State Audit Chamber,
law enforcement bodies or defense agencies. Finally, councilors are also not allowed to hold any
executive offices in local self-government bodies, except that of village, community and city gamgebeli.
The law also defines the status and rights of local self-government personnel. Employees of the
council, town hall and local administration are considered to be public servants.
The local hierarchy of public service is headed by state political officials.  The term “official” refers to
the state commissioner and deputy commissioner; heads of district local representative bodies, cities
with special status and city districts; and heads and first deputy heads of local administration in districts,
cities with special status and city districts. Officials are not allowed to pursue outside paid employment
other than scientific, pedagogical or creative activity. They and their family members are not permitted
to hold shares in the charter capital of entities over which the official has control or influence.
The civil service includes public servants, support personnel and non-staff personnel. Official status
may be granted by election or appointment of any citizen of Georgia who has attained the age of
eighteen, has at least a secondary education and command of the national language of Georgia. Any
additional requirements are established within legal limits by the head of the relevant institution or
his or her superior.
In order to prevent conflicts of interest, public servants are subject to a number of restrictions. Public
officials are not allowed to engage in entrepreneurial activities, to hold more than one office in state
or local government institutions, to pursue other employment or to belong to a representative or
legislative body at any level.
Although the legislation on public service has been systematized, this is not reflected in the current
situation.  Georgian government in general and local self-government in particular is characterized
by a lack of expertise among local government staff and a marked clientele-feudal tendency inherited
from the Soviet era.
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The Georgian government is pervaded by qualities characteristic of a patrimonial society; nepotism,
regionalism, tribalism, clannism and regional and national clientelism. Corruption and personal
connections play an important role in the hiring process. According to legislation, employees must be
recruited through an interview process. However, appointments are usually made directly by the
agency head, especially for those offices that produce lucrative bribes. When interviews do take
place, testing procedures are disregarded in favor of relatives or friends of high-ranking officials.
There is little or no transparency throughout the process.
Bureaucracy at the local government level can be classified into the three following groups:
1. Former Communist nomenklatura. Although the structure of the regional political elite has
not yet been studied, the structure of the central government may serve as an example.
Individuals who held high positions in the Soviet era constitute forty-one percent of high
ranking officials in the current central government. In addition, the proportion of former
Komsomol (Soviet Youth Organization) functionaries has been steadily increasing, from fourteen
percent in 1997 to eighteen percent in 1999. These proportions are almost certainly much
higher in regions.
2. “Bureaucratic bourgeoisie.” The groups which have most benefited from privatization seek
protectors among influential government officials. These officials often bring together the
interests of local nomenklatura, newly emerged entrepreneurs and mafia clans.
3. Local elite. This social stratum has begun to play an active role and includes local Soviet
nomenklatura and heads of current local administrations, for example, former chairmen of
collective farms, heads of farms, the “red directors” (pro-soviet industrial managers) and heads
of communal services. This group’s showings in the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections
sent a clear message to the central government that they may not be disregarded.
An overwhelming majority of bureaucrats are part of the former Soviet nomenklatura, particularly in
regions. This mentality perpetuates an authoritarian style of governance combined with features of
the late Soviet system such as gerontocracy and corruption. Illegal conflicts of interest often occur,
with local council members continuing to work in executive agencies even though they are prohibited
from doing so by law.
In addition, the lack of expertise among public servants poses a severe problem. The only government
institution to deal directly with this issue is the regional policy and governing service of the State
Chancellery. In addition, the Institute of Public Administration, an independent qualification center,
and various NGOs organize training courses. Taken together, they are still an inadequate basis for the
necessary system of training. Furthermore, local government officials have no motivation to learn
new management methods, since they take a political rather than a professional view of their
obligations.
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9. Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
According to current legislation, local self-government resolutions are binding upon citizens, local
government bodies and any enterprise, institution or organization on the subordinate territory. Georgian
citizens, local self-government bodies and local officials have the right to appeal acts passed by the
state or local governments that infringe on rights of local self-government.
Resolutions may be initiated by local council members; beyond that, the law does not specify.  In the
Tbilisi local council, draft legislation may be submitted by local council members, commissions,
factions, the mayor of Tbiliti, a city premier or a petition signed by at least five thousand residents.
The local council is obliged to decide upon the draft at the next meeting.
However, there remains a wide range of legal restrictions on local councils. Council resolutions may
be rescinded by council decision or by order of the court. Bodies of state administration that have
transferred specific rights to local self-government bodies may also veto any local government resolutions
within the sphere of transferred powers.
The council mandate shall be terminated if:
• the number of council members is reduced by more than a half;
• the council fails to elect the head of the administration within two months;
• the council has not approved the local budget within two months of the beginning of the
fiscal year.
If the local council is suspended, dissolved or otherwise terminated before the official end of its term,
the local administration is dissolved as well.
Local administrations decisions are suspended or abolished through different procedures at the first
and second levels. At the first level, resolutions of the relevant local administration or head may be
suspended by the local council or the head of the regional administration for up to one month. At
the district level, resolutions may be suspended by regional state commissioners for one month in cases
determined by the law. These resolutions may then be annulled by the court, or in specific cases, by
the President of Georgia. District councils are entitled to apply to the relevant state body for the sus-
pension or cancellation of a district administration decision and receive a response within ten days.
Local councils may be dissolved or temporarily closed if local council activities are judged to threaten
the country’s sovereignty, its territorial integrity or the constitutional rights of governmental agencies.
The president of Georgia is also entitled to impose direct rule over a territory and assign a gamgebeli
to implement it.
The legislative framework for the protection of local government rights remains unfinished. Although
the Organic Law on Local Government states that normative acts on mechanisms of legal protection
are to be adopted by mid-1998, none of them have been developed yet.
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Although the legal framework is incomplete, the reality is still worse. An overwhelming majority of
local councils, particularly at the first level, are ignorant of their rights. Where there are more politically
sophisticated local councils, typically in larger cities, they interact with the administration purely
along political party lines. For example, if different parties are in power at various levels of self-
government, the higher level will cancel any decisions of the lower one on party basis alone.
At present, the judiciary plays an insignificant role in resolving issues of local self-government. However,
several precedents of local-government related lawsuits give rise to the hope that the role of the
judiciary will continue to grow.
10. Next Steps in the Transition Process
In discussing local government in Georgia, the following conclusions must be drawn:
1. Local governments lack autonomy in decision making and real power to implement their
decisions. Despite formal recognition of ownership rights, they are unable or unwilling to
exercise their authority and effectively supervise subordinate institutions.
2. Local government reform is initiated from above by the central government and lacks a
corresponding basis in society. In practice, councilors and local officials do not fully comprehend
the concepts of decentralization and democracy.
3. On one hand, low public awareness, together with incompetence in the state apparatus,
creates the potential for populist demagogy. On the other hand, the low level of political education
allows the central government to maintain sufficient control on the local population and to
discredit the authority of newly elected local councils.
4. The population does not in fact participate in local government processes, since local residents
view the local government as a representative of central authority rather than a government
that represents their interests.
5. The prevalent black market, a mafia-controlled economy and the chronic deficit of central and
local budgets seriously impede the process of reforms.
Future prospects do not seem much better. As the process of reform continues to be drawn out, it is
increasingly unlikely that the government will enjoy the same levels of popular support as in 1989–
1992. The crisis in legitimacy triggered by the coup, the military defeat in the war, the drop in living
standards and the spread of corruption has transformed the initial enthusiasm into cynicism. Between
sixty-seven and seventy-five percent of the population distrusts the government and has no hope for
the future, according to opinion polls conducted by independent mass media and research organiza-
tions since 1993. State structures are therefore unstable and dependent on foreign powers such as
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Russia; on internal factors such as corruption, the mafia, bureaucracy and retrograde processes; and
on personal factors such as the question of succession to the presidency.
The legislation base must be finalized and adapted to real circumstances in order to secure efficient
activities in the future. So far only NGOs have promoted these initiatives, albeit weakly. However,
the state is becoming more interested in these activities as the current social, economic and political
crisis continues to deepen and the Georgian government faces stricter demands from international
organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. There have already been several precedents of
successful western-style lobbying of laws by NGOs, such as the law on the privatization of lands owned
by industrial enterprises.
In addition, the central and local governments must make efforts to inform citizens and involve them
in the governing process. Unfortunately, much of the population is either completely ignorant of
concepts of local self-governance or are skeptical about proposed solutions.
Although no nationwide surveys on this issue have been conducted in Georgia for the last three
years, some regional studies shed light on popular attitudes. According to a survey of five hundred
respondents in the Mtskheta district carried out by the International Centre for Civic Culture, the
population is ignorant of local council activity: 53.6 percent of respondents felt that nothing had
changed since the local elections; only 7.9 percent felt they had a voice in the governing process;
70.6 percent had never applied to a local member of Parliament to solve their problems; and fifty
percent had no idea what documents were required for everyday activities (building permits, et
cetera).
Respondents were equally ill-informed about the local budget process: ninety-five percent knew
nothing about the local budget, while 68.4 percent did not know how the budget was spent.
Respondents also voiced low confidence in local government, with 43.1 percent answering that only
a small part of the budget was spent properly and 20.4 percent claiming that budgetary funds were
spent improperly overall.
When asked if they would pay bribes in their relations with government agencies, 11.2 percent said
yes, while 59.2 percent replied that they would if there were no other option. Only 29.3 percent
said they would refuse.
When asked about local administrations, 66.4 percent of respondents supported elections of gamgebeli,
while only 15.5 percent thought that they should be appointed; 18.6 percent responded that it
made no difference.  In comparison, a survey carried out by the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democ-
racy and Development in 1997 found that 90.7 percent of respondents favored local administration
elections, while only 9.1 percent supported the state appointment of gamgebeli.
The multitude of problems facing the system of local government urgently requires attention from
the government, society and international organizations. Unfortunately, the party in power at the
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central government level turns a blind eye to these problems and regards any local initiative as
opposition party maneuvers, regardless of their merits.
On the other hand, the following factors operate in favor of local government reform efforts:
1. In February 1999, Georgia became a member of the Council of Europe. One of the main
preconditions of membership was the requirement that all levels of local self-government
become elected within three years.
2. There is a clear drive for self-governance in a number of regions and cities due to the central
government’s inability to effectively address local problems. Despite the consolidation of
control from above, there is a gradually increasing desire for greater independence among
districts. This sentiment is common both to opposition parties and to local offices of the ruling
party, though the latter protest only tacitly against central government policies
3. Although council members are overwhelmingly inexperienced, the creation of local councils
in 1998 was in itself a progressive step, and will provide a school of experience for over ten
thousand councilors as well as a means to promote democratic principles within the state
system and throughout society.
To further the development of local self-government, it is essential to improve legislation, decentralize
the governing system and strengthen institutions of civil society such as interest groups, political
parties, the mass media and the third sector. Only by advancing in these areas and by solving
economic problems, such as the development of local small and medium-sized businesses and the
creation of new employment opportunities, can the government guarantee the establishment of
truly democratic self-government in Georgia.
11. Territorial Autonomies
Soviet Georgia contained three autonomous territories. Two of them were based on ethnicity (the
Abkhaz Autonomous Republic and South Ossetian Autonomous Region), while the Adjarian
Autonomous Republic was based on religion, a unique precedent in the Soviet Union.
When the national liberation movement emerged in Georgia, it was met by strong opposition from
the two ethnic autonomous territories, who demanded the change of their political status.
11.1 Autonomous Republic of Adjara
The Autonomous Republic of Adjara is the only autonomy currently under Georgian jurisdiction.
Over eighty percent of the Adjarian population is of Georgian origin, so ethnic conflict with the rest
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of Georgia is not an issue. However, this region has become a second political center in opposition to
the government installed in Tbilisi. The struggle for spheres of influence between the two camps of
former Communist nomenklatura often erupts into legal battles. When the Adjarian autonomy does
not find central government decisions to be expedient, it simply refuses to implement them.
In the last local elections, for instance, the leadership of Adjara designated the mayor of Batumi and
district heads as elected positions rather than appointed ones, violating the Law on Local Government.
This should not be interpreted to mean that Adjara is more democratic, since elections were carried
out by the former Soviet method, whereby over ninety percent of the population voted for a
candidate who had in effect been appointed. This move was, therefore, primarily intended to curb
the influence of the central government and the president.
Conflict between the two political centers is not always inevitable. For example, in the spring of
2000, the Supreme Council amended the Adjaran constitution to change the title of their territory
to the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. Tbilisi did not react to this amendment negatively. However,
the division of legislative responsibilities between the center and the autonomy remains a serious
problem.
11.2 Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia
Abkhazia received the status of autonomy by the 107th clause of the 1921 Constitution of Georgian
Democratic Republic. Most of the population of Georgia agrees that the Abkhaz should be granted
autonomy.
At the time of independence, ethnic Abkhaz constituted only seventeen percent of the population
of Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, while ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia constituted forty-six percent.
Nevertheless, pursuant to the regulations cultivated under Soviet rule, ethnic Abkhaz enjoyed
certain privileges in the state government personnel policy.
In response to the restoration of the 1921 Georgian Constitution by Georgia’s Military Council on
23 July 1992, the Abkhaz Supreme Council reinstated the Abkhaz Constitution of 1925, implying
the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia.
Abkhaz separatists offered armed resistance to Georgian forces, eventually developing into a war
during which they received assistance from the Russian military and North Caucasian mercenaries.
In September 1993, Abkhaz separatists sealed their victory over Georgian armed forces. Due to
ethnic cleansing launched during the war, the Georgian population in the region has been wiped out,
and more than 200,000 Georgian residents of Abkhazia have become refugees or displaced persons.
Independent Abkhaz legislation and state institutions are currently operating in Abkhazia, with a
system of local government developed after the war. On 23 November 1996, a parliamentary
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election was conducted in Abkhazia. According to formal Abkhaz sources, the voter turnout was
eighty-one percent, with 180,000 voters out of 220,000 participating in the ballot. No international
observers monitored the elections, as the Georgian government declared them illegal.
The local elections, held on 14 March 1998, laid the foundation for the development of a system of
self-government in Abkhazia. Local council elections for both the first and second level of local
government were held by the majority system and characterized by a large number of candidates.
Elections were not held in areas depopulated by ethnic cleansing. Local administrations were formed
solely by central authorities (sokhumi ), with local administration heads appointed by and accountable
to the president.
The Georgian government does not recognize the legitimacy of the Abkhaz separatist government or
the current system of governing.
11.3 Tskhinvali Region
The South Ossetian Autonomous Region was created under Bolshevik rule on 20 April 1922.
Prevailing opinion in Georgian society at the time held that this was a reward to local Ossetians from
the Bolsheviks for their assistance in establishing Soviet rule in Georgia.
Ethnic Ossetians constitute about seventy percent of the region’s population. Roughly 60,000
Ossetians remain out of the 105,000 Ossetians residing in Georgia prior to 1990. In that year,
armed conflict began when the South Ossetian establishment conducted elections and the newly
elected Supreme Soviet declared the South Ossetian Republic without consent from Tbilisi. In
December 1990, Georgia’s Supreme Council formally abolished the South Ossetian Autonomous
Region, a decision which led to escalated violence.
The armed conflict was limited, ending on 24 June 1992, and was characterized by mixed success
on both sides. The Ossetian side succeeded in establishing political autonomy on the territory
populated by ethnic Ossetians.
No changes have been made in the South Ossetian system of local self-government since the Soviet
era; even the terminology remains Soviet. Formally, people’s soviets are still in power. In reality,
authority belongs to the separatist executive authorities. However, Georgian villages of the conflict
zone are under Georgian jurisdiction.
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Contacts for Further Information on Local Government in Georgia
Parliament of Georgia
Committee on Self-government and Regional Policy
Address: 8 Rustaveli Ave., Tbilisi, 380018, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 99-61-78
E-mail: sgrpcmt@parliament.ge
312
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
State Chancellery of Georgia
Department for Local Government and Regional Policy
Address: 7 Pavle Ingorokva St., Tbilisi 380034, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 92-35-84
Non-governmental Organizations:
The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD)
Address: 1 Merab Alexidze St., Tbilisi 380093, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 33-40-81
Fax: (+995-32) 33-41-63
E-mail: cipdd@access.sanet.ge
Internet: www.cipdd.org
Civitas Georgica
Address: 17 Barnov St., Tbilisi 380009, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 98-33-98
Fax: (+995-32) 98-33-98
E-mail: admin@civitas.hipermart.net, civitac@caucasus.net
Georgian Economic Development Institute
Address: 1 May 26th Square, Tbilisi, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 98-47-06
Fax: (+995-32) 94-15-04
E-mail: bis@access.sanet.ge
Georgian Institute of Public Administration
Address: 1 Merab Kostava St., Tbilisi 380075, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 93-14-66
Fax: (+995-32) 93-14-66
E-mail: office@gipa.ge
Georgian Young Lawyers Association
Address: 7 Erekle the 2nd St., Tbilisi 380005, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 93-61-01
E-mail: lawyer@gyla.org.ge
313
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N  G E O R G I A
Dedamitsa—GIS and RS Scientific-Studying Center
Address: 11 M.Tamarashvili Ave., Tbilisi 380062, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 29-48-23
Fax.: (+995-32) 29-48-23
E-mail: gis.rs@caucasus.net
International Centre for Civic Culture
Address: 20a Bako St., Tbilisi 380012, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 95-38-73
Fax: (+995-32) 95-38-73
E-mail: iccc@ip.osgf.ge, iccc_georgia@yahoo.com
International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy
Address: 77 M.Tsinamdzgvrishvili St., Tbilisi 380002, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 95-00-89
Fax.: (+995-32) 95-45-59
E-mail: isfed@access.sanet.ge
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
Address: 1 Larsi St., Tbilisi 380079, Georgia
Phone: (+995-32) 93-28-34
Fax: (+995-32) 93-28-34
E-mail: ndi@access.sanet.ge
Glossary of Georgian Terms
Khevisberi — Institutions of elders
Gamgebeli — Head of local administration
Gamgeoba — City hall
Mamasakhlisi — Village headman
Sakrebulo — Local council
Tbileli Berebi — Historical institution of city elders in Tbilisi, operating roughly from
1080–1122
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Annex 5.1
Major General Indicators
Size of territory 69,700 square kilometers
Population
Including the conflict zones (1999) 5,444,700
Not including residents 4,322,100
in the conflict zones, emigrants or
internally displaced persons
Pensioners (1998) 423,000
School-age children (1999) 1,055,000
Population density 78 people per square kilometer
Major ethnic divisions (1989):
Georgians 3,787,000 70.13 percent
Armenians 437,000 8.09 percent
Russians 341,000 6.31 percent
Azerbaijanis 308,000 5.70 percent
Ossetians 164,000 3.04 percent
Greeks 100,000 1.85 percent
Abkhazs 96,000 1.78 percent
Ukrainians 52,000 0.96 percent
Kurds 33,000 0.61 percent
Jews 25,000 0.46 percent
Other ethnicities 58,000 1.07 percent
Per capita GDP (1999) USD 1,267
Total revenues (1999) USD 488,000,000
Central budget USD 327,000,000
Local budgets USD 161,000,000
Total expenditures (1999) USD 783,900,000
Central budget USD 624,000,000
Local budgets USD 159,900,000
Public debt (1998) USD 409,000,000
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Unemployment (1998) 345,000
Inflation rate (1999) approximately 5.8 percent
Average population per local government 4,474
Number of public employees (1998) 39,853
State government employees 11,203
Local government employees 28,650
SOURCE: The State Department of Statistics and Ministry of Finance
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Annex 5.2
Population, Settlements and Administrative Tiers
Table 5A.1
Settlements by Population Size Categories in Georgia, 1999*
Population Size Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Categories Settlements Settlements Inhabitants Population
0–1,000 3,150 84.3 934,800 21.6
1,000–5,000 509 13.6 913,400 21.1
5,000–10,000 47 1.3 300,200 6.9
10,000–50,000 25 0.7 543,100 12.6
50,000–100,000 1 0 64,700 1.5
100,000–1,000,000 3 0.1 478,100 11.1
1,000,000+ 1 0 1,087,800 25.2
Total 3,736 100.0 4,322,100 100.0
Table 5A.2
Municipalities by Population Size Categories in Georgia, 1999*
Population Size Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Categories Municipalities Municipalities Inhabitants Population
0–1,000 212 21.9 129,709 3.0
1,000–2,000 274 28.5 407,052 9.4
2,000–5,000 354 36.6 1,045,022 24.2
5,000–10,000 89 9.2 550,117 12.7
10,000–50,000 32 3.3 552,400 12.8
50,000–100,000 1 0.1 64,700 1.5
100 ,000–1,000,000 3 0.3 478,100 11.1
1,000,000+ 1 0.1 1,095,000 25.3
Total 966 100.0 4,322,100 100.0
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Table 5A.3
Types of Administrative-territorial Units in Georgia
Type of Administrative-territorial Unit Number of Units
First tier (village, settlement, town) 966
Second tier (district, city with special status) 65
Total 1,031
Table 5A.4
Administrative-territorial Structure in Georgia*
Local and Regional Average Number of Average Number of
Governments Inhabitants per Unit Settlements per Unit
First tier 4,474 4
Second tier 66,494 57
* Not including conflict zones.
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Figure 5A.1
Administrative Map of Georgia
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Regions and Districts Historical–Cultural
Regions
Tbilisi
Kakheti
1. Akhmeta Kakheti
2. Gurjaani Kakheti
3. Dedoplistskaro Kakheti
4. Telavi Kakheti
5. Lagodekhi Kakheti
6. Sagarejo Kakheti
7. Signagi Kakheti
8. Kvareli Kakheti
Mtskheta–Mtianeti
9. Akhalgori Shida Kartli
10. Dusheti Mtianeti
11. Tianeti Kakheti
12. Mtskheta Shida Kartli
13. Kazbegi Mtianeti
Shida Kartli
14. Gori Shida Kartli
15. Kareli Shida Kartli
16. Kaspi Shida Kartli
17. Khashuri Shida Kartli
68. Java Shida Kartli
Kvemo Kartli
18. Bolnisi Kvemo Kartli
19. Marneuli Kvemo Kartli
20. Gardabani Kvemo Kartli
21. Dmanisi Kvemo Kartli
22. Tetritskaro Kvemo Kartli
23. Tsalka Kvemo Kartli
Imereti
24. Tskaltubo Imereti
25. Tkibuli Imereti
26. Tchiatura Imereti
27. Bagdadi Imereti
28. Vani Imereti
29. Zestaponi Imereti
30. Terjola Imereti
31. Samtredia Imereti
32. Sachkhere Imereti
33. Kharaguli Imereti
34. Khoni Imereti
Samtskhe–Javakheti
35. Adigeni Samtskhe–Javakheti
36. Akhaltsikhe Samtskhe–Javakheti
37. Akhalkalaki Samtskhe–Javakheti
38. Birjomi Shida Kartli
39. Ninotsminda Samtskhe–Javakheti
40. Aspindza Samtskhe–Javakheti
Samegrelo–Zemo Svaneti
41. Zugdidi Samegrelo
42. Abasha Samegrelo
43. Martvili Samegrelo
44. Mestia Svaneti
45. Senaki Samegrelo
46. Chkhorotsku Samegrelo
47. Tsalenjikha Samegrelo
48. Khobi Samegrelo
Guria
49. Lanchkhuti Guria
50. Ozurgeti Guria
51. Chokhatauri Guria
Ratcha–Lachkhumi
Kvemo Svaneti
53. Ambrolauri Ratcha
54. Lentekhi Svaneti
55. Oni Ratcha
56. Tsageri Lechkhumi
Atchara
57. Kobulati Atchara
58. Shuakhevi Atchara
59. Khelvachauri Atchara
60. Keda Atchara
61. Khulo Atchara
Abkhazia
62. Sukhumi Abkhazia
63. Gagra Abkhazia
64. Gali Abkhazia
65. Gudauta Abkhazia
66. Gulruphsi Abkhazia
67. Ochamchire Abkhazia
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Annex 5.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
• The Constitution of Georgia (25 August 1995)
• Law on the Tax System (6 February 1998)
• Law on the Budget System and Budgetary Powers (29 May 1996)
• Law on the Capital of Georgia (20 February 1998)
• Law on Corruption and Conflict of Interest in Public Service (17 October 1997)
• Law on the Fund for State Commissioners (21 February 1997)
• Law on Direct State Governance (9 June 1999)
• Law on Financial Bodies of Local and State Governments (22 June 1999)
• Law on Local Council Elections (25 June 1998)
• Law on Local Government and Self-governance (16 October 1997)
• Law on Local Taxes (29 May 1998)
• Law on the Long-term Economic Norms of State Tax Deductions with Respect to the
Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Ajara and Other Territorial Units (10 March 2000)
• Law on Public Service (31 October 1997)
• Law on the Social, Economic and Cultural Development of Mountainous Regions (8 June
1999)
• Law on the State Budget (10 March 2000)
• Law on the Status of Local Council Members (26 June 1998)
• Law on the Structure and Operation of Executive Power (15 April 1997)
• The General Administrative Code of Georgia (25 June 1999)
• The Tax Code of Georgia (13 June 1997)
Essential regulations and decrees:
• Presidential Decree No. 334 on the Transfer of State Property to Local Self-Government
Bodies (25 May 1999)
• Regulations of Procedures to Resolve Issues in the Administrative Organization of Georgia
• A List of Documents and Legislative Materials on Administrative Organization of Georgia to
be Submitted to the President (prepared by the State Chancellery)
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Notes
1 OSCE and the Georgian organization International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy,
among others.
2 Public polls conducted under the aegis of USIA.
3 In 1997, this tax and the preceding one composed a single tax on environmental impact.
4 The tax on the transfer of real estate was approved in 1998.
5 From 1998, this category is combined with state taxes.
6 This item also includes expenditures on religion.
7 The category “other expenditures” reflects differences in the classification of national and
municipal budgetary items.
8 There is no new information.
9 The number of unemployed registered by the Department of Statistics is 3,800.
10 Since statistical data of various governmental agencies differ, the given data may not match
information of other sources.
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Local Government in Armenia
David Tumanyan
1. Overview of Local Government Reform
From 1922 to 1991, Armenia formed part of the Soviet Union and Armenian local governments
functioned as a component of Soviet administration. In the late 1980s, the Karabakh movement
emerged, initially to call for the incorporation of Nagorni–Karabakh into Armenia, but gradually
evolving into a struggle for independence led by the Armenian National Movement. Upon winning
the 1990 parliamentary elections, they commenced the process of seceding from the Soviet Union.
On 23 August 1990 the General Council, or Parliament, adopted the declaration of independence.
A referendum was held on 21 September 1991, and two days later the General Council proclaimed
the Republic of Armenia. Of the former Soviet republics, Armenia was the only one to secede in
accordance with the laws of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet administrative-territorial division of Armenia into thirty-seven raions persisted until
1996. During that time, Armenia was involved in the Karabakh war and blockaded by Turkey and
Azerbaijan. Only after the cease-fire in May 1994 could the government turn its attention to
strategic development problems. In particular, democratization and the creation of a civil society
required innovative approaches to issues of local self-governance.
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, adopted by referendum on 5 July 1995, directly
addresses issues of regional and local self-government in chapter 8, articles 104–110. These articles
became the legal foundation for administrative-territorial reforms. Further legislation rapidly followed,
paving the way for the creation of new systems of territorial administration and local self-government
in a short space of time. Public policy aimed to increase local autonomy in issues of local importance
and strengthen the capacity of regional governments to solve broader regional issues by expanding
their territories.
According to the Constitution and Law on the Administrative-territorial Division of the Republic of
Armenia (4 December 1995), Armenia is divided into ten regions (marzer) and the capital city of
Yerevan, which is accorded regional status. Marzer are further divided into rural and urban communities
(hamainkner), and Yerevan into districts (see table 6.1 for data on marzer). Marzer vary greatly in
territory, population, number of communities and level of economic development. The largest
region is Gegharkunik Marz, whose 5,348 square kilometers also includes Lake Sevan (1,256 square
kilometers). Shirak Marz has the most communities, with a total of 119.  Marzer are governed
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through the system of state administration. The Armenian government appoints and dismisses
regional governors (marzpetner) to carry out the following duties with the assistance of regional
administrations (marzpetaran):
• to implement the government’s regional policy;
• to coordinate the activities of regional agencies of state administration;
• to mediate between the central and local governments;
• to regulate inter-community issues within their competence.
Table 6.1
General Characteristics of Armenian Marzer
Name of Territory Regional Distance Number of Munici- Population
Region [sq. km] Capital from palities or Districts [in thousands]
(marzer) Yerevan [km]
Rural Urban 1996 1999
Yerevan 227 Yerevan — 12 1,249.4 1,248.7
Aragatsotn 2,753 Ashtarak 20 111 3 162.5 166.7
45.7 46.9
Ararat 2,086 Artashat 29 93 4 305.0 310.0
96.5 98.7
Armavir 1,242 Armavir 48 94 3 315.5 321.1
123.5 122.7
Gegharkunik 5,348 Gavar 98 87 5 272.4 277.6
101.1 102.0
Lory 3,789 Vanadzor 120 105 8 392.4 394.1
265.4 265.6
Kotayk 2,089 Hrazdan 50 60 7 325.9 328.9
201.0 201.3
Shirak 2,681 Gumry 116 116 3 358.3 361.8
242.5 243.6
Sunik 4,506 Kapan 316 106 7 161.9 163.6
114.4 115.1
Vayots Dzor 2,308 Yeghegnadzor 119 41 3 68.3 69.1
28.0 28.4
Tavush 2,704 Igevan 137 58 4 154.8 156.6
62.6 63.0
Armenia 29,743 Yerevan 871 59 3,766.4 3,798.2
2,530.1 2,536.0
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The regional council is an advisory body, composed of the marzpet and all community heads from
the region. Although its competencies are not defined by law, the regional council typically discusses
issues of regional policy and regional development. The marzpet may take the results of these discussions
under consideration when performing government duties.
Although Yerevan has regional status, local self-government and state administration in Yerevan
possess special features. The mayor of Yerevan is appointed by the president of Armenia, upon
nomination by the prime minister. The twelve city districts function as units of local government
(see table 6.2). The districts themselves vary greatly with respect to territory, population, infrastructure,
public parks and other characteristics. When district boundaries were being drawn up, several factors
were taken into consideration, including former territorial divisions, geography, the current state of
urban development and future strategies for urban planning.
The Yerevan Council is comprised of the district heads and chaired by the Mayor of Yerevan. In
general, the council has limited scope of action. Its responsibilities include approval of estimated
expenditures in the budget, which is prepared according to legal specifications and submitted by the
mayor.  Council responsibilities also include other city-related responsibilities that fall outside the
jurisdiction of district governments. These include naming streets, squares, avenues, parks and
educational, cultural and other city institutions; regulating the activity of trade and public service
enterprises; and awarding honorary citizenship to Armenian or foreign citizens.
Table 6.2
Yerevan Districts
District Number of Inhabitants, 1 January 1999 [thousands]
Ajapniak 125.9
Avan 50.5
Arabkir 151.4
Davitashen 50.7
Erebuny 126.5
Kentron 180.5
Malatia-Sebastia 159.6
Nor Nork 131.5
Nork-Marash 14.6
Nubarashen 9.3
Shengavit 145.5
Kanaker-Zeitun 102.7
Total 1,248.7
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In Armenia, local self-government is exercised only within the unit of the community. Each urban
or rural community may consist of one or more settlements; there are one thousand settlements in
Armenia, but only 930 communities. These consist of forty-seven urban communities, 871 rural
communities and twelve Yerevan districts.
After establishing the register of communities nationwide, the National Assembly adopted the Law
on Elections to Local Governments (14 May 1996) and the Law on Local Self-government (22 July
1996). The first local elections were held in November of that year. Based on the European Charter
of Local Self-government (1985), the Law on Local Self-government established general principles
of local self-government as well as the specific division of powers within local governments. Local
government powers consist of own responsibilities, funded by the local budget, and responsibilities
delegated and funded by the state. Local governments have some flexibility in implementing voluntary
community-related activities within the framework of the law.
Communities vary widely in population, territorial size, property and social and economic structure.
There is no legal distinction between a city and village; these names are derived from tradition and
location. For instance, the term “city” refers to both Dastakert in Sunik Marz, with six hundred
inhabitants, and Gumry in Shirak Marz, which is the second largest city in the republic, with 211,700
inhabitants. The largest rural community has 10,049 inhabitants (Akhurian, in Shirak Marz), and
the smallest only thirty-seven (Kashuni, in Sunik Marz). Despite their different natures, all community
governments are regulated by the same laws.
In implementing community-related policies, the government gives weight to population indicators.
For example, population size is the main factor in determining community subsidies under the
Financial Equalization Law. Communities with fewer than three hundred inhabitants are allotted
extra definite quantity subsidies. Other geographic and demographic characteristics are defined by
law. According to Government Act No. 713 on Classification of Armenian Border Communities
(17 November 1998), 173 communities are ranked as border communities, including nine cities and
190 villages. According to Government Act No. 756 on Classification of Armenian Settlements
According to Altitude (27 November 1998), settlements 1,700–2,000 meters above sea level are
considered mountainous settlements, while those above 2,000 meters are classified as high mountainous
settlements. Altogether there are 195 mountainous communities (eight urban and 187 rural) and
143 high mountainous communities (four urban and 139 rural).
The financial basis of local government was first addressed by the Law on the Budget System
(21 July 1997), which stipulates procedures for the creation, implementation and supervision of
community budgets; intergovernmental fiscal relations; and types of revenues and expenditures.
The Law on Local Duties and Fees (9 January 1998), which defines the types and permitted rates
of local duties and fees, further enhanced local initiative and economic and political autonomy.
Transfers from the central to local budgets are regulated by the Financial Equalization Law
(23 December 1998), which establishes the general concept of financial equalization, the form of
subsidies and the main factors for their calculation. Each of the above-mentioned laws has been
repeatedly amended since adoption.
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According to Armenian law, the central government has the authority to decide on over twenty spheres
of local government interest.  These include allocating budgetary loans, credits and guarantees; establish-
ing procedures for the collection and distribution of local taxes; and confirming community property.
Armenian legislation on local self-government is largely based on the European Charter of Local Self-
government. In its Report on Local Democracy in Armenia, the Bureau of the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) noted that “the chief requirements of the Charter are thus
fulfilled by Armenian law, which does not contain any provision conflicting outright with a principle
of the Charter.”   However, the report goes on to mention that “the fact remains, as the Armenian
authorities are themselves convinced, that the functioning of local government at present is not
without defects and shortcomings that will have to be rectified.”
2. Local Politics, Decision Making
2.1 Public Participation in Decision Making
Armenian legislation does not address public participation in the decision making process in detail,
although it may do so according to the Law on Local Self-government. In general, the community
head and community elders have the right to initiate decisions, but residents may submit draft
resolutions and attend council sessions with the permission of the local council. However, the level
of public participation is very low. Most citizens are poorly informed about local authorities and their
responsibilities as well as local government procedures. Although the Constitution provides for
forms of direct democracy, such as referenda, public hearings and meetings, they have rarely been
used at the local government level. Only a few cases of public hearings are known. The absence of
direct forms of democracy is due to many factors, such as lack of financial resources, an ill-defined
legal framework, minimal activity on the part of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
overall organizational difficulties.
Even though over 2,200 NGOs are registered in Armenia, few of them are active and involved with
local governments. According to the Law on Non-governmental Organizations (1 November 1996),
an NGO is a voluntary union formed to satisfy people’s spiritual and other non-material requirements.
An NGO may be initiated by an individual or another NGO, and founded by the decision of an
assembly of no fewer than three individuals or two NGOs. All NGOs, both regional and local, must
be officially registered with the Ministry of Justice in Yerevan.
2.2 Internal Structure of Local Government Decision Making
Together, the council of community elders and the community head comprise the local decision-
making bodies. The community elders act as the representative body, providing guidance on
community development, improvement of community life, public service delivery and other issues.
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Council sessions are held at least once per quarter at the elders’ discretion. These are presided over by
the community head, who has a tie-breaking vote. Community elders have the authority to issue
resolutions on any matters related to community interests. Community elders may also issue statements
on matters which are outside their jurisdiction but related to the community. These may be addressed
to the public, the head of the community, the marzpet or other state authorities.
The first session of the newly elected community elders must be convened no later than twenty days
after the elections. The council of elders is considered formed if more than fifty percent of the
members have been elected.
The institution of elders dates back to 2200–2100 BC, when seventeen small Armenian
princedoms formed a confederation around the Kuty princedom of southern Armenia.
According to ancient Mesopotamian manuscripts, the Kuty kings were elected rather than
hereditary, and individual princedoms retained local autonomy. Local administrators were
elected by councils of elders and public assemblies. The same system was in place in the
federation of Nairian countries, founded in the second millenium BC during the struggle
against the Assyrians. This is the earliest record of regional local self-governments. The earliest
mention of urban self-governments dates back to the sixth century BC. Sovereign municipal
assemblies operated in large cities, managed by the mayor. Members of municipal assemblies
included community elders chosen from old and wise people, the head priest, the judge, city
district mayors and ethnic leaders in cities with mixed ethnicities.
The following responsibilities are mandatory for community elders:
• to issue regulations on the council of elders;
• to determine the salary of the community head, according to legal specifications;
• to approve the structure of the local administration;
• to approve the general urban development plan;
• to approve the local budget;
• to establish local duties and fees;
• to approve the implementation of the land cadastre regulating use of communally owned land;
• to establish rules of operation for trade, catering and public service enterprises;
• to approve the annual inventory of community property;
• to publish a three-year development plan and the annual budget;
• to publish the annual statement of the community head on budget performance.
The council of elders may undertake the following responsibilities at their own discretion:
• to dismiss the head of the community;
• to request any non-classified information pertinent to community activities from state authorities;
• to make amendments to the budget;
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• to name streets, avenues, squares and parks;
• other issues within the framework of voluntary powers.
Mandatory duties of the head of the community include the following:
• to approve regulations on the organization and functioning of the local administration;
• to establish a list of positions and official salaries of local administration staff;
• to prepare the general urban development plan, implement the land cadastre and approve
detailed plans of certain sectors within the general urban development plan;
• to appoint and dismiss local administration staff;
• to open the founding session of the community elders;
• to approve the annual inventory of community property;
• to make decisions and issue orders within his or her jurisdiction.
Either the community head or a community elder may submit draft resolutions for the council’s
consideration (see figures 6.1 and 6.2) Local council resolutions are implemented by the respective
executive bodies, in cooperation with other interested organizations and people. Local councils set
up specialized committees to identify the main priorities of development for the respective
communities. Council decisions are passed by a majority vote of elders present, provided that over
half its members attend the meeting. A copy of the council decision must be delivered to the office
of the regional governor within seven days.
Figure 6.1
Submission of a Draft Decision by the Head of the Community
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Figure 6. 2
Submission of a Draft Decision by a Community Elder
2.3 System of Local Elections
The first local elections in the Republic of Armenia were held in November 1996 under the Law on
Elections to Local Governments. The second round of elections took place on 24 October 1999
pursuant to the Electoral Code, which was adopted on 17 February 1999 to ensure guarantees of
transparency, democracy and fairness. Community heads and elders are chosen through general,
equal and direct elections by secret ballot. Extraordinary elections may occasionally be called.
The term of office for both elders and community heads is three years.  Communities with up to
three thousand inhabitants elect five elders to the local council, communities with up to twenty
thousand inhabitants elect ten and communities with over twenty thousand inhabitants elect fifteen.
A candidate for the position of elder must be an Armenian citizen over twenty-one years old,
registered in the community for the past year and entitled to vote according to the special requirements
of Armenian law. Candidates for community head must be at least twenty-five years old, but
otherwise meet the same requirements. Members of the Constitutional Court and judges may not be
nominated as candidates for either position.
Regional electoral committees organize local elections, compile and publish election results and
certify the elected elders and community heads. Regional electoral committees consist of:
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• three government appointed members;
• one member appointed from each party or coalition represented in the acting or dissolved
National Assembly, if they have applied to participate in the National Assembly elections
through a proportional voting system and have produced at least thirty thousand certified
signatures defending their nomination in the list;
• one member appointed from each of the first five parties not represented in the acting or
dissolved National Assembly, but which have applied to participate in the National Assembly
elections through a proportional voting system and have produced at least thirty thousand
certified signatures defending their nomination in the list.
Elections are organized in multi-mandate electoral districts as follows:
• one majority system electoral district with five mandates in communities with up to three
thousand inhabitants;
• two majority system electoral districts with five mandates each in communities with up to
twenty thousand inhabitants. The population of an electoral district shall not exceed fifty-five
percent of the total population of the community;
• three majority system electoral districts with five mandates each in communities with over
twenty thousand inhabitants. Electoral districts must divided according to population, not
deviating by more than five percent of the population.
Candidates for community elders and head may have legally authorized representatives to campaign
on their behalf. In order to ensure fairness, elections may be covered by the mass media and observed
by international organizations, representatives from foreign countries and NGOs. Candidates’ legally
authorized representatives, observers and representatives of the mass media have the right to be
present at the electoral committee sessions, to examine documents, sample ballots, electoral committee
decisions and records and to appeal against the actions of electoral committees. Observers from
CLRAE were present in the last local elections and reported that “the CLRAE delegation found no
serious irregularities such as to cast doubt on the fairness of the ballot held on 24 October 1999 to
elect community leaders and community councilors. In its press release, it concluded that the elections
had been free and fair.”
Political parties play almost no role in local elections and do not have the right to nominate candidates.
Political affiliation is mentioned only on the ballot itself, if in fact the candidate belongs to any
particular party. This is rarely the case; in the 1999–2000 elections, 74.2 percent of the winning
candidates ran as independents (see table 6.3).
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Table 6.3
Results of the 1999–2000 Local Elections in Armenia
Electoral Party Community Heads Council of Elders
Total [%] City Village Total [%] Urban Rural
Man- Mayors Heads Man- and Commu-
dates and dates District nities
District Commu-
Heads nities
Independent Candidates 554 67.1 24 530 2,779 75.8 414 2,365
Armenian Republic Party 156 18.9 16 140 314 8.6 101 213
Armenian People’s Party 53 6.4 2 51 146 4.0 38 108
Armenian Revolutionary 9 1.1 0 9 112 3.0 28 84
Federation
Armenian Communist Party 16 1.9 0 16 115 3.1 21 94
Armenian National Movement 22 2.7 1 21 72 2.0 1 71
National Democratic Union 0 0.0 0 0 41 1.1 5 36
Powerful Homeland 5 0.6 0 5 32 0.9 3 29
Lawful Country 3 0.4 0 3 36 1.0 4 32
Other Parties 8 0.9 0 8 20 0.5 2 18
Total 826 100 43 783 3,667 100 617 3,050
2.4 Ethnic Issues, Multicultural Government
Though there are few ethnic minorities in Armenia, some communities do exist where the majority
of inhabitants are of different nationalities. The Yezdies, for instance, inhabit eighteen rural
communities in Aragatsotn region. There are also a few communities where Russians and Assyrians
are the majority. Some national minorities may operate schools, publish newspapers or sponsor radio
broadcasts. However, Armenian is the working language in all local self-government bodies.
2.5 Local Government Associations
There are currently three major local government associations operating in Armenia: the Community
Union of Armenia (CUA), the Union of Yerevan Elders (UYE) and the Community Finance Officers
Association (CFOA). In addition, there are also rural inter-community associations, none of which
are particularly active. Local government associations are established by the agreement of community
heads and ratified by the community elders.  They act as legal entities to help local governments solve
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problems of cross-community impact and thereby reduce costs. Armenian law also provides for the
establishment of voluntary professional associations, which applies to associations formed by other
local government officials. The above-mentioned associations all work towards the goal of improving
existing legislation in the field of local government.
The Community Union of Armenia first convened on 12 December 1997.  Today membership in
the CUA includes six affiliated individuals and 530 communities, representing over three million
citizens from forty-seven urban communities, twelve districts and 471 rural communities. The
general assembly is held every three years and elects a council, which in turn elects a board. The
board manages association affairs, while the executive director of the association is charged with
managing operational and financial affairs. The main tasks of the CUA are as follows:
• to support forms of cooperation among communities;
• to sponsor legislative changes and state administrative decisions affecting communities;
• to promote communities as effective instruments of democracy and public service provision;
• to work together with similar foreign organizations and foster international relationships;
• to promote effective local self-government by providing information to local government officers.
The CUA is well known in Armenia. Among its other activities, it has drawn up a draft concept of
public policy in the sphere of local self-government and submitted it to the government, which is
expected to discuss the draft and adopt an appropriate decision. The CUA cooperates with various
international organizations, such as the Urban Institute, the International Union of Local Authorities
(IULA) and CLRAE.
The Union of Yerevan Elders, founded in 6 March 1998, currently has seventy-seven members. Its
general assembly convenes annually, approves a general program and elects a twelve-member board
responsible for its implementation. The assembly also elects a president to conduct daily association
affairs. After confirming the president, the board elects a deputy president from its members. The
main tasks of the UYE are as follows:
• to harmonize council activities among Yerevan districts;
• to exchange best practices and information on current council activities in other districts;
• to submit amendments to local government laws or suggestions on specific local council activities;
• to encourage professional development among its membership;
• to carry out research and educational activities.
Among its activities, the Union of Yerevan Elders has submitted amendments on local government
laws to the National Assembly and organized training workshops for Yerevan community elders. The
UYE may respond to local community developments by addressing letters to the government,
granting interviews and press conferences and making television appearances. The UYE works
together with international organizations such as the Urban Institute.
The Community Finance Officers Association, founded on 24 September 1988, is governed by its
general assembly, held once a year. The assembly elects fifteen board members, at least two-thirds of
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whom must be community representatives, a president to act as chairman of the board and a deputy
president. The association has a total of eighty-four members: sixty-six members representing commu-
nities, fourteen representing state agencies and four unaffiliated members.
The main tasks of the CFOA are as follows:
• to participate in drafting legislation on local government finance;
• to exchange best practices in community financial management;
• to attend working groups, meetings and other central government venues in which they may
express the interests of their communities;
• to provide assistance to communities currently engaged in the budget process;
• to cooperate with foreign and local self-governments as well as public organizations;
• to organize seminars, meetings and discussions;
• to draft plans for the joint financing of inter-community projects;
• to establish and operate community information centers.
The CFOA provides consultancy services to community finance officers in formulating and imple-
menting community budgets. With the assistance of Eurasia Foundation, the association has created
a computer program for drawing up community budgets.  This project is currently in the investment
phase. The association is also participating in the creation of a new Law on Local Self-government
together with the German Technical Cooperation. The CFOA works with international organizations
such as ICMA and the Urban Institute.
3. Functional Structure of Local Administration
The local government level utilizes a vertical hierarchy of control. Local administration staff and
community institutions are accountable to the head of the community, who is in turn accountable
to the community elders.
The community head represents the executive branch of community government, acting on the
principle of individual leadership. The head is required to submit a proposed organizational structure
of local administration staff to the community elders for approval no later than one month after
taking office. If the community elders reject the proposed plan, the head may consider their suggestions
and present a revised plan. If agreement cannot be reached, the community elders may submit a
motion to the marzpet to dismiss the head of the community. The local administration is a legal
entity, with its own seal bearing its name and the state emblem of the Republic of Armenia. Local
administration is composed of the deputy head of a community, the secretary of staff and their
divisions. The size of local administration staff is defined according to population size by Government
Decision No. 372 (adopted 6 December 1996).
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Figure 6.3
Structure of Local Administration in the City of Vanadzor (172,700 inhabitants)
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The community head is prohibited from simultaneously occupying any other state position or
performing other employment with the exception of creative, scientific and pedagogical activities.
The community head is charged with the following duties:
• to approve the local administration charter;
• to establish a list of staff positions and official salaries and hire local administration staff;
• to appoint and dismiss staff officers and directors of community enterprises or organizations;
• to submit drafts of the three-year development plan and the annual budget to the community
elders for review;
• to make decisions and issue orders within his or her jurisdiction;
• to carry out the instructions of the regional governor on organizing civil defense and anti-
epidemic measures and on minimizing the risk and consequences of technological and natural
disasters;
• to exercise other powers specified by the Law on Local Self-government;
• to oversee implementation of council decisions.
The head of a community is charged with mandatory responsibilities in the following spheres: finance,
protection of citizens’ rights, public safety, defense, planning, development, construction and land
use, public utilities and service provision, transportation, trade and services, education and culture,
public health, athletics, agriculture and environmental protection. In Yerevan, these responsibilities
are divided among the city administration, the council of Yerevan and individual district communities.
The following duties are assigned to the heads of rural and urban communities and the head of
Yerevan (excluding district heads):
• to grant permission to hold assemblies, demonstrations, marches and other mass gatherings as
specified by the law;
• to prepare the general urban and local development plan and submit them to the regional
governor upon council approval;
• to approve detailed plans of certain sectors and urban development complexes of the community
within the general urban development plan and carry out development activities;
• to name streets, squares, parks, educational, cultural and other community institutions;
• to establish a numbering system for houses, buildings and other structures;
• to organize construction, maintenance and operation of sanitation facilities;
• to ensure proper maintenance of cemeteries;
• to regulate transportation and organize community transport enterprises;
• to provide for the operation of taxi services, with the exception of minibuses;
• to regulate trading, public catering and consumer service enterprises in accordance with
legislation and with the consent of the community council.
The local administration performs the following management functions:
• to protect the rights of citizens and the interests of the local self-government;
• to provide local development planning;
• to manage financial matters and community property;
• to implement projects and achieve strategic goals;
341
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N  A R M E N I A
• to define, calculate and forecast citizen needs, formulate appropriate methods for their satisfaction
and prepare the relevant draft resolutions;
• to assign resources for public service delivery, supplement existing resources and search out
new resources;
• to supervise implementation of the three-year development plan, making any necessary
adjustments.
Various institutions in community ownership, under direct control of local governments, include
kindergartens, specialized schools for art, music and athletics, cultural halls, libraries, parks, clubs and
stadiums. Local authorities also have direct control over companies providing heating, sewerage,
water supply, public utilities, sanitation and landscaping.  Local authorities are also responsible for
supervising streets, squares, parks, bridges and other structures of community importance; residential
units and buildings; administrative, historical, cultural and athletic institutions; and any other structure
owned by local governments. A register of property owned by each community is approved by the
central government.
4. Public Service Provision
Local self-government bodies are responsible for providing the following public services:
• water supply,* sewerage, irrigation, gas and central heating systems;
• landscaping and community improvement;
• use and maintenance of community building stock, including residential and non-residential
buildings, dormitories, administrative buildings and other community-owned structures;
• ensuring the proper maintenance of cemeteries;*
• construction, maintenance and operation of roads, bridges and other engineering structures
within the community’s jurisdiction;
• construction, maintenance and operation of sanitation facilities;*
• operation of community public transport;*
• construction and operation of irrigation systems;
• waste collection and disposal.
* refers to services not provided by district heads.
Responsibility for water supply systems has been transferred to local governments, including water
treatment stations, supply networks, reservoirs and local water sources. Unfortunately, water supply
facilities are typically thirty to forty years old, resulting in a large loss of water. Actual water consumed
by residents is not directly measured, but is instead estimated by dividing the total volume of water
supplied to a community by the number of its residents. The central government sets a wholesale
price of thirty AMD/m3 for water delivered from the source to the community treatment plant. The
retail price is then set by the community elders, usually ranging from thirty to sixty AMD/m3.
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However, collection of water service fees is low, and community debts to the central government for
the supply of bulk water often exceed local budget revenues. To recover these fees, the central
government issued Decree No. 49 (3 March 1999) to rent water supply systems for a fixed term of
ten years through the central government’s Armenian Water Supply and Sewerage Company. Another
solution to problems arising from the decentralization of the water supply is to contract with foreign
companies for the management of water supply systems, as has been done in Yerevan. The government
is also making efforts to find resources from donor organizations for investment, repair and decentralization
of the water supply system. The sewerage systems are old and badly maintained. Rates for sewage
collection and treatment are set by community elders and vary depending on whether the consumers
are individuals or firms.
Since villages represent 93.6 percent of Armenian communities, agriculture is an issue of great local
importance. Many communities have their own internal irrigation network, managed and maintained
by the local government. Alternatively, associations of water users organize the operation and
maintenance of irrigation systems. The central government supplies irrigation water and sets the
wholesale price based on the area to be irrigated. To encourage conservation, the government imposes
a two-tier rate structure based on consumption for water supplied to the irrigation associations.
Community elders approve the allocation of resources and land for cemeteries. Some communities
have transferred the preservation, maintenance and servicing of cemeteries to specialized agencies on
a contractual basis. Street cleaning and maintenance of public areas such as gardens and parks are
financed from the community budget and performed by local government enterprises or contracted
to private companies through public tenders. Community elders determine the area to be cleaned
and the rate per unit of area. Landscaping and community improvement are mainly carried out in
cities, due to lack of funds in villages. Public transportation, usually buses, are provided only in large
and medium-sized cities, either by a community-owned public transportation enterprise or by the
private sector. In both cases, fares are set by community elders.
Local governments are also responsible for waste collection and disposal. Rates are set annually by the
community elders, on average about one hundred AMD per capita per month. Some local governments
negotiate contracts between private enterprises and community residents, in which case the company
sets a fee, usually much lower than those charged by communities. Some communities own and operate
landfills, which they maintain with funds from the community budget. Communities without
landfills must pay a fee for use of the landfill in another community. These fees are another source of
budget revenues. However, many communities mismanage fee collections and consequently
appropriate street cleaning funds to ensure the performance of waste management services. Sometimes
street cleaning and waste collection are performed simultaneously.
Although heating supply is another mandatory responsibility of the local governments, most systems
are in extremely poor condition, occasionally not functioning at all. Other communities are unable
to collect user charges, forcing them to end the service altogether.
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Community housing stock generally consists of apartment blocks (in cities only) and privately
owned houses. Most apartment blocks have been privatized.  Maintenance of non-privatized apartment
blocks is provided on a contractual basis either by local government enterprises or by the private
sector. Community elders maintain and establish rent for community-owned non-residential space.
Privatized apartment blocks form condominium associations to carry out maintenance. Condominium
associations were first authorized by Government Decision No. 295 (30 May 1995), which provided
that they be established in privatized buildings or groups of buildings where more than fifty percent
of the units had been transferred to private ownership. The process of forming and legally registering
condominiums associations began very slowly, with the first registered in early 1996, mainly in
Yerevan.  Multiple-building associations were typically composed of buildings with adjoining outdoor
courtyards, common roofs or infrastructure, such as water mains, heating supply or electrical lines
and other common facilities. On 1 June 1996, the National Assembly adopted a more comprehensive
Law on Condominiums, under which a condominium association could not be comprised of more
than one residential building. Most owners felt their buildings were too small to support improvements
in services and facilities and could not afford to hire managers, accountants and cleaning staff. In
May 1998, the Condominium Law was amended once again to allow groups of buildings to form
condominium associations.
The most recent major change in condominium legislation occurred with the adoption of a new
Civil Code for Armenia in 1999. Prior to this, communities retained control over the common areas
of condominiums and contracted public property management enterprises (zsheks) to maintain
them. Common areas are now jointly owned by apartment owners, with shares in proportion to the
size of their apartment, and are consequently managed by the condominium association. Since the
1998 amendments to the Condominium Law and the adoption of the Civil Code, registration of
associations has proceeded fairly quickly. By February 2000, there were 595 legally registered
condominium associations in Armenia, including a total of four thousand buildings and 165,000
apartments. Roughly forty percent of total apartment buildings now have registered condominium
associations.
The prevalence of condominium associations is not evenly distributed among the marzer or among
communities within a given marz. Within Yerevan, the percentage of apartment block households
belonging to condominium associations ranges from 6.4 percent in Kentron District to one hundred
percent in Nubarashen District. In Yerevan overall, 56.1 percent of households belong to condominium
associations; in seven out of twelve districts, this number is over seventy-four percent. This ratio
ranges from 79.4 percent in Sjunik Marz to zero percent in Ararat Marz.
Of registered condominium associations, approximately fifteen percent report that they do not
collect fees or operate services either because residents are too poor or because they resent being
controlled by association managers perceived as lacking adequate management skills. Many of these
associations could be revitalized through a change in leadership or through training in association
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management if it were available. Eighty-five percent of condominium associations are more active,
with sixty percent reporting improvements in public utility services. The remaining forty percent do
not perceive any change in the quality of services, but no condominiums report an actual decline.
According to condominium associations, between sixty and eighty percent of members regularly pay
fees. Many condominiums have established methods of assisting their most economically vulnerable
residents. On average, roughly ten percent of a building’s inhabitants are unable to pay any condominium
fees and have been exempted from their financial obligations by decision of the association meeting.
In most cases, these residents contribute labor instead.
The relationship between local authorities and condominiums is complicated by a sense of competition,
since associations prefer to seek service provision privately rather than through the local government
or its enterprises. For example, about twenty-five percent of all condominiums contract privately for solid
waste collection. Although the law states that local authorities must support the establishment of
condominiums and provide further assistance, there remains a perceived conflict between the interests
of local authorities and condominiums. However, there have also been cases of effective cooperation.
Every district in Yerevan provides condominium support service departments.  However, residents
view these departments as impeding those associations that wish to contract for services elsewhere.
With the loss of business to district public utility or housing maintenance departments, staff salaries
are frequently delayed for long periods and condominium associations are blamed.
With the support of USAID, the National Association of Condominium Owners (NACO) was
founded in 1997 to provide support to condominium associations. Its activities include training
programs, consulting, dissemination of public information and research on the number of registered
associations, their activities and problems. Originally established by twenty condominium association
representatives, NACO now has a membership of four hundred association heads.
Condominium associations struggle with many problems, largely because most citizens and public
officials have little understanding of the rights and responsibilities of condominiums and procedures
for establishing condominium associations. The legal framework is filled with contradictions and
omissions, failing to adequately define the procedures for establishing and registering condominiums,
the functions and duties of the participants and legal remedies for the breach of law. For example,
under article 31 of the Law on Local Self-government, the preparation and organization of general
meetings of condominiums is a mandatory function of the local government. In practice, many local
officials instead try to hinder this process. There are no effective citizen participation procedures that
would allow condominium residents to work with local government officials in developing legal
regulations and rational procedures and policies relevant to condominiums.
The management and operation of kindergartens is another mandatory responsibility of local self-
government bodies. The cost of operating and maintaining kindergartens is covered jointly by
parents and by the community budget. Community elders establish the fee paid by parents and
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determine social groups eligible for reductions or waivers. A number of kindergartens have closed
due to an insufficient number of students. Specialized education is provided by the local government;
these institutions include music and fine arts schools, athletic schools and centers for enhancing
technical and creative potential in children. As with the kindergartens, the elders set fees and determine
which students are eligible for exemptions and remaining costs are covered from the budget. In most
small communities, such services are not offered and students must attend schools in neighboring
communities. Fees vary for this, usually depending on the demand for a given service.
Primary and secondary education is the provenance of the state government, which funds and administers
institutions, employs teachers and administrators and determines curricula and performance standards.
As an experiment in decentralization, fifty-seven public schools have been transferred to community
management. If this experiment succeeds, then decentralization of the educational system will continue.
Maintenance of libraries and museums is entirely covered from community budgets. Although
cultural institutions charge fees, they are not sufficient to cover costs and the community budget
makes up the deficit. Health care is provided primarily by the central government.  However, a few
communities have primary health care clinics, which are covered from user fees and the community
budget. Ownership of electricity and gas supply systems was not transferred to communities, but local
governments must facilitate the installation of such services for community residents and businesses.
A special public committee defines the rates for these services, while the respective ministry establishes
procedures for operation and maintenance. Local governments have no responsibility for telecommuni-
cations, which is provided by the Armentel stock company on a monopoly basis.
Other local government responsibilities include the development of commercial trade, restaurants,
consumer services, public lighting and stray animal control, all of which are regulated by council
decisions. Services provided by the central government are coordinated and controlled by the governor
of the respective region. The local government may open public tenders for service provision, and the
private sector is gradually increasing its participation in public service delivery. In some cases services
are provided by stock companies, which are fully or partially owned by the local self-government. In
general, local authorities play a minor economic role, due to lack of financial resources.
5. Local Finance, Local Property
5.1 Budget System
The Law on the Budget System in the Republic of Armenia regulates all budgetary relations between
central and community budgets in a system based on unified state fiscal, monetary and taxation
policies. The Armenian budget system follows the common procedures of developing draft budgets,
classifying revenues and expenditures, accounting, reporting and implementation. Regulation of
budgetary relations is based on the principles of unity, independence, balance and transparency of the
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budgets, as defined by law. The aggregate of the revenues and expenditures of the state and com-
munity budgets forms the consolidated budget of the Republic of Armenia.
The economic decline that had begun in the final years of the Soviet Union intensified after Armenia
declared independence, due to the cessation of economic relations. The GDP continued to fall until
1995. It has risen since then, but consolidated budget expenditures as a percentage of GDP have
not (see table 6.4). In relation to consolidated budget expenditures, local budget expenditures are
extremely small (see table 6.5).
Table 6.4
National Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP in Armenia, 1994–1999
Year % of GDP
1994 21.9
1995 24.1
1996 19.2
1997 19.0
1998 22.3
1999 24.5
In its fiscal relations with local governments, the central government carries out the following purposes:
• to promote community development by reducing financial disparities between communities
and enabling them to implement their mandates;
• to allocate subventions (special-purpose appropriations) to communities for capital expenditures;
• to allocate budgetary credits and loans to the community budgets for capital expenditures.
Communities are heavily dependent on state budget transfers, which typically comprise over fifty
percent of local budget revenues. Of the two types of central government transfers, subventions and
subsidies, the subsidy is more important by far. Individual communities have full discretion over use
of equalization subsidies, which are considered budget revenue and distributed through the
community budget. Subsidies are distributed from a fund, the precise size of which is determined
each year by the Annual State Budget. In 1998 and 1999, the subsidy fund amounted to at least
twenty-five percent of total previous-year collections from income, land and property tax, as stipulated
in the Law on the Budget System.
Procedures for distributing equalization subsidies among communities are stipulated in the Law on
Financial Equalization. Prior to 2000, subsidies were calculated according to the same procedure for
all communities. In 2000, the law was amended so that subsidies are calculated separately for
communities with populations over and under three hundred.
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Table 6.5
Relative Size of Local Budget Expenditures and Central Government Expenditures,
1996–1999 [%]
1996 1997 1998 1999
Central budget expenditures, 95.3 93.9 94.7 95.3
not including subsidies from
the state budget to local
governments
Local budget expenditures 4.7 6.1 5.3 4.7
Total expenditures 100.0 100.0 100.0 10.00
Subsidies for communities with more than three hundred inhabitants are determined by the following
factors: (a) land and property tax revenue per capita and (b) the number of residents. For communities
with fewer than three hundred inhabitants (a total of 172 communities), the subsidy based on (a)
may not be less than twenty-five percent of total previous-year collections from income, land and
property tax.  The total subsidy to these communities based on (b) may not be less than ten percent
of previous-year income tax collections. The subsidy based on (a) is destined for communities with
over three hundred inhabitants where per capita land and property tax revenues are lower than the
national average.
For communities with over three hundred inhabitants, the subsidy based on (b) is calculated by
multiplying the number of residents by the subsidy amount per capita (the ratio of the total subsidy
based on (b) to the entire population in Armenia living in communities of over three hundred
inhabitants). The amount of subsidies for the communities with fewer than three hundred inhabitants
is calculated evenly.
The central government may also allocate subventions to local governments for the implementation
of concrete projects. Although credits and loans may be issued by procedures stipulated by the
government, they are not yet common practice.
5.2 Revenues
Local governments in Armenia, as in most countries, bear responsibility for more expenditures than
they can finance from allocated sources of revenue. The resulting vertical imbalance means that
communities must generally depend on state transfers. Given that local governments vary enormously
in capacity and need, providing local services fairly and efficiently in the absence of a well-designed
revenue and transfer system can create horizontal imbalance among the different communities.
Budgets are also not executed completely according to their original estimates. In 1999, for example,
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only 49.7 percent of local budgets were implemented fully. In order to ensure that financing
corresponds to the exercise of local self-government powers, community budgets should be divided
into an administrative budget and a capital budget. Revenues and expenditures are to be balanced
separately in each section of the budget. However, capital budgets are not actually created in many
communities, and capital budget revenues are few.
The main sources of community budget revenue are as follows:
• centrally established taxes and duties;
• subsidies from the state budget;
• local duties and fees;
• land and property rent;
• revenue from the sale of community property.
Table 6.6
The Proportion of State Subsides in Local Budgets in Armenia, 1997–1999
1997 1998 1999
Amount [%] Amount [%] Amount [%]
[AMD thousand] [AMD thousand] [AMD thousand]
Local budgets 9,941,968.5 100.0 12,329,077.6 100.0 11,702,161.8 100.0
including state
subsidies
Local budgets 6,188,920.2 62.25 8,498,763.5 68.9 9,509,740.8 81.3
not including
state subsidies
Total 3,753,048.3 37.75 3,830,314.1 31.1 2,192,421.0 18.7
state subsidies
to local budgets
All taxes in Armenia are collected by State Tax Agency. The principle of locally shared taxes was
designed to give incentive to the State Tax Agency in collection of all taxes. However, local governments
have been assigned a larger role in tax collection. Initially, the centrally established taxes paid to
community budgets were land tax and property tax, but later included fifteen percent of income tax
collections. Since income tax collections are low or non-existent in rural communities, the government
decided in 2000 to designate income tax entirely as state budget revenue. To replace the local share
of income tax collections, the government intended to increase the subsidy, but failed to act
accordingly. Subsidies and income tax debts of 1999 were not completely transferred to local
budgets until December 2000. Land and property taxes are currently the only community budget
tax revenues; one hundred percent of each tax is paid to local governments.
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Table 6.7
Share of Central Tax Revenues Paid to Local Budgets in Armenia, 1997–2000 [%]
Year Income Tax Land Tax Property Tax
1997 — 100 100
1998 15 95 95
1999 15 95 95
2000 — 100 100
Local governments also receive revenues from the following state duties which are imposed on
registration of certain official documents.
• duty for registering acts of civil status such as birth, marriage and death certificates, amending
records and issuing copies of certificates or documents that were lost;
• duty for Notary Office services, such as issuing copies of documents certified by the notary,
drafting contracts and applications and issuing copies or extracts of official documents.
State duties comprise more than ten percent of local budget revenues.  The Law on Local Duties and
Fees, adopted in 1998, stipulates requirements and procedures for implementing nine local duties
and three local fees. Under this law, community elders have the right to fix rates within a defined
range for duties on the following items:
• license to construct or renovate buildings, building facades or other civil engineering structures
including temporary ones;
• license to demolish buildings or other civil engineering structures;
• license to sell alcohol or tobacco products, in accordance with standards set by the community
or the city of Yerevan;
• license for open-air trade activities, except trade in markets, fairs and provisional buildings;
• license to operate entertainment facilities after midnight, including saunas, catering facilities and
gambling establishments in accordance with standards set by the community or the city of
Yerevan;
• license to keep a non-pet animal in Yerevan and other urban communities, in accordance with
standards set by the community or the city of Yerevan;
• license to advertise in public areas, in accordance with standards set by the community or the
city of Yerevan;
• copies of documents from the communal archive;
• license to operate a passenger taxi on community territory, except for minibuses (districts are
not allowed to implement this duty).
Local governments may also charge the following fees:
• fee for local government services in preparing technical or financial documentation for the
construction of new buildings or renovation of building facades;
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• participation fee for auctions and tenders organized by the local self-government, for covering
expenses;
• fee for government services in surveying land and other necessary activities in allocating,
reclaiming or renting local government property.
Table 6.8
Local Budget Revenues in Armenia, 1997–1999 [%]
Type of Revenue 1997 1998 1999
Taxes 43.3 49.1 57.2
Income tax 14.2 11.1
Land tax 21.2 9.4 12.3
Property tax 7.4 12.7 20.6
State duties 14.7 12.8 10.8
Local duties 2.4
Other tax revenues 0
Non-tax revenues 17.8 16.9 15.1
Land rent payment 7.5 6.4 5.9
Property rent payment 1.0
Local fees 1.0
Other non-tax revenues 2.8 10.5 7.2
Total income 61.1 66.0 72.3
Residual revenue to cover expenses 0.9 2.8 8.5
Transfers and subsidies 40.0 31.2 19.2
Subsidies from the state budget 37.8 29.9 18.7
Subventions 1.2
Transfers from other 0.5
community budgets
Short-term loans 0.2 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
By 1999, the share of local duties and fees in community budget revenue was 3.4 percent overall,
although they were primarily implemented in urban communities.
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State subsidies form a major share of local revenues, comprising 37.8 percent of community budget
revenue in 1997 and 18.7 percent in 1999. The decrease is due to the failure of the state budget to
perform its duties in 1999. Although AMD 4,388.7 million had been set aside in equalization
subsidies and AMD 86.1 million in subventions, a total of only AMD 2,192.4 million was actually
transferred. The remaining sum was considered debt and transferred in 2000.
Table 6.9
Local Budget Expenditures In Armenia, 1997–1999 [%]
Area of Expenditure 1997 1998 1999
Administration 23.1 19.4 23.5
Housing stock and public utilities 28.6 28.6 19.8
Agriculture, fish-farming, forest 0.0
and water
Transport and communication 0.6
Other branches of economy 4.6 6.6 8.4
Education 23.0 22.6 21.5
Transfers to the social fund and 7.8 8.4
subsidies, excluding wages
Culture and sports 14.8 14.0 13.9
Transfers to the social fund 1.7 2.6
and subsidies, excluding wages
Other expenditures 5.9 8.8 12.3
Payment of previous year debts 1.0 0.2 4.0
Payment of state budget loans 0.0 0.1
Total, of which: 100.0 100.0 100.0
Compensation of employees 34.1 28.6 33.8
Investments 0.8 0.5 0.8
Capital repairs 10.3 21.4 4.6
5.3 Expenditures
The community budget is mainly used for current expenditures from the administrative budget.
Capital expenditures form a small part of the budget, and may be paid for from a reserve fund which
is shown under the administrative budget.  This fund is designed to cover contingency appropriations
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not provided for in the community budget for the given year and serve as a guarantee for financing
the cost of appropriations made for the capital budget, credits and other loans drawn. The proportion
of the reserve fund to total estimated revenues in the administrative budget is stipulated by the
community budget for the given fiscal year and may not exceed thirty percent. Total expenditures on
debt servicing from the reserve fund for credits and other loans drawn may not exceed twenty
percent of the reserve fund.
Community elders may decide on the allocation of expenditures; the main areas of expenditure are
usually administration, housing stock and public utilities, pre-school education, culture and sports
(see table 6.9). In many rural communities, administration expenditures make up the greatest part of
budget expenditures. Execution of community budgets is supervised by the community elders, the
National Assembly and the central government according to their legally stipulated powers.
5.4 Local Budget Process
The official fiscal year begins on 1 January and ends on 31 December. The budget process for a given
fiscal year lasts for about two years, beginning in June of the previous year and ending upon approval
of the budget execution report in May of the following year.  The head of the local community, with
the assistance of local administration staff, drafts the local budget on the basis of the annual objectives
stated in the community’s three-year development plan.  Unfortunately, the local budget process does
not always follow the given schedule due to delays in the adoption of the state budget, which contains
necessary information on community subsidies.
The community head must submit the following documentation to community elders prior to
adoption of the budget:
• the draft of the community budget from a three-year perspective, broken down into separate
components, and detailed revenues and expenditures in accordance with defined operational
and economic classifications;
• a report from the community head on the major directions of community development for the
fiscal year;
• a supporting statement for the required funds and proposed appropriations for implementing
special-purpose programs financed from the community budget;
• the debt structure, accompanied by a comparative analysis of its indicators, actual previous
year indicators and estimated current year indicators;
• a supporting statement for proposed appropriations from the reserve fund;
• information on transfers from the state budget, as stipulated by law;
• information on the total number of full-time local positions and total payments for wages; a
comparative analysis with similar figures from the previous and current years and data on
actual number of employees of budgetary institutions financed from the community budget.
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The head of a community may submit the draft budget to community elders up to one month after
approval of the state budget. It is then adopted by the community elders, with any necessary amend-
ments or additions initiated by either the community head or community elders. The community
head is responsible for the implementation of the local budget and local authorities exercise the full
right to manage own financial resources.
5.5 Local Property
Community property rights are regulated by the Law on Property in the Republic of Armenia, the
Civil Code and the Law on Local Self-government. Local authorities possess substantial authority to
manage local property, including the right to sell property, which often provides a major source of
community revenue. Community property consists of registered public assets (buildings and other
facilities) and other resources including financial and other non-patrimonial properties (for instance,
bonds). The inventory of community property was defined by Government Decisions No. 42  and
No. 51, adopted in March 1997. According to these and subsequent decisions, the following items
fall under the category of community property.
• heating, sewerage, water-supply and irrigation systems of community significance;
• kindergartens, specialized schools, clubs, culture halls, libraries, streets, squares, parks, stadiums,
bridges and monuments; landscaping, sanitation facilities, housing maintenance and similar
organizations; and administrative buildings;
• non-privatized housing stock.
Communities control few enterprises, and rural communities almost none. At the end of 1999 only
108 out of 43,184 registered legal entities belonged to communities. Data on community enterprises
are given in table 6.10. Communities also have thirty-four percent of each fifty companies’ stocks.
They are mainly municipal enterprises.
Table 6.10
Characteristics of Local Government Enterprises in Armenia (1999)
Number Registered Capital Number of
[AMD million] Employees
Yerevan district enterprises 52 222.26 4,463
Urban community enterprises 47 326.16 2,273
Rural community enterprises 9 22.83 362
Total local government enterprises 108 571.25 7,098
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6. Relationship Between the State Administration
and Local Governments
Armenia is a unitary and indivisible state, which is reflected in the administrative structure. The
Armenian government has a two-tier structure, with most administrative powers exercised by the
central government. Marzer, the regional units, are subdivisions of the state administration rather
than a separate tier of the public administration system, as they lack elected officials or bodies.
The governor, or marzpet, implements central government policies in the following spheres:
• Finance.  The marzpet prepares proposals for the section of the state budget relevant to the
marz, and submits them to the central government for consideration; supervises the use of
funds allocated to the marz from the state budget; provides support and methodological
assistance to local government bodies during preparation of the community budget.
• Construction and Utilities. The marzpet draws up territorial boundaries within the marz as
specified by law; proposes any changes to administrative borders of communities to the central
government; forecasts demographic developments and allocation of the labor force; organizes
communal services and civil construction; contracts for capital construction and repairs with
private enterprises; monitors urban construction activities; and manages the regional water
supply, sewerage, and water purification plants as well as other communal service enterprises.
• Transportation. The marzpet organizes inter-community public transportation and organizes
construction, maintenance and operation of roads, bridges, tunnels and other civil engineering
projects of regional and national importance.
• Agriculture and land. The marzpet manages and disposes of state owned lands not in com-
munity ownership; maintains regional border signs and geodesy points; preserves the ecological
balance at the regional level; and coordinates measures to combat plant disease and weeds.
• Education. The marzpet implements national public education programs and constructs and
operates buildings for primary and secondary education.
• Health care. The marzpet oversees any state health care institutions accountable to the regions.
• Social security. The marzpet implements national social security programs and oversees any
social security institutions accountable to the regions.
In Armenia, local self-government bodies are perceived as branches of the state government, created
by the state and performing state responsibilities and duties. The head of a given community performs
a dual function as a local government official and as a representative of state authority.
The apparently broad powers assigned to local governments are in fact quite limited. The Law on
Local Self-government states that “local self-government is the right and capacity of local self-
government bodies, acting at their own initiative, to dispose of community property and to resolve
issues of community importance with a view to improving the well-being of the population.” This
article is taken directly from European Charter on Local Self-government.  However, contradictions
in legislation and inadequate financial support prevent local self-government bodies from enjoying
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full autonomy. Furthermore, the state retains sweeping powers in the sphere of local self-government,
such as the ability to determine community property.
In Armenia, local self-government is regulated by laws, while central and regional government are
regulated by presidential decrees. According to current legislation, the state government may remove
a head of a community from office upon the request of the marzpet or the Mayor of Yerevan, in cases
when the community has not met its budgetary responsibilities or fulfilled powers delegated by the
state.  The prime minister may then appoint a city or district head, or the marzpet an interim village
head, until the next elections are held.
Figure 6.4
Structure of Central and Local Government in Armenia
subordination
supervision
Ministry of Finance is the principal source of funding for local self-governments
President
Central Government Local Self-government
MinistriesCentral
Government
Agencies
Governors’
Offices
Deconcentrated
Bodies
Yerevan
District
Communities
Urban
Communities
Rural
Communities
Parliament
356
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
The new judicial system is still under development. Local self-government bodies may appeal against
decisions or actions of state authorities, officials or citizens that infringe upon community rights. In
a few cases, mayors have successfully defended their rights in court. The marzpet may likewise appeal
against decisions or actions of local self-government bodies in court, but this right is not generally
exercised.
Because the regional governor, as regional secretary of the Communist Party, was such a powerful
position under Soviet rule, citizens and local government officials continue to perceive the government
system as being centralized and authoritarian rather than a decentralized democracy with powers to
effect change and deliver public services. The marzpet often uses administrative methods of control
in its relations with local self-government bodies. In other cases, relations between central and local
governments may assume the nature of a partnership. Provided that local governments have the
necessary financial resources, they may choose to offer services similar to those already offered by
regional governments, such as health care, primary, secondary and higher education, social services,
pensions and unemployment security. Despite their limited financial capacity, local governments do
try to exercise their voluntary powers.
Relations between central and local authorities and private sector organizations are regulated by the
law. Land, as well as trading, public catering service organizations and small- and medium-sized
industries are mainly privatized. Many industrial enterprises do not operate due to the country’s
economic situation, but other enterprises continue to function.
7. Local Government Employees
Local government employment in Armenia is regulated by the Law on Local Self-government as well
as specific government decisions. Unfortunately, the Law on Civil Service has not yet been adopted,
and the framework for civil service remains undefined. As a result, Armenia lacks necessary conditions
for the creation and maintenance of a stable, professional corps of civil servants.  Currently civil
servants are defenseless against arbitrary actions from above and high government offices are filled
according to political connections. After the second local elections in 1999, for instance, many local
government employees were dismissed by the newly elected community leaders. Recruitment,
promotion, evaluation and training of staff are not regulated by any normative acts. In the absence
of a cohesive national policy, each local government addresses these issues in its own manner.
The Armenian School of Public Administration (ASPA) organizes training of municipal employees.
However, training is voluntary and few communities choose to participate. Trainings are also organized
through international organizations such as International City/County Management Association
(ICMA), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Urban Institute. Despite these
beginnings, a more comprehensive training system for local government employees is badly needed.
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The only official statistic available on local civil service is the total number of local government
employees, which equaled 6,425 in 1998, not including community heads or elders. Of these
employees, 77.7 percent were from rural communities, 12.6 percent from urban communities and
9.7 percent from districts.
Remuneration of local government employees is regulated by the Law on Local Self-government.
According to the law, community elders are not compensated for their work.  The council of elders
establishes the salary of the community head as a percentage of the marzpet’s salary within the
following limits:
• up to forty percent in communities with fewer than a thousand residents;
• up to fifty percent in communities with up to five thousand residents;
• up to sixty percent in communities with up to twenty thousand residents;
• up to seventy-five percent in communities with up to seventy-five thousand residents;
• up to eighty-five percent in communities with over seventy-five thousand residents.
The community head determines the salaries of local administration staff, which may not exceed
eighty percent of the head’s salary. Local administration salaries are paid from a fund defined in the
community budget.
8. Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
Although guarantees of local self-government exist, there is a gap between legislation and practice
typical of nearly all former socialist countries. The Constitution provides the following general
guarantees of local self-government: local autonomy and equal legal protection of all types of property
including community property; freedom of economic activity and competition; the right of citizens
to express their will directly through free elections and referenda and indirectly through state and
local self-governments; and division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches
of government.
The following guarantees of local self-government are defined by legislation and government decisions
related to local government:
• Local governments shall be delegated any state powers that are more effectively exercised in
communities;
• Local governments have the right to perform any activities of local interest not assigned to the
state government, within the framework of the law;
• Community heads have a dual function as a local government official and as a representative
of the state;
• Judicial protection of community rights, interests and property;
• Local governments shall receive adequate funding for performance of their responsibilities;
• Financially weak communities shall be assisted through financial equalization;
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• Local government autonomy;
• Local authorities shall provide public services in the manner they deem necessary, including
tenders;
• Community heads shall manage local government staff within their jurisdiction;
• Transparency of local government activities.
These principles are not always upheld. For example, financial assistance from the state is irregular
and often inadequate for the exercise of local government responsibilities. And although the Constitu-
tion provides for judicial protection of local government rights, there are no administrative courts in
Armenia. Litigation between different levels of public administration, though rare, must take place
in general courts.
9. Next Steps in the Transition Process
Recent experience in Armenian local self-government has revealed many areas that urgently require
clarification or strengthening. These include local government finance, administrative-territorial
division, decentralization of responsibilities and procedures of public administration. Following is a
list of recommendations for the future development of local self-governance in Armenia.
In order to provide local governments with the necessary finances to carry out their activities, the
following steps may be taken:
• to increase the power of local authorities to collect taxes;
• to define a share of centrally established taxes as a new community budget revenue;
• to transfer state funds to community budgets in a timely manner.
In order to clarify the status and responsibilities of various administrative-territorial units, the following
steps may be taken:
• to differentiate between the requirements of urban communities, rural communities and
districts of Yerevan;
• to enlarge community territories;
• to modify the status of the capital city and allow the city mayor to be directly elected by the
population;
• to ensure that the staff of the regional governor corresponds to its assigned functions.
In order to support decentralization and the development of local democracy, the following steps
may be taken:
• to broaden the authority of local governments to resolve local matters such as the creation and
operation of the social-economic infrastructure, primary and secondary education and commu-
nity police;
• to create support offices for community councils;
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• to increase the transparency of local government activities by publicizing them and soliciting
feedback.
In order to develop the system of public administration, the following steps may be taken:
• to adopt the Law on Civil Service;
• to clarify the relationship between bodies of public administration and local authorities;
• to develop mechanisms for the supervision of local authorities;
• to establish administrative courts;
• to clarify the legal requirements for removing the community head from office.
All of these issues require changes to the Constitution and existing legislation as well as the adoption
of new normative acts. In addition, the European Charter of Local Self-government must be re-
examined in the Armenian political, social and economic context.
Recent Publications on Local Government in Armenia
Human Development Report Armenia 1998: The Role of the State. Armenia: UNDP Office, 1998.
Ordyan, E. “The Problems of Public Administration in Armenia.” Occasional Papers in Public
Administration and Public Policy, vol.1, no. 3. Bratislava: NISPAcee, 2000.
Ordyan, E. and D. Tumanyan. “Reforms of the Public Administration of the Republic of Armenia.”
In Public Administration and Social Policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Bratislava, NISPAcee,
1999.
Women and Men in Armenia. Yerevan: 1999.
Contacts for Further Information on Local Government in Armenia
National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia
Address: Republic Av., Government House 3, Yerevan 375010, Armenia
Phone: (+374-1) 52-42-13
Fax: (+374-1) 52-19-21
E-mail:  armstat@sci.am
Ministry of Finance and Economy
Address: 1, Melik-Adamyan St., Yerevan 375010, Armenia
Phone: (+374-1) 59-52-55, 50-61-09
Fax: (+374-1) 51-42-82
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Ministry of Territorial Administration and Urban Development
Address: Republic Av., Government House 3, Yerevan 375010, Armenia
Phone: (+374-1) 52-15-07, 56-51-31
Armenian School of Public Administration
Address: 8 Kievian St., Yerevan 375028, Armenia
Phone: (+374-1) 27-75-15,
Fax: (+374-1) 22-89-75
Community Finance Officers Association (CFOA)
Address: 4 Tigran Mets St., room 317, Yerevan 375010, Armenia
Phone: (+374-1) 58-22-93
E-mail: CFOA@dolphin.am
Community Union of Armenia (CUA)
Address: 1 Charents St.,  Yerevan 375025, Armenia
Phone: (+374-1) 57-45-01
Fax: (+374-1)  57-68-63
E-mail: amsay@acc.am
Union of Yerevan Elders
Address: 4 Tigran Mets St., room 318, Yerevan 375010, Armenia
Phone: (+374-1) 58-77-41
E-mail: avagani@dolphin.am
Glossary of Armenian Terms
Avagani — Elders
Hamaink (plural: hamainkner) — A rural or urban community
Hamainky ghekavar — Community head
Marz (plural: marzer) — A region, the largest administrative subdivision in Armenia
Marzpet (plural: marzpetner) — Regional governor, appointed by the central government
Marzpetaran — Regional branch of state administration
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Annex 6.1
Major General Indicators
Religion Armenian Apostolic Church
Official language Armenian
Currency Dram [AMD]
UN exchange rate (1999) USD 1=AMD 535
Size of territory 29,743 square kilometers
Population (1 January 2000) 3,803,400
Urban 2,535,700
Rural 1,267,700
Pensioners 568,200
Old-age pensioners 334,400
School-age children 597,500
Population density 128 people per square kilometer
Major ethnic divisions
Armenians 96 percent
Yezdies, Kurds, Russians, Ukrainians, etc. 4 percent
Per capita GDP (1999) AMD 260,067 or USD 486
Total revenues (1999) AMD 40,042.7 million (100 percent)
National budget AMD 190,917.8 million (79.5 percent)
Local budget AMD 11,702.2 million (4.9 percent)
Social security fund AMD 37,422.7 million (15.6 percent)
Total expenditures (1999) AMD 280,543.8 million (100 percent)
National budget AMD 231,656.6 million (82.6 percent)
Local budget AMD 11,565.7 million (4.1 percent)
Social security fund AMD 37,321.5 million (13.3 percent)
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Public debt (31 December 1999)
Foreign debt USD 869.874 million
Internal debt AMD 31,178.59 million
Unemployment rate
1997 10.8 percent
1998 9.4 percent
1999 11.1 percent
Inflation rate (1999) 2 percent
Average population
per local government (1999) 4,084
Number of public employees (1999)
Employed by the state government 24,500
Employed by local governments 7,355
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Annex 6.2
Population, Settlements and Administrative Units
Table 6A.1
Settlements by Population Size Categories in Armenia (1 January 1999)
Population Size Category Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Settlements Settlements Inhabitants Total Population
0–1,000 544 54.4 202,432 5.5
1,000–2,000 218 21.8 304,300 8.2
2,000–5,000 169 16.9 509,768 13.7
5,000–10,000 35 3.5 231,426 6.2
10,000–50,000 28 2.8 637,200 17.2
50,000–100,000 3 0.3 190,500 5.1
100,000–1,000,000 2 0.2 384,400 10.4
1,000,000+ 1 0.1 1,248,700 33.7
Total 1 000 100.0 3,708,726 100.0
Table 6A.2
Communities by Population Size Categories in Armenia (1 January 1999)
Population Size Category Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Communities Settlements Inhabitants Total Population
0–1,000 465 50 197,831 5.3
1,000–2,000 217 23.3 302,481 8.1
2,000–5,000 168 18.1 508,333 13.7
5,000–10,000 35 3.8 234,381 6.3
10,000–50,000 30 3.2 666,000 18.0
50,000–100,000 5 0.5 291,700 7.9
100,000–1,000,000 10 1.1 1,508,000 40.7
1,000,000+ — — — —
Total 930 100.0 3,708,726 100.0
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Lory
TavushShirak
Aragatsotn
Armavir
Yerevan
Ararat
Vayots Dzor
Sunik
Gegharkunik
Kotayk
Table 6A.3
Types of Administrative-territorial Units in Armenia
Type of Administrative-territorial Average Number Average Number Number of Units
Unit of Inhabitants of Settlements
per Unit   per Unit
Urban and rural communities 2,777 1.1 918
Yerevan district communities 104,058 — 12
Regions (not including Yerevan) 254,950 100.0 10
Figure 6A.1
Administrative Map of Armenia
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Annex 6.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
• Electoral Code (adopted 17 February 1999, amended 23 March 1999)
• Law on Local Self-Government (adopted 22 July 1996, amended 18 July 1997, 9 January
1998 and 7 March 2000)
• Law on the Budget System in the Republic of Armenia (21 July1997, amended 30 December
1997, 8 May 1998, 6 November 1999, 7 March 2000 and 3 November 2000)
• Law on Local Duties and Fees (adopted 9 January 1998 )
• Law on Financial Equalization (adopted 23 December 1998, amended 7 March 2000)
• Law on the Administrative-Territorial Division of the Republic of Armenia (adopted 4 December
1995, amended 30 June 1996)
• Law on the Privatization of State, Public and Community Housing Resources (adopted 29
June 1993, amended 8 June 1998)
• Law on the Procedure for Transfer of Lands from the Reserve Fund Considered State Property
in the Administrative Territories of Rural Communities (adopted 24 December 1998)
• Law on the Privatization of Public Property (13 January 1998)
• Law on Condominiums (adopted 1 June 1996, amended 6 May 1998)
• Law on Urban Development (adopted 26 May1998)
• Law on Education (adopted 8 May 1999)
• Civil Code of the Republic of Armenia (adopted 28 July, 1998)
• Presidential Decree on Public Administration in the Marzer of the Republic of Armenia (6
May 1997, amended 20 January 1998, 7 July 1998, 6 November 1998, 28 September 2000)
• Presidential Decree on Public Administration in the City of Yerevan (6 May 1997, amended
20 January 1998, 7 July 1998, 6 November 1998, 17 November 1998, 28 September 2000)
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Annex 6.4
Responsibilities of Administrative Tiers
Table 6A.4
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Armenia
Functions Municipalities (Individually Central or State
 or in Partnership) Territorial Administration
I .   E D U C A T I O N
1. Pre-school X
2. Primary X
3. Secondary X
4. Technical X
5. Higher X
6. Specialized X
I I .   S O C I A L  W E L F A R E
1. Nurseries X
2. Kindergartens X
3. Welfare homes X
4. Personal services for elderly X
and handicapped
5. Special services X
(for homeless, families in crisis, etc.)
6. Social housing X
I I I .   H E A LT H  S E R V I C E S
1. Primary health care X X
2. Health protection X
3. Hospitals X
4. Public health X X
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Table 6A.4 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Armenia
Functions Municipalities (Individually Central or State
 or in Partnership) Territorial Administration
IV.   C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E ,  S P O R T S
1. Theaters X X
2. Museums X X
3. Libraries X X
4. Parks X
5. Sports, leisure X
6. Maintaining buildings for cultural events X
V.   E C O N O M I C  S E R V I C E S
1. Water supply X
2. Sewage X
3. Electricity X
4. Gas X
5. District heating X
V I .  E N V I R O N M E N T,  P U B L I C  S A N I TAT I O N
1. Waste collection X
2. Waste disposal X
3. Street cleansing X
4. Cemeteries X X
5. Environmental protection X X
 V I I .   T R A F F I C ,  T R A N S P O R T
1. Roads X X
2. Public lighting X X
3. Public transport X X
 V I I I .   U R B A N  D E V E L O P M E N T
1. Town planning X
2. Regional/spatial planning X
3. Local economic development X X
4. Tourism X
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Table 6A.4 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Armenia
Functions Municipalities (Individually Central or State
 or in Partnership) Territorial Administration
 I X .   G E N E R A L  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
1. Authoritative functions (licenses, etc.) X X
2. Other state administrative matters X X
(electoral register, etc.)
3. Local police X
4. Fire brigades X
5. Civil defense X X
6. Consumer protection X
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Notes
1 Nagorni-Karabakh was a self–governing region in Azerbaijan at that time.
2 National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia.
3 National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia.
4 Strasbourg, 1 March 2000, GG/BUR (6) 139.
5 Strasbourg, 23 November 1999, CG/BUR(6)85.
6 Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Armenia.
7 The Russians and Jews operate schools; the Yezdies, Russians, Ukranians and Kurds publish
newspapers; and the Yezdies and Kurds broadcast over the radio.
8 National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia.
9 Ministry of Finance and Economy.
10 Ministry of Finance and Economy.
11 Ministry of Finance and Economy.
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Local Government in Azerbaijan
Meriban Mamedova, Hasanov Hafiz Bashir ogly,
Bairamov Abil Nazir ogly & Huseinov Mirali Asad ogly
1. Overview of Local Government Reform
Since independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan has pursued the establishment of a legal state and
civil society as a main strategic objective. Most major legislation incorporates this principle, from the
Constitutional Act on the Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan (adopted 18 October 1991)
to the Constitution itself (adopted 12 November 1995).
One of the most urgent tasks faced by the country in the ongoing process of democratization is the
foundation of a system of local self-government. No precedent for a comprehensive system of local
self-government can be found in Azeri history, although different elements have existed at various
points. Under the Soviet Union, local government was exercised solely through local soviets and
executive committees as part of state administration.
The newly adopted Constitution of Azerbaijan, effective from 27 November 1995, is the primary
basis for the establishment of local government. Not only does the Constitution uphold decent-
ralization of state authority, it specifically enumerates standards of local self-governance. The fourth
section of the Constitution, also called the “Transition Provisions,” addresses the issue of local self-
government in particular detail. Article 6 of the Provisions annulled the authority of the local soviets,
while article 7 stipulates that laws on local self-government be introduced and municipal elections
held within a period of two years.
The institution of local self-government in Azerbaijan emerged only at the end of 1999, rather than
the deadline of 1997 cited in the Constitution. The official explanation for the delay was that the
population was not ready and that there was a lack of appropriate experience in the field. In the view
of independent experts, however, the delay was instead due to the reluctance of the former local
authorities to transfer functions and relinquish the centralized system of control.
In 1995, Milli Mejlis (Parliament) created a standing commission on local self-government to prepare
a package of relevant laws. This task remains uncompleted, although the commission has recently
developed and submitted a number of draft laws on local self-government.
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The campaign to establish municipalities truly began after July 1999, when the Law on Municipal
Elections and the Law on the Status of Municipalities were passed. The first municipal elections
were held on 12 December 1999, and the newly elected local governments commenced activity in
January 2000.
According to the Constitution, local government in Azerbaijan is exercised both through local
bodies of state administration and through municipal governments. Local bodies of state administra-
tion are regulated by the Constitutional Provision on Local Executive Authority and municipal
governments by relevant laws, and legislation in both these areas continues to be developed. In
general, the constitutional provisions on local self-government and the legislation on municipalities
comply with principles stated in the European Charter of Local Self-government.
2. Legal and Constitutional Basis
2.1 Constitutional Basis of Local Government
The fourth section of the Constitution addresses major issues of local self-government, such as the
legal status of municipalities, types of local self-government bodies, their basic powers and their
relationships to other official entities. The Constitution does not explicitly declare whether the
concept of municipalities is founded on the principle of decentralization of state authority or on the
principle of local autonomy. However, closer analysis of the main provisions on the division of power
indicates that decentralization is the dominant concept. Consequently, many municipal bodies are
in fact former agencies of state administration, both central and local.
Article 142 of the Constitution stipulates that municipal councils are elected. According to Article
144, local councils perform the following functions:
• adopt municipal legislation;
• elect the council chairman and deputies;
• establish standing and temporary commissions;
• establish local taxes and duties;
• adopt the local budget and report on budget performance;
• manage and dispose of municipal property;
• adopt and implement programs for social protection and development, local economic
development and the local environment.
Article 144 also stipulates that local councils may be vested with additional powers. Article 146 of
the Constitution specifies guarantees of local autonomy such as judicial protection and compensation
for additional expenses incurred by local governments due to state government decisions. According
to article 150, municipalities may adopt statutory acts within their competence and in accordance
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with legislation. Compliance with these acts is mandatory for citizens and legal entities residing or
working in the territory of the relevant municipality.
2.2 Legal Basis of Local Government
The Law on Municipal Elections and Law on the Status of Municipalities were the first to be adopted
in the field of local government. The Law on Municipal Elections sets forth general principles, rules
governing electoral commissions, procedures for drawing up voter lists and eligibility requirements
for candidates. The Law on the Status of Municipalities regulates the role and structure of municipal
bodies and outlines state guarantees of legal and financial autonomy. The law pays special attention
to the adoption and execution of municipal programs concerning social protection, social and economic
development and the local environment. It also contains articles addressing municipal bodies and
officials, forms of citizen participation, the economic foundations of municipalities, municipal property
and the local budget.
The other normative legal document to address municipal government is the Model Municipal Charter.
This document specifies common issues to be incorporated in all municipal charters, such as territorial
boundaries, municipal assemblies, standing and temporary council commissions, executive bodies and
administrative procedures.
The Law on Municipal Service regulates the activities of municipal employees, their rights, duties,
labor conditions and social benefits, and outlines the structure of the executive apparatus and the
organization of municipal service. The Law on Local Referenda defines the issues that may be decided
by local referendum and establishes procedures for organizing referenda, publishing the results and
enacting them into law.
The foundations of municipal finance are established by a triad of laws: the Law on the Transfer of
Assets to Municipalities, the Law on Municipal Finance and the Law on Municipal Territory and
Lands. Standards for determining municipal property and transferring it to municipal ownership are
established by the Law on the Transfer of Assets.  The Law on Municipal Finance defines principles
of local finance, the basis for the local budget and the division of powers between the local council
and local executive bodies. This law also regulates legal issues concerning the adoption, implementation
and monitoring of the local budget. The Law on Municipal Territory and Lands, together with the
list of all municipalities in Azerbaijan and their territories, defines municipal boundaries. According
to this law, the State Land Committee and the local branch of state administration draw up documents
for urban planning and construction which clearly indicate municipal territories and land to be
transferred to municipalities. These documents are then made available to local governments. Other
laws also regulate issues of municipal property, such as the Law on Land Reform, in which article 7
is wholly devoted to the issue of municipal lands. However, it must be noted that this law was
adopted in 1996, prior to the establishment of municipal governments.
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The foregoing legislation constitutes the legal basis for local self-government; in addition to these,
other laws have been passed by Parliament and await presidential approval before taking effect.
These laws include the Law on Local Council Members, the Law on Standing and Temporary
Commissions, the Law on Association, Division, Liquidations and Joint Activities of Municipalities
and the Provision on Municipal Coordination Boards. At present, the parliamentary commission on
local self-government is in the process of drafting further legislation in this field. A number of laws
devoted to municipal government were passed in the fall session of 2000, but information on
specific issues covered by these laws is not yet available.
The role of local bodies of state administration remains imperfectly regulated by legislation. The
Provision on Local Executive Authority is the primary law in this area, addressing local state administration
activity, the structure of local state administration bodies and eligibility requirements for local administ-
ration heads.
Analysis of Azeri legislation reveals that local government reforms in Azerbaijan are based on decentrali-
zation of state authority. Currently existing legislation offers genuine opportunities for independence
to self-government bodies at all levels, and there is a general tendency to transfer even more powers
to municipalities.
2.3 Territorial Structure
As declared in its Constitution, the Republic of Azerbaijan is a unitary state.  Other than the
Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic (NAR), there are no independent states within the republic.
The former Upper Karabakh autonomous region was formally abolished by the Supreme Board of
the Republic on 26 November 1991. Since this decision was never recognized by the Armenian
population of Upper Karabakh, the conflict escalated into war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  As
a result, Upper Karabakh and neighboring areas, roughly twenty percent of Azeri territory, are still
occupied by Armenian military forces. A cease-fire has been in effect since 1994.
The legal status of the NAR is defined in chapter 8 of the Constitution. Article 134 declares the
NAR to be an independent state within the Republic of Azerbaijan and an integral component of
the republic. The constitution, legislation and decisions adopted by the Parliament or Cabinet of
Ministers of the NAR may not contradict the Azeri Constitution, legislation, presidential decrees or
decisions of the Azeri Cabinet of Ministers, all of which are effective on NAR territory.
The government of the NAR is structured according to the principle of division of powers. Legislative
powers are vested in the NAR Parliament, executive powers in the NAR Cabinet of Ministers and
judicial authority in the courts of the NAR. Each of these government entities are independent from
one another in decision-making issues within their competence, as stipulated in the Constitution
and legislation.
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According to Article 138 of the Azerbaijan Constitution, the NAR Parliament determines the
following issues: elections to the NAR Parliament, taxes, the path of economic development within
the NAR, social security, environmental protection, tourism, public health, science and culture. The
Parliament also appoints the prime minister of the NAR, approves the organizational structure of the
Cabinet of Ministers, approves the budget and adopts economic and social programs.
The president of Azerbaijan assigns heads of local state administration in the NAR upon nomination
by the chairman of the NAR Parliament, the highest ranking official within the NAR.
The administrative-territorial division of Azerbaijan has essentially been retained from the Soviet era
and consists of villages, settlements, regions and cities. These units were the basis for determining
municipal territories in the Law on Municipal Territories and Lands. According to the Law on the
Status of Municipalities, the local population must be consulted when municipal boundaries are
drawn up or altered. Altogether, 2,673 municipalities have been created, with over twenty-two
thousand elected officials.
Municipalities are established in villages, settlements or cities, rather than on a regional basis. Each
municipality acts as an independent juridical entity, with neither horizontal nor vertical subordination.
Cities may be divided into administrative-territorial units, in which case each unit comprises a
separate municipality. Only two cities are divided into districts; these are Baku, the capital, and Ganja,
the second largest city in the republic. In these cities, district or settlement bodies of local executive
authority are subordinate to the city executive authority. No statutory document has yet been
adopted on the legal status of these two cities, although the issue has been discussed at the state level.
3. Local Politics, Decision Making
3.1 Public Participation in Decision Making
Local self-government provides ample opportunity for citizens to be involved in the creation of local
policies. Local government activity in Azerbaijan is based on resolutions adopted by local citizens or
by elective bodies of local self-government. Citizens may participate in local government through a
variety of forms, including referenda, assemblies and proposing municipal resolutions.
The municipal government may hold a referendum on any issue within its competence at its own
initiative or at the request of at least ten percent of eligible voters in that territory. These referenda are
financed from local budgets. When a referendum is to be held, the municipality issues a resolution
announcing the date of the referendum, the issue at stake and the order of financing. This resolution
must be publicized in the local mass media within three days. All citizens with the right to vote in
that territory may take part in the referendum, which is held between thirty and sixty days after it is
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announced. The municipality then enacts the results into municipal legislation. Other issues
concerning electoral procedures, such as undue influence of voters or falsification of results, are defined
in accordance with national legislation. Local referenda may not be held within three months from
the official announcement of a state of emergency or martial law or while they remain in force. A second
referendum on the same issue may not be held within one year of the publication of results from the
first.
Citizens may also participate in local decision making through public assemblies. According to the
Law on the Status of Municipalities, public assemblies have the power to adopt resolutions only in
municipalities with fewer than five hundred inhabitants. These assemblies have due authority provided
that at least twenty-five percent of all resident citizens over eighteen are in attendance. In these
assemblies, citizens have the right to express their opinions on local issues, to initiate proposals, to
express the collective opinion and to adopt, amend or dissolve the municipal charter.
The local population may also initiate municipal decisions. Such proposals must be discussed in open
council session with the participation of citizen representatives, and their results should be officially
announced.
3.2 Internal Structure of Local Government Decision Making
Local councils play a central role in the local decision-making process. The chairman, commissions
and heads of municipal agencies are empowered to decide upon local issues within the framework of
their authority, although local councils should approve major decisions. Local council sessions must
be convened at least once per month by the chairman or at the request of either one-third of all council
members or at least ten percent of the local population. Decisions passed in council sessions are valid
if a majority of council members are present and are effective on the territory of the given municipality.
The local council passes municipal regulations, establishes local taxes and duties, adopts the local
budget, reports on its performance and approves local programs for social protection, social and
economic development and environmental protection, among others. Specific programs are designed
by standing commissions and submitted to the local council for discussion. Decisions related to local
taxes must be passed by a majority of two-thirds of all council members; all other decisions are adopted
by a simple majority vote. Council sessions are transparent and open to all citizens residing in the
municipality.
In its opening session, the local council elects a chairman from among its members by a simple
majority vote through either open or secret ballot. The chairman both acts as the head of the executive
apparatus and manages local council activity. According to legislation and municipal charter, the
chairman issues orders and instructions, signs municipal resolutions, appoints heads of  municipal
agencies based on local council decisions and manages the implementation of local council decisions.
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Councils may also create standing and temporary commissions to focus on particular areas of activity.
Commission members are typically council members, although they may also choose to invite outside
experts to participate. These commissions are generally established for the following purposes:
• to develop programs for social protection and development, local ecology, economic development
and local services and submit them for discussion to council sessions and to the public;
• to discuss local issues and prepare information, draft resolutions and other materials for discussion
at council sessions;
• to prepare proposals for the municipality and its executive apparatus;
• to assist in implementing and monitoring the performance of the voters’ will.
Commission activity and decision-making procedures are defined in the Law on Standing and Temporary
Commissions. Commissions are responsible to the local council and must report to them regularly.
The executive branch is charged with implementing local council decisions and consists of the
municipality chairman and other municipal agencies established by legislation or municipal charter.
In order to fulfill its obligations, the executive apparatus may adopt appropriate decisions within the
framework of its authority. Heads of municipal divisions may issue orders, instructions or other
documents of an administrative nature, as defined by the municipal charter.
3.3 System of Local Elections
Local elections are held according to the Law on Municipal Elections.  Although political parties
initially proposed a mixed majority and proportional system, it was finally decided to hold elections
by a relative majority system in multi-mandate territories. This decision remains somewhat controversial
among voters.
The first municipal elections in Azerbaijan were held on 12 December 1999. Altogether, local
councils were elected in fifty-one cities, eight city districts, 123 settlements and 2,409 rural municipalities.
Official elections were not held in Upper Karabakh and the neighboring occupied territories. Instead,
internally displaced citizens from these areas took part in the municipal elections in their temporary
residences. Although the Armenian community of Upper Karabakh held local elections in 1998, the
government of Azerbaijan holds these elections to be illegal and consequently has not recognized the
results.
Local councils are constituted through free, general, direct and equal elections. All citizens over the age
of eighteen are eligible to vote, while those over the age of twenty-one are eligible to run for office.
Candidates may be nominated by citizens, registered political parties or voter initiative groups. Although
candidates are required to gather voters’ signatures in support of their candidature, the number of
required signatures is reasonable. Certain groups may not run for office: these include state administration
officials, judges, law enforcement officers, religious officials, military officers and convicts.
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The number of council members is determined by population according to the following scale:
Table 7.1
Size of Local Council According to Population
Population Number of Council Members
0–500 5
500–1,000 7
1,000–5,000 9
5,000–10,000 11
10,000–20,000 13
20,000–50,000 15
50,000–100,000 17
100,000–300,000 19
 The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) of Azerbaijan creates regional electoral commissions to
organize elections for all municipalities within that region. These commissions establish polling
stations and local electoral commissions in the appropriate municipal territories. Territorial and local
electoral commissions are formed of representatives who are nominated by local branches of public
associations and political parties or by voter assemblies in the given territory.
Elections are considered valid if over twenty-five percent of registered voters have participated.
Upon the closing of the polls, official reports on the election results and statistics are compiled at polling
stations and transferred to the regional electoral commissions. Based on local electoral commission
reports, the regional electoral commissions must determine the outcome of the elections no later than
two days hence. Within twenty days of the election, the CEC announces the results of municipal
elections nationwide. The newly elected councils are then certified within five days by the regional
electoral commissions.
Political parties actively participated in local elections, even though they were not held according to
the proportional system. The law allows regional branches of political parties to field a list of candidates
according to the number of council seats. Altogether, fifty-one percent of all nominated candidates
(about eighteen thousand representatives) and forty-seven percent of elected candidates represented
a total of twenty-six political parties. Of the elected candidates representing political parties, seven
percent are members of opposition parties.
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3.4 Relationship between Elected and Appointed Local Government Bodies
According to legislation, elected and appointed municipal bodies operate autonomously within
their spheres of competence. When implementing local policies and adopting programs, elected
bodies are not dependent on any local state administration authority. By law, the state guarantees local
elected officials the unobstructed exercise of their authority and protection of their rights and dignity.
In relation to the local council, the executive branch of the municipality has similar freedom of action
within its framework of authority.  Although it is subordinate to the local council, established by
local council decision and must report to the local council, this does not limit municipal employees’
rights and freedom of activities. Based on local council decisions, the executive branch may establish
institutions and enterprises and monitor their operation. These organizations have legal status and
function according to legislation, municipal charter and municipal resolutions. According to law,
municipal employees are not under direct subordination to the elected municipality bodies and may
not be dismissed upon the expiration of the council mandate.
3.5 Local Government Associations
Municipal bodies may form associations in order to render mutual assistance, jointly solve social,
economic and cultural issues, more effectively exercise their rights, promote their interests and
coordinate their activities. Procedures for founding and operating municipal associations are regulated
by the Law on the Status of Municipalities and the Provision on Municipal Coordination Boards.
According to item 1 of the provision, coordination boards on local self-government are forums
created in order to discuss issues within municipal competence; to develop methods for the joint
solution of common, regional, district and urban problems; to analyze and disseminate best practices
and experiences; to coordinate issues of joint municipal and state activity; and to prepare proposals
on harmonizing the local self-government system. In addition to coordination boards, elected officials,
municipal employees and other individuals in the field of local government may also create public
associations, according to legislation.
Participation in coordination boards is voluntary and a given municipality may simultaneously
belong to district, regional and republic coordination boards. A board consists of municipal representatives
and selects a chairman, vice-presidents and a secretary from its members. Outside individuals may be
invited by the chairman to participate in board activities or submit proposals to the board. These
may be representatives from municipalities, from legislative, executive or judicial bodies, from scientific
and educational establishments or from local government related public associations. By legislation,
coordination boards must be registered by the state and may not exercise municipal powers.
At present, seventeen city districts of Baku have united to form a coordination board.  In addition,
the newly established Center of Municipal Reforms in Azerbaijan brings together municipalities
from different regions. No other local government associations of municipalities, elected officials or
municipal employees currently operate in Azerbaijan.
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3.6 Territorial Branches of State Administration
The legal status of local state administration in Azerbaijan is determined by the Provision on Local
Executive Authority, adopted 16 June 1999. According to legislation, the president of Azerbaijan
establishes territorial branches of state administration in regions, cities and city districts and appoints
a head to manage its operation. These heads in turn designate local administrations in the villages
and settlements situated within their territory.  Heads of local state administration carry out executive
duties in regions, cities and city districts; ensure rights and freedoms of citizens; further the economic,
social and cultural development of the given territory; and coordinate the activities of municipalities
and territorial divisions of state administration.
Heads of local administration perform the following duties:
• carry out orders of the president of Azerbaijan and, in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic,
those of high NAR officials;
• implement state programs authorized by the president of Azerbaijan as well as local programs;
• establish and dissolve local state administration departments, services, enterprises and organizations;
appoint and dismiss their heads; and annul any documents that run counter to existing legislation;
• organize elections, national referenda and public discussion as established by legislation;
• submit issues and proposals concerning local development to the appropriate executive bodies;
• execute other duties as established by the legislation.
The head of local administration has the right to adopt statutory decisions on issues within the
framework of his or her authority, provided that they do not contradict existing legislation.
Compliance with these decisions is mandatory on the given territory. The head also defines the
structure of the local apparatus as stipulated by the provision. Local administration expenses are
financed from the state budget.
3.7 Relationship between Local Governments
and Territorial Branches of State Administration
Relations between the municipalities and local state administration are only vaguely described in
current Azeri legislation.  In principle, municipalities and local bodies of state administration should
carry out their activities autonomously, on equal terms. However, there are no explicit standards for
the division of authority in current legislation; the topic is not even mentioned in the Constitution.
Clarification of the resulting ambiguity has become essential.
According to Professor Ismailov, Director of the Center for Civil Society, this ambiguity is not accidental;
the purpose of the provisions relating to municipal-state relations was to re-establish the old communist
model. According to that model, boards of people’s deputies were subordinate to the respective urban
or district committee of the communist party, since board officials were also party members. However,
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this principle no longer holds and the divergent interests of municipal and state administration
bodies will inevitably lead to dissention in the absence of a precise delineation of authority.
In the Provision on Local Executive Authority, many issues referred to municipal competence are
also referred to the competence of the local state administration. In some cases, divisions of state
administration even continue to manage areas delegated to municipal authority. This has already
created conflict.
The case of Baku offers a typical example. According to legislation, advertising on municipal territories
is a municipal responsibility. However, the already existing Department of Advertising and Information
in the Baku local administration has illegally prevented the municipal budget from receiving advertising
revenue. The local branch of state administration in Baku has even signed an instruction stating that
advertising revenue should be diverted to the administration, not municipal, budget until the end
of 2000.
Similar cases occur throughout the republic. In the district of Barda, the conflict centers around taxes.
Although the Law on Municipal Finance stipulated that land and property tax should go to the
municipal budget, the Barda district administration has levied a duty of a million AZM (approximately
USD 250) on each municipality to be paid from these taxes to the regional tax department.
Parliament is expected to pass a law, currently under development, to address the division of authority
between the municipalities and bodies of local executive authority. It is hoped that adoption of this
law will finally resolve relations between municipalities and local administrations as municipalities
begin to fully realize their powers.
3.8 Local Government and the NGO Sector
As public associations have expanded their activities, it became evident that a more advanced law was
required (the previous law governing public association activity was the Law on Public Associations,
adopted in 1992). Accordingly, on 13 June 2000, Parliament passed a Law on Non-governmental
Organizations (NGOs), which took effect on 6 October 2000.
Although roughly 2,500 NGOs exist in Azerbaijan, only 1,300 of them are registered and only 150
function significantly. The majority currently operate in Baku, but NGOs recently been emerging
throughout the republic. Already, a few regional NGOs have some influence in the solution of local
problems.
NGO activities focus on human rights, educational projects, citizen participation, electoral awareness
and legislative amendments. Subsequent to the creation of municipalities, a number of NGOs were
founded to promote municipal activity. Unfortunately, these organizations are unable to render any
effective assistance to municipalities under current conditions.
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Although NGOs exercise some influence on public processes, they do not participate in creating
local policies. This is due to the lack of skills and experience in public administration and the absence
of a favorable political climate. However, relations between NGOs and local government bodies
have only just begun to develop, given the short history of local self-government in Azerbaijan.
4. Functional Structure of Local Government
The functional structure of local self-government in Azerbaijan can be categorized according to the
division of powers and functions. In terms of the division of powers, the local council approves the
structure of an executive apparatus to implement its decisions; this may include commissions or
other executive bodies. In general, the executive branch of municipal administration is subordinate
to the local council.  However, direct day-to-day management is performed by the council chairman,
who is responsible for composing the executive apparatus.
Administrative divisions generally fall along the functional areas of programs adopted by the local
council, for instance, programs to address issues of social, economic or environmental development.
Heads of structural divisions carry out management functions according to the municipal charter
and local legislation and report to the executive apparatus. Working relationships within administration
departments are governed by contracts drawn up according to national labor legislation.
The executive office is responsible for accomplishing the following tasks:
• to prepare draft budgets, plans, programs and resolutions to submit to the municipality;
• to implement the mandates and decisions of the municipal council;
• to manage municipal property and other property transferred for municipal use;
• to perform a technical inventory of municipal property;
• other obligations as stipulated by legislation.
Internal control of municipal entities is carried out by the appropriate municipal bodies. Municipalities
define the objectives, conditions and regulations governing the activities of municipal entities; regulate
prices and rates of their production and services; approve their charters; appoint and dismiss their
heads and review reports on their activities. Relations between municipalities and subordinate municipal
entities are regulated by civil and labor legislation. Municipal bodies may also monitor other non-
municipally managed enterprises operating on municipal territory, but they do not have right to
place restrictions upon the economic activities of legal and physical persons, except in cases specified
by law. Municipalities establish relations with other legal and physical persons on a contractual basis.
According to article 13 of the Law on Municipal Finance, municipalities also create financial structures
to monitor local budget execution and its correspondence to the planned budget. Municipalities
may receive financial assets from legislative and executive authorities for this purpose.
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5. Public Service Provision
Under the Soviet Union, public service delivery was a responsibility of the state. Although the
transition to decentralized management and a market economy created certain preconditions for the
development of the private sector, the burden of public service delivery continued to fall on the state
through the initial years of the independent republic. When municipalities were established, however,
they became responsible for public services as well. Currently, these functions are performed by the
state, municipalities and, to a limited extent, the private sector.
The state continues to take the lead in public service delivery since, unlike municipalities, it has the
pre-existing structures and financial resources to do so. Most services, such as education, culture,
public health services, communications, public catering and other services, are carried out by local
divisions of the relevant state structures. Management and control over public service delivery are
performed by central executive bodies, such as ministries, committees and the local state
administration. These services are financed from the state budget.
In theory, municipalities have extensive authority in providing public services as well. According to
legislation, municipalities may adopt programs of public service delivery and create municipal entities
to implement them in the following areas: education, health care, culture, municipal housing and
other buildings, sanitation, water supply and sewerage, local transport and communication, cemeteries
and funeral services, public catering and consumer services. The executive branch of the municipality
reports to the local council on the performance of these services, which must correspond to the
standards determined by the state. Municipalities have complete autonomy in determining the
method of public service delivery and may take local conditions into account in order to determine
exemptions and other special features.
Since municipalities do not have the necessary financial resources at present, they have not yet
undertaken provision of public services. However, as one example, the state has begun to transfer a
number of its housing and communal services to municipalities. If municipalities continue to operate
these services at an acceptable level, all housing and communal services currently managed by the
state are to be transferred to municipalities.
Certain public services may also be delivered by the private sector (local, joint and foreign organizations)
on a contractual basis. Private companies may engage in any public service where not explicitly
prohibited, provided that they meet standards established by the state. The role of the private sector
is substantially increasing in this field, especially in public health care, education, transport, communi-
cation, trade and public catering. This is an undoubtedly positive trend, which leads to increased
quality of public services at reduced cost. However, in the absence of quality control, certain negative
phenomena emerge, such as inconsistency or division of services.
It must be noted that in-depth analysis of public service delivery by the state, municipalities and the
private sector is difficult, as the area remains underdeveloped and lacks a normal level of competition.
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6. Local Finance, Local Property
Independent finances and discretion over their use are essential to smoothly functioning local self-
government. Article 3 of the Law on Municipal Finance establishes the fundamental principles of
municipal finance: self-government, autonomy, transparency and the balance of local and national
interests.  Specific issues of municipal finance are regulated by the Constitution, the Law on Municipal
Finance, the Law on the State Budget and the Law on Banking.
Municipal finances are comprised of local budgetary and non-budgetary funds, municipal property,
municipal lands and profit from production, services and other economic activities.
Municipalities independently draft, adopt, implement and monitor local budgets, which are entirely
separate from the state budget. Current legislation prohibits state bodies from intervening in municipal
budget activity, except in cases stipulated by the law. This radical separation between the state and
municipal budgets means that the state does bear any responsibility for local budget obligations.
However, according to article 6 of the Law on Municipal Finance, the state undertakes the following
guarantees of local financial autonomy:
• to create conditions for the development of industry through national investment and monetary
policies;
• to allot additional funds to cover local budget deficits when the state budget permits; to
allocate grants and subventions from the state budget if local social and economic development
programs cannot be financed by local budget resources;
• to transfer funding to municipalities commensurate with the transfer of any additional legislative
or executive responsibilities;
• to allocate resources in compensation for any losses or increased expenditures incurred by local
budgets due to state decisions.
In turn, municipalities must report to the government statistical bodies on local budget implementa-
tion, as stipulated by law.
Municipalities have not yet exercised the above-mentioned guarantees, as they were only recently
adopted and there are no programs in place to implement them. However, in 2000, the state allocated
AZM 1.5 million to each municipality from the state budget to solve initial problems. According to
official information for 2001, the state budget currently being drafted allocates a total of AZM 18
billion in grants to local budgets.
The absence of precise mechanisms for receiving grants, donations and subventions from the state
budget has posed a problem for municipalities. So far, there is no specified method for distributing
grants among municipalities or determining whether to divide them evenly or proportionately according
to population or territory.
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According to article 7 of the Law on Municipal Finance, the local budget is based on the following
sources of income:
• land tax;
• property tax;
• tax on the use of natural resources upon building materials of local importance;
• enterprise profit tax;
• fee for advertising on public property;
• hotel tax, parking fees and other local taxes or duties stipulated by the law;
• subventions from the state budget;
• profit from privatization or the lease of municipal property
• income from lotteries or other municipal activities;
• financial aid from private entities and international organizations or funds;
• compensation from the state for expenses incurred due to state decisions.
Although several local taxes were designated as local budget revenues, it is unlikely that local incomes
will increase much in the near future, due to flawed taxation laws and inefficient tax collection. Nor
is it likely that other sources of income will provide a significant addition to municipal budgets.
The local council adopts decisions regarding local taxes and duties by a two-thirds majority vote.
Municipalities have the authority to select the number of local taxes and duties and decide upon
their rates within the list of taxes and duties enumerated in the Law on Municipal Finance. Local
residents may also decide to create an ad hoc local public fund, either by local referendum or at
citizens’ assemblies, for the purpose of resolving local problems.
Relevant municipal agencies are responsible for tax collection. Initially, these duties were performed
by state tax agencies due to the absence of the appropriate municipal structures. However, as of
3 August 2000, on the basis of contracts between municipalities and tax collection agencies, the
Ministry of Taxation has decided that municipalities will independently collect land and property
taxes from their citizens and transfer them to the municipal budget.
Municipalities have autonomy over budget expenditures as well as revenues. Local budget expenditures
include operational expenses, maintenance of social, housing, cultural and sports establishments and
maintenance of public streets, parks and squares. Local budgets may also designate funding for social
protection programs, environmental programs and social and economic development programs.
Local budget deficits may be partially covered by funding from the state budget.
Current legislation does not clearly define local budget procedures, referring them instead to municipal
charters. However, the municipality should adhere to the general standards of budget preparation in
use in Azerbaijan. The budgetary year for municipalities begins on 1 January and ends on 31
December. Municipalities approve budget implementation reports and inform the local population
as determined by the municipal charter. The municipalities are responsible for monitoring local
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budget implementation and may involve independent auditors at their discretion.  Municipalities
may dispose freely of any budget surplus.
Although the law accords broad financial powers to municipalities, they are currently only theoretical
in nature. In reality, municipalities are far from able to balance the local budget based solely on own
revenues.
In addition to local budget revenues, municipal property consists of the following: municipal
possessions, lands, enterprises and organizations; municipal housing, and uninhabited premises;
roads that are neither state nor private property; municipal establishments of education, health care,
culture and sports; and other movable and immovable property. Municipalities may rent or re-
distribute municipal property, enter into contracts using municipal property as collateral and draw
up contracts for the privatization of municipal services and factories. In the interest of local citizens,
the municipality may also set conditions for the use of lands falling within municipal boundaries.
Much of the above-mentioned property was state property that is now due to be transferred to
municipal ownership. However, this transfer has been delayed, with insufficient explanation. Some of
this property is no longer even in the power of the state to transfer, since many of these entities were
privatized before the list of state property to be transferred to municipalities was compiled. The
remaining types of property to be transferred are typically unprofitable. According to Article 4 of the
Law on the Transfer of Assets to Municipalities these objects are considered municipal property:
municipal housing, social and cultural institutions, objects in common use of local citizens and other
property.
This law also places certain restrictions on the transfer of state property.  Article 4 declares that state
property may only be transferred to municipal ownership at the request of the municipality and
provided that conditions have been created for its utilization. The vagueness of those conditions, the
absence of explicit procedures for transferring state property and the fact that this issue is referred to
the appropriate state administration has created considerable confusion. As a result, property has not
yet been transferred to municipalities, even though sufficient time has passed since the establishment
of municipalities.
The issue of municipal land poses yet another problem for municipalities. According to the Law on
Land Reform, thirty-three percent of common lands belong to the municipalities. These include all
lands not privatized or retained by the state and are referred to as lands of the reserve fund. By a presidential
decree on the implementation of the Law on Municipal Territory and Lands, the appropriate state
administration bodies were to determine municipal lands and transfer them within two months.
This was accomplished in the majority of municipalities, with the notable exception of major cities.
In the cities of Baku, Ganja, Sumgayit and Mingachevir, the state administration bodies are reluctant
to relinquish lands that generate high profits. In many cases, local administration heads had already
illegally leased under long-term contracts many of the lands later designated for municipalities.
Lands that are actually transferred to municipalities are usually unfit for use or of disputable ownership.
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This situation places municipalities in a desperate situation. Since the judicial branch of government
is entirely dependent on the executive branch, municipalities have no opportunity to resolve these
conflicts fairly. Most local revenues specified by law are purely formal, since municipalities do not
possess stable tax revenues, property to be privatized or rented or profitably functioning enterprises.
For example, forty-eight municipalities in the capital city still are not able to regulate profits from
advertising. In addition, the citizens themselves are incapable of paying the taxes stipulated by
legislation, and non-payment of taxes is widespread.
7. Relationship between the State Administration
and Local Governments
According to law, municipalities operate autonomously and separately from the system of state
administration. Nonetheless, municipalities must often perform their functions in cooperation with
central and local bodies of state administration.
Bodies of state administration are legally required to assist the local population in implementing local
self-government and create the necessary legal, organizational and financial conditions for the
foundation and development of municipalities. As an initial step, the central government passed
legislation regulating municipal activity.
Municipalities and state administration must also cooperate in preparing and implementing local
programs.  Since issues often overlap, these bodies must take into account programs by the other, but
may not directly interfere in their activities.
The legislative and executive branches of the central government may also transfer additional powers
and responsibilities to local governments, provided that the requisite funds are allocated as well. In
these cases, the legislative or executive authorities may supervise implementation of those responsi-
bilities. The municipal government may also enter as a customer into a contractual relationship with
state agencies in connection with certain economic activities
In economic affairs, the state is enjoined to protect municipal property and create conditions for its
development. One method, as stated in the Law on the Status of Municipalities, is by distribution
of subsidies, credits, and grants. If the central government passes a decision which results in increased
expenditures or decreased revenues for municipalities, it must allocate funds in compensation. Also,
expected local budget revenues should be taken into account during the adoption of the state
budget. If a minimum amount of local budget revenue is not covered by own local revenues, then
the state administration should transfer funds from the state budget to municipalities.
The state, through the Ministry of Justice, may also exercise control over compliance with the
Constitution and laws of Azerbaijan by municipalities and their officials, according to Article 52 of
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the Law on the Status of Municipalities. If municipal acts contradict the Constitution, legislation or
ministry resolutions, they are subject to annulment by the Constitutional Court, according to article
130(5) of the Constitution. Bylaws of the Constitutional Court may not be appealed. According to
law, only the president, Supreme Court, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, and the Parliament of the
Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic have the right to address the Constitutional Court. The right
of other entities, such as municipalities and citizens, to address the court is not stipulated by legislation.
Citizens and juridical persons residing in a given municipality may appeal municipal bylaws and
activities of municipal bodies or officials. These appeals may be submitted in the district or urban
court. The decision of the district court may be in the appeals court. Should the court deliver judgment
mandating the annulment of a municipal decree, the municipality must abide by this decision.
Failure to comply with the judgment of the court may result in criminal liability.
Within the Ministry of Justice, a division has been formed to provide legal assistance to municipalities,
in order to establish close, permanent working relations between the state and municipalities. However,
this division has not yet commenced activity.
Any conflicts that may emerge between municipal and state government bodies should be settled by
legal proceedings. In closing, it must be noted that there has been little if any progress in municipal
relations with central and local state authorities.
Local governments may collaborate with one another to achieve common goals, improve working
practices and pursue common interests. Since a one-tier system of local government operates in Azerbaijan,
there is no subordination between municipal governments of various levels, that is, from rural areas,
settlements, districts, and cities. In cases of collaboration, each local government therefore acts autonomously.
8. Local Government Employees
Municipal service is regulated by the Law on the Status of Municipalities and the Law on Municipal
Service.  The personnel structure of the executive apparatus is determined according to the size of the
municipal territory and local council decision, as stipulated by municipal charter.  The executive
office may be divided into agencies, departments or other units for different fields such as social
security, social or economic development and the environment. Personnel hired to implement these
programs may include agency heads and deputies, department heads and deputies, experts, inspectors
and other employees.
The chairman and heads of municipal divisions are responsible for managing the municipal
government’s organizational affairs. Their tasks include the following:
• to organize advanced vocational training;
• to develop recommendations for the placement or transfer of municipal officers;
393
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N  A Z E R B A I J A N
• to implement council resolutions;
• in the case of the chairman, to appoint heads of executive divisions.
Municipal officers possess the following rights:
• to request a written description of their duties and the conditions necessary for their fulfillment
from their hiring supervisor;
• to demand  information and documents from government bodies, agencies, organizations and
citizens in compliance with legislation;
• to decide upon issues related to their sphere of competence;
• to establish professional unions of municipal officers;
• to pursue vocational training;
• to develop proposals to improve municipal service;
• to receive protection of their rights and privileges.
In performing their duties, municipal officers must keep in mind the following obligations:
• to execute their duties in keeping with the Constitution and legislation of Azerbaijan;
• to implement directives from municipal leadership;
• to be disciplined in their work and behavior;
• to coordinate their activities with the appropriate local bodies of state administration and seek
to solve local problems jointly.
Municipal officers are full-time paid professionals of the local government and are classified in the
same legal category as government officials. They may not jointly hold positions in legislative,
executive or judicial bodies or use confidential information outside of their responsibilities to the
local government. Salaries are determined in accordance with the organizational chart approved by
the local government. Other working conditions, such as hours, vacation, retirement benefits and
social security, are regulated by the appropriate labor legislation. Individual municipal governments
may assign additional payment to municipal employees according to their financial capabilities.
Further privileges or exemptions may also be stipulated in the municipal charter.
The head of the appropriate municipal division is responsible for the employment and dismissal of
municipal personnel. According to law, the expiration of an employee’s term of office may not be
used as a basis for firing an employee.
Current legislation is lacking in any provisions regulating personnel recruitment by local governments,
instead delegating the responsibility to determine criteria and rules of employment to the local
governments themselves. Depending on the nature of the position, the local government may either
hire staff on a competitive basis or simply solve the matter in keeping with the labor legislation.
Although the efficiency of government administration depends on the professionalism of their officials,
municipal officials do not have the opportunities for advanced vocational training available to their
counterparts in the state government. State government officials may attend vocational training
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courses sponsored by the state. However, municipal employees have not been able to participate in
these trainings due to lack of financial resources, and the state has done little to remedy the situation.
Nor do non-governmental organizations render assistance to municipal governments in this area,
beyond the distribution of a few guidebooks on methodology, although they are otherwise active in
educating the population. This is due to insufficient financial support and a lack of other kinds of
assistance rendered to local governments by international organizations.
9. Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
The Azeri state government has envisaged a system of guarantees, embodied in specific legislation, to
ensure the autonomy of local governments.
The principle of local autonomy is embedded foremost in the Constitution, which defines municipal
governments as independent self-governing institutions separate from the system of state administra-
tion bodies. Article 146 of the Constitution grants judicial protection to municipalities and guarantees
that additional municipal expenditures caused by state decisions shall be reimbursed. Article 13 of
the Constitution acknowledges municipal property as a legal category of property and guarantees its
protection, the most important legal provision on the economic independence of municipalities.
Guarantees of local autonomy may also be found in other national legislation. Article 14 of the Law
on the Status of Municipalities unambiguously states that local governments and their subordinate
bodies are not incorporated in the system of state government bodies and state government bodies
or officials may not intervene in municipal government affairs. Municipal governments are to be
established as self-governing bodies in all districts, regardless of population size or the existence of
municipal property in the given territory. That is, citizens in a territory without municipal property
may not be prevented from exercising their right to local self-government on those grounds. Local
governments are completely independent in passing and implementing resolutions that are binding
for all persons and legal entities within their territory. Non-compliance with municipal government
decisions results in judicial liability.
Legislation also provides specific guarantees of financial autonomy. The state government is obliged
to protect municipal property and ensure the budgetary independence of local governments. The
government may ensure compliance of local budgets with state standards by allocating the necessary
funds to local budgets.  If the government passes a resolution that results in increased local expenditures,
it must immediately determine a sum to be transferred to the municipality in compensation.  In
managing municipal property, local governments have complete autonomy.
Municipal officials are also protected by law. The government guarantees that local government
officers shall not be obstructed in the performance of their duties and undertakes to protect the
rights and dignity of elected municipal officials. The conditions for dismissing municipal officers are
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explicitly detailed in law. According to article 21 of the Law on the Status of Municipalities, a
councilor’s term of office may be prematurely terminated only in the following instances:
• if a court conviction is in force against the member;
• if the member must undergo medical treatment;
• if the court has judged a member not to be responsible for his or her actions;
• if the member terminates his or her citizenship, becomes a citizen of a foreign state or makes a
similar commitment to a foreign government;
• if the member is deceased or declared dead or missing by the court.
According to the article 22 of the same law, municipal government officers may only be dismissed
from office in the following cases:
• if it is discovered that electoral procedures were violated;
• if they submit a written resignation;
• if they fail to fulfill the legal requirements for the position;
• if they are appointed to a position in a legislative, executive or judicial body;
• if they have been declared medically incompetent to fulfill official duties for more than four
months;
• if they fail to attend local government personnel meetings without due cause for a period of
time stipulated in the municipal charter.
Judicial protection of municipalities is also guaranteed by law. Citizens, local governments, municipal
agencies and officials may appeal against actions of state government agencies or other entities that
violate the rights of local self-government. In the absence of a special court devoted to issues of local
self-government, these claims are generally submitted to district and city courts. Economic disputes
between municipal governments and other legal entities are settled in economic courts.
Legislation may impose certain restrictions on local governments’ rights only in case of threat to the
constitutional regime or national security and for a set period of time. Current legislation does not
permit the dissolution of local self-governments prior to the expiration of the designated term. When
individual council members are dismissed from office in the specific cases mentioned above, the
municipal electoral commission must submit a request to the Central Electoral Commission to hold
new elections within three months.
10. Next Steps in the Transition Process
Municipal governments were instituted in a period of wide-ranging political reform in Azerbaijan
and therefore entered their existence on somewhat uncertain foundations. The resulting potential
for problems has only been confirmed by time. Although municipal governments have been created,
they are not significantly active and have little opportunity to become more so. This is reflected in
public perception: the majority of citizens believe that local self-governing institutions will not be
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able to fulfill their obligations under current conditions. If municipal governments in Azerbaijan are
to become viable, certain factors currently impeding their development must be eliminated.
The lack of properly structured state power is the primary obstacle to normally functioning municipal
government. Despite the division of powers stipulated in the Constitution, the legislative and
judiciary branches remain virtually subordinate to the executive branch. Under these circumstances,
Parliament is not in a position to adopt legislation that empowers municipal governments to act
independently, that is, potentially counter to state administration interests. Similarly, the judicial
branch cannot provide adequate legal protection when municipal rights are violated by the state
administration. A true balance of powers must therefore be instituted at the national level before
municipal autonomy can be realized.
Furthermore, the role and powers of municipalities in the national political system are imprecisely
defined in legislation. This confusion seriously hinders the passage of necessary legislation on local
government. Even if these laws were passed, they would not necessarily be effective.  Supremacy of
law does not always hold true in Azerbaijan, and many laws are ultimately purely formal.
Indifference on the part of the state government is yet another barrier to progress. Measures taken by
the state are often unsystematic and ineffective since state officials lack a clear concept of local
government. In addition, no government body responsible for local government issues has yet been
created.  However, this problem is under discussion, and the Office of the President and the Parliament
are expected to create internal divisions to coordinate local governments’ relations with the central
government. This possibility gives rise to hope that the government will begin to render significant
assistance to municipal governments.
The lack of finances is also a key source of difficulty for local governments. The central government
often does not allocate due subventions or delays the transfer of property to municipal ownership. In
general, current conditions do not allow local governments to carry out free economic activities. In
order to endow municipalities with financial independence, the state must provide for the financial
and economic demands of municipalities in the state budget and transfer a number of profitable
state enterprises to municipalities or allocate subsidies for municipalities to create their own enterprises.
Finally, free and universal municipal elections are one of the most important prerequisites for local
autonomy. The municipal elections held on 12 December 1999 were largely formal, as the majority
of elected municipal officers were in fact candidates backed by the existing executive authorities and
are therefore unable to act independently.
If the system of local governance in Azerbaijan is to meet international standards, these issues demand
resolution. Several initiatives have recently been submitted to central authorities to hasten solutions
to these problems. Both the Coordinating Council of Municipal Governments, which operates out of
Baku, and the Center of Municipal Reforms have sponsored similar proposals. Support from both local
government associations and the population at large have propelled these issues into prominent debate
in the mass media, giving rise to the hope that the government will take serious steps in this direction.
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Contacts for Further Information on Local Government in Azerbaijan
Parliamentary Commission on Local Self-government
Zakhid Garalov, Commission Chairman
Phone: (+994-12) 93-77-05
Commission Experts
Phone: (+994-12) 39-53-23
Zumrud Novruzova, Chief Consultant
Phone: (+994-12) 92-79-37
The Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Yusif Gumbatov, Chief of the Department of Local Self-government
Phone: (+994-12) 92-48-62
General Department
Phone: (+994-12) 92-42-88
E-mail: root@lider.baku.az
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Annex 7.1
Major General Indicators (1999)
Size of territory 86,600 square kilometers
Population 8,016,200
Pensioners 1,176,000
School-age children 1,848,300
Birth rate 1.1 percent
Population density 92.6 people per square kilometer
Public debt (foreign) USD 336,200,000
Unemployment rate 1.2 percent
Inflation rate 91.5 percent
Figure 7A.1
Administrative Map of Azerbaijan
Baku
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Annex 7.2
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
• Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan
• Law on Presidential Elections
• Law on Parlimentary Elections
• Law on the State Budget
• Law on State Debt
• Law on the State Taxation Service
• Law on the Armed Forces
• Law on the Border Guards
• Law on the National Bank of Azerbaijan
• Law on the Status of Members of Parliament
• Law on the Judiciary System
• Provision on Local Executive Authority
• Law on the Status of Municipalities
• Law on Municipal Elections
• Model Municipal Charter
• Law on Municipal Finance
• Law on Municipal Territories and Lands
• Law on the Transfer of Assets to Municipalities
• Law on Municipal Service
• Law on Local Referenda
400
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
Annex 7.3
Responsibilities of Administrative Tiers
Table 7A.1
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Azerbaijan*
Functions Municipalities District and City Central or State
(individually or Administrations Territorial
in partnership) Administration
I .  E D U C A T I O N
1. Pre-school X X
2. Primary X X
3. Secondary X X
4. Technical X
I I .  S O C I A L  W E L F A R E
1. Nurseries X X
2. Kindergartens X X
3. Welfare homes
4. Personal services for the elderly X X
and handicapped
I I I .  H E A LT H  S E R V I C E S
1. First aid X X
2. Heath services X X X
3. Hospitals X X
4. Public health
IV.  C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E ,  S P O R T S
1. Theaters X X
2. Museums X X
3. Libraries X X
4. Parks X X X
5. Sports, leisure X X X
6. Maintaining buildings X X X
for cultural events
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Table 7A.1 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Azerbaijan*
Functions Municipalities District and City Central or State
(individually or Administrations Territorial
in partnership) Administration
V.  E C O N O M I C  S E R V I C E S
1. Water supply X X X
2. Sewage X X
3. Electricity X X
4. Gas X X
5. District heating X X
V I .  E N V I R O N M E N T,  P U B L I C  S A N I TAT I O N
1. Waste collection X X
2. Waste disposal X X
3. Street cleaning X X
4. Cemeteries X X
5. Environmental protection X X X
V I I .  U R B A N  D E V E L O P M E N T
1. Town planning X X
2. Regional construction X
3. Local economic development X X
4. Tourism X X
 V I I I .  G E N E R A L  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
1. Authorization functions
(licenses, etc.)
2. Other state administrative X X
matters (electoral register, etc.)
3. Local police X
4. Fire brigades X
5. Civil defense X
6. Consumer protection X X X
* As may be seen in table 7A.1, the majority of local public services fall under the competence
of both state and municipal structures. However, the scope of powers exercised by the state
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and municipal structures still does not reflect modern standards. In addition, the table reflects
the range of powers delegated to local government by legislation; in reality, most local
governments have failed to fulfill these responsibilities.
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Local Government in Kazakhstan
Meruert Makhmutova
1. Major General Indicators
The Republic of Kazakhstan is located in the middle of the Eurasian landmass. Extending over a
territory of 2,725,000 square kilometers, it is the second largest republic of the former Soviet Union
and the ninth largest country in the world. The republic borders Russia to the north and northeast,
China to the southeast, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to the south.
According to a census taken in 1999, Kazakhstan has 14,953,000 inhabitants, fifty-six percent of
whom live in urban areas. Since 1991, the population has decreased by almost 1,500,000 people,
due to the social and economic crisis, which has produced migration and lower fertility rates. The
average population density is 5.5 people per square kilometer. Kazakhs compose the majority of the
population (53.4 percent), although Russians account for a significant minority (thirty percent).
The former capital, Almaty, remains a financial, business and cultural center with a population of
1,130,000. Astana, the new capital, has a population of 319,000 and is growing rapidly. Kazakh is
the official language, but is used co-extensively with Russian.
In Kazakhstan, there are fourteen oblasts (regions), two cities with special status, eighty-four cities,
thirty-nine of which are of national and oblast subordination; 160 raions (districts); ten city districts;
two hundred towns and 2,150 rural counties. More detailed information on the administrative-
territorial division and population of Kazakhstan may be found in annex 8.2.
Administrative-territorial division is the organizational, legal, social and economic basis for the system
of local government. The administrative-territorial structure in Kazakhstan is distinguished by its
traditional division into administrative units of equal status. According to legislation, all raion, city
and oblast administrations (akimats) have equal powers regardless of their economic potential,
population or size. Exceptions to this rule are Almaty and Astana, whose representative and executive
bodies are assigned broader powers by specific laws addressing the status of these cities.
After the capital was moved from Almaty to Astana, the government adopted a Law on the Special
Status of Astana City (1 July 1998), which stipulated financial, economic and social incentives to
ensure future development of the city. The same year also saw the passage of a Decree on the Status
of the Capital City of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In addition, the Law on Establishing Special
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Economic Zones (SEZ) in Astana had previously been passed on 9 October 1996. This law envisaged
a special legal regime of taxation and customs regulation, but was subsequently abolished on 1
January 2001. Shortly thereafter, on 15 January 2001, the Law on the Budget System was amended
to incorporate special procedures for formulating the Astana city budget.
Kazakhstan is divided into the following tiers of local government:
• Third (oblast) tier, which includes the local state administrations, that is, the executive and
representative bodies in fourteen oblasts and two cities, Almaty and Astana;
• Second (raion) tier, which includes the local state administrations, that is, the executive and
representative bodies in 160 raions and seventy-nine cites of raion status;
• First (rural) tier, which includes the local administrations, that is, executive bodies in towns,
villages (auls) and rural counties.
1.1 Overview of Social and Economic Reforms
Since the declaration of independence in December 1991, the economic, political and social structure
of Kazakhstan has experienced considerable change. (Major social and economic indices from 1991
to 2000 are listed in annex 8.1).
Until the introduction of the national currency, the country was completely dependent on the
social, economic and political transformations in Russia. In particular, the single currency environment
meant that monetary, crediting and budgetary policies were unavoidably dictated by the Central
Bank of Russia. With the launch of the Kazakh tenge (KZT) in November 1993, the government
was able to initiate an independent macroeconomic policy.
In 1994, the Kazakh government adopted an anti-crisis program for the purpose of promoting
macroeconomic stability and institutional transformation. At that point, the main focus was on
developing a legal and regulatory base for economic reform. Between 1995 and 1998, the government
undertook additional measures to create conditions for a market economy. Key documents included
a medium-term program for further reform of the banking system and programs for step-by-step
transfer of social and economic organizations to local budgets, for developing the securities’ market,
for promoting employment growth, for developing small and medium businesses, for supporting
entrepreneurial activity and for privatizing and restructuring entities in state ownership.
The practice of establishing special economic zones became widespread, as did the transfer of enterprises
into trust management by foreign companies. These companies consequently obtained preferential
rights to privatize these enterprises. Management of state funds was cardinally reformed and the
taxation system was modernized. Due to mass privatization, the share of the private sector in the
national GDP grew from twenty percent in 1994 to fifty-five percent in 1997.
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Implementation of these anti-crisis programs created the organizational, legal and economic pre-
requisites for a transition to market economy. However, reforms were often contradictory to one
another and faced many obstacles. Although they produced positive change in the economy and
society, they also generated negative consequences related to market transformation.
The country managed to achieve macroeconomic stabilization and in 1996, for the first time in five
years, GDP grew by 0.5 percent compared to the previous year. This trend strengthened in 1997 as
GDP increased by 1.7 percent and inflation declined to 11.3 percent. In comparison to 1991,
however, the level of GDP had decreased by almost half and the living standards of the overwhelming
majority of the population had deteriorated dramatically.
Nor was economic growth stable. Due to the impact of the financial crises in Russia and Southeast
Asia, the level of GDP decreased by 2.5 percent by the end of 1998. Kazakhstan pursued a policy
of supporting the overstated tenge rate at a time when national currencies were devalued in virtually
all the CIS countries, its main trade partners. This damaged the competitiveness of Kazakh goods in
both foreign and domestic markets, resulting in a further fall in production.
In 1999, the Kazakh government made the decision to float the tenge and enact a twofold budget
sequester, thereby achieving macroeconomic stability, a key precondition for revitalizing the real
economic sector. In 1999, per capita GDP was KZT 152,610.70, or USD 1,049.90. In 2000 the
production volume increased by 114.6 percent compared to 1999. As of 1 January 2000, the rate
of inflation stood at 9.8 percent and total national debt was approximately USD 4.5 billion, or USD
307 per capita.
At the beginning of 2000, there were 2,626,000 senior citizens in Kazakhstan; 3,376,800 students
in state and private schools; 8,597,000 citizens of working age; and 6,105,000 employed in the
economy. At that time, the minimum pension was KZT 3,000, an amount twelve percent lower
than the living wage.1  This was since increased to KZT 4,000 in 2001.
Poverty and unemployment remain urgent problems due to the steep decline in living standards
throughout the transition period. From 1991, when the Law on Minimal Consumer Budget was
revoked, until 1999, when the Law on the Living Wage was passed, legislation lacked a regulatory
definition of the living wage. In 1999 the real income of the population was only ten percent of the
1991 level. Low salaries, pensions and benefits placed the majority of the population on the brink of
survival. In 2000, the official unemployment figure was 231,400 people, or 3.7 percent of the
economically active population. However, the actual unemployment level, calculated according to
ILO methodology and taking into account self-employed individuals, approximated thirty percent.
Regional differences, which had always existed in Kazakhstan, became still more acute during the
transition process. Due to mixed results of the reform process, the social and economic disparities
among regions have widened, as shown in figure 8.1.
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  Figure 8.1
Per Capita GAV (Gross Added Value) by Oblast, 1999
[KZT thousands]
Per capita GAV is above average in Almaty city and Atyrau, Mangistau and Pavlodar oblasts. These
are industrially developed regions, rich in strategic resources. GAV production in Atyrau oblast alone
exceeds the combined levels of Akmola, Almaty, Zhambylskaya, Kzylorda and South Kazakhstan
oblasts.
Towns, medium-sized cities, remote rural areas and ecologically affected territories require special
attention. The economies of most towns and medium cities that developed around industrial objects
(Tekeli, Zhetikar, Zhanatas, Karatau and others) are in deep crisis and need active government support.
The major problems facing towns include the decline in production and living standards, the
growth of unemployment and continuing migration, especially of qualified specialists. In light of
these difficulties, local executive bodies are not equipped to lead their towns out of crisis independently.
Almost all agricultural raions fall into the category of areas in crisis. Unfortunately, programs to
support small towns are fragmentary, selective and short-term.
These issues may be resolved if the government is able to maintain stable growth. However, a steadily
growing national economy and politically stable society cannot be established without first equalizing
inter-regional differences, overcoming crisis phenomena and addressing the development lag in
certain territories. In order to facilitate sustainable, long-term economic development—a key goal of
state policy—the resource and production potential of the regions must be utilized more rationally
and thoroughly. The Kazakh government has passed a vast quantity of laws and resolutions over the
last ten years to regulate the social and economic development of regions. The content of this legal
base exhibits a transition from direct government management to more flexible mechanisms for
government regulation of local economy.
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Legislation aimed at promoting the real rights and responsibilities of local governments should both
strengthen regional authority and increase regional responsibility for the implementation of economic
reform.
2. Legal and Constitutional Basis
The process of local government reform in the former Soviet Union began in April 1990, with the
passage of the Law on General Principles of Local Self-government and Local Economy.
This law laid the foundations for the future reform of local government in Kazakhstan. On
15 December 1990, the Law on Property in the Kazakh SSR was adopted. According to this law,
property was subject to decentralization and could be classified as one of three categories: federal,
republic or local. Local property referred to communal assets which local councils could own, use and
dispose of on behalf of the given administrative-territorial unit. In addition, the councils of subordinate
territories obtained the right to own, use and dispose of assets in state ownership.
On 15 February 1991, the Law on Local Self-government and Local Councils in the Kazakh SSR
was passed. This law determined the material and financial basis of government and specifically
addressed the level of self-government in the following sections. The law established the supremacy
of representative bodies and assigned the chairman of the executive committee to the position of
local council chairman. It also established extra-judicial procedures to review and resolve disputes
between councils of different tiers. Higher-level councils were vested with the authority to review
and solve these issues, even though the same law provided for contractual relations and delegation of
powers by the mutual consent of the councils.
However, this law did not differentiate between local public administration and local self-government.
Local public administration was structured according to a uniform system of state power. Local
bodies of the state authority, including village and rural county councils were formed through local
elections and recognized as local self-governments. These representative bodies in turn established
local executive bodies.
Amendments to the Law on Local Self-government and Local Councils of Kazakh SSR for the
Transition Period were passed on 13 January 1992. The new law substituted the principle of
“differentiation between the functions and powers of representative and executive bodies” for the
previously stated principle of “supremacy of representative bodies.”
Interestingly enough, the Supreme Council adopted the Law on the Suspension of the Validity of
Some Constitution Norms during the Transition Period on the very same day. These norms were
related to structural changes in local governments and allowed the gradual differentiation of council
and executive body functions. The law introduced an institution of undivided authority, with the
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head of local administration accountable to the president or head of oblast administration and
controllable by the respective council.
The law particularly underscored the point that local councils “did not have the right to review issues
related to the competence of heads of administration,” and heads of local administration were no
longer “entitled to review the issues in the competence of the respective local councils.”
On February 7, 1992 the president signed a Decree on Improving the Organization and Activities
of Public Administration Bodies under the Conditions of Economic Reform. This decree established
for the first time a uniform structure of executive administration from the president to heads of local
administration and stipulated the responsibilities of the Cabinet of Ministers in the strategic supervision
of all executive power.
In the period between 1991 and 1993, local councils and newly established local administrations
vied with each other on many issues of local importance, often duplicating each other’s powers.
Consequently, heads of local administrations (akims) began to acquire more powers, while full-
fledged institutions of local self-government were absent. In the end, the introduction of administration
heads restored the vertical structure of executive power.
On 28 January 1993, the Supreme Council passed the first Constitution of the independent Republic
of Kazakhstan, which preserved local representative bodies and even declared their right to make
independent decisions within their competence.
Immediately prior to dissolving itself, the Supreme Council adopted the Law on Local Representative
and Executive Bodies (19 December 1993), which designated a completely new model of self-
government. First, the concepts of “state administration bodies” and “executive bodies formed by
the councils” disappeared entirely. Second, representative bodies (maslikhats) no longer created local
executive bodies and the head of local administration represented the president, not local citizens.
Third, representative bodies were formed at the oblast and raion levels only, not in rural settlements
(auls). These representative bodies were no longer called local self-governments, though they were
considered to represent the population and entitled to express and implement the will of local
inhabitants with due consideration of national interests. Fourth, the law replaced the concept of
“local self-government” with that of an “assembly of representatives of the citizens of a town or rural
county.” Nonetheless, the citizen assembly is the body that exercises government powers in rural
areas. This is only confirmed by the fact that the heads of rural administration establish the
representation quota for the assembly, convene the assembly at their own initiative or by the initiative
of at least one third of the members of the previous assembly and chair assembly sessions. The law
also establishes that assembly decisions within its competence are binding for all inhabitants residing
on the respective territory.
In essence, this law narrowed the concept of local self-government to the village level and then
stripped it of real meaning. Higher authorities, that is, raion, city and oblast maslikhats, remain
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agencies of public administration, despite the fact that they are called local representative bodies.
According to this law, oblast maslikhats became responsible for approving provisions on the bodies
of territorial self-government within their oblasts. This article was taken directly from the Law of
Kazakh SSR on Local Self-government prior to its amendment.
The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, adopted on 30 August 1995, established the
general principles and directions of public administration reform. According to the Constitution,
the Republic of Kazakhstan is a unitary state, a principle which determines its organizational structure.
The nation is governed by the president (article 2) and a bicameral Parliament composed of the
Senate and the Majilis (article 50). The government heads the system of executive bodies and
administers their activities (article 64). The structure of public administration is shown on Figure 8.1.
The Constitution also recognized the rights of local self-government (article 89) as well as local
government (article 85). Bodies of local public administration include local representative bodies
(oblast, raion and city maslikhats) and local executive bodies (oblast, raion and city akimats and rural
akims). Maslikhats express the will of the inhabitants in the respective administrative-territorial units
with due consideration of national interests, determine measures for its implementation and control
their realization (article 86). They are elected by inhabitants of the respective administrative-territorial
unit through general, equal and direct vote by secret ballot for a term of four years.  The number of
maslikhat members is determined by the Central Electoral Commission of Kazakhstan within the
following limits: up to fifty in the maslikhats of oblasts, Astana and Almaty; up to thirty in city
maslikhats; and up to twenty-five in raion maslikhats.
According to article 87 of the Constitution, the akim of the administrative-territorial unit heads the
local executive authorities and represents the president and government of the republic.
In closing, the Constitution stipulated that current legislation must be made to conform to
constitutional provisions within a two-year period. It was thus imperative to pass the Law on Local
Public Administration and the Law on Local Self-government. However, draft laws remained under
discussion in Parliament for five years, creating a legislative gap with regard to the regulation of local
public administration and self-government issues.
The Law on Local Public Administration in Kazakhstan was finally passed in January 2001, outlining
the following basic concepts:
Local public administration is defined as activities carried out by local representative and executive
bodies in order to implement or develop state policy on local territory within their competence as
determined by legislation.
The local executive branch, or akimat, is headed by oblast-level akims (including akims of Almaty
and Astana cities) or raion-level akims (including akims in cities of oblast subordination), who implement
local public administration on the respective territory within their competence. Akims represent the
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president and government of Kazakhstan and head the local executive body. They are responsible
for realizing state policy within local territory, for coordinating territorial divisions of central
administration agencies and for administering executive bodies funded from the local budgets.
Furthermore, the akim is also responsible for economic and social development in the given territory.
Figure 8.2
Structure of Public Administration in Kazakhstan
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The local representative body, or maslikhat, is elected by the inhabitants of the oblast or raion. This
body expresses the will of the citizens, determines measures to realize this will and controls their
implementation. Villages and small towns do not possess maslikhats.
This law also enumerates the major obligations and limits applying to local representative and
executive bodies. They may not make decisions that contradict national foreign, internal, financial
and investment policies; they must support the interests of national security in Kazakhstan; they
must adhere to established national standards for activities of national importance; and they must
observe the rights and legal interests of citizens. Maslikhats and akimats are prohibited from making
decisions that impede the creation of uniform labor, capital and financial markets and the free
exchange of goods and services within Kazakhstan. Territorial development plans passed by maslikhats
or akimats should correspond to national strategic development plans.
In addition, the Laws on the Status of the Capital City of Kazakhstan and on the Special Status of
Almaty City grant further powers to those local executive bodies.
3. Local Politics, Decision Making
3.1 Public Participation in Decision Making
Citizens exercise their right to participate in the local decision making process through maslikhat
elections. Citizens over eighteen years old have the right to vote. Citizens over twenty may run for
election to maslikhats at all levels, but are prohibited from being a member of more than one
maslikhat at a time (article 86, item 3 of the Constitution). As members of the maslikhat, they express
the will of local inhabitants with due consideration of national interests (article 20 of the Law on
Local Public Administration). Public participation in the elections is voluntary.
The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan stipulates for national referenda as a form of direct
democracy. Article 3, item 2 specifies that people exercise their power through national referenda,
while article 33, items 2 and 3 stipulate the right of citizens to participate in national referenda. The
law does not envisage local referenda.
Kazakh legislation proclaims the right of citizens to participate in issues of state administration
directly and indirectly through representatives. Citizens may appeal individually or collectively to
their public administration bodies and local self-governments. Article 87 of the Constitution even
grants local inhabitants the right to impeach the akim through the local maslikhat. However, this is
not so easily done in practice and thus far there have been no such instances in Kazakhstan.
Also, citizens may propose issues to be discussed in maslikhat sessions or by its standing commissions,
either to their representatives in meetings with their constituency or to local self-government bodies
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and agencies. Citizens may submit inquiries or appeals to the local executive bodies and agencies
located in the territory of the respective maslikhat on issues within its competence.
The role of citizens in decision making is primarily exercised in maslikhat elections. Candidates may
be nominated by the managing bodies of national or local community associations. Citizens may also
nominate themselves.
Community associations may nominate only one candidate per electoral district. The decision to
nominate candidates to a maslikhat is passed by the majority vote of all members of a local community
association or its managing body. The candidate does not necessarily have to be a member of the
community association. In addition, citizen assemblies with at least fifty eligible members residing
within rural or urban communities have the right to nominate candidates to local self-governments.
Parties may also participate in the local decision making process. Maslikhat members are entitled to
establish associations within the maslikhat, in the form of political factions (article 21 of the Law on
Local Public Administration). These groups must number at least five maslikhat members and be
registered at the maslikhat session. The organization of their activities and various powers are determined
by maslikhat regulations.
In recent years, public hearings have been used to facilitate citizen involvement in the decision
making process. In May 1999, Pavlodar oblast held the first public hearing of a local budget in
Kazakhstan,2  enabling its citizens to comment on changes to be made to the draft budget awaiting
passage by the akimat and maslikhat. The cities of Atyrau and Uralsk hold public hearings to discuss
changes to tariffs for communal services.3  The methodology behind such hearings has been introduced
by USAID/ICMA, who are currently implementing a four-year project on the Development of
Local Governments in Kazakhstan, launched in 1998.
Article 13 of the Law on Local Public Administration currently determines that standing commissions
may organize public hearings to discuss key issues of public importance within the commission’s
jurisdiction, either at their own initiative or by decision of the maslikhat. These hearings may take the
form of commission meetings which have been expanded to include maslikhat members, representa-
tives of executive bodies, local self-governments, organizations, mass media and inhabitants. The
procedures for public hearings at commission meetings is determined by maslikhat regulations.
According to current legislation, there are no obstacles to the establishment of voluntary associations.
Nonetheless, no local government associations have yet been registered in Kazakhstan. A Coordination
Council4  of secretaries from oblast, Almaty and Astana maslikhats has been established and took part
in the discussion and amendment of the draft Law on Public Administration. However, this council
has not been registered. An Association of Civil Servants is in the process of being established.
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According to the Law on Local Public Administration, “local self-governed communities can found
local community associations according to established procedures in order to coordinate their activities
and more actively participate in regional policy. However, these associations do not possess the
powers of local self-government bodies.”
Some oblast centers have condominium associations that protect the rights and interests of inhabitants
and ensure that the housing stock is properly maintained. One such organization in Ust-Kamenogorsk
began a project on “Determining the Institutional Status of and Local Taxation Policy towards
Condominium Associations” with the financial support of the Soros Foundation. They were able to
organize a broad discussion of existing problems involving condominium association heads,
inhabitants, representatives of public administration and agencies which deliver communal services.
It is planned to create an efficient model of condominium associations within the system of local self-
government.
Because Kazakhstan is home to representatives of over one hundred nationalities, the Assembly of
Nationalities in Kazakhstan and its regional offices were established to deal with multi-national
issues. Some forty cultural centers (Russian, German, Ukrainian, Polish, Tatar, Azeri and others) exist
throughout the country.
There are roughly 1,400 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Kazakhstan. Some are large,
active organizations, especially in the field of ecology, due to the scale of ecological problems facing
Kazakhstan. However, it cannot be said that NGOs have any significant impact on local decision
making or that akims cooperate with them closely. It is possible that their importance will increase
with the development of public hearings.
3.2 Methods of Appointing or Electing Akims
Amendments entered in the Constitution in 1998 stipulate that akims in oblasts, Almaty and
Astana are appointed by the president upon nomination by the prime minister, and may be dismissed
by the president. Their mandate terminates when a new president takes office, although they
continue to perform their duties until new akims are appointed. Akims of other administrative-
territorial units are either appointed or elected according to procedures determined by the president.
The constitutional amendments thus introduced the legal basis for elected akims for the first time.
This option is not yet widely in use; to date, only Shamalgan rural district, the home district of the
current president, has elected an akim.
Until recently, all akims of lower-level governments have been appointed by superior akims: the
akims of Almaty and Astana cities appointed akims in their city districts; oblast akims appointed akims
in raions and cities of oblast subordination; and raion akims appointed akims to villages and towns.
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Table 8.1
Status of Akims in Villages, Towns and Cities
Akim of village or town ****
Akim of city of raion subordination ****
Akim of city of oblast subordination ****
Akim of city, capital city or city of central subordination ****
Akim heading the corresponding mashlikat —
* elected by the maslikhat
** elected by the maslikhat upon proposal of the state administration
*** elected by inhabitants
**** appointed by the head of the state or heads of superior administrations
***** simultaneously acts as maslikhat chairman
The Law on Local Public Administration passed in January 2001 reflects the constitutional provisions
and procedures to appoint akims in oblasts, Almaty and Astana remain unchanged. Similarly, as set
forth in the constitutional amendments, lower-level akims are appointed or elected according to
procedures determined by the president. So once again, the law referred to an opportunity to elect
heads of executive bodies. Exactly how this opportunity should be realized—through direct elections
of akims by the inhabitants of the respective administrative-territorial units, indirect elections by
maslikhats or appointment by maslikhats—will probably be specified soon.
3.3 Relationships between Elected and Appointed Local Government Bodies
The Constitution stipulates the mechanisms governing interactions and interdependence between
the akim and maslikhat. For instance, article 87, item 5 establishes that the maslikhat “has the right
to pass a vote of no confidence in the akim by a majority of two-thirds of all members and to request
his or her dismissal from office from the president or superior akim.” The vote of no confidence may
be passed after the maslikhat twice fails to approve the akim’s reports on the implementation of
plans, the local budget or economic and social development programs for the territory.
Article 88 of the Constitution determines that draft maslikhat decisions on the reduction of local
budget revenues or increase of local budget expenditures can be submitted for review only with a
positive resolution by the akim.
According to the Law on Public Administration, oblast-level akimats develop regional social and
economic development programs and oblast budgets and report on their implementation. The
akimat submits these documents for approval by the maslikhat, along with the structure of the local
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administration. The maslikhat exercises control over the implementation of plans, economic and
social development programs and local budgets. Maslikhat members are entitled to present inquiries
or appeals on issues within its competence to local executive bodies or organizations located on its
territory. They may request to hear reports from local executive officials or representatives of
organizations located on its territory on issues within its competence. They may also participate in
akimat sessions. The akimat and officials of organizations or territorial offices of central state
administration financed from the local budget are obliged to provide the required information to
standing maslikhat commissions within their competence and according to established procedures.
The akimat staff is approved at oblast level maslikhat sessions. Maslikhats review reports from heads
of executive bodies and may submit requests to law enforcement bodies in order to call government
officials or organizations to account for their failure to implement maslikhat decisions.
The akimat develops programs to support employment and reduce poverty, submits them to the
maslikhat for approval and subsequently oversees their implementation. The akimat also establishes
a list of staff for consultative and deliberative bodies responsible for intersectoral issues and presents
it to the maslikhat for approval.
Oblast-level akimats are accountable to their corresponding maslikhat for performance of their
functions, according to article 27, item 3 of the Law on Local Public Administration. Akimats of
raions and cities of oblast subordination are likewise accountable to the raion or city maslikhat (article
31, item 3).
3.4 Internal Structure of Local Government Decision Making
The maslikhat makes decisions within its competence (article 7 of the Law on Local Public Administ-
ration). Draft maslikhat resolutions on the reduction of local budget revenues or increase of local
budget expenditures can be submitted for review only by positive resolution of the akim. Maslikhat
decisions on the rights, freedoms and duties of citizens shall be officially published according to
legally established procedures and are binding in the respective territory. Maslikhat decisions that are
of intersectoral importance, obligatory for all inhabitants or related to the rights, freedoms and duties
of citizens are subject to registration with territorial offices of the Ministry of Justice, according to
legally established procedures.
Although there is no vertical hierarchy for maslikhats, decisions of superior maslikhats are strictly
compulsory for lower ones. Maslikhat decisions that contradict the Kazakh Constitution or legislation
can be revoked by court or by the maslikhat itself.
The akimat issues resolutions signed by the akim, who is empowered to make regulatory or legal
decisions and issue instructions on administrative, operational and individual issues. Acts of akimats
and akims within their competence are mandatory throughout the local territory (article 37 of the
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Law on Local Public Administration), although they can be suspended by the public prosecutor.
Any acts concerning the rights, freedoms and duties of citizens are subject to official publication in
newspapers and other periodicals as determined by the maslikhat or akim, unless they contain state
secrets or other legally protected confidential information
Akimat or akim acts that are of intersectoral importance, obligatory for all inhabitants or related to the
rights, freedoms and duties of citizens are subject to registration with territorial offices of the Ministry
of Justice, according to legally established procedures. The effect of akimat or akim resolutions may
be cancelled or suspended in full or in part by the president, the government of Kazakhstan, court
decision, a superior akimat or akim or the akimat and akim themselves.
Regulatory legal acts of local representative and executive bodies take effect upon being signed by
authorized persons.
At the recent workshop of secretaries of oblast, Almaty and Astana maslikhats, the Minister of Justice
stated that, “The quality of the locally adopted regulations leaves much to be desired. Fifteen to twenty
percent of raion-level decisions are not registered. Every third or fourth act is returned without registration
and one can only guess how many illegally passed decisions are effective in our republic. All losses
caused by illegal decisions have to be covered by the state budget after being cancelled by the court.”5
3.5 System of Elections
The system of elections is governed by the Constitutional Law on Elections. According to this law,
elections of the president, members of the Majilis and maslikhats are based on general, equal and
direct vote by secret ballot. Senators are elected through indirect vote by secret ballot, by a group of
electors which includes members of all relevant maslikhats.
The Majilis consists of seventy-seven members, sixty-seven of whom are elected in one-mandate
electoral districts, established according to administrative-territorial divisions with approximately
equal populations. The remaining ten members are elected nationwide based on party lists, according
to a system of proportional representation.
For the first time, political parties were involved in the most recent national elections, which were
held on 10 October 1999 and 24 October 1999. Out of seventy-seven members elected to the
Majilis,6 forty-three were nominated by political parties, eight by trade unions and public associations
and twenty-six were self-declared. Pro-government parties—the Otan, Civil and Agrarian parties—
received eighty percent of Parliament seats.
Maslikhat elections are held only in one-mandate districts and do not involve party lists. In addition,
electoral legislation specifies elections for local self-governments, should they be established. Candidates
for local self-governments should be capable citizens of at least eighteen years of age, and may be
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nominated by rural or urban citizen assemblies or by the candidates themselves. Candidates are
considered to have won the election if they obtain a relative majority of votes. However, these norms
are not in use due to the absence of any self-government institutions per se.
Members of Central Electoral Commission (CEC) are elected or dismissed from office by the Majilis
upon nomination by the president. The CEC establishes and administers oblast electoral commissions
based on proposals of oblast-level akims. Lower territorial electoral commissions are formed by the
decision of superior territorial electoral commissions on the proposal of the respective akim.
Public associations have the right to nominate maslikhat candidates. Alternatively, candidates may
nominate themselves by submitting an application to the corresponding electoral commission. No
other pledge or collection of signatures is required to support self-nomination. Candidates for maslikhats
may be released from their employment, military service or military training. They cannot be fired,
transferred to other positions without their consent, sent on business trips or sent to military camp.
Individuals called to account for corruption-related violations in the preceding year may not register
as candidates. Nor may individuals who have outstanding convictions or who have received official
reprimands from the courts for deliberate violations in the preceding year.
Maslikhat elections are financed from the national budget. Elections may not be financed by inter-
national organizations, international public associations, foreign legal entities or individuals without
Kazakh citizenship. All direct or indirect participation of these parties in funding elections is prohibited,
as are voluntary contributions from state bodies and organizations, charity funds, religious associations
or any legal entities with foreign investment in their authorized capital stock.
Akims determine electoral precincts in order to hold elections and calculate votes in coordination
with the district electoral commissions. These precincts are created with consideration of the following
conditions:
• No constituency should have more than three thousand voters;
• The boundaries of administrative-territorial units should be observed;
• Boundaries of electoral districts should not overlap boundaries of electoral precincts.
Authorized representatives of each candidate may be present at each electoral precinct, as well as one
representative each from mass media organizations, public associations, foreign states and international
organizations.
Members of electoral commissions or representatives of public associations may appeal violations of
electoral legislation or other issues related to the elections. These appeals are submitted to the courts
or to the public prosecutor’s office, which must review them within five days. Appeals received five
days prior to the elections, up to the day of elections itself, must be reviewed immediately. Should a
candidate or political party violate legal requirements, they receive a warning. If these violations
continue, the electoral commission strikes the registration of the candidate or party list.
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In general, the electoral system in Kazakhstan is not entirely democratic. Authorities have the
opportunity to “correct” election results through using government-controlled media, manipulating
public opinion in rural areas, placing obstacles in the path of “undesirable” candidates and providing
advantages to preferred ones. Several experts were surveyed after they had assessed the results of the
most recent elections. Sixty-five percent responded that the numerous violations during the elections
were primarily preconditioned by the desire of local authorities to hinder opposition candidates;
62.5 percent attributed them to the authorities’ habit of regulating all public processes according to
their will; 32.5 percent ascribed them to flaws in current electoral legislation; and 32.5 percent
credited the low level of democracy in Kazakh society.7
The last elections confirmed a pattern first observed in Kazakhstan during the referenda of 1995.
One expert observed that “Almaty appears to be the most critically disposed, while it is the most
socially safe region; on the contrary, the poorest regions unconditionally support the authorities.
Obviously, this difference is explained by a higher degree of community control over the elections.”8
4. Functional Structure of Local Government
The organizational structure of public administration is detailed above in figure 8.2.
4.1 Local Maslikhats
4.1.1 Maslikhat Functions
The major functions of local councils are specified in the Constitution and further detailed in the
Law on Local Public Administration. Maslikhat responsibilities include the following:
• to approve plans, local economic and social development programs and local budgets, including
cost estimates for the maintenance of districts within cities of central subordination, towns,
villages and rural counties;
• to approve programs for environmental protection and management of natural resources; to
approve expenditures on environmental protection and rehabilitation and solve other issues
on environmental protection according to legislation;
• to approve the management structure of the administrative-territorial unit, upon submission
by the akim;
• to solve issues of local administrative-territorial organization within its competence and determine
the boundaries of local community organizations;
• to coordinate the staff of a respective akimat upon proposal by the akim;
• to discuss reports from heads of executive bodies or request law enforcement bodies to call
officials of state agencies or organizations to account for their failure to fulfill maslikhat decisions;
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• to exercise their powers according to the legislation of Kazakhstan to ensure the rights and legal
interests of the citizens;
• to approve regulations and courses of disciplinary action for their violation, in accordance with
the Administrative Violations Code of Kazakhstan;
• to control the implementation of plans, local economic and social development programs and
the local budget;
• to establish standing commissions and other bodies and review their reports; to solve other
issues related to the organization of maslikhat activities;
• to approve programs to support employment and reduce poverty;
• to approve the staff of consultative and deliberative akimat bodies on intersectoral issues, upon
nomination by the akim;
• to regulate land relationships in accordance with the land legislation of Kazakhstan;
• to facilitate observance of the Constitution, national legislation, presidential and government
decrees and legal acts of central and local governments.
Maslikhats have the right to pass compulsory regulations, the violation of which is subject to administra-
tive action. The new Administrative Code adopted on 30 January 2001 lists the following such
regulations: rules of maintenance and protection for newly planted trees (article 300); veterinary
legislation (article 310); rules for keeping cats and dogs (article 311); municipal improvement in
cities and settlements and the destruction of city infrastructure objects (article 387); violation of an
emergency regime (article 362); and actions that provoke violation of the public order under emer-
gency conditions (article 362).
Maslikhats of oblasts, cities of republican subordination and the capital city may propose to amend
the urban planning scheme in oblasts; draft the urban plan of the oblast capital, city of republican
subordination or capital city; and endorse plans submitted by their subordinate administrations for
urban planning of cities and raions within their particular territorial competence.
Raion maslikhats approve the urban plans for the cities, towns and auls located on the territory of the
respective raion.
Maslikhats of oblasts, cities of republican subordination and the capital city have the right to decide
on local borrowing, upon proposal by the akimat and in accordance with the legislation.
4.1.2 Structure of Maslikhat Activities
The maslikhat exercises its authorities in maslikhat sessions, convened at least four times a year, through
its standing commissions and other bodies and through its session chairman, members and secretary.
The maslikhat elects and dismisses the session chairman and secretary and reviews their reports;
establishes standing commissions and other bodies; elects and dismisses commission chairmen and
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reviews their reports; determines expenditures to maintain its activities; approves the acts of the audit
commission; approves the structure of the maslikhat office; and determines expenditures on main-
tenance, material and technical supplies in accordance with the legally established staff and funding
limits.
The chairman of the electoral commission opens the first session of the maslikhat and acts as chair
until the election of the maslikhat session chairman. Decisions are made by majority vote. Sessions are
typically open, although the decision to hold a closed session may be proposed by the chairman or
a third of the members present and approved by the vote of a majority of the members present.
Session chairmen may invite heads of local executive bodies, managers or officials of local organizations
to the maslikhat session to provide information on issues within maslikhat competence. Attendance
is obligatory in these cases.
The maslikhat creates no more than seven standing commissions for the duration of its mandate and
determines their staff. The session chairmen and members of standing commissions are elected by
the maslikhat from among its members. These commissions are accountable to the maslikhat and
should report on their activities at least once per annum.
Standing commissions may draw up conclusions on issues within their competence and submit
them to the maslikhat session for review. They may present reports related to their specific duties at
maslikhat sessions and, within their competence, propose that the maslikhat hear reports from the
heads of local executive bodies.
The audit commission plays an important role in the organization of maslikhat activities. This com-
mission is elected in order to control implementation of the local budget and may include individuals
outside the maslikhat. On the basis of audit results, the audit commission drafts a certificate and
provides it to the maslikhat and akimat for their information.
The maslikhat and secretary are entitled to set up interim commissions to prepare issues within maslikhat
competence for review at maslikhat sessions. The composition of these commissions, their tasks, term
of office and rights are determined by the maslikhat upon their establishment. Interim commissions
make resolutions within their competence. Participation in the work of interim commission is unpaid.
Chairmen of maslikhat sessions are elected by the maslikhat from its members by open vote at a
preceding session and exercise their duties freely. In case of his or her absence, these functions are
performed by the maslikhat secretary. Maslikhat members may not be elected session chairman more
than twice per calendar year.
The maslikhat secretary plays a key role, overseeing daily maslikhat operations. The secretary occupies
a full-time position. He or she is elected by the maslikhat from among its members for the duration
of its term of office and may also be dismissed by the maslikhat session. The secretary prepares issues
to be discussed at the maslikhat sessions and makes any other necessary arrangements; supports
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members in the performance of their duties; provides them with all necessary information; and
handles issues concerning the release of members from their regular jobs in order to allow them to
participate in the maslikhat sessions, standing commissions and other bodies. The secretary controls
the review of member inquiries and appeals, supervises the operations of the maslikhat office and
appoints and dismisses its staff. The secretary regularly provides the maslikhat with information on
appeals from voters and measures taken in response; organizes cooperation between the maslikhat
and local self-governments; coordinates activities of the standing commissions and other member
groups; and represents the maslikhat in its relations with state bodies, organizations, local self-
governments and public associations. The secretary issues instructions within his competence, ensures
that maslikhat resolutions are published and determines measures to control their implementation.
The maslikhat secretary cannot be a member of any standing commissions. In the absence of the
secretary, the chairman of maslikhat sessions may temporarily assign his or her powers to the chairman
of one of the standing commissions.
A small office may be established to support maslikhat functions. Its structure and staff depend on
the level, nature and volume of its duties. According to article 25 of the Law on Local Public Admi-
nistration, the maslikhat office provides organizational, legal, material, technical and other support to
the maslikhat and its bodies and otherwise assists its members in the performance of their duties. The
maslikhat office is a governmental body funded through the local budget. The minimum number
of public servants in the office is three; the maximum is determined according to the size of the
maslikhat by a ratio of one official to seven maslikhat members.
Civil servants in maslikhats perform their duties in accordance with the Law on Civil Service and
retain their positions after the term of maslikhat expires or is terminated prematurely.
4.2 Local Administration
4.2.1 Local Administration at the Oblast Level
Oblast-level akimats, including akimats of cities of central subordination, form part of the uniform
system of state administration. The akimat is created and headed by the akim and consists of
deputies, the chief of staff and heads of local budgetary institutions. Akims themselves are appointed
by the president upon nomination by the prime minister. They represent the interests of their oblast
or city in interactions with government agencies, organizations and citizens. They coordinate activities
of lower-level akimats and akims and cooperate with the local self-governments through lower-level
akims.  The akim appoints and dismisses the following officials:
• deputy akims, in coordination with the authorized superior government bodies. The maximum
number of deputies is determined by the government of Kazakhstan;
• the chief of the akim’s office and the heads of its structural divisions;
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• heads of executive bodies financed from the oblast-level budget, excluding military positions,
positions in uniformed services or other special ranks. The heads of divisions of interior services
funded from the local budgets are appointed and dismissed in accordance with Kazakh legislation.
Akims are empowered to license business activities in cases specified by legislation and according to
legally established procedures. Akims also organize measures to ensure compliance with legislation on
universal military service, civil defense, mobilization preparations and mobilization itself. Akims take
part in signing contracts for the privatization, lease or sale of enterprises, deposits and other state-
owed assets and exercise control over their implementation, together with the authorized state agency.
In oblast-level governments, as well as raions or cities of oblast subordination, the office of the akim
provides information, analytical, organizational, legal, material and technical support. The office of
the akim is a state institution funded through the local budget and is established, dissolved or
reorganized by the akim. If the akim should be dismissed from office, Kazakh legislation regulates the
employment of the civil servants within the akim’s office as well as terms for appointing a new akim.
Territorial agencies of the central state administration are structural divisions which perform central
administration functions within the administrative-territorial unit. Heads of territorial agencies funded
from the national budget are appointed directly by the head of the central agency, without coordination
with the akim. This measure is intended to increase the responsibility of central government members
for regional staff policy.
The akim establishes, dissolves and reorganizes executive bodies funded through local budgets and
determines the scope and organization of their activities.
An approximate list of the divisions, directorates and departments in oblasts, Almaty and Astana has
been drafted and approved by the national government. Based on this list, akims develop corres-
ponding administration structures. Figure 8A.1 in annex 8.2 provides an example of an oblast
administration structure submitted by the akim to the maslikhat for approval. 9
Oblast executive bodies include the office of the akim, the archives and the departments of public
administration, health care, land use, industry, trade and business development, local economy,
transport and communications, local property, culture, medical services, education, agriculture,
social protection, labor, tourism and sports, finance, economy, interior affairs and the administrative
department of the akim.
Territorial divisions of central administration include the department of the Committee for National
Security; committees on state property and privatization, on the regulation of natural monopolies
and the protection of competition, on land resource management and on taxes; and the departments
of migration and demography, customs, protection of environmental resources, information and
public relations, treasury, tax police, forestry, justice, environmental protection, emergencies, statistics
and agriculture.
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In accordance with legislation, the akim may decide whether to pursue disciplinary action for
administrative violations by heads of local budgetary institutions or lower-level akims. Penalties may
also be imposed on employees of the interior services funded from local budgets in accordance with
the legislation.
The oblast level is responsible to the president and government of Kazakhstan for issues within his
competence and within the jurisdiction of the oblast-level akimat. Akims may delegate some of their
authorities to lower-level akims.
4.2.2 Local Administration at the Raion Level
Raion-level akims, including akims in cities of oblast subordination, head the raion or city akimat,
which they constitute from deputy akims, the head of the raion akim’s office and heads of local
executive bodies. Akimat members may also include heads of territorial divisions of oblast-funded
bodies in coordination with the heads of their superior institutions. Heads of territorial agencies of
the central administration may also participate in akimat activities and possess a deliberative vote.
Raion-level akimats are accountable to their corresponding maslikhat for performance of their functions.
Raion-level akimats are also accountable to the president, government and oblast akim for exercise of
the powers conferred on them upon their appointment as well as other responsibilities derived from
their subordinated territories. The structure of a raion-level administration should be approved by
the oblast akim (figure 8A.2 provides a sample organizational chart of a raion akimat). Raion administra-
tion bodies may include the office of the raion akim; a department of the interior, a department of
education and directorates for communal economy, agriculture, social policy, finance and economy.
Akims in raions or cities of raion subordination develop their administrative structures and submit
them for the approval to raion maslikhats.
4.2.3 Local Administration at the Sub-raion Level
The following levels of government—city districts in cities of central subordination, cities of raion
subordination, towns, villages and rural counties—do not possess akimats. Instead, the akims of
these territorial units are responsible for reviewing the appeals, applications and complaints of local
inhabitants; for undertaking measures to protect the rights and freedoms of local citizens; and for
ensuring the collection of taxes and other obligatory fees. In addition, akims estimate overhead costs
for their offices, including expenditures for maintaining the administrative-territorial unit, and
submit these cost estimates for approval to their corresponding maslikhat.
The akim ensures compliance with the Constitution and laws of Kazakhstan by citizens and legal
entities; regulates land relationships within his or her competence; organizes construction and repair
of housing stock; oversees the operation and maintenance of roads; supports the establishment of
peasants’ farms and the development of entrepreneurial activities; ensures compliance with legislation
on universal military service and civil defense; organizes notary services; registers acts of civil status
according to legally established procedures; arranges for the preservation of historical and cultural
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heritage; submits proposals to superior bodies on assistance to socially vulnerable population groups;
facilitates the development of local social infrastructure; organizes public transportation and regulates
traffic; and cooperates with local self-government bodies.
These akims are accountable to superior akims and the maslikhats of raions, cities, cities of republican
subordination and the capital city for issues within their competence. They are appointed or elected
according to procedures determined by the president of Kazakhstan.
4.3 Local Administration in Cities with Special Status
In 1998, the Kazakh government passed the Law on the Status of the Capital City of Kazakhstan
and the Law on the Special Status of Almaty City. These laws established the legal, organizational,
political and economic basis for the functioning of the two cities and granted additional powers to
their maslikhats and akimats.
Article 3 of the Law on the Status of Capital City outlines the powers of the Astana city akim and
maslikhat. The law confers additional powers on the executive bodies which underscore the special
legal status of the capital and its representative and executive bodies. These include the power to
develop measures for ecological safety and control their implementation. In addition, the local
administration is responsible for providing government bodies or diplomatic representative offices
with land for their construction needs or with other locally owned buildings, structures or facilities
in accordance with legally established procedures.
Until recently, a free economic zone (FEZ) was effective in Astana. The FEZ Administrative Council,
headed by a chairman appointed and dismissed by the president, was responsible for administrative
issues throughout the territory of the FEZ. However, throughout the lifetime of the FEZ, there were
no council chairmen that could function alongside the akims. FEZ were created within city or raion
boundaries. The Astana city akim was also chairman of the FEZ Administrative Council, and the
Administrative Council itself was a special executive body within the administrative-territorial unit,
appointed and dismissed by the president, with very little relevance to the local or oblast akims. Its
specific responsibilities included registering economic objects within its territory, opening
representative offices outside FEZ territory, forming and allocating FEZ financial funds, attracting
domestic and foreign investment and regulating relationships between economic entities. All decisions
of the Administrative Council made within its competence were binding for legal and physical
entities located in FEZ territory.
The Astana city maslikhat approves the city budget, budget execution reports and social and economic
development programs, taking into consideration the particular functions of the capital city as well
as the structure of the city administration. These powers are essentially the same as the legally
established powers for other maslikhats of this level. Local property forms the economic basis for the
implementation of capital city functions.
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The Almaty city maslikhat determines fines and procedures for administrative violations committed
on the territory of Almaty. In addition, the maslikhat establishes fees and regulations for the use of
Almaty city symbols by legal and physical entities in their brand names and trademarks, approves the
register of historical and cultural monuments of local importance in coordination with the state
organization on the protection of historical and cultural heritage; and approves regulation of the
migration process within its territory.
The Almaty city akimat approves the list of local property not assigned to communal legal entities;
owns, uses and disposes of the state share of economic entities registered in Almaty, excluding legal
entities determined by the government; privatizes local property according to legally established
procedures; issues licenses to public catering enterprises, casinos, bookmakers, fuel stations, tourist
agencies, local lotteries and organizations that provide disinfecting services. The Almaty city akimat
also licenses medical practices, veterinary activities, motor transportation for passengers or cargo and
activities which attract a foreign labor force or export the local labor force. In addition, the akimat
authorizes institutions of secondary and specialized education to issue diplomas for certain professions
in accordance with government established procedures. The above list of functions contains a great
number of central government responsibilities that have been delegated to the Almaty city akimat.
4.4 Control, Audit and Supervision of Local Governments
The president exercises presidential control directly or through his administration and appoints
akims in oblasts, Almaty and Astana upon nomination by the prime minister. The president has
more compelling authority over akims than does the government, as confirmed by his constitutional
right to dismiss akims at his discretion (article 87, item 4 of the Constitution).
Logically, akims should be accountable to the government, as the local executive branch is a component
in the uniform system of executive power. However, akims are also required to report to the president
and fulfill presidential orders. This creates a situation in which dual subordination replaces a clear
hierarchy and responsibility to the president prevails.
Even though the president is empowered to exercise control over akims, he has neither the resources
nor the time to supervise all akim activities and may not dismiss them without due grounds. State
inspectors are assigned to oblasts but are not able to control the performance of all akims in oblasts
and rural areas as well. This creates a situation in which akims may avoid responsibility to either
president or government. Akims should report to the government, which in turn should report to
the president.
Kazakh legislation does not envisage any parliamentary control over local government activities.
Upon the proposal of the attorney general, the Senate has the right to terminate the authority of a
maslikhat before the expiration of its mandate. The central government controls compliance with
legislation within its constitutional powers. The Ministry of Justice and its territorial offices register
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local government acts. Central bodies perform sectoral control over subordinate divisions of local
executive bodies. In accordance with the vertical hierarchy governing executive bodies, control is
exercised from the top down.
Maslikhats are not bound by vertical subordination. Nevertheless, the administrative-territorial
structure means that oblast maslikhats can implement their policy through city maslikhats as well as
their own subordinate structures. Decisions of a superior maslikhat are binding for lower-level
maslikhats, provided that they do not contradict legislation. However, the superior maslikhat may
not interfere in the competence of the lower-level body. Even if the lower maslikhat adopts an illegal
decision, it may only be cancelled though legally established court procedures, not by the superior
maslikhat.
Maslikhat standing commissions do not possess any control functions. The law stipulates their right
“to propose that the maslikhat hear reports from local executive bodies at the maslikhat session.”
These hearings, however, do not encompass sanctions.
Maslikhats and akimats exercise general control on the local territory. Akims ensure implementation
of national policy together with the interests and development needs of oblasts, cities and raions.
The constitutional model of local government in Kazakhstan dictates the preservation of centralized
control over representative bodies by akims. Although administrative control is justified in itself,
there should be specific forms and methods for its exercise. If the local executive body must simul-
taneously make decisions on local issues and organize their implementation as well as control the
general situation within the territory, overall efficiency will suffer due to the absence of any division
of labor.
The Office of the Public Prosecutor oversees the uniform application of laws, presidential decrees
and other regulatory or legal acts. It may conduct inspections by request of the president or in
response to appeals, complaints or other information about legal violations. Investigations may be
initiated due to the direct disclosure of violations or by request of a superior public prosecutor. There
is no rule mandating that a copy of all decisions must be sent to the public prosecutor’s office for
control.
In order to fulfill its tasks, the Office of the Public Prosecutor undertakes measures to uncover and
eliminate any violations of legislation and may appeal against legal acts contradictory to the Constitution
or legislation.
It would be an exaggeration to say that local governments are controlled on a systematic basis; rather,
control is often simultaneously performed by several institutions.
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5. Public Service Provision
5.1 Distribution of Functions
Economic crises over the past five years have forced the scale of public services to decrease significantly.
The current distribution of functions between the central and local governments is described in
brief in table 8A.5 in annex 8.4 and presented in more detail below.
The Law on the Budget System distributes duties, programs and sub-programs between the national
and local budgets, but does not specify the distribution of functions between oblast and raion
budgets. Instead, the law outlines general approaches according to which responsibilities are divided
between oblast, raion and cities of oblast subordination, taking into account specific local conditions.
Since 1 January 1998, non-budgetary funds have been cancelled and their revenues included in the
national budget. A social tax replaced the previous compulsory deductions from those funds. In
September 1998, the Law on the Budget System was amended to itemize and distribute programs
and sub-programs financed from the national and local budgets.
Local programs and sub-programs are financed from the local budgets. These tasks include:
1. Expenditures for the maintenance of local government bodies, whose tasks include
• maintenance of public order and security;
• education and health care;
• social protection and the provision of legally established benefits to certain population
groups;
• housing and local economy, water supply and engineering infrastructure;
• culture, tourism, sports, maintenance of the local media and leisure facilities;
• agrarian reform, land reform, support for farmers and pest control;
• the preservation of local ecology and the rational management of nature;
• development of small and medium businesses;
• support for other programs planned in the budget for the coming fiscal year, including
loan service expenditures;
• prevention of natural and technological accidents or emergencies;
• support of employment;
• construction, maintenance and repair of local roads;
2. Repayable loans from the local budget, generally through state-owned banks, to implement
short-, medium- and long-term national and regional programs;
3. Redemption of local debt and payment of interest on loans.
The national budget finances national programs and sub-programs, which include:
1. National expenditures on the maintenance of national, international and representative bodies
as well as other expenditure on general government services and funding of programs and sub-
programs;
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2. Repayable loans from the national budget, generally through state-owned banks, to implement
short-, medium- and long-term national programs;
3. Redemption of state debt.
This distribution of expenditures and tasks corresponds to accepted practice in most countries and
is based upon correct principles. The major challenge currently facing local governments is the ever-
increasing gap between their expanding social and economic functions and the minimal financial
opportunities available for their implementation.
Education
In the sphere of education, the distribution of functions between the center and regions has changed.
The share of local governments in the total education budget rose from sixty-six percent in 1990, to
seventy-five percent in 1995, to eighty-nine percent in 1999. The central government is responsible
for higher education and specialized types of primary and secondary education, such as military
schools, schools for gifted children and the continuing training of civil servants. Local governments
are responsible for primary, secondary, vocational and specialized secondary education as well as the
training of local government personnel. Local budgets allocate approximately eighty percent of their
expenditures for this purpose. Kindergartens are primarily maintained at the expense of organizations
and through fees paid by parents. Only a small number are supported by raion budgets.
Private kindergartens, schools and educational institutions have already appeared, as has the
opportunity to take out loans for university education.
Administrative control over education has been completely transferred to local governments. They
are empowered to solve financial issues, organize education and appoint school principals, who then
select the rest of the staff. The Ministry of Education and Science authorizes the activities of universities
and specialized secondary education institutions, exercises control over these institutions and retains
the right to revoke their licenses.
Social Protection
The system of social insurance and its funding has also undergone changes in recent years. In 1998,
the Pension Fund, the Social Insurance Fund and the Employment Fund were dissolved and their
revenues consolidated in the state budget. Prior to 1997, a uniform pension system existed in Kazakhstan,
but has since been reformed in favor of a “personalized pension system,” in which individuals accumulate
contributions throughout their working life. Currently, the government is responsible for pensions
paid under the former system, for special state privileges to certain categories of people and for special
state benefits to the veterans of World War II and victims of Chernobyl or Stalinist repression. Social
assistance to the needy and unemployed was delegated to local governments and performed from
local budgets. According to Government Resolution No. 1036 on the Approval of Temporary Rules
of Targeted Social Assistance Provision (22 July 1999), oblast akims determine the amount of social
assistance and distribute it in the form of benefits for families with children, for the birth of a child,
for burials or for the unemployed. Households receive targeted social assistance if their average per
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capita income falls below an established minimum. Government bodies in raions of oblast sub-
ordination are responsible for implementing budget programs as employment, unemployment
benefits, child benefits and social assistance for burial.
Health Care
The Medical Insurance Fund was established in 1996 and subsequently dissolved and incorporated
into the state budget. The government limits its participation to financing national public health
programs, such as the centralized purchase of vaccines; preventing and responding to dangerous
infections such as AIDS and tuberculosis; collecting the supply of blood; and sanitary and
epidemiological monitoring. In addition, the national budget finances the maintenance of special
hospitals and institutions of medical research.
Local budgets finance general and specialized local hospitals, TB clinics, diagnostic centers, hospitals
and outpatient clinics for veterans of World War II. Local governments are also responsible for
preventing and combating dangerous infections at the local level. Local governments should allocate
as much funding as possible for primary health care in the rural areas.
State funding for health services is minimal, whether at the national or local level. Patients are
expected to bring syringes, medicines and dressing materials to the hospitals themselves. Most
services are provided by private medical institutions.
Culture, Sports and Leisure
The national budget funds the maintenance of national museums, theaters, historical and cultural
monuments; the organization of cultural events for children at the national level; and the production
of national films. Local governments provide subsidies to local organizations to organize cultural
events and leisure activities; preserve local historical and cultural values; maintain local museums,
zoos, stadiums and entertainment complexes; and organize local sporting events for children.
Economic Services
The government is responsible for improving water resource management, for investment in the
water supply and sewerage infrastructure and for the use of inter-state water economic objects. Local
governments operate, maintain and provide subsidies for this infrastructure.
Environment and Public Sanitation
From January 2001, local budgets will receive all payments and fines for environment pollution,
whereas previously they had received up to fifty percent. These means are allocated for the solution
of environmental protection issues at the local level.
The government is responsible for developing and implementing environmental protection programs
on a national scale, rehabilitating the environment in areas of natural disaster, protecting natural
objects of interregional importance and fulfilling the country’s international obligations with respect
to environmental protection.
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Public sanitation and epidemiological stations are now included in the structure of city and raion
governments and are funded from the respective local budgets. Local governments are responsible
for the overall condition of cities and raions. In large cities, like Almaty and Astana, they may invest
in infrastructure by constructing waste processing plants and similar actions. Condominium associations
are responsible for waste collection and disposal as well as street cleaning. Associated costs are paid by
inhabitants and private enterprises.
Urban Development
The central government creates programs to develop small cities and underdeveloped rural areas.
Local governments formulate programs for regional development and plans for general local
construction; erect local objects and social or cultural facilities; issue permits for building local networks
or structures; and organize the construction of communication, transport and engineering infrastructure.
General Administration
Licenses are issued by the relevant ministries. Local governments issue licenses to businesses, regulate
land relationships and issue permits for building local networks or structures.
City and raion executive bodies oversee the maintenance of public order and security. Various bodies
of the department of the interior have been transferred to their authority and are now financed from
city and raion budgets.
Local budgets fund protection against fires, which falls under the jurisdiction of city and raion
governments. Local executive bodies manage the enlistment campaign for fire brigades, also financed
from city and raion budgets.
Amendments to the Law on the Budget System in 1998 and 1999 specified issues of execution and
control over the many programs divided between different levels of public administration and
determined their sources of funding. As a result, local governments were vested with the responsibility
for financing programs of direct local importance.
5.2 Trends in Public Service Provision
Traditional local administration functions include environmental protection, public sanitation, fire
protection, maintenance of public order, local libraries, water supply and sewerage.
Some alternative forms of service delivery have appeared, such as external contractors, concessions
and private companies. As mentioned above, educational services are offered by the private sector as
well as by central and local governments. Many private schools, institutions and universities have
emerged in recent years.  In addition, private medical practices provide a broad range of health care
services. The private sector is also involved in organizing cultural events, leisure and sports activities.
In cities, private companies actively work with local government companies in the sphere of public
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transportation. When tenders for public purchases are announced, private companies participate as
well as state-owned companies.
Central and local governments are jointly responsible for social security, economic development, law
enforcement and regional planning.
In recent years, many state companies or joint stock companies have been established by ministries,
institutions and local executive bodies. These enterprises possess control, administrative and licensing
functions and provide paid services that had previously been performed by the state. A recent
inquiry at the Attorney General’s Office found that over 1,700 such enterprises now exist in
Kazakhstan.10  This form of service delivery is neither competitive nor funded from the budget;
instead, these specially established enterprises have a guaranteed monopoly in licensing, certification,
audit and other control functions. To reduce the potential for corruption, it is planned to remove
state regulation over issues that can be solved on a competitive basis and instead allow the market to
regulate these services.
6. Local Finance, Local Property
The current Law on the Budget System, adopted in 1999, regulates all financial relations in the
process of forming budgets at different levels. According to article 3 of the law, national and local
budgets are independent of one another and together comprise the consolidated national budget.
6.1 Local Budget Process
Article 18 of the Law on the Budget System establishes procedures for developing, discussing and
approving local budgets. According to amendments made on 15 January 2001, oblast-level akims
establish budget commissions and determine their tasks and working schedule in order to draft the
local budget. Local executive bodies create a list of officials in charge of local budget programs in
accordance with the local administration structure approved by the maslikhat.
Budget commissions at the oblast level review and draft proposals for coordination with the Ministry
of Finance on the following indices:
• accounts receivable in the oblast-level budget;
• maximum permissible debt for the oblast-level administration by the end of fiscal year;
• expenditures for repayment of debt and debt servicing.
These budget commissions forecast basic indices for the local budget and submit them to the akim.
These must consider the following parameters: indicative national plans for social and economic
development, forecast indices from the Ministry of Finance, subventions from the national budget
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to local budgets, budget deductions allocated to the national budget, regional development programs
and the redistribution of revenues between oblast and raion or city budgets.
Local administrations of oblasts, Astana and Almaty then draft their local budgets, taking into
account the proposals of the budget commission, and submit them to the Ministry of Finance by
September 1. They must also inform raion and city akims of predicted raion and city budget
revenues. Raion and city akims create their own budget commissions.
After the Law on the Annual Budget takes effect, oblast-level akims have two weeks to adjust their
previously drafted budget forecasts and submit them to their corresponding maslikhats for review.
According to the Law on the Budget System, local budgets are passed by maslikhat decision no later
than two weeks after their submission.
The decision passed by the maslikhat must contain the following items: revenues, expenditures,
crediting, the budget deficit and sources for its financing, norms for the distribution of revenues
between the oblast and raion or city budgets, the size of the reserve fund, a list of local budget
programs that are not subject to sequestration and other items. The budget itself is presented as an
annex to the maslikhat decision, which is drafted in strict accordance with the budget structure
established by the Law on the Budget System and uniform budget classifications.  Expenditures and
crediting of local budgets are approved at the program level.
The most recent changes to the Law on the Budget System, effective from January 2001, are
intended to strengthen the role of maslikhats in the process of budget clarification. Previously, akims
often made changes to the approved local budget, which were formally approved by maslikhats only
after the fact. The revised law now states that “local executive bodies cannot finance additional
budget programs envisaged in the process of local budget clarification until adoption of the relevant
decision by the maslikhat” (article 18.1, item 3 on “Procedures to Clarify Local Budgets”).
The revenue base of local budgets is formed from the top down, and the decision making process
follows a similar pattern. Local governments have little influence on budget revenues and
expenditures, which are in fact determined by the Ministry of Finance. The ministry calculates
control figures, based on which it establishes the amount of subventions and deductions for the
regions. Local budgets are approved only after the approval of the national budget, when the
amount of subventions and deductions is made known.
6.2 Revenues
According to the Law on Taxes and Other Obligatory Payments to the Budget, adopted in 1995,
taxes are divided into national and local taxes. The law established the following five national taxes:
• income tax on legal and physical entities;
• VAT;
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• excise taxes;
• fees for registering the issue of securities;
• special fees and taxes on the use of mineral resources.
In addition, the law established the following six local taxes:
• land tax;
• property tax on legal and physical entities;
• tax on means of transport;
• fees for registering physical entities engaged in entrepreneurial activity ;
• fees for engaging in certain types of business;
• fees from auction sales.
National taxes and fees were regulatory sources of the Kazakh national budget. The deducted
amounts were entered in the revenues of national and local budgets according to procedures established
by the Law on the Annual Budget. Local taxes and duties were fixed revenue sources for local budgets,
while the distribution of taxes between budgets of different levels was reviewed annually.
This system was effective from 1995 to 1999. In 1999, this procedure was changed and the previous
division of taxes into national and local taxes, stipulated by the Law on Taxes and Other Obligatory
Payments to the Budget, was made invalid. As of 1 April 1999, the Law on the Budget System lists
the allocation of taxes and duties to the central and local budgets, rather than the Law on the Annual
Budget.
According to Article 11 of the Law on the Budget System, local budget revenues include the
following:
1. Taxes, duties and other obligatory payments to the local budget:
• fifty percent of income tax on legal entities, excluding income tax on legal entities
registered as taxpayers in Astana city;
• fifty percent of VAT on manufactured goods or services provided by entities registered
as taxpayers in Astana city;
• fifty percent of the excise tax on alcoholic beverages;
• excise tax on gambling;
• excise tax on retail sales of gasoline and diesel fuel;
• personal income tax;
• social tax;
• property tax on legal and physical entities;
• land tax;
• tax on means of transportation;
• allocations to local budgets from state budget revenues from inter-state contracts concluded
by the government of Kazakhstan;
• fee for the registration of physical entities engaged in entrepreneurial activity;
• fee for the permit to engage in certain types of business;
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• fee for the state registration of legal entities;
• fees from auction sales;
• fee for the right to sell goods in markets;
• fee paid by legal or physical entities for using symbols of Almaty city in their brand
names, signs or trademarks;
• water fee;
• fee for use of the forests.
2. Non-tax earnings:
• dividends from shares owned by the local government;
• share in profits from local government owned companies;
• earnings from state lotteries held by maslikhat decision;
• interest on loans from the local budget;
• proceeds from the sale of property owned by local budgetary institutions;
• income from services provided by local budgetary institutions;
• income from the lease of local property;
• proceeds from public purchases organized by local budgetary institutions;
• income from the lease of land;
• fine for pollution;
• fee for registering real estate rights and transactions;
• state duty;
• administrative fines and sanctions imposed by the local government;
3. Revenues from capital transactions:
• proceeds from the privatization of local property;
• proceeds from the sale of land;
• income from the sale of grain purchased for internal consumption;
• transfers from higher budgets;
• repayment of the principal on loans extended from the local budget.
The amendments of 1999 introduced a key change by establishing uniform norms for all oblasts
that specified permanent revenues from regulated taxes, replacing the previous system of establishing
individual norms for each regulated tax. This measure was intended to promote the predictability of
local budget revenues. However, its effect was to increase the inequality in tax collections among
oblasts, due to their varying tax potential. For instance, the average share of taxes in local budget
revenues nationwide was seventy-eight percent. However, taxes accounted for only forty-three percent
of local budget revenues in South Kazakhstan oblast, in contrast to Atyrau oblast, where they
accounted for ninety-eight percent of local budget revenues.
In 2000, the most important source for local budgets was the social tax, which comprised twenty-
nine percent of local budget revenues, followed by the income tax on legal entities (twenty-two
percent) and personal income tax (16.5 percent).
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As shown in table 8.2, local budget revenues have risen since 1999. This increase is due to changes
in the mechanisms of inter-budgetary regulation: as a result, most taxes were first entered in local
budgets and only afterwards redistributed through subventions and deductions.
Table 8.2
Share of State Subventions in Local Budget Revenues, 1998–2000
1998 1999 2000*
[KZT [% of the [KZT [% of the [KZT [% of the
million] State million] State million] State
Budget] Budget] Budget]
Local budgets 111,288 29.2 185,588 46.5 271,734 45.4
excluding
state subsidies
Local budgets 151,624 39.8 217,575 54.6 313,648 52.4
including
state subsidies
State budget 40,336 10.6 31,987 8.1 41,914 7.0
subsidies
to local budgets
* not taking the calculating period into account
6.3 Local Taxes and Fees
Taxes that were previously termed local taxes in the Law on Taxes and Other Obligatory Payments
to the Budget—property tax on legal and physical entities, land tax and transport tax—are no longer
called local taxes, even though they are entered in local budgets as before. Their share in local budget
revenues is around fourteen percent. Local fees are insignificant, accounting for some 1.5 percent of
local budget revenues.
Local budgets in Kazakhstan may not independently establish tax rates or determine the tax base,
with the exception of the land tax. Depending on the location, water supply and production condi-
tions of a given plot of land, local representative bodies can establish tax rates within a range of twenty
percent (article 109 of the Law on Taxes and Other Payments to the Budget). Also, as mentioned
above, the Almaty city maslikhat has the special right to establish procedures and fees for the use of
Almaty symbols by legal and physical entities in their company names, service signs and trademarks.
Otherwise, local governments possess almost no control over taxation on their territories.
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6.4 Expenditures
Social expenditures dominate the structure of local budget expenditures, but oblasts have varying
capabilities in this regard.
In 1997 and 1998, most oblasts allocated roughly eighty percent of all expenditures to education,
health care, social security and culture. Education consumed approximately forty percent of all local
budget expenditures. In 1997, the average local budget expenditures on health care amounted to
20.1 percent, falling to 11.8 percent in 1998. Expenditures varied greatly among oblasts. In 1998,
average social security expenditures in the country rose by 15.8 percent compared to 1997. Culture
and art received the least funding, only slightly exceeding three percent.
With the introduction of modified inter-budgetary regulations in 1999, the structure of local
budget expenditures was altered. This primarily affected those oblasts which contributed most to
the national budget. The new system of tax distribution increased their revenues, but their entire
budget surplus was withdrawn to support more vulnerable oblasts. This led to the decrease of
expenditures on social needs, although absolute figures did not change significantly.
On average, local budgets spent almost seventy percent of total expenditures on social needs in 1999
and almost sixty percent in 2000. In the same period, they allocated approximately thirty percent to
education, eighteen percent to health care, nine percent to social security and insurance and four
percent to culture. The small increase of spending on culture is a special case, since 2000 was
officially declared the year to support culture.
In 1997, the share of local budget expenditures in the state budget structure was almost thirty
percent of total expenditures. Due to the new mechanisms of inter-budgetary regulation, local
budget expenditures grew to 34.4 percent of state expenditures in 1998, 45.9 percent in 1999 and
50.8 percent in 2000 (see table 8.5).
This is due to the replenishment of the state budget, which allowed them to repay previously
accumulated debts, primarily for social payments. By 1 July 1999, local budget debt amounted to
33.7 billion KZT. This was partially reduced by the end of 1999, a trend more regularly continued
in 2000.
According to a government established schedule to liquidate budget accounts payable for 2000 to
2003, the national debt was reduced by 7.5 billion KZT in 2000. Local budget debts were reduced
even more significantly, to 2.4 billion KZT. The remaining debt is due to be repaid in the coming
three years. These payments are planned in the 2001 budget and will be incorporated in the
following annual budgets.
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Table 8.5
Relative Size of Central and Local Expenditures
1997 1998 1999 2000*
[KZT million] [%] [KZT million] [%] [KZT million] [%] [KZT million] [%]
State budget 471,335 100 453,298 100 468,423 100 595,792 100
expenditures
Local budget 143,178 30.4 156,150 34.4 214,974 45.9 302,421 50.8
expenditures
* preliminary data
Table 8.6
Central and Local Budget Expenditures [percent]
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Central government expenditures 10.4 14.8 10.0 20.9* 19.5* 17.4 15.0
as a percentage of GDP
Central government expenditures 56.0 56.6 60.8 74.2 74.5 70.1 65.5
as a percentage of the
consolidated budget
Regional government 44.0 43.4 39.2 30.4 34.4 45.9 50.8
expenditures as a percentage of
the consolidated budget
* including extra-budgetary funds
Table 8.7
Financial Status of Local Governments [percent]
1994 1999
Share of central government expenditures in GDP 10.4 17.4
Share of central government expenditures in the consolidated budget 56 70.1
Share of regional government expenditures in the consolidated budget 44 45.9
Share of raion governments in the consolidated budget* n/a n/a
Share of local government expenditures in the consolidated budget* n/a n/a
* It is not possible to present information in these rows since the Ministry of Finance provides
data only for national and oblast budgets. Although oblast budgets distribute funds to raion
budgets, this data is not provided. Towns and villages do not have own budgets, only cost
estimates entered in raion budgets.
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6.5 Mechanisms for Inter-budgetary Regulation
As noted above, 1999 introduced a change in the mechanisms for inter-governmental budget
regulation. Budget surpluses are deducted from oblasts which perform well and allocated in the
form of subventions to oblasts which cannot cover their needs through legally assigned revenues.
The methodology to determine the amount of budget deductions in 1999–2001 was approved by
Resolution No. 529 of the government of Kazakhstan (4 May 1999). According to this resolution,
the norm of expenditures, established through standard methodology for all oblasts, should be
subtracted from estimated local income, giving the sum of the deduction. Unfortunately, since revenues
tend to be overestimated and expenditures underestimated, the figure for deductions is often overstated.
Both donor and recipient blasts have criticized the existing system of deductions from local budgets
and subventions from the national budget. This methodology neither draws on economically sound
norms nor stimulates efficient local spending. The sheer size of local transfers—over thirty percent of
total revenues—curtails the incentive for local governments to enlarge budget revenues or increase
collection of taxes or other payments. In fact, the size of subventions depends on the accrual of
budget deductions. Budget deductions themselves are approved in absolute figures and are in
practice strict directive plans.
Table 8.8 shows that donor and recipient oblasts are the same every year, with exception of East
Kazakhstan and West Kazakhstan. Donor oblasts include the oblasts of Aktiubinsk, Atyrau, East
Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Kustanay, Mangistau, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan and the city of Almaty.
Recipient oblasts include Akmola, Almaty, Zhambylskaya, West Kazakhstan, Kzylorda, South
Kazakhstan and the city of Astana (not listed in the table since the Free Economic Zone was in effect
until 1 January 2001).
By year-end, many oblasts accumulate sizeable accounts payable on salaries, child benefits and local
payments, due to overstated forecast revenues and understated expenditures.
Kazakhstan has no regional experience in using investment funds. The creation of FEZ in 1996 was
one attempt to develop regions. Although four such zones successfully operated, they were later
dissolved since FEZ tax privileges effectively equaled the usual subventions.
Local governments must try to implement their resolutions while lacking sufficient funds, since all
financial and tax issues are decided by the central government.
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Table 8.8
Subventions and Deductions by Region (deductions in parentheses)
Oblast Local Budget Subventions and Subventions and Subventions and
Revenues in 1999 Deductions in 1999 Deductions in 2000 Deductions in 2001
Akmola 3,380,900 3,266,134 3,129,123 2,992,112
Aktiubinsk 7,823,043 (1,645,768) (1,244,872) (843,975)
Almaty 6,827,196 6,047,347 6,774,942 7,502,537
Atyrau 11,915,498 (6,765,916) (6,759,055) (6,752,194)
East Kazakhstan 16,892,364 282,452 (511,135) (1,304,723)
Zhambylskaya 5,375,442 2,346,787 3,007,704 3,668,620
West Kazakhstan 6,357,050 344,089 121,168 (101,752)
Karaganda 18,891,654 (4,384,315) (4,424,305) (4,464,294)
Kzylorda 5,320,323 3,252,699 2,374,553 1,496,408
Kustanay 10,682,341 (362,519) (324,675) (286,832)
Mangistau 8,655,787 (4,844,265) (4,887,851) (4,931,437)
Pavlodar 12,737,289 (3,740,322) (4,049,525) (4,931,437)
North Kazakhstan 6,900,300 3,815,267 3,729,353 3,643,439
South Kazakhstan 8,104,256 6,117,011 7,591,439 9,065,866
Almaty City 29,147,371 (16,161,844) (16,960,027) (17,758,211)
Total 159,010,814 (12,433,163) (12,433,163) (12,433,163)
6.6 Local Government Borrowing Practices
Local governments in Kazakhstan have the right to borrow. In order to reduce risk, legislation
stipulates that borrowed funds may only be used to finance regional investment programs or the
budget deficit. To borrow funds, local governments may issue state securities or conclude borrowing
agreements. Quotas for annual local borrowing and total local debt are fixed by the Law on the
Annual Budget. The Law on the Budget System and the Law on State and State-guaranteed Borrowing
and Debt, adopted in 1999, determine the main regulations, accounting rules and limits governing
local government borrowing. For instance, annual borrowing should not exceed ten percent, and
total debt should not exceed twenty-five percent of local budget revenues in a given fiscal year.
Debt-servicing costs for the local executive body should not exceed ten percent of annual local
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budget revenues. The Ministry of Finance calculates the borrowing quota for local administrations
and recommends a permissible amount of debt. According to the laws regulating the borrowing
process, the state government does not back these loans or otherwise guarantee repayment of local
government debts.
The market for municipal securities in Kazakhstan is a fledgling one. Beginning in 1999, Mangistau
and Atyrau oblasts, Almaty and Astana cities issued bonds to implement several regional investment
projects. Currently there is no legislative or regulatory base to govern the issue and circulation of
municipal securities. Thus, the government adopted special resolutions on a case by case basis, such
as the resolutions on Temporary Procedures for Issuing Bonds by the Local Executive Body of Almaty,
Temporary Rules for Issuing, Placing, Circulating and Repaying Municipal Bonds of the Executive
Body of Astana City and so forth. Local bonds are used as a tool to finance capital expenditures in the
oblast budget. Transparency of the budget, its revenues and expenditures is a key precondition for
attracting investment loans.
6.7 Local Budget Execution
Local executive bodies oversee budget implementation in their respective administrative-territorial
units. They must submit an annual report on local budget execution to maslikhats no later than
1 July of the following year, together with an explanatory note and annexes. The annual report on
local budget implementation should be submitted according to the approved local budget divisions.
Territorial agencies of the Treasury Department perform servicing of local budgets.
Raion and city executive bodies submit monthly reports on budget execution to oblast executive
bodies by the first of the month. Oblast-level administrations in turn submit monthly reports to the
Ministry of Finance, following the same procedures. Local executive bodies also publish quarterly
reports on local budget execution in the media. Neither budget assessment not monitoring of local
budget execution is performed.
Although maslikhat audit commissions exercise control over local budget execution, their members
often lack the required skills to carry out high-quality control.
6.8 Local Property
The Government Resolution on State Property Restructuring (1996) created the legal basis for
establishing local government property. In April 1999, the division of state property into national
and local government property began. The government approved the list of state shares in companies
of national or local government ownership. The national government retained state shares in national
companies, large objects to be privatized and some other important objects for economic development.
Social institutions such as schools and kindergartens were transferred to local ownership, as was all
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infrastructure of regional importance, such as energy, gas and heat supply. As a result, over eighty
percent of all state enterprises became local government property. Data on local enterprises transferred
to local executive bodies has not been published in statistical reference books.
Local administrations in Almaty and Astana, oblasts, raions and cities of oblast subordination have
established departments and directorates for management of local property. As representatives of the
local administration, akims hold the state share in property and authorize departments as their
representatives in owning, using and disposing of these assets. By order of the akim, these departments
may transfer the state share in holdings into trust management for reasons of profit.
7. Relationship between the State Administration
and Local Governments
Local executive bodies are an integral part of the uniform system of public administration in
Kazakhstan. This system follows a strict vertical hierarchy in which lower akims are subordinate to
the higher ones and oblast-level akims report directly to the president and the government.
The Constitution differentiates between the functions and powers of the central and local governments
in general terms, while further legislation specifically delineates powers of the central government,
central agencies and local executive bodies. Central executive bodies, such as ministries and state
committees, are based on sectoral and functional principles; some of them have divisions within local
administrations. The distribution of authorities between central and local governments is a rather
tangled issue in Kazakhstan. Suffice it to say that the draft Law on Local Public Administration was
under debate for six years, a period of time that saw three changes in government. When finally
adopted, it outlined the legal differentiation between the central executive body, central government
agencies and local executive bodies.
The law distinguishes between categories such as “executive body funded from the local budget,”
bodies “authorized to perform certain functions of local public administration” and “territorial
divisions of the central executive body.” The latter is the structural division of a central executive
body, performs functions of the central executive body in the local territory and is funded from the
national budget.
Oblast-level akims may call to account subordinate akims or heads of local budgetary institutions in
accordance with the legislation. Courses of disciplinary action against employees of the bodies of the
interior funded from the local budget are performed in accordance with the Law on the Bodies of the
Interior.
Oblast-level akims are entitled to report to heads of central executive bodies on their territorial division’s
compliance with legislation, acts of the president or central government and acts of the oblast akim
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or akimat. If these defects are not corrected, then the akim may submit this information to the
president and the government of Kazakhstan.
Raion-level akims may report to the oblast akim on the performance of territorial divisions of central
executive bodies or local budgetary institutions with regard to their compliance with the Constitution,
legislation and acts of the president or  government of Kazakhstan.
Oblast-level akims may delegate some authorities to subordinate raion or city akims, who may in turn
delegate authorities to lower-level akims. Current legislation specifies the relationships between the
central and oblast governments in detail, but does not regulate the relationships between oblast and
raion governments or clearly differentiate between their functions.
Local representative bodies are not incorporated in a vertical system of representative bodies linked to
Parliament. Nor are maslikhats strongly linked to one another, although decisions of higher-level
maslikhats are binding for lower-level ones.
8. Status of Civil Servants
The passage of the Law on Civil Service in January 2000 launched a new stage in civil service reform.
By dividing civil servants into political and administrative employees, this law tackled a thorny
problem in civil service, that is, the custom of replacing a staff of apparatchiks every time a new chief
executive took office.
Political civil servants include ministers and their deputies at the central government level; akims and
their deputies at the oblast level; and akims in cites, raions, villages and counties. The president
determines grounds for dismissing political civil servants as well as the relevant procedures.
All other positions in the executive branch are considered administrative. These employees, who
comprise ninety-six to ninety-seven percent of all civil servants, are now protected by law from
unjustified dismissals resulting from a change in government. The law also guarantees employment
to administrative civil servants if a government body is reorganized or liquidated. In addition, it
provides a thorough explanation of grounds and procedures for disciplinary action, including the
dismissal of administrative employees.
The current model of civil service divides government posts into categories in order to make the
classifications conform to the acting governing structure. According to the list, administrative employees
are grouped in the categories A, B, C, D, and E, where A represents the president’s staff, B represents
employees in Parliament, the judiciary branch, the prosecutor’s office and the government, C represents
the staff of ministries, departments and other governmental agencies, D represents the staff in local
bodies of the judiciary branch, prosecutor’s office and government and E represents the staff of local
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executive bodies.11  The registry of civil posts was introduced to unify and reduce the tiers of
administration.
The president appoints heads of the central executive bodies and oblast-level akims and approves
their deputies upon nomination by the prime minister.  Higher-level akims appoint deputy akims at
the oblast-level and akims in cities, raions and city districts in coordination with the president and
prime minister or with their authorized representatives. Deputy akims of oblasts, akims of cities and
raions may be dismissed only after coordination with the chief of staff of the president and the
government. Administrative civil servants at the local level belong to categories D and E.
Table 8.9
Status of Civil Servants
Name of the Law on Civil or Municipal Service Municipal Employees Civil Servants
Law on Civil Service as of 1999 — *
In order to enter and be promoted in administrative service, the prospective civil servant must go
through a competitive process designed to allow citizens equal access to civil service. The Civil Service
Agency or the government body requiring personnel announces an open or closed tender in the
official national mass media in both Kazakh and Russian. All citizens of the country may participate
in the open tender, but only administrative employees may participate in the closed tender.
The Civil Service Agency implements a uniform state policy on civil service. The agency develops
and realizes state programs to increase efficiency, formulates and approves standard requirements for
different categories of employees, monitors the status of state personnel and creates proposals to
improve the system of remuneration. In addition, the agency coordinates the training and skill
development of civil servants by various state bodies, controls their compliance with legislation on
civil service, determines procedures for hiring personnel on a competitive basis and controls the
hiring process. The agency reviews complaints from civil servants on the actions and decisions of
state bodies or officials and may turn to court if the laws on civil service are violated.
The law establishes mechanisms to control the professional quality of government employees through
assessments conducted every three years. The assessment commission pronounces the employee fit
for service or recommends his or her dismissal. Either result is announced at all government bodies.
The commission may also recommend further training to increase the employee’s professional skills.
The Methodological Recommendations of the Civil Service Agency stipulates that civil servants
must increase their skills once every three years. The government concept for the training of civil
servants, approved by government resolution on 13 November 2000, suggests that funds be allocated
from the central and local budgets for this purpose.
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Training of qualified specialists on public administration is performed by the Civil Service Academy,
whose students make up the personnel reserve of the presidential administration and national
government. This institution was established by presidential resolution in 1994 as the Higher National
School of Public Administration for training top administrative officials.12  Currently, there are ten
regional institutions operating in oblast capitals to train and re-train mid-level government officials.
9. Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
Legislation on local state administration is based on the Constitution and consists of the Law on Local
Public Administration and other legal acts (article 2 of the Law on Local Public Administration).
Article 85 of the Constitution determines that local state administration is performed by local
representative and executive bodies, which are jointly responsible for the state of affairs in the local
territory.
Maslikhat competencies are established by the Constitution (article 86, item 4), while their rights
and duties are specified by law. Maslikhats have the right to make independent decisions on issues
within their competence. Thus, maslikhats of any level can make decisions that do not contradict
applicable legislation without any coordination with or further approval from higher institutions of
representative or executive power. Maslikhats may independently determine the methods of pre-
paration, adoption and implementation of their acts. Another guarantee of maslikhat autonomy is
their right to determine the goals, objectives and content of their decisions on an independent basis.
No institutions have the right to instruct a maslikhat on any issues or on the content of pending
decisions. According to article 88, item 3 of the Constitution, maslikhat decisions that contradict the
Constitution or legislation of Kazakhstan can be voided only by court.
One guarantee for the autonomy of local executive bodies is a provision in the Law on the Budget
System (article 18, item 5) which states that “interference of the government, central executive
bodies or local executive bodies in the process of drafting and implementing oblast or raion level
budgets is not allowed except for cases envisaged by this law.”
According to the Constitution (article 87, item 5), a maslikhat’s authority may only be prematurely
terminated by the Senate for reasons specified by law and according to established procedures or by
a maslikhat resolution to dissolve itself. Article 23 of the Law on Local Public Administration estab-
lishes the following grounds for which the Senate can prematurely terminate the maslikhat’s authority
upon the proposal of the attorney general:
• if the maslikhat violates the Constitution two or more times by adopting decisions that were
recognized as unlawful by the court;
• if a newly elected maslikhat does not determine its structure or form necessary bodies within
thirty days of its opening session;
• if the respective administrative-territorial unit has been reorganized or dissolved;
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• if a maslikhat passes a decision to dissolve itself through secret ballot by a majority of two-thirds
of all members;
• in case of insurmountable disagreement with the akimat, expressed through repeated failure to
approve the local budget or economic and social programs for territorial development;
• in case of insurmountable disagreement with the akim, expressed through repeated failure to
approve the structure of local administration.
In the article immediately following, the law stipulates that a maslikhat may pass a vote of no confidence
in the akim if the maslikhat twice fails to approve reports submitted by the akim on the implementation
of local budgets, plans and social or economic programs for territorial development. The law thus
establishes the right of maslikhats to pass a vote of no confidence as a right that is impossible to
exercise. The very order of the two articles serves to quell any rebellious tendencies by maslikhats.
Legal guarantees for local self-governments are also set forth in the Constitution (article 89), but no
institutions of local self-government have yet been formed.
10. Next Steps in the Transition Process
Kazakhstan currently faces the dual challenge of overcoming the social crisis caused by reforms and
leading the republic on a path to sustainable development. To do so, it is necessary to achieve sustain-
able, long-term economic growth and social and political stability as well as preserve the ecological
balance. It is also necessary to consolidate society and reach a reasonable compromise between vastly
different ideas about social development. The strong centralization of power inherited from the
Soviet Union still prevails. Local representative bodies have played only a token role, while akims
appointed from the top retain the bulk of power.
In light of these problems, measures must be taken to bring administrative bodies closer to the
people. Redistribution of power from the center to the regions, or decentralization of public administr-
ation, is a key issue. A recent survey asked officials in the presidential administration and prime
minister’s office the question “how do you understand decentralization of power?” Of respondents,
78.6 percent answered independent budget planning by local governments, 73.3 percent mentioned
the election of akims; and seventy percent said increasing the importance of the maslikhat.
It is now apparent that local governments must have true independence in the solution of local issues
under market conditions. In addition, they should be accountable to local inhabitants; since akims
of all levels have been appointed from the top, they have only been accountable to the officials who
appointed them.
Foreign models of local self-government suggest that local authorities should be accountable to local
voters through democratic procedures. The main argument in favor of developing local self-governance
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is that a strong system of local self-government enables greater responsiveness to citizens’ needs,
which vary widely from region to region.
Reforming public administration and creating the legal basis for decentralization is still in process, as
reformers search for the most effective mechanisms.
The progress of decentralization remains somewhat weak and unstable due to low public support;
these concepts were introduced from outside by international organizations, rather than originating
from within society. Kazakhstan does not yet have the kind of civil society that perceives the
distribution of power between the center and regions as an opportunity to limit arbitrariness by the
state, protect rights and freedoms and create broader participation in society. The only sign that
these ideas are gaining support are the increasingly visible efforts of certain regional elites.
Amendments to the Constitution and the Law on Local Public Administration open the possibility
to elect as well as appoint akims of raions, cities of oblast subordination, towns and villages—an
important first step towards the election of akims. It is also one that leaves room for interpretation,
since the law does not specify whether local inhabitants or local representative bodies are to elect the
akims. Obviously, elections will not be held universally, but will first be introduced in regions and
settlements with relatively stable social, economic and political conditions. The next steps are likely
to involve the passage of laws to specify mechanisms for electing akims. The first such elections have
been scheduled for the fall of 2001.
It is more difficult to predict when the governing powers will be ready to create a system of modern
self-government in Kazakhstan. Although the Law on Local Self-government has not yet been
adopted, a draft has been published in the media for general discussion. The draft law envisages that
local self-government will be organized at sub-raion levels, in villages, rural counties and cities of
raion subordination as well as within quarters and micro-districts in cities of oblast and national
subordination. Local self-governments will be elected. The main body is the kenes, to be selected by
the local inhabitants in settlements with over one thousand people. If the settlement has a population
of under one thousand, then kenes functions are to be performed by a citizen assembly. According
to the authors of the draft law, the executive body of local self-government is the zhamiyat, which
will be headed by a zhetekshi elected by inhabitants. The main local community document will be
a statute developed by an initiative group and adopted by the vote of the inhabitants.
The creation of local self-government requires a clear delineation of powers. Although the draft law
states that local self-governments will “solve issues of local importance independently and at their
discretion,” it does not explain what is meant by “issues of local importance.”  Nor does the draft Law
on Local Public Administration differentiate between the authorities of the local self-government
and local government, making it rather difficult to estimate how these relationships will be organized.
Many issues must still be clarified: how local self-governments will be established and function in
cities, how akims and local self-governments will interact in villages and rural counties, who will
453
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N  K A Z A K H S T A N
decide on dismissing village akims and transferring their functions to the local self-governments and
at which stage they will do so.
The absence in the draft law of any real financial base for local self-government operations is a
significant obstacle. Local self-governments are planned at the level of towns and villages, which do
not have local budgets. Instead, the draft stipulates for the allocation of subventions from local
budgets to local self-governments. During discussion of the draft law, the Ministry of Finance
repeatedly underscored that, according to the Law on the Budget System, subventions can only be
allocated from oblast budgets to raion or subordinate city budgets and that there are no budgets at
sub-raion levels. For this reason, the ministry insists on the exclusion of this provision.13
According to the draft law, the state shall transfer local government property into the ownership of
local communities within one year as determined by the government. However, the Ministry of
Finance objected that local government property cannot be owned by local self-governments, only
consigned to their management.
Thus, the only sources of revenue remaining for local self-governments are the opportunity to
establish commercial enterprises and independently tax inhabitants. The establishment of commercial
enterprises is a rather dubious option, as local self-governments would then be entering into unfair
competition with the private sector, ousting private companies. Tax collection would also create
problems if the local self-government simultaneously owns enterprises and acts as a regulatory body.
The last option, independent taxation of inhabitants, does not stand up to any criticism, since
inhabitants of villages and towns have the lowest income in the country.
How then are these small local self-governments, deprived of own resources, to solve issues “of local
importance?”  Local self-government cannot exist without real financial potential. If there is to be any
point in introducing local government, it is necessary to make changes in the Law on the Budget
System, which determines the place of local self-government budgets in the budgetary system.
Some other proposals also deserve attention. During debate over the draft Law on Local Public
Administration, the role and position of maslikhats occasioned most discussion. One proposal expressed
by the famous lawyer G. Sapargaliyev is of particular interest: “On the one hand, maslikhats are
representative bodies, and on the other hand they are bodies of local public administration. If the
maslikhats are representative bodies, then they can be recognized as local self-governments at the
level of raions and cities. The law determines maslikhats as the bodies of public administration, but
they have neither administration objects nor administrators.”
The authors of the draft Law on Local Self-government have the steadfast vision that local self-
government should concentrate only on issues of local importance and be absolutely detached from
the local administration. However, the state cannot be indifferent to issues of local importance.  All
these problems require careful assessment and balanced solution. To do so, it may eventually be
necessary to make changes and amendments to the Law on Local Public Administration.
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Annex 8.2
Populations, Settlements and Administrative Units
Table 8A.2
Administrative-Territorial Units in Kazakhstan, 2001
Regions Cities Counties Settlements
Total Cities Town Villages Towns Villages
of Oblast
Subor-
dination
Republic of
Kazakhstan 160 84 39 173 2103 200 7863
Akmola 17 10 2 12 221 14 751
Aktiubinsk 12 7 1 3 121 3 468
Almaty 16 10 3 14 234 15 811
Atyrau 7 1 1 14 56 15 189
East Kazakhstan 15 10 6 27 225 30 870
Zhambylskaya 10 4 1 8 81 12 367
West Kazakhstan 12 2 1 1 154 4 512
Karaganda 9 11 9 39 168 39 556
Kustanay 16 5 4 5 203 13 799
Kzylorda 7 3 1 12 87 12 269
Mangistau 4 3 2 8 25 8 48
Pavlodar 10 3 3 8 166 8 516
North Kazakhstan 13 5 1 3 189 5 774
South Kazakhstan 12 8 4 13 173 13 933
Astana City* — 1 — 6 — 9 —
Almaty City* — 1 — — — — —
* The cities of Almaty and Astana have special status.
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Table 8A.3
Settlements by Population Size Categories
Population Size Category Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Settlements Settlements Inhabitants Total Population
0–1,000 5,725 71.8 2,022,026 13.5
1,000–2,000 1,309 16.4 1,804,258 12.1
2,000–5,000 626 7.9 1,787,423 11.9
5,000–10,000 201 2.5 1,690,520 11.3
10,000–50,000 81 1.0 1,841,663 12.3
50,000–100,000 7 0.1 509,483 3.4
100,000–1,000,000 18 0.2 4,168,397 27.9
1,000,000+ 1 0.1 1,129,356 7.6
Total 7,968 100.0 14,953,126 100.0
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Table 8A.4
General Characteristics of Administrative-territorial Units
Population Estimated Number Number of
of Political Employees Administrative Employees
in Local in Local
Public Administration**   Public Administration
Rep. of Kazakhstan 14,953,126 3,009 63,595
Akmola 836,271 252 4,238
Aktiubinsk 682,558 146 3,243
Almaty 1,558,534 282 4,600
Atyrau 440,286 93 1,858
East Kazakhstan 1,531,024 285 5,379
Zhambylskaya 988,840 116 3,537
West Kazakhstan 616,800 176 2,754
Karaganda 1,410,218 234 5,595
Kustanay 1,017,729 302 4,558
Kzylorda 596,215 121 2,603
Mangistau 314,669 46 1,504
Pavlodar 806,983 193 3,765
North Kazakhstan 725,980 215 3,933
South Kazakhstan 1,978,339 225 5,377
Astana City 319,324 37 1,529
Almaty City 1,129,356 14 3,233
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Figure 8A.2
Sample Structure of a Raion Administration
Attachment 1
For the decision of the oblast akim
As of «___» ___________2000, No. _________
Maslikhat Raion Akim Court Attorney
Directorate of Agriculture
Directorate of Finance and Economy
Department of Finance
Department of Economy
Directorate of Social Policy
Department of Health Care
Department of Culture and Sports
Department of Social Protection
Office of the Raion Akim
General Department
Organizational Department
Financial and Economic Department
Department of the Interior
Directorate of Local Economy
Department of Area Development
Department of Employment and
Business Development
Department of Transport and Communications
Department of Education
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 Figure 8A.3
Administrative Map of Kazakhstan
West
Kazakhstan
Atyrau
Aktiubinsk
Mangistau
Kustanay
North
Kazakhstan
Akmola
Karaganda
Kzylorda
South Kazakhstan
Zhambylskaya
Almaty
East Kazakhstan
Pavlodar
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Annex 8.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
• Constitutional Law on the State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan (adopted 8
December 1991). Vedomosti (Bulletin) of the Supreme Council of Kazakhstan 51 (1991): 622.
• Constitution of Kazakhstan (adopted 30 August 1995, amended 7 October 1998). Vedomosti
of Parliament No. 4 (1996): 217.
• Law on Administrative-territorial Composition of Kazakhstan (adopted 8 December 1993,
amended 19 December 95). Vedomosti of the Supreme Council of Kazakhstan 23–24 (1993):
507.
• Constitutional Law on Elections in Kazakhstan (Law No. 2464 adopted 28 September 1995,
amended 19 June 1997 according to Law No.133-1; amended 8 May 1998 according to
Law No. 222-1; amended 6 November 1998; amended 6 May 1999 according to Law No.
375-1; amended 28 June 1999 according to Law No. 407-1). Vedomosti of Parliament 17–18
(1995): 114.
• Constitutional Law No. 2529 on the Parliament of Kazakhstan and Status of its Members
(adopted 16 October 1995). Vedomosti of Parliament 21 (1995): 124.
• Constitutional Law No. 2592 on National Referenda (adopted 2 November 1995). Vedomosti
of Parliament 22 (1995): 131.
• Constitutional Law No. 2688 on the Government of Kazakhstan (adopted 18 December
1995). Vedomosti of Parliament 23 (1995): 145.
• Constitutional Law No. 2733 on the President of Kazakhstan (adopted 26 December 1995)
Vedomosti of Parliament 24 (1995): 172.
• Constitutional Law No. 2737 on the Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan (adopted 29
December 1995). Vedomosti of Parliament 24 (1995): 173.
• Law on Public Associations (adopted 31 May 1996). Vedomosti of Parliament 8–9. (1996):
234.
• Law on Political Parties (adopted 2 July 1996). Vedomosti of Parliament 11–12 (1996): 260.
• Presidential Decrees on Special Economic Zones in Kazakhstan (adopted 26 January 1996)
• Law on the Budget System in Kazakhstan (adopted 1 April 1999)
• Law on Public Service (adopted 23 July 1999)
• Law on Status of the Capital City of Kazakhstan (adopted 20 May 1998).
• Law on Special Status of Almaty City (adopted 1 July 1998)
• Law on Local Public Administration (adopted 23 January 2001)
• Program for Privatization and Increasing Efficiency of State Property Management for 1999–
2000. Government Resolution No. 683 (adopted 1 June 1999), amended by Government
Resolution No. 1127 (adopted 11 August 1999)
• Law on Non-profit Organizations (adopted 16 January 2001)
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Annex 8.4
Responsibilities of Administrative Tiers
Table 8.A5
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Kazakhstan
Functions Raion and Oblast Central Administration
Administrations
I .  E D U C A T I O N
1. Pre-school X
2. Primary X
3. Secondary X National Olympics,
state support to schools
for gifted children
4. Vocational X
5. Specialized secondary X Training of personnel
for law enforcement bodies,
Ministry of Defense, etc.
6. Higher X
7. Refresher training X X
for professionals
I I .  S O C I A L  W E L F A R E
1. Nurseries X, insignificantly
2. Kindergartens X, insignificantly
3. Welfare homes Orphanages
4. Services for aged and Housing subsidies to
disabled people low-income people; social
assistance for the burial of
employed people and
material assistance to bury
the unemployed.
5. Special services 1. Support to families with
(for homeless, families children; assistance to
in crisis, etc.) children of enlisted men;
support to children
living with AIDS;
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Table 8.A5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Kazakhstan
Functions Raion and Oblast Central Administration
Administrations
2. Assistance to unemployed
mothers with four or more
children under seven;
3. Material assistance
to citizens registered
as unemployed;
4. Assistance to the disabled
children who are raised
and educated at home.
6. State housing stock Distribute housing stock
I I I .  H E A LT H  S E R V I C E S
1. Primary health care Provision of primary
medical care;
2. Health protection Local medical centers; Rehabilitation of children,
prevention of and response to centralized purchase
dangerous infections of vaccines;
at the local level; prevention of and response to
 dangerous infections;
3. Hospitals Hospitals, outpatient A broad spectrum
clinics, specialized hospitals of hospitals
at the local level;
hospitals and clinics for the
veterans of WWII
4. Public health TB clinics Collection of blood
donations at the national level,
sanitation and epidemiological
monitoring; TB program
5. Other, in particular: Provision of inpatient Forensic expertise
assistance including
specialized medical care
at the local level
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Table 8.A5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Kazakhstan
Functions Raion and Oblast Central Administration
Administrations
IV.  C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E ,  S P O R T S
1. Theaters Local subsidies to The same at the national level
organizations that organize
cultural and leisure activities
2. Museums Preservation of historical The same at the national level
and cultural values
at the local level
3. Libraries Local subsidies to The same at the national level
organizations for
cultural activities
4. Parks Local subsidies to The same at the national level
organizations for cultural
and leisure activities
5. Sports, leisure Organization of sports Financing of sports at
activities at the local level  a high level of achievements;
state bonuses
6. Maintaining buildings Administrative expenses
for cultural events
V.  E C O N O M I C  S E R V I C E S
1. Water supply Construction and Improvement of water
maintenance of water pipes resources management
and rehabilitation of the water
reserves, operation of
international waterworks;
plans for uniform use of water
safety measures, register of the
water supply reserves.
2. Sewage Construction and maintenance
of sewage disposal plants
3. Electricity Maintains the construction Capital investments
of new electric power lines
4. Gas
5. District heating
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Table 8.A5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Kazakhstan
Functions Raion and Oblast Central Administration
Administrations
V I .  E N V I R O N M E N T, Local environment Organization of
  P U B L I C  S A N I T A T I O N problems, sanitary  environmental protection
epidemiological stations at the national level
1. Waste collection X
2. Waste disposal X
3. Street cleansing X
4. Cemeteries Allocate cemetery plots
5. Environmental protection Local environment problems; Organization of environmental
Organize ecological expertise protection at the national level
V I I .  U R B A N  D E V E L O P M E N T
1. Town planning Draft the general land
development plans;
serve as clients for the
construction of communal,
social and cultural objects;
issue permits for the
construction of communal
infrastructure and facilities;
organize construction of
objects for communication,
transport and engineering
infrastructure;
2. Regional/spatial planning Design the administrative Co-finance certain projects
region development plans
and general development
plans for raion centers
3. Local economic Prepare the scheme for raion Co-finance certain projects
development planning in oblasts;
organize public transportation;
maintain roads
4. Tourism Operate and maintain roads Tourism development
programs
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Table 8.A5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Kazakhstan
Functions Raion and Oblast Central Administration
Administrations
V I I I .  G E N E R A L  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
1. Authoritative functions Issue licenses for business Specific ministries are
(licenses etc.) activities, regulate land responsible for licensing
relationships; issue permits
for the construction of
communal networks and
facilities
2. Other state Electoral districts are formed Central electoral commission
administrative issues to organize elections and
(electoral register, etc.) calculate votes in the cities
and raions by the decisions of
respective akims and in
coordination with county
electoral commissions.
3. Local police Bodies of the interior
funded from the local budgets
4. Fire brigades Fire brigades funded The same at the national level
from the local budgets
5. Civil defense Organization of activities The same at the national level
on civil defense issues
6. Consumer rights
protection
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Notes
1 Statistics Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan and CIS Countries 1 (2000): 41.
2 “Public Budget Hearing,” Municipal Administration (June 1999).
3 Municipal Administration (June 2000): 7.
4 “Seminar of Maslikhat Secretaries from Oblasts, Almaty and Astana,” Municipal Administration
16, (May 2000): 4.
5 Municipal Administration 17 (June 2000): 3.
6 Delovaya Nedelia, “Elections to the Parliament of Kazakhstan on October 10 and 24, 1999,”
Final Report of HRD OSCE 6 (2000): 14.
7 K. Yezhenova et al., “Elections to Representative Bodies: Expectations and Reality,” Panorama
41 (1999): 2.
8 N. Drozd, “Concentration of the “Protest Electorate” is Highest in Successful Almaty (The
Poorest Regions Unconditionally Support Authorities),” Panorama 41 (1999): 3.
9 Presented by the authorities of Pavlodar oblast.
10 J. Djandosova, “Administrative Reform and Corruption Problems,” Al-Pari 6 (2000): 69.
11 A. Baimenov, “Reform Does Not Accept Stereotypes,” Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 43 (22
February 2000): 1–3.
12 Presidential Resolution No. 1845 on the Establishment of the Higher National School of
Public Administration (HNSPA) (29 August 1994).
13 This point was emphasized in the course of discussion on the draft law by B. Zhamishev, first
vice prime minister of finance and by N. Korzhova, vice prime minister of finance.
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Local Government in Uzbekistan
Kuatbay Bektemirov & Eduard Rahimov
1. Major General Indicators
The Republic of Uzbekistan has been a sovereign state since September 1991. Located in the middle
of Central Asia, Uzbekistan occupies most of the area between the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers,
a total of 448,900 square kilometers. As of the beginning of 2000, Uzbekistan had a total of
24,487,700 inhabitants, 61.6 percent of whom live in rural areas. The average life expectancy is
67.8 years. Uzbeks account for seventy-seven percent of the population and Russians for six percent,
while other ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, Kazakhs and Kara-Kalpaks comprise the remaining
seventeen percent. In terms of religious faith, eighty-eight percent are Muslim (primarily Sunni),
nine percent are Orthodox Christians and three percent are of other faiths. There were 4,992,000
government sector employees as of the first half of 1999, of which 119,000 were employees of
public administration agencies.
The vast majority of urban settlements (74.3 percent) have populations of five thousand to fifty
thousand people. The capital city, Taskent, has over two million inhabitants, while eleven other
cities have populations exceeding one hundred thousand. Of rural districts, or raions, 79.3 percent
have populations of fifty thousand to two hundred fifty thousand inhabitants. Rural districts have
an average population of 235,500 and an average number of 72.2 settlements per district.
The Republic of Uzbekistan consists of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, twelve oblasts, or regions,
120 cities, 113 towns, 164 raions and 11,844 rural settlements. The most densely populated regions
are Andizhan, with 506.3 people per square kilometer; Ferghana, with 365.7 people per square
kilometer; and Namanghan, with 236.4 people per square kilometer. The city of Tashkent also has
a relatively high population density (150.7), as do the regions of Khorezm (203), Samarkand
(158.8) and Syr-Darya (127.9). The desert areas of the Navoi regions are the most sparsely inhabited,
with seven inhabitants per square kilometer overall, a number which diminishes to 4.1 in rural areas.
Similarly, the Republic of Karakalpakstan has only 8.9 inhabitants per square kilometer overall and
4.6 in rural areas.
The system of public administration in Uzbekistan is comprised of two tiers, central and local. Local
governments are subdivided into regional, district and city administrations. In addition, community
self-governments also operate locally, although they are not part of the central public administration
system.
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2.  Legal and Constitutional Basis
2.1 Overview of Local Government Reform
Since independence, Uzbekistan has laid down entirely new foundations for the national state, dis-
mantling the previous administrative system. Many former political and economic government
structures were thus dissolved to pave the way for an Uzbek state governed by democratic principles.
The adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 8 December 1992 created the
basis for the developing legislative framework of a sovereign Uzbekistan. Section 4 of the Constitution
defines the state and administrative-territorial structure of Uzbekistan, while article 11 establishes
the division of powers—legislative, executive and judicial—on which the government is based.
In 1994, the first elections were held according to the new electoral system. Representatives were
elected both to Parliament (Oliy Majlis) and to the local councils. The unicameral Oliy Majlis
(literally “Supreme Council” in Uzbek) is the highest legislative body in the Republic of Uzbekistan.
It is currently composed of 250 deputies elected for a term of five years through multi-party elections
in local districts.
The office of the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, introduced in 1990, is the central position
in public administration and the keystone in the national political system. According to article 89 of
the Constitution, the president possesses both chief executive authority and the powers of head of
the state. Therefore, the president of the country simultaneously performs the office of Chairman of
the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the highest executive body.
The system of local government has been established according to the Law on Local Public Administra-
tion, adopted on 2 September 1993. Local government activities are specified in the seven chapters
and twenty articles of the law. Article 1 states that the local representative authorities at the regional,
district and city levels are the local councils, whose full name in Uzbek is “Councils of People’s
Deputies.” According to article 99 of the Uzbekistan Constitution, local councils at all levels are
headed by a chairman, or hokim (hokim is translated as deputy ruler). Regional, district and city
hokims also act as the head of the local executive branch, or hokimiyat.
Establishing a new system of local government according to constitutionally defined principles
marked the final step in the process of government reform in Uzbekistan. Local government powers
are shared between local divisions of state administration and the local self-government, which itself
is comprised of the local council and the hokimiyat. The institution of the hokim is the core of the
new system, combining executive and representative functions.
The general distribution of authority between the central and local governments is defined in the
Constitution. At the macroeconomic level, the central government has the authority to establish
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uniform tax, loan and monetary policy (articles 122 and 123), relevant powers assigned to the
President and the Cabinet of Ministers and special powers belonging to the Zhokargy Kenes (Karakalpak
for “Supreme Council”) and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan. Other
aspects of central government authority are addressed in the Law on Land Cadastre, the Law on
Ownership, the Law on Denationalization and Privatization, the Law on Banks and Banking Activities
and the Law on Natural Resources.
The new structure of executive power differs from previous ones in that the executive branch does
not possess planning or distribution powers, and is only responsible for coordinating and regulating
economic policies. Central government bodies are charged with maintaining the overall balance between
supply and demand for goods and services. Socio-economic development at the local level is regulated
on a case-by-case basis in addition to national and regional programs targeted at specific socio-economic
issues. Administration and coordination of regional development is performed jointly by these bodies:
1. The Office of the President, which coordinates decisions on local development through its
Department of Socio-economic Policy;
2. The Cabinet of Ministers, whose Information and Analysis Department is responsible for the
consolidation and development of relevant government resolutions and monitors their imple-
mentation. This department has territorial offices in regions, Taskent and the Republic of
Karakalpakstan;
3. The Ministry of Macroeconomics and Statistics. Its territorial offices are responsible for analyzing
the current status of socio-economic development and formulating annual and long-term
development programs for territories;
4. The Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, Committee for State Property Management and Support
of Entrepreneurial Activities, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, Ministry of Labor,
Ministry of Social Welfare, State Committee for the Protection of Nature and the State
Committee for Construction and Architecture.  All of these agencies participate in the resolution
of specific issues related to local development through the activities of their territorial offices;
5. Local administrations. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan and
hokimiyats of regions, districts and cities directly oversee the development of their territories.
2.2 Legal Basis of Community Self-government
Local government in Uzbekistan is supplemented by self-governing community organizations. The
Law on Community Self-government, adopted in 1993 and subsequently revised in 1999, defines
community self-government as “independent activity by citizens, guaranteed by the Constitution
and the Laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan, for the purpose of resolving issues of local importance
according to their own interests and history, as well as to national traditions, spiritual values and local
customs.”
Community self-governments exist throughout Uzbekistan, based on the principle of decentralization.
Different types of territorial units engaging in self-government activities include villages, kishlaks,
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auls and mahallas. According to article 10 of the Law on Naming Administrative-territorial Units,
the term “village” refers to localities with over two thousand inhabitants which are located in the
vicinity of industrial or construction enterprises, railway stations or other important objects.
Kishlak is the Uzbek name for rural settlement. Its equivalent in Kara-Kalpak, Kazakh or Tatar is aul,
a term which refers to compact enclaves composed primarily of these ethnic groups. A kishlak or aul
may comprise many neighboring localities and is represented by an assembly of its citizens. Localities
are grouped together under a given rural assembly using the criterion of convenience for local
inhabitants. Government bodies establish or abolish villages, kishlaks and auls, and modify their
territories or names with due regard for the opinion of the relevant self-governments.
Mahalla is an Arabic word meaning “local community” and refers to a community of people residing
in a specific territory.  Mahallas may vary in size from 150 to 1500 families. In cities, mahallas are
generally established by the residents of a particular residential quarter or suburb. According to
article 5 of the amended Law on Community Self-government Bodies, local governments may
establish, abolish, merge or divide mahallas and modify mahalla borders upon the initiative of the
mahalla self-government.
Citizens exercise their constitutional right to self-governance through citizen assemblies. These
assemblies, attended by resident citizens over the age of eighteen, are the highest body of community
self-government and are entitled to represent the interests of its inhabitants and make decisions on
their behalf, which are effective on the respective territory.
According to article 7 of the Law on Community Self-government, bodies of community self-
government include citizen assemblies of villages, kishlaks and auls, as well as those of mahallas
within cities, villages, kishlaks or auls. An assembly council (kengash) is created to implement the
decisions of the citizen assembly and to carry out daily self-government activities between sessions.
This council is comprised of the chairman of the citizens’ assembly, various advisors, chairmen of
assembly commissions and the executive secretary.
Community self-governments are non-governmental organizations, separate from the system of
central government. They enjoy the rights of legal entities, possess unique official seals and are
subject to registration with local government bodies. The guiding principles of the self-governments
are democracy, humanism, openness, social justice and local autonomy.
According to article 3 of the Law on Local Public Administration and article 6 of the Law on
Community Self-government, central government bodies should create the necessary conditions for
the development of community self-governments without interfering in their affairs and assist
citizens in the execution of their right to self-governance. However, this provision is rarely fulfilled;
in practice, community self-governments have thus far had limited independence.
477
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N  U Z B E K I S T A N
2.3 The Mahalla as a Form of Community Self-government
Today, the term “mahalla” is used uniformly in Uzbekistan to refer to a neighborhood community.
In the East, the neighborhood community as a unit of social life dates back to ancient times. Mahalla,
in both its historic and modern meanings, represents a clearly defined socio-demographic, cultural
and spiritual entity, as well as an administrative-territorial one, in which people are united by
traditions, customs and human, business and legal relationships. For centuries, these territorial
entities have shaped the creation of rules of human coexistence, public opinion, ideological systems
and outlooks within their boundaries.
Mahallas have received powerful support from the central government since the early stages of
Uzbek independence. The state considers their welfare to be essential for the stability of the republic.
In his book, Uzbekistan: National Independence, Economy, Politics, and Ideology, President Karimov
emphasizes that “an important feature of our society is that it is based on the idea of collectivism, the
unity of communal interests and the priority of public opinion. Therefore, mahallas play a major
part in democratizing society and realizing its main principles, foremost that of social justice. Today,
there is no other entity more knowledgeable about the real financial situation of local families and
their spiritual and cultural interests. Mahallas are the fairest and most credible mechanisms for social
support of the population and should become a reliable support and an effective instrument of
reform in our society.”
In the Soviet era, mahallas existed alongside former government bodies such as local village councils.
Today, mahallas have assumed their functions and are developing into bodies of local self-governance.
Their recently acquired formal status as an important component of the state is reflected in the
Regulation on Mahalla Committees in Cities, Villages and Kishlaks. In 1997, Uzbekistan had roughly
ten thousand mahallas. Some mahallas have been established even within large city apartment blocks.
In view of new government objectives, the administrative structure of the mahalla has been clearly
defined. A general assembly of household representatives elects a committee, or kengash, to head the
mahalla. Committee members may also include elders elected for their experience in organizational
work. This committee elects a chairman, officially titled chairman of the mahalla assembly, but more
commonly known as the aqsaqal, a deputy chairman (muovin) and a secretary (kotib). Specific mahalla
commissions are founded for improving living conditions, organizing ceremonial events, maintaining
public order, housing stock and finances and overseeing issues concerning women, youths, war and
veterans. In rural areas, several mahalla committees may combine to form one citizen assembly.
The social status of mahalla chairmen has changed notably. Many chairmen have extensive experience
with administration in Soviet institutions, schools and universities, although inhabitants ultimately
elect those who are familiar with popular customs and traditions. The prestige of the mahalla
administration overall has significantly increased over recent years and the offices of chairman and
secretary are now paid positions. In a further move to promote mahalla administration activity, a
Presidential Decree on Support to Community Self-governments, adopted 23 April 1998, raised
the salaries of both chairman and secretary and assigned a full retirement pension to chairmen.
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In the years since independence, mahallas have accumulated substantial experience in resolving
social, economic and other local issues. Many of them are now actively involved in the implementation
of the large-scale government programs for revitalizing society and improving the quality of life.
They also create material and spiritual conditions fostering individual initiative. Mahallas have
gained experience in this area, as shown by the examples of Beruni mahalla in the Sabir Rahimov
district of Tashkent, Yoshlik mahalla in the city of Djizak and Ulugbek kishlak mahalla in the Samarkand
district.
Mahalla committees have also materially increased their financial capabilities. The government now
permits them to engage in economic activity and establish industrial enterprises, canteens, shops or
other facilities which contribute a share of their profits to mahalla funds. In addition, hokimiyats
provide some financial support to mahallas, typically allocating one percent of the sale value of real-
estate. It is also community custom that those who are better off share their wealth with their neighbors
and citizens accordingly provide material assistance to the community. Traditionally, these acts are
performed on a voluntary basis and are not widely publicized.
The tradition of community-based assistance acquired new forms and content once the government
shifted its aims from universal social protection to support for the most vulnerable population groups.
In a decision unprecedented elsewhere in the world, mahallas were charged with the distribution of
certain government funds. This was designed to target social assistance more accurately, since mahallas
are best placed to discern those in need of assistance, as well as to reduce administrative expenses.
For example, a special mahalla commission pays benefits to unemployed mothers of children under
two, according to the Presidential Decree on the Increase of Material Support for Children, adopted in
December 1996. Assistance to families with children is the largest social program in terms of both
expenditures and beneficiaries, accounting for 6.3 percent of all national budget expenditures in 1998.
In January 1999, a Presidential Decree on Increasing the Role of Community Self-governments in
Providing Targeted Social Assistance appointed community self-governments to oversee timely payment
for public utilities. Part of these funds is then transferred to the mahalla to subsidize public services for
low-income families. This role has considerably improved the prestige of mahalla committees. However,
it must be noted that the excessive expansion of responsibilities frequently leads to bureaucratization
of mahalla committee activity and thus distracts them from their main traditional functions.
2.4 Territories with Special Status
The Republic of Karakalpakstan is the only territorial autonomy with special status in Uzbekistan.
Formerly the Karakalpak ASSR, it was renamed in 1992. As of 1 January 2000, Karakalpakstan had
a population of over 1.5 million people in an area of 165,000 square kilometers. According to article
70 of the Uzbek Constitution, the Republic of Karakalpakstan is part of the Republic of Uzbekistan
and its sovereignty is protected by the Republic of Uzbekistan.
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According to the Constitution of Karakalpakstan, adopted on 9 April 1993, the highest representative
state body with legislative authority is the Zhokargy Kenes. Its exclusive powers include the adoption
and amendment of the Constitution and laws of Karakalpakstan.
The Uzbek Constitution also states that the Karakalpak Constitution may not contradict the Uzbek
Constitution and that the laws of Uzbekistan are also mandatory and binding on the territory of
Karakalpakstan. Article 75 of the Uzbek Constitution stipulates that relations between Uzbekistan
and Karakalpakstan are regulated by their bilateral agreements.
In general, Karakalpak laws are virtually identical to the equivalent Uzbek laws, with only minor
changes. For example, according to article 99 of the Karakalpak Constitution, bodies of self-governance
in villages, auls, as well as city makan-kenes’es (mahallas) are citizen assemblies. Local self-government
powers, procedures and elections are regulated by the Karakalpak Law on Community Self-
government, very similar to the Uzbek law of the same name. This is true for the Law on Local Public
Administration and many others. Thus, the system of local self-governance in Karakalpakstan does
not differ greatly from the rest of the nation.
Tashkent, the political, economic, administrative, academic and cultural center of Uzbekistan, is
another administrative-territorial unit with special status. As the capital city of the country, it is
the largest city directly subordinate to the republic. As of 1 January 2000, it had a population of
2,135,500. Although there is no specific law on the status of the capital city, Tashkent has an
administrative structure unlike other cities in that its hokim, like regional hokims, is appointed
directly by the president, as stipulated in both the Constitution and Law on Local Public
Administration. In addition, Tashkent is divided into eleven administrative districts, each with their
own hokim and hokimiyat, which are in turn divided into several mahallas.
3. Local Politics, Decision Making
3.1 Public Participation in Decision Making
Popular traditions have been used as a basis for reforming the system of self-governance. These
include several traditionally Eastern features such as paternalism, continuity, the power of moral
example, esteem for elders and an orientation toward family values. These principles, rooted in the
community and deeply embedded in both individual and collective psychology, remain relevant
and adaptable to the new socio-economic reality.
Citizen assemblies arguably represent a traditional form of public participation in the decision
making process. Citizen assemblies resolve local social issues and make proposals to government
authorities regarding specific decisions. The new version of the Law on Community Self-government
has also expanded opportunities for their participation in decision making. For instance, they will be
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able to more efficiently control the local execution of law and review reports from heads of enterprises
located in community territory on issues of environmental protection and land improvement.
According to the Constitution, the most important issues regarding the state and society are subject
to public discussion and referendum. Consequently, a public referendum was held on 26 March
1995, to determine the timing of the presidential elections. A new public referendum will decide
whether to introduce a bicameral parliament in 2004. There is no law on local referenda, as local
referenda and public hearings are not widely popular.
Although local referenda are infrequent, representative and executive bodies acknowledge the
importance of public opinion, making it a priority to review citizen appeals and often taking the
opinion of citizens and NGOs into account when making decisions. The hokim holds regular office
hours open to citizens who wish to make complaints or proposals. Local council members also review
citizen requests in meetings with their constituencies and take specific local measures in response.
The establishment of the Ombudsman’s office and its regional offices has created yet another mode
for citizen participation.
3.2 Internal Structure of Local Government Decision Making
Regional, district and city council members are elected by the residents of the respective territory.
Councils conduct their activities through council sessions, which are convened by the hokim at least
twice per year. In addition, they may be convened at the initiative of two thirds of the members.
Council members shall be notified of the hokim’s decision to open a session at least seven days
beforehand. The sessions are chaired by the hokim or, in his or her absence, by a council member
appointed by either the hokim or the council. The secretary is elected from the council members for
the duration of the session. The session has due authority provided that at least two thirds or total
members are in attendance.
Local council decisions are approved by a majority of council members through open vote or secret
ballot. Special commissions are established to prepare issues to be submitted to the session, to control
the execution of council decisions and to implement the legal acts of Uzbekistan.
The local council has authority over issues related to the activities of the local executive branch. The
hokim and deputy hokims are appointed and dismissed with council approval.  In addition, the
council reviews general legislation, approves the budget and reviews reports from the hokim and the
local administration on implementation of council decisions.
The local council establishes the rates of local taxes, duties and fees and may determine exemptions
in compliance with the applicable legislation. It also decides upon issues related to the protection of
citizens’ rights, social and economic development, environmental protection and administrative
matters, and may resolve other issues within its competence.
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The hokim is empowered to make decisions and issue instructions. He or she is responsible for
planning, funding and managing local property.  The hokim also coordinates the activities of community
self-governments and enterprises of different forms of ownership which provide construction, transport,
roads, telecommunications and trade, communal, social or cultural services. In addition, the hokim
is responsible for administering social protection, law enforcement and protection of human rights
and freedoms. In cases specifically envisaged by the law, the hokim’s decisions shall be approved by
the local council. If any of the hokim’s decisions contradict legislation, the council is empowered to
annul them.
Local council legislation and hokim decisions adopted within their competence are binding for all
citizens, officials and enterprises located in the given territory.  These acts enter into force at the date
of signing, unless the act itself stipulates otherwise.
3.3 Methods of Election or Appointment to Government Positions
According to the Constitution, the president has the power to appoint or dismiss the first deputy
and deputies of the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet of Ministers, subject to approval by
the Oliy Majlis. The president also appoints and dismisses the hokims of regions and Tashkent, subject
to approval by the corresponding councils. As a rule, candidates are promoted from the personnel
reserve currently under formation by the administrative and human resource divisions of the state
administration.
Regional hokims in turn appoint district and city hokim, subject to approval by the district or city
council. City hokims appoint hokims to city districts upon the approval of the city council, and
district hokims appoint hokims to cities of district subordination upon approval by the raion council.
The latter are also considered to be the district hokim’s first deputies; other deputies are also appointed
or dismissed by hokims at all levels subject to the approval of their respective council.
According to article 80 of the Karakalpak Constitution, the chairman of the Supreme Council
(Zhokargy Kenes) is the highest government official in Karakalpakstan. Elected from the members
of the Supreme Council, the chairman may serve a maximum of two terms in office. The Council of
Ministers of Karakalpakstan is the highest body of state administration in the autonomous republic.
The Council of Ministers is headed by a chairman who is nominated by the chairman of the
Supreme Council and appointed by the Supreme Council in coordination with the President of
Uzbekistan. Raion and city hokims of Karakalpakstan are appointed and dismissed by the chairman
of the Supreme Council upon nomination by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and are
subsequently approved by the corresponding local council.
The personnel policy of the Uzbek government is designed to ensure the regular rotation of public
servants in both central and local governments in order to promote industriousness and prevent
corruption. It is no secret that family, neighborhood and clan connections play an important role in
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staff promotion. However, these are gradually becoming less reliable guarantees for obtaining
prestigious government posts and privileged community status. Under the new political and economic
conditions, entrepreneurial qualifications, skills and initiative are increasingly valued over family and
political connections.
3.4 System of Local Elections
All citizens over eighteen years old are eligible to vote and run for office, with the exception of those
who are imprisoned or declared incompetent by court. Presidential, parliamentary and local council
elections are regulated by the Law on Presidential Elections, the Law on Elections to the Oliy Majlis
and the Law on Elections to Regional, District and City Councils, amended on 26 December 1997
and 19 August 1999. Elections have been held twice in Uzbekistan since independence. Unlike
elections held under the old regime, these were organized on a competitive, multi-party basis.  The
most recent elections to Parliament and local councils were held in December 1999 and the most
recent presidential elections on 9 January 2000.
Although the Constitution has laid the legal foundations for the functioning of a multi-party system,
the new political system of the republic is still under development. According to article 34, citizens
have the right to form political parties, trade unions and other public associations. Currently, there are
five registered political parties. Political parties may nominate their parliamentary candidate if they
have been registered at the Ministry of Justice at least six months prior to elections and have gathered
fifty thousand signatures. However, no more than ten percent of the fifty thousand signatures may
come from any one region, including Tashkent and the Republic of Karakalpakstan. Political parties may
nominate up to 250 candidates for Parliament, a total of one candidate from each electoral district.
In the 1999 elections, unlike previous elections, citizens were granted the right to nominate their
own candidates.  Citizens may form an initiative group of at least one hundred voters in a given electoral
district to nominate a candidate.  Local governments also nominate their own candidates, usually the
local hokim.  Local administration officials, members of government and employees in the Office of
the Public Prosecutor may run for office, but must resign their posts if elected.  Hokims are permitted
to both perform their office and enjoy membership in the Oliy Majlis, as it is not yet a professional
parliament, convening only for two to three days, four times per year, in order to adopt laws drafted
by its committees and commissions.
It should be noted that candidacy requirements are not equal, since local government sponsored
candidates are not required to gather signatures in their support, unlike candidates from political
parties or citizen initiative groups.  In addition, pre-election meetings of candidates and their consti-
tuencies may only be organized by the electoral commission and held in its presence of its members,
who are usually influenced by local governments. There is evidence of hokimiyats pressuring certain
candidates and generally interfering in the election process, all of which is to the detriment of truly
democratic elections.
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In the 1999 elections to the Oliy Majlis, the results were as follows: forty-eight seats were won by the
People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU); thirty-four by the People’s Democratic Party
Fidokorlar (The Selfless); twenty by the Vatan Tarakkiyoti Party (“Motherland Progress”); eleven by
the Social Democratic Party Adolath (“Justice”); ten by the Democratic Party Milliy Tiklanish
(“National Rebirth”); 110 by local governments; and sixteen by voter initiative groups.
To some extent, political diversity at the local council level is reflected by the parliamentary elections.
Analysis of these elections reveals the dynamics of growth among the different political powers and
their popularity. For instance, most council seats at the regional, district and city levels had frequently
been occupied by representatives of local governments and members of the PDPU, the former
communist party. Today, the Fidokorlar Party is also widely represented in the local councils, although
the popularity of other parties at the local level is still rather low, demonstrating how gradually this
traditional Eastern society is moving towards a democratic system.  According to the Law on
Community Self-governments, citizens’ assemblies may submit proposals to local councils on the
nomination of candidates to Parliament, regional councils and the Tashkent council and decide
upon the nomination of candidates to district and city councils.
In 1993, the first elections of chairmen (aqsaqals) and council members of citizen assemblies were
held, following the adoption of the Law on Community Self-government. Elections of citizen
assemblies and their officials may be held by secret or open ballot, provided that all citizen voting
rights are upheld. During the preparation for elections, local agencies of the central government
must assess and recommend the candidates. These agencies organize public opinion polls on
candidates, evaluate their professional, organizational and moral qualities, and analyze the previous
work record of assembly chairmen. The role of political parties in this process is still insignificant.
In November 1998, citizen assemblies were organized nationwide to hold the elections for community
chairmen. Seventy percent of the adult population participated, a total of 8.4 million people. In many
places, citizens voiced their dissatisfaction with ineffective or indifferent self-government heads, refusing
to re-elect eighteen percent of chairmen for a second term. Among council members, forty-seven
percent were not returned to office. In total, 7,574 chairmen were elected.  Of these, 65.5 percent
had received higher education and over half of them are under the age of fifty. A total of 446 women
were elected as chairmen and over 14,000 as council members. On average, ten council members and
one chairman were elected per self-government. Among council members, 42.2 percent have received
higher education. Of both chairmen and councilors, 372 individuals have a scientific degree.
3.5 Relationship between Elected and Appointed Local Government Bodies
The Constitution assigns specific powers to the Parliament, the president, Cabinet of Ministers,
Supreme Court and other courts of the Republic. The principle of division of powers was subsequently
elaborated in further legislation, such as the Law on the Oliy Majlis, the Law on the Cabinet of
Ministers and the Law on the Courts.  It should be noted that even with the attempts to specify the
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functions of each branch of power, their “solidarization” still remains an important goal.  This does
not dictate a uniform approach to all government activities; in contrast, it refers to coordinated effort
rather than unification along party lines. Coordination of activities between all government bodies
is necessary for the strength of the institution as a whole.
An objective analysis of the laws and activities of representative and executive powers reveals that
hokimiyats ultimately possess the upper hand in their relationships with local councils.  On one
hand, council approval is necessary for their appointment to office and councils may monitor hokim
activities by reviewing their reports in local council sessions. However, the extent to which hokims
are truly accountable to the council remains unclear. The actual role of local councils in the system of
local state administration is rather limited, while hokims have real political, legal, organizational, staff,
material and financial advantages. As long as the same individual heads both branches of power, the
principle of undivided authority prevails over those of democracy.
3.6 Functional Autonomy in Decision Making
According to article 103 of the Constitution, regional, district and city hokims exercise their powers
on the principle of undivided authority and are personally responsible for the decisions and activities
of government bodies subordinate to them. The hokims’ decisions are binding for all enterprises,
institutions, organizations, officials and inhabitants in the respective territory, provided they are
made on issues within their competence.
Decisions of the higher levels of government are obligatory for lower ones. The hokim must comply
with legislation of Uzbekistan, implement Oliy Majlis resolutions, presidential decrees, instructions
of the Cabinet of Ministers or higher hokims and execute local council decisions within the territory
of the local government. The hokim may also annul decisions of lower level governments if they
contradict the Constitution or other legislation.
3.7 Ethnic Issues, Multicultural Government
Representatives of over one hundred nationalities live in Uzbekistan. Of these, Uzbeks are the most
numerous. According to article 4 of the Constitution, all citizens have the same rights and freedoms
and are equal under the law regardless of gender, race, language, belief or social origin.  The state
language is Uzbek, except in the Republic of Karakalpakstan, which uses both Karakalpak and
Uzbek as official state languages. The Constitution guarantees respect for the languages, customs
and traditions of national and ethnic groups living in Uzbekistan and ensures conditions for their
continued development. Many ethnic groups have the opportunity to maintain their unique cultural
identities by practicing their national traditions, establishing associations or cultural institutions and
exchanging information or providing education in their native languages.
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Uzbek legislation does not indicate special privileges for any ethnic groups with regard to participating
in public administration. The rights of representation and participation in political life are regulated
by common legislation, which treats all citizens equally. This equal status is borne out by the ethnic
composition of candidates in the most recent elections.  Of all registered candidates for Parliament
approximately eighty-nine percent were Uzbek; 5.1 percent Karakalpak; 2.1 percent Tajik; 1.6
percent Russian; 1.3 percent Kazakh and 1.1 percent representatives of other ethnic groups.
3.8 Local Government Associations
According to article 4 of the Law on Local Public Administration, local councils and hokims of
different cities or districts are authorized to undertake joint measures in their mutual interest, such as
setting up joint ventures, business associations or other contractual forms of inter-governmental
cooperation. Local governments cooperate on a voluntary basis, in the spirit of solidarity. They may
organize funds and establish joint structures to perform common duties. They may also unite to
form associations or alliances in order to regulate and represent the interests of a larger territory. The
status of these associations is defined by the type of organization.
Local governments may also cooperate to improve local self-government and service delivery, form
partnerships with foreign municipalities and work together with local offices of international
organizations. According to article 17 of the Law on Community Self-governments, a national council
of aqsaqals and oblast, district and city coordination councils on self-government issues may be established
to coordinate local self-government activities.
The national non-profit Mahalla Foundation was established to provide state support to preserve
historical and spiritual values, to promote folk customs and traditions, to disseminate cultural and
educational activities among mahallas and to encourage further social and economic development.
The foundation distributes funds to organize different events and publishes the Mahalla newspaper.
Major foundation activities are directed at:
• improving the activities of local mahalla committees nationwide;
• improving social protection of low income families, disabled people and children in the local
territory;
• promoting concepts of humanism, mercy, mutual understanding and good neighborly relations.
Counterpart Consortium, an international NGO, is currently implementing a program to support the
mahalla initiative and strengthen cooperation between NGOs and local self-government in the Republic
of Karakalpakstan and the Bukhara and Ferghana regions. The program’s main objectives include:
• increasing the participation of mahallas in NGOs activities on the grounds that they are
recognized representatives of public opinion and partners of the local communities;
• encouraging the transformation of mahalla committees and other administrative structures in
order to establish efficient two-way communication between citizens and the state;
• establishing sustainable interaction between mahalla committees and NGOs within the
framework of social partnership.
486
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
4. Functional Structure of Local Government
4.1 Local Government Functions
Local government activities are regulated by the Law on Local Public Administration. Major local
council functions are the following:
• to approve the local budget and report on its execution;
• to approve long-term social, economic and land development programs and plans for regions,
districts or cities;
• to establish tax privileges or exemptions on local taxes, duties and fees;
• to approve the appointment or dismissal of hokims or deputy hokims and review reports on
their activities;
• to review reports from heads of divisions, departments and other structural units of the executive
branch;
• to approve and amend regulations concerning the local council and provisions on council
commissions;
• to establish or dissolve local council commissions and review reports on their activities;
• to certify local council members or dismiss them from office before the end of their term;
• to review and decide upon council member initiatives.
Major functions of the local hokim functions are:
• to supervise economic, social and cultural activities in the region, district or city;
• to develop and maintain social and economic development programs;
• to mobilize territorial and inter-sectoral resources to promote efficiency in production and the
solution of social issues;
• to submit local social and economic development programs to the local council for approval;
• to submit major components of the local budget and budget execution to the local council for
review;
• to continue privatization and destatization efforts at the local level;
• to promote foreign and inter-regional economic relations;
• to provide for the enforcement of law, order and security;
• to supervise local communal services;
• to ensure protection of the environment.
Both internal and external bodies perform control, audit and supervision functions over local govern-
ments. Internal control is the responsibility of the representative branch, and is performed by the
hokim, the budget and finance commission and the accountant. The hokim monitors operations of
all department heads and local administration employees, while the budget and finance commission
monitors changes in budget revenues. The control and audit department of the Ministry of Finance
and its local government divisions monitor local government assets.
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State regulatory bodies are charged with overseeing the implementation of approved programs and
their timely performance. In addition, they monitor the application of economic legislation and the
observance of the rights and guarantees for businesses. These functions are fulfilled by special control
bodies of the executive branch of government and the court system, primarily by the economic courts.
According to the Law on Community Self-government, citizen assemblies in villages, kishlaks, auls
and mahallas are usually responsible for the following functions:
• electing a chairman and committee, electing commission members and commission chairs for
main areas of assembly activity and reviewing their reports on a quarterly basis;
• electing an audit and administrative commission;
• approving the action plan and expenditures of the community self-government as well as
measures to improve local sanitary conditions;
• exercising control within the community over the implementation of national legislation as
well as community government decisions;
• sending representatives to district election committees for presidential, parliamentary and local
council elections;
• reviewing reports from the heads of district, city and regional hokimiyats on issues within the
competence of community self-governments. Minutes of the citizen assemblies on these reports
are sent to the regional or Tashkent hokimiyats, which then register them and control the ful-
fillment of citizens’ applications;
• forming own local self-government funds and owning, managing and disposing of local
government property;
• organizing control over expenditures;
• organizing voluntary financial collections from residents to improve public places or to assist
low-income families to repair their housing;
• deciding upon the contractual use of resources belonging to enterprises or organizations located
on the respective territory to improve them, plant trees and gardens or organize sanitary purification;
• deciding upon the voluntary pooling of funds from legal entities and individuals for the
development of local social infrastructure;
• sending representatives to the district commission on distributing plots of land.
In addition, city mahalla meetings address issues concerning benefits to needy families with children
and ensure the targeted and efficient use of state funds. Citizen assemblies in villages, kishlaks and
auls support the meetings of the mahallas in their territories and review their reports on the use of
centrally allocated funds. The kengash of the citizens’ assembly has the following responsibilities:
• to assign and distribute benefits to unemployed mothers with children under two years old
from state budget funds according to established procedures;
• to support regular medical care for single senior citizens who require permanent care, using
funds allocated by the state;
• to facilitate employment opportunities for local inhabitants, for example, by organizing home-
based jobs.
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More and more often, community self-governments are undertaking initiatives and engaging in
entrepreneurial activity by opening small private companies, joint ventures, commercial shops and
cooperatives to produce consumer goods or by establishing subsidiary farms to raise cattle and
poultry or cultivate crops. For instance, the meeting of Mahalla Number 34 of Bukhara opened a
custom tailor shop in its territory, thus providing dozens of women with jobs.  In addition, they have
established a shoemaker’s workshop, a barber shop, a tearoom, a greenhouse and a bakery.
4.2 Distribution of Powers among Government Tiers
Government reform has proceeded according to the stated principle that “the state is the major
reformer,” adopted as the Uzbek national model. Accordingly, in the initial stage of reforms, the state
concentrated major authorities, including central executive power, in its own hands. Currently,
reform is characterized by a combination of central and local regulation, since it is necessary to coordinate
both regional and national interests to implement social, economic, budgetary and taxation policies.
The key objective now is to achieve a balance of central and regional interests and codify them in
legislation. In order to do this, the government must make two key changes. First, it must differentiate
between the functions and authority of different levels of government. Equally importantly, it must
provide all local government tiers with sufficient funding to carry out their assigned tasks.
Powers of regional, district and city councils and hokimiyats are all addressed by the Law on Local
Public Administration; however, the law fails to specify clearly their functions and authority.
Consequently, former administrative methods have been preserved at the local level, in a manner
often contradicting the general strategic approach to reforms. In order to clarify the rights and res-
ponsibilities of local government in solving social and economic issues, legislation on the administrative-
territorial structure must be modified as follows. The number of tiers that supervise regions, districts
and cities should be reduced, the organizational structure of the territorial government should be
simplified and the number of organizations or enterprises subordinated to the local governments
should be increased.
According to legislation, hokims are authorized to make decisions on daily operations and the use of
state-owned property within their territory. Hokims exercise control over the efficient location of
production and social facilities, environmental protection, the rational use of natural and human
resources and state-owned objects.
Regional, city and district administrations are financed from the state budget of Uzbekistan. The
structure of an administration and its departments depends on the size of local government. Small
administrations are organized according to functional principles, whereas large administrations establish
special divisions to address specific issues. Regional administrations are subdivided into various
structural units such as directorates, departments, agencies and divisions. At the oblast level, directorates
are subdivided into departments and groups, with directorates on economy, culture, education,
health care, social security, justice, communal services and others. In addition, these administrations
have a secretariat, an accounts department, a human resource department and an economic department.
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Local governments are usually subordinated to higher level governments in carrying out their
administrative functions. Most administrative decisions on district and regional public service delivery
are made from above, following a hierarchy of power starting at the ministry, followed by the chief
regional division, followed by the city or district department.  The minister designates heads of
regional divisions in coordination with the regional hokim. The regional division head in turn
appoints heads of territorial departments in coordination with the district or city hokim.
Local government employees are classified as either elected or appointed officials. Hokims, deputy
hokims, committees and commissions are appointed from the members of the local council. These
officials then establish the local executive bodies within the administration. The city hokim drafts a
list of staff for the hokimiyat in coordination with the regional hokim and within budget limits
approved by the local council. The higher executive body determines the organizational structure of
the hokimiyat according to the model presented in figure 9A.1.
The Law on Community Self-government regulates citizen assembly activities. The kengash has a
support office determined by the assembly. The chairman of the assembly is elected for a two and a
half-year term in coordination with the hokim of the respective district or city. The executive
secretary and other employees are hired upon the chairman’s nomination and paid from either
community government or local budget funds.
5. Public Service Provision
5.1 Distribution of Functions
As shown in annex 9.4, the system of public service provision is based on the principles of centralization
and deconcentration. Budgetary organizations such as educational, health care or cultural institutions
are doubly subordinated both to local governments and to their respective ministries. Local
governments generally provide services in the fields of schooling, health care, social security, culture
and leisure, communal services and land improvement.
According to article 41 of the Constitution, every citizen of Uzbekistan has the right to free education.
Schools are supervised by the state, meaning that the central government has the authority to open,
reorganize and close educational institutions. However, local hokimiyats regulate and maintain
secondary schools. School principals are employed or dismissed by the Ministry of Public Education
in coordination with the respective hokim.
Local self-government functions are mainly concentrated in the provision of social services and the
distribution of benefits to low-income inhabitants.  In general, the state establishes, reorganizes or
dismantles the social service divisions of local self-governments and regulates their activities.  Local
governments also analyze data on inhabitants, organize their registration and determine the amount
of assistance to be provided.
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All citizens of Uzbekistan have the right to adequate health care.  Free health care includes basic
medical services, such as outpatient services and first aid. Local governments supervise primary
health care institutions, clinics, hospitals, outpatient centers and some other medical institutions in
addition to managing public health within the territory.
In the cultural sphere, local governments administer libraries, museums, cinemas, theaters and other
institutions in their territory. As long as institutions are subordinated to different central, regional
and oblast bodies, local governments will be responsible only for those considered to be of local
importance or those that they established themselves. However, these institutions may only by
reorganized or closed in coordination with the Ministry of Culture.
Economic responsibilities of local governments include communal services such as water, gas, electricity,
heat supply, waste management and maintenance of engineering structures. These services may be
provided by state-owned, joint, municipal, private or other types of companies. Hokimiyats also
sponsor transport and construction projects, administer construction works and maintain local roads.
5.2 Trends in Public Service Provision
In order to build civil society and democracy in Uzbekistan, the government is implementing a long-
term strategy of political, economic and social development. It envisages the creation of a social order
in which a strong central government will focus its efforts on the major functions of national
importance, such as defense, security, law and order, foreign policy, currency, financial and taxation
policies, the adoption of legislation and the pursuit of strategic goals. Other issues are to be gradually
transferred from the central to the local level.
Based on this concept of statehood, central administration powers are slowly being assigned to local
governments. Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers have dissolved the ministries of local industry,
communal economy and communal services and transferred their enterprises to the supervision of
regional hokimiyats. While the state continues to monitor the performance of the production process,
it has handed over branches of industry as well as some social services to local governments.
Local community self-governments have acquired the authority to establish, reorganize and liquidate
small service enterprises. The state actively stimulates the establishment of economic relations and
cooperation zones, through various programs such as the mahalla enterprise, all of which play an
important role in creating relationships between local governments and businessmen. In the past
three years, 174 such zones were created in the country, affecting 409 collectives, small and private
enterprises, workshops and shops and creating 6,500 jobs. The establishment of economic zones in
the Uzbek regions is a promising development, as they contribute to the stabilization of economy by
supplying local markets with different consumer products. At the same time, the proximity of these
enterprises to residences allows mothers to work at home, giving them the opportunity to earn a
steady salary while raising their children, which promotes the general well-being of the population.
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The chairmen of the citizen assembly encourages inhabitants to participate voluntarily in improving
local surroundings by planting greenery, maintaining housing, outdoor structures, yards and parks
and constructing and maintaining playgrounds, sports fields, roads, bridges, streets, sidewalks,
historical or cultural monuments, communal facilities and cemeteries. To finance these functions, the
community uses resources allocated by the district or city hokimiyat in addition to own resources.
The chairman of the citizen assembly also registers civil status acts such as birth, death, marriage,
divorce and paternity certificates. If there is no notary in the settlement, chairmen are authorized to
certify wills or proxies (excluding proxies to drive and dispose of vehicles), to undertake measures to
protect inherited property, to certify the authenticity of copies or excerpts of official documents
(excluding copies of education certificates) and to certify the originality of signatures on the documents.
Due to the reduction in GNP, state funding of public services, including health care, diminished through-
out the period of transition. Nevertheless, several innovative educational institutions have recently been
created.  A total of 240 lyceums and 136 gymnasiums have been built, the number of specialized schools
has grown by six percent and the number of higher educational institutions has increased by thirty
percent since 1991.  Secondary education is available to most children, though there is a trend towards
decreased attendance. The scope of major service provision to the inhabitants is detailed in table 9.1.
Table 9.1
Provision of Major Social Services by Region, 1999
Regions Secondary Hospital Beds Housing Availability of
Schools per 1000 people [m2/person] Natural Gas [%]
Republic of Karakalpakstan 62.3 48.2 14.1 87.6
City of Tashkent 81.4 80.2 17.3 97.0
Andizhan 73.0 65.4 10.0 62.6
Bukhara 85.1 48.5 12.9 85.3
Djizak 68.8 50.4 13.4 71.8
Kashka-Darya 71.7 47.9 12.9 55.0
Navoi 75.6 47.1 14.0 67.4
Namangan 76.8 60.0 11.1 56.2
Samarkand 72.4 57.3 13.8 84.8
Surhan-Darya 71.3 41.8 11.9 57.7
Syr-Darya 79.7 65.7 13.1 84.3
Tashkent 71.9 49.5 13.3 79.5
Ferghana 78.5 63.3 12.7 75.0
Khoresm 79.0 50.2 17.9 90.5
National average 74.8 56.3 13.4 72.9
492
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
5.3 Civic and Private Sector Role in Service Delivery
Local governments facilitate the establishment of enterprises, institutions and organizations of different
forms of ownership engaged in public service delivery within the territory. Hokimiyats register enter-
prises, facilitate joint ventures with foreign investors and conclude agreements on the sale and purchase
of products for territorial development or for use by inhabitants. Local governments may also agree
to accept services or payments in kind in lieu of profit tax.
Of the various kinds of enterprises, local governments clearly have the most control over municipal
companies and organizations. The hokim approves provisions on municipal enterprises, institutions
and organizations and appoints their heads if so stipulated by the company charter. These organizations
are mainly financed from the local budget.
Though public services are primarily provided by budget-funded organizations, the private sector
also plays a role. Legislation does not restrict privatization in this sphere. For example, hokimiyats issue
tenders for city transport routes to private companies and most passengers use private transport
services. In addition, local communal service associations are being created to replace former housing
maintenance offices (ZhEKs). Relations between local divisions of the state government and non-
municipally owned organizations are governed by contract. Local governments of large cities may
also establish associations and form partnerships with private companies. In cases such as these,
private companies may receive advantages such as the use of land at lower prices, tax privileges and
other benefits that the local government may choose to grant, depending on the importance of the
service provided. However, it should be noted that tax and other privileges may be granted only for
taxes and fees assigned to the respective local budget.
In order to create a market for medical services and thereby increase their quality, the government has
encouraged the development of paid health care. By 1999, fifty-nine private, self-financing hospitals
were already functioning, with a total of fifteen thousand beds. About three thousand doctors are
licensed to practice medicine privately. Alongside these positive developments, however, there are
many unresolved problems, such as the supply of medicines and the need to reduce morbidity in
rural areas.
Most small companies operating on the territory of local self-governments are private.  Their owners
provide services to mahalla residents and manage operations according to mahalla regulations.  Local
self-governments are entitled to use the social and economic potential of enterprises located in their
territory in the interests of the resident and of local development. Accordingly, they may grant permission
to enterprises to use natural resources in the local territory if this furthers local interests.  In order to
maintain comprehensive development, local governments may do the following:
• coordinate the participation of enterprises and organizations in local development;
• pool the resources of enterprises, organizations, citizens and local budgets on a voluntary basis
to build, repair and maintain facilities of production and social infrastructure;
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• conclude agreements with non-municipally owned enterprises on cooperation for the social and
economic development of the territory, for the production of consumer goods and for the
provision of services.
6. Local Finances, Local Property
6.1 Budget and Finance System
According to article 122 of the Constitution, Uzbekistan has an independent financial and monetary
system. At the head of Uzbekistan’s banking system is the Central Bank. The banking system is
regulated by the Law on the Central Bank (1995) and the Law on Banks and Banking (1996).
Uzbekistan also has a Banking and Finance Academy and thirty-three commercial banks with some
eight hundred subsidiaries and divisions. However, no municipal banks currently exist.
The national budget is comprised of the national budget, the budget of the Karakalpak Republic
and local budgets. The national budget consolidates national funds earmarked for specific purposes.
The draft Law on the Budgetary System is under discussion and there is no special law on local public
finances. The key principles of the budgetary system are a unified system of budget classification, a clear
budgetary process and documented budget accounting; conformity of the budget structure to the
administrative-territorial structure of Uzbekistan; correlation of budgets at different levels; a balanced
national budget; itemized planning of public revenues by specific sources and expenditures; and
national budget expenditures within the limits of the approved budgetary allocations.
Over the past few years, Uzbekistan has managed to achieve a growth in GDP and the consolidated
national budget. The national budget includes central government expenditures, while the local
budgets include expenditures of the regional governments, district and city governments as well as
community self-governments. Central and regional government expenditures are stable relative to
GDP and the consolidated national budget, while local community self-government expenditures
have dramatically increased (see table 9.2). Social assistance programs funded through the local
budget include assistance to low-income families, families with children under sixteen and single
mothers with children under two. These programs have been administered by community self-
governments since 1994, 1997 and 1998, respectively. Funding for these programs is established
centrally as part of consolidated budget expenditures, reflected in the local budget and transferred to
the community self-governments.  Specific funds for these programs are distributed by local self-
governments in compliance with fixed regulations. As of 2001, community government expenditures
are to be itemized separately in the national budget.
National budget funds are redistributed among budgets of different levels by assigning subventions
and subsidies to lower-level budgets, granting budgetary loans, and channeling budgetary funds to
the higher or lower-level budget through mutual settlement schemes created during budget
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implementation. Local budgets enjoy no financial autonomy and are strongly dependent on the
center. The budgetary subventions and subsidies are allotted within the limits of the approved
budgets. There is no special law regulating subventions, which are granted to underdeveloped
regions according to need. Standards for their allocation are subject to change on an annual basis. In
1999, for example, subventions accounted for 35.9 percent of local budget revenues in
Karakalpakstan, 29.6 percent in Djizak, 23.6 percent in Samarkand, 17.3 percent in Namangan,
16.4 percent in Syr-Darya, 14.4 percent in Andizhan and 11.2 percent in Surkhan-Darya. No other
regions received subventions in 1999.
Table 9.2
Correlation of Consolidated National Budget Components
1996 1997 1998 1999
Central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP 17.0 14.0 16.8 14.7
Central government expenditures 46.6 43.6 48.8 45.9
as a percentage of the consolidated budget
Regional government expenditures 53.4 56.4 51.2 54.2
as a percentage of the consolidated budget
Community self-government expenditures 0.47 4.9 6.3 6.7
as a percentage of consolidated budget
Table 9.3
Share of State Subventions in Local Budget Revenues, 1997–1999
1997 1998 1999
[UZS million] [%] [UZS million] [%] [UZS million] [%]
Local budget revenues 168,326 70.1 239,725 74.2 340,574 76.6
including
state subventions
Local budget revenues 136,704 57.0 186,406 57.7 304,578 68.5
excluding
state subventions
State subventions 31,622 13.1 53,319 16.5 35,996 8.1
to local budgets
Other sources 71,651 29.9 83,642 25.8 103,839 23.4
of revenue
Total revenues 239,977 100 323,367 100 444,413 100
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6.2 Revenues
Regional funds are comprised of budgetary funds, extra-budgetary funds, special funds, credit,
subventions and subsidies. Local budget revenues are formed of:
• local taxes, duties and fees as well as obligatory payments and other non-tax revenues assigned
to local budgets;
• national taxes, duties, fees, obligatory payments and other national revenues channeled to
local budgets;
• revenues from the allocation or utilization of public property in compliance with legally estab-
lished standards;
• funds acquired by the government through succession or gift as prescribed by the legislation;
• budgetary subventions, subsidies and loans from higher-level budgets;
• donations from legal entities, individuals and foreign states.
By decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Finance may increase the share of national budget
revenues designated for local budgets in order to fund specific expenditures itemized in the local budget.
Local governments may also form extra-budgetary funds out of voluntary donations from citizens,
organizations and enterprises as well as other extra-budgetary resources. Taxes and other payments
that are to be entered to the budget may not be used for this purpose. Extra-budgetary funds are kept
in special accounts, not be withdrawn except by decision of the appropriate local council or hokim.
Extra-budgetary funds at the regional and national level include territorial development funds,
environmental funds and the social assistance fund for low-income groups. Drastic changes in the
economic situation quite often require rapid administrative response, especially when finances need
to be redistributed. Thus, extra-budgetary funds are managed by the executive branch—unlike
budgetary funds, which are regulated by local council—since the executive branch is able to act with
greater speed and efficiency. The extra-budgetary fund may be used to:
• influence the manufacturing process by funding, subsidizing and crediting enterprises;
• implement environmental protection measures funded by specifically designated sources and
fines for environmental pollution;
• provide social services through providing benefits and pensions and subsidize or fund the
general social infrastructure.
The Karakalpak Republic provides one example of local budget structure. Since implementation of
local budgets follows a standard accounting format, the structure of local budgets is the same
throughout Uzbekistan, though the numbers vary. In Karakalpakstan, VAT forms the major part of
revenues (15.29 percent), followed by corporate income tax (9.92 percent) and personal income tax
(9.27 percent). Since the republic is located at the epicenter of the Aral environmental crisis, it is
notably behind other regions in terms of socio-economic development. Therefore, Karakalpakstan
has been provided with all possible support from the national government, including subventions
amounting to over thirty-five percent of the Karakalpak local budget.
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6.3 Expenditures
Local budget expenditures, including those of the Karakalpak Republic, are made within the limits
of the approved allocations in the form of:
• current expenditures of public organizations funded through local budgets;
• current budgetary transfers;
• capital expenditures for the acquisition and repair of fixed assets, capital for public need, the
acquisition of land and other intangible assets for public needs.
Again using the Karakalpak Republic as an example, the largest part of its local budget expenditures
in 1999 went to the social and cultural sphere (49.89 percent). Since the personnel training program
is a national government priority, over thirty-six percent of the local budget is invested in education.
Other important areas of budget funding include health care (12.17 percent), social assistance for
low-income citizens (10.45 percent) and public capital investment (14.97 percent).
6.4 Local Budget Process
As part of the national budgetary system, local budgets are firmly tied to the state budget. Local
governments exercise only nominal authority over local budget resources; in practice, local budget
planning is centralized, with local revenues and expenditures defined by the Ministry of Finance.
Budget policy is frequently aimed at limiting regional independence and supporting vulnerable
regions at the expense of stronger ones. Nonetheless, these policies still preserve a sectoral-specific bias
in allocating production facilities and other factors contributing to underdevelopment in the poorer
regions. In addition, wide disparities in the per capita budgetary funds distributed among regions
create unequal access to basic social services (see Annex 9.3).
Regional budgets do not set aside funds to develop the local economy so as to generate local tax
revenues. Regional hokims are generally uninterested in the issue, although opportunities exist for
organizing facilities to manufacture consumer goods, building materials and art industries. These
facilities could improve the supply of these goods to the local population as well as contribute to local
budgets. However, upon their establishment, the tax rates for funds distributed to local budgets under
the regulated budgetary articles would be immediately applied to these enterprises or industries.
There are no long-term standards for the allocation of funds from the regulated tax items. The depen-
dence of local governments upon central bureaucracy is thus entrenched in the local budget structure.
Local budgets mainly consist of funding from the national budget and local tax revenues. Central
funding distributed to regions includes:
• funding through national investment programs earmarked for social and cultural events, social
protection, administrative costs and maintenance;
• allocations from national taxes and revenues according to standards established by the government;
• subventions allocated from the national budget.
497
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N  U Z B E K I S T A N
The process of formulating national and local budgets is as follows. According to the terms set by the
Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Finance issues an annual request to local governments to draft
their budgets for the coming year and file requests for allocations from national targeted funds. This
is sent to regional hokims, the Tashkent hokim and the Karakalpak Cabinet of Ministers. Upon
receipt of this request, these administrations have three days to decide upon drafting procedures.
Within three days of making their decisions, the financial bodies of these administrations likewise
request their subordinate local governments to draft budgets and file requests for budgetary allocations.
The request form for budgetary allocations and procedures for compiling the necessary documentation
are provided by the Uzbek Ministry of Finance.
The deadline for submitting a request for budgetary allocations in the coming year is 1 June of the
current year. The financial departments of district and city hokimiyats must then submit their draft
budgets to higher financial bodies by 25 June. Regional hokimiyats, the Karakalpak Council of
Ministers and the Tashkent administration must submit their draft budgets to the Ministry of
Finance by 1 June. Finally, the national budget for the coming year is drafted by the Ministry of
Finance by 1 October.
The draft national budget contains the following items:
1) revenues and expenditures of the national budget;
2) standards for allocating shares from national tax revenue to local budgets, the amount of local
budget revenues, including budgetary subventions and subsidies, and total local budget
expenditures;
3) the amount of petty cash provided for in local budgets;
4) the amount of the reserve fund of the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers and reserve funds of local
budgets, the ceiling for the national deficit and sources for its financing.
The Uzbek Ministry of Finance must draft a budget message together with various ministries and
organizations and submit it to the Cabinet of Ministers by 1 October. This message contains:
1) a summary of national socio-economic development and estimated figures for the current year;
2) a budget implementation report for the previous year and the forecast of budget implementation
for the current year;
3) key macroeconomic indicators on which the draft budget is based;
4) an outline of the proposed national budgetary and tax policies for next year;
5) data on the status of national debts, foreign and internal, as well as debt-related expenditures;
6) the draft budget for the coming fiscal year.
The Cabinet presents the budget message by 1 November to the National Parliament, which
approves the national budget. Within two weeks, local budgets are adopted by regional councils, the
Tashkent council and the Karakalpak Parliament in compliance with the national budget. City and
district budgets are passed by the appropriate local councils one week later. Budgets of city districts
and cities of raion jurisdiction are adopted by the city or district council, respectively.
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Within one week of adopting the national budget, the Ministry of Finance notifies the Karakalpak
Cabinet and regional and Tashkent city hokims of their total budget revenues and expenditures,
subventions, subsidies and other budgetary indicators. Within the same period of time, the State
Committees for Taxation and Customs are also notified of the estimated amounts of national budget
revenues. Within in one week of adopting the local budget, local financial authorities notify local tax
bodies of the approved amounts of revenue for the Karakalpak Republic and local budgets. They
must also notify any organizations funded through the local budgets of their allocated funding.
Local administrations are not authorized to take steps that reduce revenues or increase the expenditures
of the national budget, if the deficit passes over the established limit as a result. During budget
implementation, the council may pass a decision bringing about a reduction of specific types of
budget revenues only if there is a corresponding increase in other revenues or reduction in expenditures.
If council legislation produces decreased expenditures or increased revenues in the local budget, then
the council retains the resulting surplus.
The Uzbek Ministry of Finance and local financial bodies are jointly responsible for executing the
national and local budgets within the established parameters. While executing control over the
implementation of the national budget, the Ministry of Finance and its local divisions review data on
budget implementation at different levels, collect information from the tax and customs authorities
on the receipt of funds by budgets of different levels, request the recipients of budgetary funds to
provide information on the receipt and spending of budgetary allocations and, as prescribed by
legislation, obtain information from banks on the movement of budgetary funds. The Cabinet
reviews national budget implementation reports from the Ministry of Finance on a quarterly basis.
Recipients of local budget funds report to local financial bodies on the use of those allocations over
an accounting period established by the Ministry of Finance. The financial bodies in districts and
cities report on local budget implementation of the city and district budgets over the accounting
period to the appropriate hokims and higher financial bodies. The Karakalpak Ministry of Finance,
Tashkent and regional financial bodies report on the implementation of their budgets over the
accounting period to the Karakalpak Cabinet and the appropriate hokimiyats, respectively, as well as
to the Uzbek Ministry of Finance. The Karakalpak Cabinet and hokims of regions, Tashkent,
districts and cities review and approve of reports on budget implementation and present them to the
Karakalpak Parliament and the appropriate local councils, respectively.
The local tax divisions provide monthly reports to the local financial departments on the receipt of
taxes, duties and other obligatory payments by the budget over the accounting period. The Uzbek
Ministry of Finance reports on the execution of the national budget over the accounting year to the
Uzbek Cabinet by 1 May of the following year. The Cabinet subsequently presents a budget execution
report to Parliament for review and approval by 15 May of the year following the accounting one.
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6.5 Tax System, Local Taxes
Uzbekistan has a unified tax system in which the National Parliament has the sole authority to
establish taxes. The Tax Code (1 January 1998) is the primary document regulating the taxation of
individuals and legal entities. The tax system consists of national and local taxes and duties. Local
budget revenues are comprised of fixed and regulated revenue articles. Regulated budget articles
include national taxes such as income tax on legal entities; personal income tax; VAT; excise tax; tax
on subsoil assets; environmental tax; and the tax on water resources. In 1999, Parliament established
a tax rate of fifteen to forty-five percent on income; thirty-three percent on profit; and twenty percent
for VAT.
National taxes are distributed among the national and local budgets according to standards reviewed
annually by the Cabinet and based on proposals drafted by the Ministry of Finance. The range in
regulated rates for local budget taxes is more than wide enough. For instance, the VAT allocated to
local governments ranges from 18.6 percent in the region of Tashkent to 21.1 percent in Tashkent
itself to one hundred percent in the regions of Karakalpakstan, Djizak, Navoi and Surkhan-Darya.
Similarly, revenues from the excise tax in 1999 ranged from ten percent in Ferghana to one hundred
percent in Karakalpakstan, Andizhan, Djizak, Navoi, Surkhan-Darya and Syr-Darya. The enterprise
profit tax was thirty percent in Tashkent, thirty-five percent in Ferghana, and one hundred percent
in others of the above-mentioned regions.
In addition to the regulated revenues articles as described above, the local budget is comprised of
fixed revenues such as local taxes and fees. According to current legislation, local taxes include
property tax, land tax, advertising tax and motor vehicles sales tax. Local fees include the fees for
trading licenses (such as fees for goods-specific licenses), fees to register as a legal entity or individual
engaged in entrepreneurial activities, fees for motor transport parking and fees for urban and rural
development activities.
Property and land taxes are collected nationally; however, their specific tax rates are defined by local
legislation unless otherwise provided by national legislation. Since 1998, a unified land tax has been
introduced for agricultural enterprises. This tax is payable on an annual basis according to year-end
results at rates defined according to parameters measuring the quality of the land. Thirty percent of
this tax goes to the central budget, while the remaining seventy percent goes to the local budget. The
remaining local taxes and duties are introduced by local councils. Other tax rates (except for the
property tax, whose rate has been fixed at four percent by the tax code) are subject to annual review
by the Cabinet of Ministers.
Although local taxes represent a small portion of local budget revenues, their importance is not
limited to the role of a revenue source for the budget, as they also serve to control distributional
relations. Since taxable items include land plots, property, vehicles and other items, taxation helps
account for these items and monitor their purchase and utilization.
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Although the amended Law on Bankruptcy was approved on 28 August 1998, it does not apply to
enterprises, institutions and organizations funded from the national budget. In case of a temporary
gap between revenues and expenditures of budgets of different levels over the financial year, budgetary
loans may be issued out of the relevant budgets. The limits and procedures for allocating budgetary
loans are established by the Ministry of Finance. Overall, local budget expenditures account for a
larger share than the national budget expenditures in the total volume of the national budget.
Table 9.4
Relative Size of Local Budget Expenditures and Central Government Expenditures,
1996–1999
1996 1997 1998 1999
[UZS [%] [UZS [%] [UZS [%] [UZS [%]
billion] billion] billion] billion]
National budget 94.7 46.6 138.2 43.6 228.6 48.8 301.8 45.9
expenditures
Local budget 108.6 53.4 179.0 56.4 240.1 51.2 356.9 54.2
expenditures
Total national 203.3 100.0 307.2 100.0 486.7 100.0 658.7 100.0
budget
Analysis of the current system of local financial and fiscal management reveals the following negative
trends:
• There is a failure to comply with the principle of guaranteed minimum per capita budget
allocations to regions (see table 9A.1);
• The size of local budgets does not meet the needs for local economic development in those
regions with the largest concentration of natural economic potential: Tashkent, Kashka-Darya,
Samarkand, Navoi and the densely populated regions of the Ferghana valley;
• The system of determining budget revenues and expenditures does not correspond with the
scale and efficiency of manufacturing. Seventy percent of regions cannot balance their budgets,
hindering normal economic development and the functioning of the social sphere, particularly
health, education and cultural facilities;
• Standards for allocating funds to local budgets are reviewed annually and do not take full
account of the regional situation and its peculiarities;
• Long-term standards have not been developed for allocating funds to maintain social facilities,
in contradiction to the principles of local self-governance and democratization;
• Subventions are generally determined on a subjective basis and do not develop the structure
of regional production. Rather than being targeted, subventions are generally issued to the
underdeveloped regions, which then use them inefficiently.
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• Since regions are divided into donor and recipient regions, the wealthy regions tend to exert
pressure upon the central government, which is illegal in a democratized government;
• The various extra-budgetary funds are used inefficiently by regions; they are structured according
to a sectoral approach and lack coordination or control by national and local administrations;
• The low technical level and deteriorated condition of municipal property and facilities necessi-
tates increasing expenditures for maintenance, appreciation and the low quality of goods and
services.
6.6 Legal Forms of Ownership
In the process of economic reform in Uzbekistan, there was no abrupt transition from public and
collective forms of ownership, such as farm cooperatives, to private forms. Rather, it was decided that
a solid legal framework and favorable socio-economic conditions for privatization must first be
established. The adoption of the Property Law in 1990 marked the first step towards legalizing a
diversity of forms of ownership. However, most provisions of this law have since become outdated
and require significant revision.
Other legislation regulating property ownership includes the Uzbek Civil Code, which took effect
on 1 March 1997. According to article 164 of the Civil Code, the right to ownership is the right of
an individual to own, use and dispose of property at his or her own discretion and in his or her
interest.  Individuals have the right to demand the elimination of any infringement on their right to
ownership regardless of who is responsible. Article 213 of the Civil Code outlines a concept of public
property which includes both national and municipal property.
In Uzbekistan, the land, subsoil assets, water and air space, animal and vegetable life are the exclusive
property of the state, by article 214 of the Civil Code. The purchase or sale of natural assets is not
allowed by legislation.
The issue of land ownership is central to the agricultural economy and, since sixty percent of the
population is rural, decisive for the entire Uzbek economy. Because of the particular climate conditions
in Uzbekistan, most land suitable for cultivation must be irrigated. The nature of precipitation, the
soils and the unequal distribution of water resources all render individual farming difficult, calling
instead for the organized efforts of large communities. Since the purchase and sale of land would
disable the unified irrigation system, it was decided to retain land in public ownership. Market
relations in rural areas are based on lifelong, inherited ownership of land plots together with the right
to utilize them (article 165 of the Civil Code, article 5 of the Law on Peasants’ Enterprises, article 10
of the Law on Land). However, plots with trading facilities may be sold on a competitive basis,
according to a presidential decree issued on 21 January 1994.
In addition to natural assets, other property and enterprises are publicly owned due to strategic
considerations or their value as institutions of historical and cultural heritage. The Parliamentary
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Resolution on Issues of Denationalization and Privatization of Some Enterprises and Property,
issued 31 August 1995, lists items that are not subject to denationalization, privatization or buy-out
and transfer to private property. It also defines property and enterprises which may be denationalized
and privatizated by Cabinet decision.
According to article 214 of the Civil Code, national property is managed by Parliament, the president
and the Cabinet of Ministers or agencies that they authorize. Presently, the State Committee for
Public Property Management and Support for Entrepreneurial Activity has government authority
to perform these tasks, as specified in the Cabinet Resolution of 29 March 1994.
According to article 215 of the Civil Code, municipal property includes assets belonging to the local
administrations, local budget funds, municipal housing stock, communal service enterprises and
facilities for education, culture and health care. Regional property may also consist of local engineering
infrastructure; enterprises and organizations established or purchased from regional funds (including
sharing arrangements) or transferred from other sources; and securities and financial assets. District
and city property includes assets of the respective local council, budget funds, extra-budgetary
funds and earmarked funds.
The Law on Local Public Administration, among other legislation, regulates management of local
property as well as assets of higher-level governments that have been transferred to the management
of local authorities. Assets in the ownership of regions, cities and districts are managed by the appropriate
local councils and hokims. Legal entities may also be licensed to manage nationally or municipally
owned assets. City or district hokims have the authority, following established procedures and local
standards, to lease or allot land plots for the use of citizens or public enterprises as well as to terminate
the right of these entities to hold these plots and confiscate the land. The decisions are subject to
approval by the appropriate local council.
Consequently, municipal property is legally recognized as the wealth, or share in national assets,
belonging to the local population and should serve its interests. Local governments have authority
over the establishment, acquisition, utilization and lease of municipal assets. The particular municipal
assets of a specific territorial unit are determined by the characteristics of its socio-economic develop-
ment, its size and other factors. Due to the lack of reliable statistics, it is not possible to detail here the
number of assets in municipal ownership or enterprises controlled by the local governments.
Although the creation of municipal property is closely related to the process of privatization, local
government bodies, particularly in cities of district jurisdiction, have no significant influence upon
privatization processes and are therefore deprived of the opportunity to protect local interests in this
field. Local governments have the right to pursue small scale local privatization programs, but this is
relatively insignificant and pertains only to a short list of assets including distribution, public catering
and service facilities.
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7. Relationship between the State Administration
and Local Government
Uzbekistan has an established presidential form of administration, with all central power concentrated
in the hands of the president. The Office of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers exercise
control over compliance with presidential decrees and cabinet resolutions. Local administrative
powers are exercised by local representative and executive bodies.  Local councils and hokimiyats are
responsible for ensuring social and economic development in their territories and compliance with
the Constitution, laws, acts of Oliy Majlis, the president and government of Uzbekistan.
The nature of relationships between different tiers of government varies between the executive and
representative branches. The executive branch is characterized by a centralized hierarchy and strict
vertical subordination. District and city hokims represent the regional hokim, who in turn represents
the president.  Hence, regional hokimiyats have authority over district ones and district hokimiyats
over rural and city governments.
Local representative bodies are not so closely related to the national legislative body, the Oliy Majlis.
Nor is there subordination between councils; for instance, city and district councils are independent
of regional ones. Representative bodies operate through sessions and standing and provisional
commissions and may organize public hearings. They have the right to question council members,
whereas executive bodies are based on the principle of undivided authority.
There is a recognized need for the phased decentralization of administrative authority in Uzbekistan.
Some central government authorities are gradually being transferred to regions and local governments.
At the same time, the central government is attempting to preserve efficiency of government operations
in general. In addition, local divisions of central government are to increase the role of local governments
by delegating additional competencies and functions.
Current Uzbek legislation specifies the accountability of hokims on issues related to local council
jurisdiction. Local councils and hokims have the right to demand that decisions of the other be
annulled if they contradict legislation. However, such cases are quite rare in practice.  Mutual under-
standing between the local councils and hokims is considered to be decisive and their cooperation
the basis of efficiency and stability. Forms of cooperation include informing each other about their
activities, on the current situation and on the progress of implementing decisions.
It is essential to analyze the status of relations between branches of power in different districts and
cities and their joint response to the misunderstandings which occasionally occur. Once again, this
requires clear legal regulation of the relationships between the branches and tiers of power. Inspectorates
and committees of constitutional supervision at the regional level currently exercise control over the
appropriateness of local government decisions.
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Despite their ever increasing role, in practice local governments are only able to manage their daily
administration and economic functions partially from their allocated funds. Their responsibility to
support comprehensive local development is not backed by real ownership rights over regional
property or actual management of funds or material, technical and natural resources. Their hands are
tied by their lack of authority to solve strategic development issues, such as establishing an efficient
branch structure and determining the direction and priorities of local social development.
The imperfect territorial administration of the economy is mainly the result of centralized government.
Territorial administration is characterized by direct influence in the form of centralized capital investments
from the national budget or ministerial funds. Rarely are these investments effective for the transformation
of territories. Budget funds are nominally distributed by regions, but are in fact distributed among
ministries. Since local taxes form a small share of revenues, local budgets are dependent on central decisions.
The most important task facing the government is the improvement of the middle tier of local
government. Regional governments technically possess the necessary instruments by law to influence
social and economic processes while taking into consideration their specific conditions. However,
this distribution of authorities is not reflected by current realities. Local divisions of different ministries
and state committees function based on sectoral subordination and their central offices do not always
coordinate with local governments. Though most local government functions are legally established,
they are not clearly specified for different tiers.
Currently, interaction between different levels of government follows long established rules, both
unwritten and official, which dictate strict vertical subordination. The regulatory role of the state is
only increasing, not diminishing, with the development of democracy. It is necessary to clarify the
legal relationships between hokimiyats and local councils, between administrations of different tiers
and between local governments and enterprises. Direct interference in the activities of local
governments would consequently be replaced with a legal framework for cooperation.
8. Local Government Employees
The Constitution of Uzbekistan proclaims the right of each citizen to work, equal employment
opportunity and just labor conditions.  Currently there is no special law regarding the public service
system and status of government employees.  Labor relations are regulated by the Labor Code of
Uzbekistan, adopted on 21 December 1995, and other legislation. The legal basis for the activities
of local government officials is established in the Law on Local Public Administration.  According to
this law, the hokim, deputy hokims and other local government officials are prohibited from
occupying any other paid position while in office.
A model hokimiyat organizational chart is shown in figure 9A.1. The first deputy and other deputy
hokims in districts and cities are appointed by the hokim in coordination with higher government
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bodies. As a rule, they are selected from the members of the local council. Hokim and hokimiyat
departments are responsible for the employment and training of local government staff. Employees
are hired through open competition. Government employee salaries are based on norms established
by the government for budget organizations. The government periodically establishes a minimum
salary, which is used as the baseline for salary calculation. Factors that determine monthly salary include
the staff list, the professional grade and the category of employee, all of which depend on the level of
education, experience and other qualifications. Full-time employees have the right to paid vacation.
The length of working hours, paid vacation and other social guarantees are established by law.  Political
considerations do not prevail with regard to government officials. The office of regional, district or city
hokimiyat provides organizational, technical and other support to the activities of a respective local
council.
Government employees are assessed every three to five years. Additional assessments may be conducted
in certain circumstances, such as the need to restructure or downsize staff.  For purposes of assessment,
the employees must complete official forms, which are currently under development. In addition, an
assessment commission established by a higher level of government may question the employees on
politics, the economy, legislation and other subjects.  At the conclusion of this process, the commission
may assign one of three grades: positive, negative or conditional. If positive, the employee continues
work as usual; if negative, the commission may request his or her dismissal; if conditional, the employee
undergoes a probation period, typically three to six months, at the end of which a final performance
review is conducted.  Government employees are expected to upgrade their qualifications regularly.
They may receive training at the Academy of Public Administration, under the auspices of the
Office of the President, as well as at a number of other educational institutions.
9. Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
According to article 7 of the Constitution, the authority of the state is exercised exclusively by the
bodies authorized in legislation. Appropriation of unauthorized powers, the establishment or
termination of government body activities in contradiction to constitutional procedures or the
creation of new or parallel structures all violate the Constitution and are subject to legal account-
ability. The consent of Parliament is required for creating or dissolving regions, districts or cities and
for any amendment to the boundaries of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, regions or the city of
Tashkent.
The Constitution of Karakalpakstan contains special features pertinent to local autonomy.  According
to article 73 of the Uzbek Constitution, the Republic of Karakalpakstan independently decides on
issues of its internal administrative-territorial composition. It also has the right to secede from the
Republic of Uzbekistan through a general referendum of Karakalpak citizens.  Mutual relations
between Uzbekistan and Karakalpakstan are regulated by memoranda and bilateral agreements,
while disputes between the two are to be resolved through arbitration.
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According to article 93 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan, the president is the guarantor of human
rights and freedoms and the laws of Uzbekistan. Other legal guarantees and mechanisms to protect
local autonomy have not been established.  According to the Constitution, regional, district or city
hokims exercise their authorities on the principle of undivided authority for a five-year term. However,
this mandate may be extended or prematurely terminated based on performance. Hokims bear
personal responsibility for the decisions and activities of the bodies which they head.
In times of crisis due to the poor performance or abuse of power by the regional government, such
as a decline in regional social and economic indices or a shortage of food or services, the central
government can suspend local administration activities.  In this case, the local council convenes in an
extraordinary session at which the president of Uzbekistan proposes the dismissal of the current
hokim and nominates a replacement for the council’s approval. Recently such sessions have been
held in the regions of Ferghana, Kashka-Darya and Surkhan-Darya. Typically, the hokim is said to
be leaving “due to the transfer to another position.” The president also has the right to dismiss
district and city hokims from office if they violate the Constitution or national legislation or if their
acts discredit the honor and dignity of their position. Thus far there have been no cases of presidential
dismissal, although some district and city hokims have been dismissed by higher levels of government.
The activities of the hokim may be appealed in the court by citizens, institutions or organizations.
The Attorney General of Uzbekistan, appointed by the president, is responsible for control over
clear and uniform compliance to legislation nationwide. The Attorney General appoints regional,
district and city attorneys to monitor the legality of activities in all government structures, including
hokimiyats. Hokim decisions which contradict the Constitution, legislation, presidential and
government decrees, or which are otherwise appealed by the attorney shall be reviewed by the hokim
or annulled by either the superior hokim or the Cabinet of Ministers.
Disputes between organizations or enterprises of different forms of ownership arising over economic
or management-related issues shall be resolved by the Supreme Economic Court and other economic
courts. However, no such court proceedings between the administrations of different levels have yet
taken place in Uzbekistan.
10. Next Steps in the Transition Process
The establishment of efficient central and local government bodies in Uzbekistan is still in progress.
Problems remaining to be addressed in the existing structure of local administration include the
following:
• There is no systematic approach or clear differentiation of central and local government functions;
• There is no clear coordination between central and local governments in addressing urgent
social and economic regional issues;
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• Due to limited financial and material resources, local administrations lack the ability to influence
the social and economic situation or make independent decisions about their activities in inter-
national markets or on broadening their export potential;
• The organizational mechanism for the integration of regions has not yet been established;
• There is no system for the rational placement of industrial enterprises at the national or regional
levels;
• The system of dual subordination and the organizational structure of territorial governments
need to be reviewed in light of new goals such as administrative decentralization and liberalization.
Local government functions must be expanded and sufficient local autonomy granted before further
reforms can be fully implemented.  Broader rights and opportunities correspondingly mean more
responsibility to the state and society for decision making and implementation in all spheres of
regional life. In order to provide adequate authority and opportunities for local governments to
actively influence the process of market transformation, the following steps should be taken:
• to develop a concept for gradually transferring certain central government authorities to local
self-governments and NGOs;
• to formulate an action program to implement the concept “from a strong state to a strong civil
society;”
• to implement budgetary reform that clearly differentiates budget authorities between the
center and the regions;
• to adopt a Law on Budget Composition which establishes democratic procedures for developing
national and local budgets;
• to significantly increase the role of local budgets in the consolidated national budget so that it
corresponds to the distribution of functions between the two.
Improving government activities at every tier is one of the most important and comprehensive issues
facing Uzbekistan. This will determine the character of citizen-state relations, the successful
performance of government functions and the fulfillment of urgent tasks of social and economic
development throughout the country.  In addition, serious legislative efforts are required to restore
the balance of powers between different branches. The current balance of power is heavily weighted
in favor of the executive branch, which negates the principle of equilibrium and mutual control. It
is necessary to improve legislation on local government to strengthen the role of local councils and
expand their control functions. Although local government should undoubtedly be based on a
strong local executive branch, this does not require that local representative bodies be weak. A strong,
united local government is needed, one which utilizes both branches.
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Contacts for Further Information on Local Government in Uzbekistan:
Department of Inter-parliamentary Relations
Parliament of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Address: Druzhby Narodov Avenue, Tashkent 700035, Uzbekistan
Phone: (+998-71) 139-8570, 139-8746
Fax: (+998-71) 139-8267
Academy of Public Administration
Office of the President of Uzbekistan
Address: 45 Uzbekistanskaya St., Tashkent 700033, Uzbekistan
Phone: (+998-71) 139-1783
Fax: (+998-71) 152-6731
Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan
Address: Mustakyllik Square, Tashkent 700000, Uzbekistan
Phone: (+998-71) 139-8292
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Ministry of Justice of Uzbekistan
Information and Legal Center
Address: 2 Sayilgokh St., Tashkent 700000, Uzbekistan
State Committee of Uzbekistan on State Property Management
and Support for Entrepreneurial Activity
Address: 55 Uzbekiston Shokh Kuzhasy, Tashkent 700003, Uzbekistan
Phone: (+998-71) 139-4446
Fax: (+998-71) 139-1484
Ministry of Macroeconomics and Statistics of Uzbekistan
Institute for Macroeconomic and Social Research
Address: 1 Gogol St., Tashkent 700000, Uzbekistan
Phone: (+998-71) 133-0937
Karakalpak Branch of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan
Institute for Social and Economic Research
Address: 179a Amir Temur St., Nukus 742000, Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan
Phone: (+998-61) 217-2210
Aviabrock-CONSAUD
Address: 29A Afrosiob Avenue, Tashkent 700000, Uzbekistan
Phone: (+998-71) 152-6731, 152-6694
Fax: (+998-71) 152-6731
Glossary of Uzbek Terms
Aul — The equivalent of kishlak, or rural settlement, in Kazakh, Karakalpak or Tatar.
Aqsaqal — Chairman of the mahalla self-government.
Hokim — The chairman of the local council and head of local administration.
Hokimiyat — The executive branch of local governments.
Kengash — Committee elected to head the mahalla self-government.
Kishlak — A rural settlement which may include many neighboring localities and is
represented by an assembly of its citizens.
Kotib — Secretary of the mahalla self-government.
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Mahalla — A community of people residing in a localized area; these may range from 150
to 1,500 families.
Makan-kenes’es — City mahallas in the Republic of Karakalpakstan.
Muovin — Deputy chairman of the mahalla self-government.
Oliy Majlis — “Supreme Council,” or Parliament, the highest legislative body in Uzbekistan.
Zhokargy Kenes — The Supreme Council of the Republic of Karakalpakstan.
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Annex 9.1
Major General Indicators
Size of territory 448,900 square kilometers
Population (1 January 2000) 24,487,700
Pensioners 1,735,000
School-age children 9,714,000
Population density 54.5 people per square kilometer
Major ethnic divisions:
Uzbeks 77 percent
Russians 6 percent
Tajiks 5 percent
Kazakhs 4 percent
Karakalpaks 2 percent
Per capita GDP (1998) USD 2,053
Public debt as a percentage of GDP (1999) 0.6 percent
Unemployment rate (registered) 0.5 percent
Average monthly average inflation 1.9 percent
(according to Consumer Price Index)
Exchange rate (19 January 1999) 1USD = 110.95 Uzbek sums [UZS]
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Annex 9.2
Population, Settlements and Administrative Tiers
Table 9A.1
Per Capita Social and Economic Indicators by Region, 1999 [thousand UZS]
Regions Share of GDP Industrial Production Agri- Retail Service
National Production Production of cultural Trade Industry
Budget Consumer Production Turnover
 Goods
Republic of 9.3 51.9 18.2 14.3 18.1 24.2 3.4
Karakalpakstan
Andizhan 9.6 71.9 59.5 43.9 39.8 54.2 6.4
Bukhara 16.4 99.3 54.9 33.7 47.3 36.1 7.4
Djizak 6.6 60.1 13.1 6.8 44.2 19.7 4.0
Kashka-Darya 10.4 63.2 45.0 15.2 31.7 30.9 3.6
Navoi 23.3 100.8 157.4 16.4 37.3 37.5 6.0
Namangan 8.0 50.7 22.7 16.6 28.9 31.8 3.6
Samarkand 8.3 63.6 33.8 36.2 36.7 39.8 5.2
Surkhan-Darya 7.6 57.1 19.8 12.5 37.0 25.5 3.9
Syr-Darya 13.2 77.0 26.4 19.7 47.0 33.0 3.0
Tashkent 13.3 81.4 64.1 25.7 41.6 45.0 6.2
Ferghana 14.7 79.9 57.0 27.0 32.5 60.9 4.7
Khoresm 12.5 80.9 32.6 24.8 55.0 32.9 6.5
City of Tashkent 34.8 142.6 86.8 51.4 — 136.6 25.8
National average 13.3 84.2 53.6 26.9 34.2 47.2 7.9
Standard deviation 5.3 2.8 12.0 7.6 3.0 6.9 8.6
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Table 9A.2
Urban Settlements by Population Size Categories in Uzbekistan (1 January 2000)
Population Size Category Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Settlements Settlements Inhabitants Total Population
0–3,000 11 4.7 21,200 0.2
3,000–5,000 18 7.7 75,500 0.8
5,000–10,000 47 20.2 349,500 3.8
10,000–20,000 72 30.9 1,000,400 10.9
20,000–50,000 54 23.2 1,540,200 16.8
50,000–100,000 14 6.0 866,400 9.5
100,000–250,000 13 5.6 2,095,200 22.9
250,000–500,000 3 1.3 1,081,600 11.8
1,000,000+ 1 0.4 2,135,500 23.3
Total 233 100.0 9,165,500 100.0
Table 9A.3
Rural Settlements by Population Size Categories in Uzbekistan (1 January 2000)
Population Size Category Number of [%] Population [%]
Rural Districts Size
0–3,000 — — — —
3,000–5,000 1 0.6 3,800 0.0
5,000–10,000 1 0.6 6,300 0.0
10,000–20,000 4 2.4 63,500 0.4
20,000–50,000 28 17.1 952,500 6.3
50,000–100,000 59 36.0 4,594,600 30.5
100,000–250,000 71 43.3 9,455,500 62.7
Total 164 100.0 15,076,200 100.0
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Table 9A.4
Administrative-territorial Structure in Uzbekistan
Local and Regional Average Number Average Number of
Governments of Inhabitants per Unit Settlements per Unit
First tier 39,500 1
(cities, towns and village)
Second tier (districts) 148,800 10.3
Third tier (regions and the 1,743,400 120.6
Republic of Karakalpakstan)
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Annex 9.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
The following laws are listed in the order of adoption:
• Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (8 December 1992). Tashkent, Uzbekistan,
1992: p. 48.
• Constitution of the Republic of Karakalpakstan (adopted 9 April 1993, amended in 1995
and 1997). Nukus, Karakalpakstan, 1998: p. 63.
• Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan (May 6, 1993), Vedomosti (bulletin) of the
Supreme Council of Uzbekistan No. 5, 1993: p. 202.
• Law on Ownership in Uzbekistan (7 May 7 1993), Vedomosti of the Supreme Council of
Uzbekistan No. 8, 1993: p. 235.
• Law on Local Taxes and Duties (7 May 1993), Vedomosti of the Supreme Council of
Uzbekistan No. 5: p. 227.
• Law on Local Public Administration (2 September 1993), Vedomosti of the Supreme Council
of Uzbekistan No. 9, 1993: p. 320.
• Provision on Mahalla Committees in the Cities, Towns and Kishlaks of Uzbekistan. Tashkent,
1993.
• Civil Code of Uzbekistan (effective 1 March 1997)
• Law on Presidential Elections (amended by subsequent laws passed on 26 December 1997
and 19 August 1999)
• Law on Elections to the Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan (amended by subsequent laws passed on 26
December 1997 and 19 August 1999)
• Law on Elections to Regional, District and City Councils (amended by subsequent laws
passed on 26 December 1997 and 19 August 1999)
• Law of the Republic of Karakalpakstan on the Council of Ministers of Karakalpakstan (29
January 1998)
• Law on Community Self-governments (14 April 1999)
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Annex 9.4
Responsibilities of Administrative Tiers
Table 9A.5
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Uzbekistan
Functions District Regional Central Remarks
and City  Administration Administration
Administration
I .  E D U C A T I O N
1. Pre-school
2. Elementary X
3. Secondary X
4. Technical X X
5. Refresher courses X X
for teachers
I I .  S O C I A L  W E L F A R E
1. Nurseries X
2. Kindergartens X
3. Welfare homes X X
4. Services for elder X X Also self-
and disables people governments
5. Special services (for families X Also self-
in crisis, homeless, etc.) governments
6. State housing X
I I I .  H E A LT H  S E R V I C E S
1. Primary health care X X
2. Health protection X X X Also privately
3. Hospitals X X X* Special
hospitals
4. Public health system X
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Table 9A.5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Uzbekistan
Functions District Regional Central Remarks
and City Administration Administration
Administration
IV.  C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E ,  S P O R T S
1. Theaters X X X* State theaters
2. Museums X X X* State museums
3. Libraries X X X* State libraries
4. Parks X
5. Sports, leisure X X X
6. Maintaining buildings X Also by self-
for cultural events governments
7. Monuments protection X X X
V.  E C O N O M I C  S E R V I C E S
1. Water supply X X
2. Sewage X X
3. Electricity X X
4. Gas X X
5. District heating X
V I .  E N V I R O N M E N T,  P U B L I C  S A N I TAT I O N
1. Waste collection X
2. Waste disposal X
3. Streets cleaning X
4. Cemeteries X
5. Environment protection X X X* Particularly
relevant in the
Aral Sea region
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Table 9A.5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Government Tiers in Uzbekistan
Functions District Regional Central Remarks
and City Administration Administration
Administration
V I I .  U R B A N  D E V E L O P M E N T
1. Town planning X X
2. Regional/spatial planning X X
3. Local economic X X Also self-
development governments
4. Tourism X X X
5. Roads X X X* Of state
importance
V I I I .  G E N E R A L  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
1. Authoritative functions X X X
2. Other state administrative X X X
matters
3. Local police X X X
4. Fire brigades X X
5. Civil defense X X X
6. Consumer rights protection X X
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Local Government
in the Kyrgyz Republic
Emil Alymkulov & Marat Kulatov
1. Major General Indicators
Kyrgyzstan, or the Kyrgyz Republic, is located in northeastern Central Asia, along the Tjan-Shan
Mountains and the Pamir-Alay mountain ridge. The Kyrgyz Republic borders on the Republic of
Kazakhstan to the north, on China to the east and south, and on the Republics of Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan to the west. Its area totals 199,900 square kilometers, 5.1 percent of which is forested, 4.3
percent water, 53.9 percent agricultural land and 36.7 percent other types of land. Approximately
ninety percent of the republic is mountainous, with altitudes of over 1,500 meters above sea level.
Kyrgyzstan is a unitary state and consists of the capital city, Bishkek, and seven oblasts, Ysyk-Kol,
Naryn, Osh, Jalal-Abad, Batken, Talas and Chuy. These are divided into a total of forty raions and
four capital city districts.
According to the first national census, conducted in 1999, the Kyrgyz Republic has a population of
4,851,000, one-third of which is urban and two-thirds of which is rural. Altogether, 787,800
citizens reside in Bishkek. The Chuy valley, with its urban center of Bishkek, and the Fergana valley,
with the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, comprise the two most densely populated areas
2. Legal and Constitutional Basis
2.1 Brief History of Local Government Reform
In 1990, the Kyrgyz Republic declared its sovereignty, initiating the process of independence from
the Soviet Union. At that time, local self-government took the form of local soviets of people’s
deputies at various levels, which were representative bodies of a purely formal nature.
Political and economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan throughout the 1990s were marked by qualities
specific to many post-Soviet countries. One was the tendency to issue statements that were politically
driven, primarily for effect. Another factor, typical of the Asian republics in particular, was the high
concentration of power, both official and unofficial.
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One of the first decrees of independent Kyrgyzstan was the Law on Local Self-government and Local
Public Administration, adopted 19 April 1991, which transferred local government powers to local
councils. This law dismantled the former pyramid of national representative power, which placed
the Supreme Soviet at the top, followed by local councils at various levels. Local councils, however,
were incapable of maintaining the necessary balance between local and national interests. In the
initial phase of reform, it was not possible to establish an executive branch of local government and
thus enhance the role of municipal governments.
The experience of many countries has demonstrated the need for intermediate forms of government
in transition periods to combine principles of local self-government and mechanisms of centralized
administrative regulation. Consequently, the Kyrgyz government adopted a change in strategy. On
4 March 1992, it passed an amended Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration,
which was based on a dual approach to local government. The law introduced a system in which
forms of self-government include the “local council and bodies of territorial self-government, as well
as local referenda, citizen assemblies and other forms of direct democracy.” Alongside these bodies,
local state administrations operate as institutions of “executive authority on the relevant territory.”
Thus, the new system of local government was structured according to the division of functions and
powers between local representative and executive bodies and based on the principle of undivided
authority exercised by the head of local state administration. The principle of local self-government
was subsequently codified in article 7 of the Constitution (1993): “Local self-government in the
Kyrgyz Republic is exercised by local communities, which govern affairs of local importance according
to the law and at their own initiative.”
The course of practical reform was determined by a series of presidential decrees, a peculiar feature of
Kyrgyz government. According to the Constitution and national legislation, the president has the
right to issue decrees and orders within his competence, which are part of the system of legal norms
and obligatory throughout the Kyrgyz Republic. Together, the Law on Local Self-government and
Local Public Administration, national government decisions for its implementation and presidential
decrees constitute the legal framework for local self-government.
In accordance with the principles expressed in the European Charter of Local Self-government, the
Kyrgyz Republic has followed an axiom drawn from global experience: namely, that specific local
issues are best solved directly by residents or by their elected and executive agencies, provided that
they are possessed of available resources and real government powers. CIS nations (including
Kyrgyzstan) are currently searching for their own methods to develop state systems. Consequently,
the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS nations passed a Declaration on Principles of Local Self-
government in 1994, followed by the pilot Law on General Principles of Local Self-government in
1997.
Systematic reform of local self-government was initiated in 1994 with the goal of restructuring
authorities in local settlements along municipal lines. The Presidential Decree on the Reform of Local
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Self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic (18 August 1994) recognized reform of local self-
government as a major goal of internal policy. Due to the size of the task and the time needed for its
fulfillment, the decree stipulated two stages of implementation. First, local self-governments would
be reformed at the village (ail ), town and city levels; second, research would be conducted on the
possible introduction of self-government in raions and oblasts.
A presidential decree, issued on 22 August 1994, established a special Commission on Local Self-
government Reform, chaired by the prime minister. This commission developed provisions on
principles of local self-government organization, approved by presidential decree on 22 September
1994. This document was the first to officially define the local community and its members, as well
as the organizational, legal, financial and economic foundations of local self-government.
The decree also established a functional system of local councils (kenesh). Council elections in first-
tier local governments, raions and oblasts, are specified in other presidential decrees. Based on these
provisions, the number of members in representative bodies in all local self-governments nationwide
was reduced by two-thirds. In October 1994, elections were held for local councils in village,
settlements and cities, followed in February 1995 by elections to raion and oblast councils. A total of
6,971 deputies were elected to local councils of all levels.
Article 7 of the Constitution established that “national authorities and local self-government are
separate.” Nonetheless, many issues at the local level pertain to both local administration and local
self-governments and it has proven difficult to distinguish whether they are of national or local
importance. A further obstacle to local self-governments is the absence of a legal framework determining
local government property rights. The Constitution provides no definition of community property,
while the Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration assigned local state
administrations, not local self-governments, the authority to manage local enterprises. Thus, national
legislation declared the right to self-government without providing the newly emerging institutions
with real powers.
On 10 February 1996, a national referendum was held to decide on constitutional amendments
that would provide local self-government bodies with ownership rights over local property as well as
transfer certain state powers. Upon adoption of the amendments, the Constitution expressed the
following new principles governing the relationship between local state administration and local self-
governments:
• Article 7 replaces the principle of separation of powers with the principle of delineating
functions of national government and local self-government;
• A provision was added to article 94, according to which “local self-governments should report
to national agencies with respect to their delegated powers.”
In March 1996, the Office of the President was restructured to include a new department on local
self-government issues. According to the presidential decree of 20 March 1996, which stipulated
measures to increase the role and responsibility of heads of local state administrations and local self-
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governments, local self-governments for the first time were granted the right to perform the following
state functions:
• certifying land resources and objects of social infrastructure;
• mobilizing inhabitants for relief and restoration programs;
• protecting public order;
• creating extra-budgetary funds to solve essential issues of local importance.
The presidential decree of 20 April 1996 abolished village committees. Villages and settlements
began to set up local councils and their executive bodies, the aiyl okmotu (rural executive committee).
The next step was certifying objects of social infrastructure in settlements and land resources.
The first results of certification revealed that over 150,000 objects of social infrastructure were
located in cities. Although some of these were to be transferred to local government ownership, most
of the commercially attractive objects had already been privatized, meaning that community property
was formed primarily of objects requiring significant investment for maintenance
Article 92 of the amended Constitution proclaims the key right of local self-governments to “possess,
use and dispose of community property.” Following another national referendum on constitutional
amendments, held on 17 October 1998, community property was recognized as a constitutional
form of ownership, along with national, private and other forms of ownership.
The presidential decree of 2 August 1999 approved the Concept for Developing Local Self-
government from 1999 to 2001, which lays out the following problems related to the reforms:
• As a result of the reform, local administrations have assumed a more important role in local
communities, which has consequently overshadowed that of local councils;
• Self-governments and public organizations in local communities perform their functions
inefficiently. Local councils do not delegate their powers to public, street and house committees,
which would stimulate productivity;
• Local councils lack professionalism. Office procedures and control over the implementation of
council decisions are of low quality at all territorial levels.
This concept shifts the emphasis toward strengthening local council authority and introduces the
principle of self-sufficiency to municipal entities. A state commission to support local self-government
reform was established by presidential decree. Its primary goal is to analyze the interaction between
executive agencies and local self-governments and develop suggestions to strengthen the organiza-
tional, legal, financial and economic framework for local self-government. One outcome of this
activity was the installment of a Minister of Local Self-government and Regional Development by
the end of 2000. Also established by presidential decree, this position is intended to ensure close
interaction between the central and local governments and protect local self-government interests at
the national level. Interestingly enough, the individual appointed to this position was the Chairman
of the State Register, the state agency that registers real estate rights, who also heads the Commission
on Support for Local Self-government Reform.
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2.2 Interim Results of Local Government Reform
The progress of local self-government reform in the Kyrgyz Republic is beset by difficulties, confirming
that the Kyrgyz government lacked a clear concept for realization from the outset. An uneven and
sometimes inconsistent legislative process only supports this conclusion.
In summary, it is necessary to highlight some characteristic features of the reform process:
1) The legal framework for developing self-government in Kyrgyzstan is the result of activity by
bodies representing all branches and levels of government. After its initial passage in 1991, the
Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration was amended eight times in
different areas. During the same period, the president signed over thirty decrees and twenty
government decisions which were targeted at regulating reform of the organizational, legal,
financial and economic framework for local self-government. Among these, documents
particularly worthy of note include the Program of National Support for Local Self-government
and its Bodies, Main Guidelines for Developing Local Self-government Reform in Oblasts,
Raions and Cities from 1997 to 1998 and the Concept for Developing Local Self-government
from 1999 to 2001.
2) There is no complete set of normative legal acts based on a uniform understanding of the
nature, content and forms of national policy on the decentralization of government and the
introduction of new relations between the center and regions. There is no set limit on the
powers to be redistributed in favor of local self-governments, nor is there an official register of
functions by territory.
3) The ambiguous delineation of powers and responsibilities among bodies of different branches
and levels of government poses another major problem. Central ministries and agencies define
procedural and documentary forms of reporting. In some cases, these bodies issue documents
which are departmental in form, but nonetheless carry the weight of law, for example,
instructions from the Ministry of Finance.
4) Local self-government in Kyrgyzstan operates at the village level. There is little or no under-
standing of local self-government as an institution of public authority and the major component
of a civil society.
Nevertheless, due to administrative and legislative efforts as well as individual projects, the outlines
of the original national model of territorial self-government have emerged in the Kyrgyz Republic in
recent years. Reform of self-government is most complicated as it not only concerns the interests of
the population, but is also a key element in the search for an optimal mode of government overall.
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3. Local Politics, Decision Making
3.1 Political Parties and the NGO Sector
Clearly, the influence of democratization on the system of self-government should be reviewed in
the context of general political processes in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Political parties are not a widespread form of political organization in Kyrgyzstan. By the end of
1999, there were thirty registered parties, compared to two in 1991. A public association could be
registered as a political party if it had over five hundred members (the new Law on Political Parties,
adopted in 1999, reduces this membership requirement to ten). The largest political parties include
the Republican Party of Kyrgyzstan “Adilet ” (Justice), with thirty-five thousand members; the Party
of the Disadvantaged, with thirty-two thousand members; and the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan,
with twenty-five thousand members. However, the political influence of even the largest parties is
insignificant. According to surveys conducted in October 1999, thirty-three percent of respondents
were at a loss to name even one party representing their interests and forty-five percent answered that
none of the existing parties represented their interests. The overall weakness of political parties in
Kyrgyzstan is due to the lack of citizen interest in this form of representation, since it provides no
practical advantages in the political struggle compared to informal citizen associations.
Kyrgyzstan is a multinational country, so citizens congregate according to national cultural traditions
as well as democratic interests. Thus, several public associations are based on ethnicity. In these
difficult economic conditions, this kind of association draws upon specific national customs and
mentalities to strengthen communities and promote forms of mutual assistance.
Public associations are not supported by an adequate legal framework. By the end of 1999, the
concept of public associations was interpreted rather broadly to include political parties; trade unions;
women’s, youths’, veterans’ and creative unions; ethnic groups, funds and associations; and other
citizen entities.
By 1999, there were roughly two thousand such organizations registered in the republic, fifty
percent of which were based in the capital city. The significant growth in the number of NGOs has
occurred due to the activities of inhabitants in rural areas and small cities, such as credit unions,
specialized associations of water users and others.
3.2 System of Local Elections
The system of elections for local councils was modified with the introduction of the new Election
Code in April 1999. The elections of village and city councils on 17 October 1999 and the elections
of raion and oblast councils on 20 February 2000 applied a completely new electoral system which
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utilized multi-mandate electoral districts, a relative majority system using a single ballot, the
participation of political parties and the presence of observers.
The Election Code stipulates that candidates eligible to run for local council seats must be citizens of
the Kyrgyz Republic over twenty years of age, who have resided at least two years in the respective
territory. Voter assemblies may nominate candidates. Political parties and electoral blocks have the
right to nominate candidates in each electoral district. In addition, candidates may nominate themselves
by submitting a written application with the statement of their intention to run for office.
Village or rural elections may be held in up to seven single-mandate electoral districts; raion and city
council elections in up to ten multi-mandate districts; and oblast and Bishkek council elections in up
to twenty multi-mandate districts.
Local councils are composed according to the following scale: thirty to forty-five members in oblasts
and Bishkek, fifteen to thirty members in raions and cities of oblast subordination, eleven to twenty-
one members in cities of raion subordination and nine to nineteen members in villages and settlements.
Candidates are elected if they receive a relative majority of votes from participating citizens. Election
results are published in the media by the oblast and Bishkek electoral commissions within seven days
of the elections. Within three calendar days of publication, the district electoral commissions must
register the elected deputies and issue certificates.
Table 10.1
Number of Local Council Members by Oblast
Oblasts Oblast Raion City Town Village and Total
Councils Councils Councils Councils Rural Councils
Osh 35 183 68 20 1,164 1,470
Jalal-Abad 45 220 118 124 977 1,484
Batken 31 85 40 69 453 678
Chuy 35 219 55 54 1,216 1,579
Naryn 35 138 21 25 816 1,035
Talass 31 94 27 9 487 648
Ysyk-Kol 45 142 64 47 848 1,146
City — — 36 13 — 49
of Bishkek
Total 257 1,081 429 361 5,961 8,089
SOURCE: Central Commission on Elections and Referenda
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In the elections of October 1999 and February 2000, 527 local councils were elected at all levels,
with a total of 8,089 members.
Although, for the first time, the law allowed nomination by party lists or lists of electoral blocks, this
opportunity was not realized. This is not surprising since, according to the official procedures of the
Central Commission on Election and Referenda for forming electoral blocks, the registration and
nomination of candidates by electoral blocks would have been approved only on 9 November
1999. In the end, party lists were not utilized during local council elections.
Based on the official data of the Central Electoral Commission, election results according to party
were as follows:
• The National Party Adilet won 418 seats;
• The Party of Unity won twenty-two seats;
• The Communist Party won twenty seats;
• Party Ar-Namys (“Dignity”) won four seats;
• Other parties and public associations won sixty-three seats.
In general, political parties perceived the local council elections primarily as an opportunity to
rehearse and improve their campaigning techniques. The introduction of a mixed proportional and
majority system, including party lists, for elections to the Zhogorku Kenesh (Parliament) greatly
stimulated activity among political parties. Parties played an active role in the elections to the Legislative
Assembly of the bicameral Parliament in February and March 2000. The Legislative Assembly
consists of sixty seats, fifteen of which are allocated to representatives of political parties which receive
more than five percent of the vote. Altogether, five parties surpassed the required minimum, with
the Communist Party winning the largest number of seats (five).
The new Election Code also established the institution of public observers in the election process in
Kyrgyzstan. Twenty-nine international observers and two thousand independent local observers,
representing both NGOs and candidates, took part in monitoring local council elections.
3.3 Forms of Direct Democracy
According to the Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration, forms of direct
democracy include local referenda; citizen assemblies, kurultais and other forums to discuss issues of
public life; elections of representative bodies; and mechanisms of local control over local self-
government.
The local council has the exclusive power to announce and implement local referenda. The local
referendum is conceived as a method of citizen decision making through a general vote on major
issues of community importance. However, since the Law on Referenda (adopted 28 June 1991)
determines procedures for national referenda only, there is no legal framework or practice for holding
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local referenda. Thus, the right to local referenda is of declarative nature only, whereas four national
referenda were held in the period between 1994 and 1998.
Another form of direct democracy is the village assembly, or kurultai. This forum is used to encourage
collective decisions on major local issues such as adopting or amending the charter of a local community
(ail miyzamy) or establishing community property and its management. To initiate a kurultai,
individuals in a local community should collect signatures from at least ten percent of community
members.
In May 2001, the Presidential Decree on Increasing the Role of Kurultais in the Management of
Local Affairs attempted to give new impetus to the development of a long-forgotten institution of
community self-government. Currently, within four months of being elected head of local self-
government or appointed as head of the raion or city administration, the mayor or akim is obliged to
develop a draft program for social and economic development and social protection for their term in
office. After the local council grants preliminary approval to the program, the draft is distributed in
the local community and submitted for consideration through a kurultai called for this purpose.
Upon approval by the kurultai, the draft program is passed by the local council, taking immediate
effect. Two years following, the raion akim or city mayor should report to another kurultai on the
progress of its implementation. If the kurultai finds the progress to be unsatisfactory, it recommends
that the local council pass a vote of no confidence in the akim and submit it to the president. If the
kurultai finds the progress to be satisfactory, the raion akim or city mayor continues with his or her
activity for the four-year term, but remains obliged to report to kurultai. In case of exceptionally
good results, the kurultai can advise the local council to petition the president to extend the head’s
authority for a further four years.
This mechanism is to be introduced to the system of village and settlement self-government. This
relationship between local state administrations and councils is intended to bring the system of
government closer to the people and to place programs and decisions under public control.
Kurultais weigh issues relevant to the local community, including the following:
• adopting or amending the local community charter;
• formulating and executing the local budget and managing the extra-budgetary funds of the
local community;
• considering draft programs for local social and economic development and the social protection
of local inhabitants;
• reviewing reports from heads of local self-government in villages, settlements and cities, as well
as heads of local state administrations on the implementation of kurultai decisions.
Kurultai decisions are regarded as recommendations and are submitted for consideration at local
council session, where they may approved by a vote of two-thirds of all council members. Kurultai
meetings are held at least once every two years and are open to the mass media. These meetings are
organized and held at the expense of the local budget.
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Nonetheless, some experts are of the opinion that the introduction of kurultais reduces the influence
of the local council and minimizes opportunities for representative bodies to influence heads of
executive-administrative bodies of local self-government.
3.4 Forms of Community Self-government
In addition to the forms of direct democracy mentioned above, the Law on Local Self-government
and Local Public Administration specifies other kinds of community self-government that act as
bodies of representative democracy. These include councils and committees created in small districts,
housing complexes, apartment blocks, streets, quarters, settlements and ails as well as other entities
established by inhabitants based on local conditions and traditions. The decisions of these types of
community self-government are regarded as recommendations.
To maintain public order and prevent crime on community territory, general assemblies of the
community can form voluntary squads, called kyrk choro (literally, forty warriors).
The “people’s” judicial body is the aksakal court  (“aksakal” means elder in Kyrgyz). Aksakal courts
are established according to the traditions and customs of the Kyrgyz people and have the right to
make decisions based on the moral and ethical standards of the people, provided that they do not
contradict the laws of the Kyrgyz Republic. Aksakal courts may also include younger persons who
are respected by local citizens. Aksakal courts are elected in the place of residence by general citizen
assemblies through open ballot for a four-year term. Court decisions carry the legal weight of
recommendations. However, if a decision is not fulfilled voluntarily, the appropriate territorial court
may order it to be executed by the bailiff.
The 1997 Law on Condominium Associations defines a condominium association as a non-commercial
organization created by inhabitants in order to maintain, operate and manage condominium buildings.
By 2000, there were approximately two hundred condominium associations throughout the republic.
The growth in these organizations was caused by the mass privatization of housing, as responsibility
for the operation of existing housing was transferred from the local state administrations to proprietors.
New forms of management have taken hold more easily in the south, where local communities have
stronger corporate traditions of joint participation. As a result, there are seventy condominium
associations in Jalal-Abad oblast and thirty in Osh. Condominium associations cooperate on a contractual
basis with the appropriate local government agencies. In order to exchange experience and interact
more effectively with local self-governments, three regional associations of condominium owners
have been established in Chuy, Osh and Jalal-Abad oblasts. Local authorities render organizational,
technical and material support to condominium associations on a contractual basis, provide support to
groups of citizens wishing to set up condominium associations and otherwise encourage their establishment.
By 1999, initiative groups had established the following entities in local communities throughout
Kyrgyzstan: 431 public councils, 359 residential area committees, 1,569 house committees, 1,055
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aksakal courts, 823 councils of veterans, 878 women’s organizations, 649 youth organizations and
965 voluntary squads for the maintenance of public order.
Kyrgyz legislation does not provide a strong framework for the activities of community self-government
or public organizations. Usually these entities report to the citizen assemblies that elected them or to
the local council at which they are registered. In practice, community self-government entities often
become another type of institution subordinated to local raion administrations.
To promote the activities of community self-government entities and increase their role in resolving
everyday issues within the local community, the president signed a Decree on Increasing the Role of
Bodies of Community Self-government. According to this decree, the government, together with
the Commission on Local Self-government Reform and the Congress of Local Communities, was
assigned the task of preparing and adopting regulations on:
• types of community self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic;
• issues of community development that must first be coordinated with bodies of community
self-government;
• measures to increase material and moral support and stimulate active participation by citizens
and employees in bodies of community self-government.
The national government wishes to reinstate annual assemblies of community self-government
employees to generate broader citizen participation in the discussion of local issues.
3.5 Ethnic Issues, Multicultural Government
Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic state. Any such nation can only be strong if its national minorities thrive
and enjoy equal rights with the title nation. According to data from the Assembly of the People of Kyr-
gyzstan, there are twenty-six national and cultural societies. The largest ethnic groups populating the
Kyrgyz Republic include Kyrgyz (61.6 percent), Russians (14.4 percent) and Uzbeks (14.4 percent).
The population of the capital city, Bishkek, falls along to the following ethnic divisions: Kyrgyz
(37.13 percent), Russians (45.33 percent), Ukrainians (4.06 percent), Tatars (2.45 percent), Uigurs
(2.06 percent) and others.
According to the 1989 Law on State Language, the national state language is Kyrgyz. However,
central government offices conduct their affairs in both Kyrgyz and Russian. The Russian language
newspaper Vecherniy Bishkek has the largest circulation in Bishkek and Russian television channels
are viewed by eighty percent of the television audience. Government sessions are held in Russian,
army commands are given in Russian and the Kyrgyz Internet functions in Russian as well.
The Law on the Official Language, passed in May 2000, granted Russian the status of an official
language in the Kyrgyz Republic; previously, it had been regarded as the language of inter-ethnic
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communication. This law will significantly influence cities and raions with Russian-speaking
populations, such as Bishkek and Chuy oblast, in particular by suspending mass migration.
Russian, as the common language of the various resident nationalities in post-Soviet countries, plays
a key role in integrating the multi-ethnic republic. The increased attention to the Russian language
in the Kyrgyz Republic suggests that this role will be preserved in the further development of
society.
In rural areas, the state language is the working language for local self-government bodies. The
Constitution guarantees the preservation, equal rights, free development and use of Russian and all
other languages used by inhabitants of the republic. Localities with a high concentration of ethnic
groups may use the language of the prevailing ethnicity.
3.6 Local Government Associations
The Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration stipulates the right of villages,
settlements and cities to establish associations in order to more efficiently exercise their rights and
promote their interests. In October 1996, the Association of Local Self-governments was established.
During its existence, this association accomplished a great deal by participating in the adoption of
important legal norms related to local self-government, by initiating activities to establish community
property and by providing technical assistance. In 1997, by decision of a national forum of local
communities, the association was converted into a non-governmental organization, the Congress of
Local Communities.
In March 1998, the Congress obtained legal status as a public association. According to its charter,
the Congress is a voluntary association of village, settlement and city communities, their territorial
associations, public organizations and other forms of joint activity by local communities. Decisions of
the Congress may be taken as recommendations by local authorities.
In particular, the Congress focuses its activity on developing the legal framework for local self-
government. The Congress also participates in promoting local self-government initiatives and
coordinating international technical assistance programs for government decentralization and
municipal development. Experts feel, however, that the Congress does not reflect current realities,
since it was established according to principles of the former Soviet hierarchy.
In August 2000, the Association of Cities in Kyrgyzstan was created to integrate efforts for improving
city self-governments, to promote economic cooperation and to create conditions for the free
development of cities. The association elects its management on a rotating basis for a one-year term.
Its aim is to act as spokesman for cities in the ongoing democratization of government and strengthen
their legal and material resources.
537
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N  T H E  K Y R G Y Z  R E P U B L I C
4. Functional Structure of Local Government
According to the Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration, local self-
governments and local state administrations carry out activities based on the division of functions
and powers of representative, executive and regulatory bodies.
The Kyrgyz Republic contains the following territorial tiers of local government:
• first tier, village or rural level : local councils in villages, towns and cities of raion subordination;
• second tier, raion level : local councils and local state administrations in raions and cities of oblast
subordination;
• third tier, oblast level : local councils and local state administrations in oblasts and the city of
Bishkek.
4.1 Local Councils
The system of representative self-government bodies in Kyrgyz Republic is comprised of councils at
each tier of local government, in oblasts, raions, cities of district and raion subordination, towns and
villages. Local councils operate through sessions, which are convened as necessary, but at least once
yearly. The local council session is declared competent when at least two-thirds of all council members
are present. Local council sessions in oblasts and raion elect a secretariat from among its members by
open vote, while local councils in cities of raion subordination, towns and villages elect a secretary.
Local council members perform their duties while continuing their principal employment.
Local sessions are competent to decide on the following issues:
• electing and dismissing the council chairman and his or her deputies;
• approving rules governing local council procedures and establishing commissions;
• reviewing reports from the council chairman and commissions and considering inquiries
submitted by council members;
• approving social and economic development plans and social protection programs;
• approving the budget and budget execution reports;
• adopting a vote of no confidence in the head of the local state administration.
The local council employs three to five specialists on a contractual basis to provide logistical support
for council activities, council commissions and council members and develop necessary materials.
Local council sessions consider and resolve issues within their competence through free discussion
among all members. Local council members may not use their mandate to accomplish goals outside
of their representative duties. Members report to their constituency and are accountable to them
through the institution of voters’ demands. A council member may not concurrently occupy any of
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the following government posts: head or deputy head of local administration, head of local adminis-
tration or self-government department, prosecutor or judge. Nor may council members belong to
more than one local council.
Local council members may establish groups of three or more persons through mutual consent. Local
government staff provides assistance to registered council groups, coordinates their activities and
reviews information on their undertakings.
Local council commissions perform the following tasks:
• to prepare issues related to the economic, social and cultural development of the corresponding
territory and submit them to the council for consideration;
• to submit proposals to the council on developing local infrastructure for production;
• to give preliminary consideration to draft plans for territorial economic development, the draft
budget and reports on their implementation and prepare their comments in writing;
• to exercise other powers assigned to them by local council procedures.
Standing commissions are formed from council members. Commissions may invite scientists,
specialists, professionals and other individuals to participate in commission activities. Other council
members have the right to sit in on commission meetings and possess a deliberative vote.
The council chairman, as head of the self-government, convenes council sessions, organizes council
activity, oversees implementation of council decisions and coordinates commissions activities. The
council chairman has organizational powers and represents the council in relations with public
bodies, associations and individuals. The chairman is accountable to the council and reports at least
once per year. The council chairman may be dismissed from office by the vote of two-thirds of all
council members.
The village or rural council chairman is the head of local self-government at the first tier of government.
In addition to being accountable to the council, these chairmen are also accountable to the head of
raion administration for their executive and regulatory functions. Village and rural council chairmen
perform organizational functions and represent the council in relations with public bodies, associations
and individuals.
Local council chairmen at the first tier of local government exercise executive and regulatory functions
on the corresponding territory as well as powers of the local state administration. In addition, they
perform the following tasks:
• to exercise control over compliance with the passport system and register passports as provided
by law;
• to issue certificates on marital status, property, identification and other documents and carry
out civil registration
• to appoint guardians and custodians for children, the elderly and the disabled, among others,
and supervise the fulfillment of their duties.
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Village or rural chairmen may be dismissed by a vote of two-thirds of all local council members, either
at the initiative of the council or upon the proposal of the head of raion administration.
4.2 Local Council Functions
At the oblast and raion levels, the council chairman represents the local territory in relations with
public bodies, courts and public associations and has the right to conclude contracts or agreements.
As declared by law, raion and oblast councils independently regulate local issues as stipulated by law,
based on the principle of autonomy in financial and legal decision making.
The following tasks fall within the competence of raion and oblast councils:
• approving programs for social and economic development and social protection and exercising
control over their implementation;
• approving the local budget and budget execution reports, as well reviewing information on
the use of extra-budgetary funds;
• developing proposals on the separation of public and municipal property;
• vetoing decisions of heads of state administration if they exceed their authority;
• appealing decisions of local self-government bodies to superior government bodies and in
court;
• passing a vote of no confidence in the head of local state administration by a vote of two-thirds
of total council members;
• revoking ungrounded or unlawful decisions taken by the head of territorial self-government.
4.3 Local Administration
The local administration is the state executive and regulatory body at the oblast, raion or city levels.
The head of local state administration implements policies of the president and government in regions.
The local administration performs the following functions within the respective territory:
• formulates the draft local budget and draft programs for local social and economic development,
submits them to the corresponding council for approval, organizes their implementation and
determines the application of administrative sanctions on business entities of all types of
ownership;
• exercises control over compliance with environmental protection acts by enterprises,
organizations and institutions and monitors the use of land and natural resources, sanitation
standards and health care regulations;
• suspends the construction or functioning of production units, if these activities proceed
without the approval of the corresponding state administration;
• develops and implements measures to ensure employment and the social protection of low-
income populations;
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• maintains law and public order;
• borrow and lends on contractual basis;
• issues securities, organizes lotteries, extends local loans and balances territorial accounts in order
to mobilize additional financial resources from the state budget and other sources.
The head of local public administration and his or her deputies may not be members of the corres-
ponding local council or the Assembly of National Representatives. The head performs executive
and regulatory functions and oversees the general management of local state administration bodies
and structural divisions as well as local budgetary institutions. The head manages the resources of the
local state administration, decides on the allocation of land plots, manages municipally owned
enterprises and represents the territory in relations with higher government bodies. The head must
report to the local council on the current situation of the territory at least once every two years.
The head of local public administration coordinates activities of the territorial subdivisions of state
bodies and consents to the appointment of their heads. These include departments in the following
areas: tax, finance, customs, internal affairs, national security, defense, justice, environmental protection,
statistics, state archives, forestry, prices and antimonopoly policy, architecture and construction and
state sanitation.
Public prosecutors must take into consideration the opinion of the corresponding head of local
administration. In addition, the head of local administration, in agreement with central agencies,
establishes territorial subdivisions and appoints heads of state veterinary control and other departments
which are under their mutual supervision.
The structure of the oblast administration is submitted by the head of the oblast administration, or
governor, within budgetary assignments, for approval by the national government. The structure of
raion-level administrations is submitted by the raion head for approval to the oblast administration,
within its budgetary assignments.
In addition to the responsibilities listed above, oblast-level administrations perform the following
tasks:
• to provide economic, social and cultural services to districts and cities on a contractual basis;
• to provide financial assistance to raion-level governments in order to balance the local budget;
• to provide methodological assistance for developing programs of regional, national and cultural
development as well as demographic policy;
• to ensure public order and security, as well as the legality of executive and regulatory activities.
Raion-level administrations perform these additional functions:
• to develop and implement local programs of social, economic and cultural development;
• to provide financial assistance to balance local budgets of the village level and achieve their
minimum needs;
• to undertake measures to ensure the social protection of citizens;
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• to provide economic, social, cultural, utility and legal services to first-tier local councils;
• to organize methodological and legal assistance to bodies of community self-government;
• to oversee the condition of institutions of public education, health care and social security;
• to develop and implement measures to maintain local roads and communication.
4.4 Local Government in Cities
Of the twenty-one cities in Kyrgyzstan, only twelve cities apply principles of self-government. One
of these is Bishkek, and the remaining eleven are cities of raion subordination. This peculiarity results
from the division of cities into cities of raion subordination and cities of oblast subordination (with
the exception of Bishkek). In cities of oblast subordination, the local administration is equivalent to
the raion-level state administration. The varying degree of self-government implemented in cities
impedes the establishment of a uniform system of city administration.
Cities of Oblast Subordination. Starting in 2001, local administration reform at the city level gained
new impetus. Two regulations were approved, on the Organization of Local Self-government in
Cities of Oblast Subordination and on Elections of the Head of Local Self-government. In accordance
with the Presidential Decree on the Organization of Local Self-government in Cities of Oblast
Subordination, the cities of Osh, Jalal-Abad, Talas, Balykchy, Suliukta, Kara-Kol, Kyzyl-Kiya, Mailuu-
Suu and Tash-Kumyr were granted the right to manage local affairs based on principles of local self-
government and delegated public powers. Based on the offices of the city state administration, these
cities established the office of the mayor as new executive and regulatory bodies of city self-
government. The office of the mayor consists of a presidium, the shaar bashkarmasy (city executive
committee) and staff.
The mayor is elected through indirect elections with the following distinctive features:
• The mayor is elected for a four year term through secret ballot by city council members;
• The president has the sole right to nominate candidates;
• The election is deemed valid with the participation of at least two-thirds of all city council
members;
• The candidate wins the election with a simple majority vote;
• If the president’s candidate is twice rejected, the president appoints an acting mayor and
dismisses the city council.
Thus, mayoral elections in cities of oblast subordination resemble elections of the chairman of local
self-government in Bishkek. In general, the former heads of city state administration have become
mayors. Only in the cities of Kara-Kol, Kyzyl-Kiy and Mailuu-Suu have newcomers been elected
mayor.
Cities of Raion Subordination. Seven cities of raion subordination were reorganized along the principles
of local self-government, according to the Presidential Decree on the Organization of Local Self-
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government in Cities of Raion Subordination, passed on 23 June 1998. Soon after, that right was
granted to four other cities. The system of self-government in cities of raion subordination is comprised
of:
• representative bodies, such as the city council and kurultais;
• the executive and regulatory branch of the city council, directed by the head of city self-
government;
• bodies of community self-government.
City councils. The city council is the highest elected representative body of local self-government in
a city. Its powers include:
• approving the city budget and programs for social and economic development in the city;
consenting to the appointment of heads of city government and their deputies;
• approving the executive secretary and members of the presidium of the shaar bashkarmasy,
which is subordinated to the head of the city self-government
• passing a vote of no confidence in the head of city government by a vote of two-thirds of all
members;
• levying local taxes and duties and defining procedures and conditions for using land or other
natural resources in accordance with national legislation;
• defining the borders for bodies of community self-government and approving their registration
by the city council;
• making other decisions in compliance with legislation and the city charter.
Decisions of the city council made within its competence are obligatory for all organizations,
institutions, businesses of all forms of ownership, officials and citizens in the city
Shaar Bashkarmasy. In cities of raion subordination, the executive and regulatory branch of the local
self-government is the shaar bashkarmasy (executive committee), which is established by the city
council.
The head of city government also heads the executive committee, which consists of the presidium,
council, staff, departments, services, self-supporting organizations and other structural subdivisions.
The executive secretary oversees the office proceedings of the executive committee. The city council
defines the organizational chart for the executive committee and its staff, based on general standards
and the city budget.
The City Presidium. The presidium is established to resolve issues of vital importance to the city and
consists of five to seven persons who report to the head of city government. Members of the
presidium include the head of city government, the deputy head and the executive secretary on city
self-government affairs ex officio. The presidium meets to discuss various issues of city life at least once
per month and adopts resolutions on issues falling outside the jurisdiction of the city council and
kurultais. Resolutions of the presidium are passed by simple majority vote and are obligatory for all
individuals and entities on city territory.
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The executive committee possesses the following powers:
• to develop draft programs for social and economic development in the city and a draft local
budget and submit them for approval to the city council;
• to implement council decisions;
• to maintain and renovate municipal facilities and, if necessary, mobilize the population through
the tradition of ashar to repair facilities of vital importance to the city;
• to supervise sanitation in the city, organize the arrangement of the territory and environmental
measures;
• to develop the housing fund, city transport and communications;
• to develop and implement an urban development plan, monitor compliance with construction
standards and oversee the rational use of city lands;
• to attract investments and decide upon their targeted use;
• to submit proposals to the city council to levy local taxes and duties according to the law;
• to strengthen the material and technical foundations for institutions of health care, education
and social security;
• to appoint guardians and custodians for children, the elderly and the disabled;
• to organize mass cultural events, protect historical and cultural monuments and organize the
distribution of humanitarian aid;
• to develop and implement measures to create new jobs;
• to assist in the completion of the privatization process;
• to control the compliance of organizations, institutions and enterprises with the law and the
city charter and regulate environmental protection, use of land and other natural resources;
• to organize and support aksakal courts and other voluntary organizations for the maintenance
of public order;
• to exercise other powers as stipulated by law.
Head of City Government. The head of city government (shaar bashchasy) is the highest city official
and acts as chairman of the city council, head of the executive committee and first deputy head of the
raion state administration. The head of city government is accountable to the city council and
kurultais on issues of self-government and to the raion and oblast heads on the exercise of delegated
state powers.
The head of city government submits the draft annual budget and the program for social and
economic development for approval to the city council and kurultais and reports on their execution
once annually to the city council and once every two years to a city kurultai. The head of city
government represents the city, engages in organizational activities, defines the structure and number
of the staff of the executive committee and submits it to the city council for approval. The head of
city government convenes council meetings at his or her initiative or by request of at least one-third
of council members. City heads may resolve other questions in accordance with legislation, the city
charter and delegated state powers.
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4.5 Status of the Capital City
Local government in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyz Republic, is outlined by the Law on the Status
of the Capital City, adopted 16 April 1994. Direct elections of heads of local self-government took
place for the first time in February 1995 in the cities of Bishkek and Osh. However, no mayor was
elected in Osh due to the failure of any of the candidates to collect the minimum amount of required
votes. On 1 April 1996, the executive branch of local self-government in Osh was abolished and the
previous system of the city state administration was reinstated.
According to the Presidential Decree on the Organization of Local Self-government in Bishkek,
adopted 1 July 199, the local state administration in Bishkek was restructured into a mayor’s office,
in keeping with principles of local self-government. To support this, the government passed the
Provisional Regulation on the Organization of Local Self-government in Bishkek, which remains in
effect, and established a state commission on the transfer of organizations and enterprises into
municipal ownership. Several state-owned entities were transferred to the operational management
of the Bishkek self-government.
The system of state administration and local self-government in the city of Bishkek consists of the
following:
• the city council, a representative body of local self-government with thirty-six members;
• the office of mayor of Bishkek, the executive and regulatory branch of local self-government;
subdivisions of the mayor’s office into four administrative-territorial divisions, raion-level
administrations headed by deputy mayors (akim);
• bodies of community self-government, such as community councils, residential quarter
committees, housing block committees and others.
Maintenance of administration bodies consumes three percent of the city budget. The structure of
the Bishkek local government is unique, as it incorporates elements of all three levels of local self-
government and local state administration. The mayor’s office includes four raion-level state adminis-
trations, whose heads are appointed by the president in consultation with the mayor. Procedures for
appointing these officials are the same as those for heads of local state administrations and their
deputies.
The main powers of the Bishkek city council are as following:
• developing and implementing measures for social security and providing utilities and social
and cultural services to the population;
• maintaining local communications and roads as well as educational and medical institutions;
• approving rates for local taxes and duties;
• approving the city budget and reports on its execution;
• coordinating the development of general construction plans and supervising compliance with
established construction standards on its territory.
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The mayor, as the head of local self-government and the head of the executive branch, is the highest
government official in the city and a representative of the president and government of Kyrgyzstan.
In accordance with the Presidential Decree on Increasing the Role of Heads of Local State Adminis-
trations and Local Self-government (adopted 20 March 1996), heads of local self-government,
including the mayor of Bishkek, have equal status to heads of oblast public administration, or
governors.
In 1998, procedures for mayoral elections in Bishkek were fundamentally changed. In accordance
with the Regulation on Elections of the Mayor of Bishkek, approved by presidential decree on 9 July
1998, the mayor of Bishkek is elected by members of the city council. The new procedures stipulate
that mayoral candidates may only be nominated by the president. The candidate is considered
elected if he or she receives a simple majority vote. If the president’s candidates are rejected three
times running, the president appoints a mayor and dismisses the Bishkek city council.
4.6 Local Government in Rural Areas
Head of the Aiyl Okmotu. The head of the aiyl okmotu, or rural executive committee, is the highest
official in the territorial jurisdiction of the village or town council. The rural executive committee is
accountable to the raion council chairman on issues of local self-government and to the head of raion
administration for the exercise of delegated state powers.
Key functions of the rural executive committee include drafting the local budget; formulating draft
programs for the social and economic development of the territory; managing municipal property
and financial resources, maintaining and repairing all facilities of vital importance; and exercising
control over the use of agricultural land. In addition, the committee is obliged to ensure access to
education and health care, maintain law and public order and perform notary acts and civil registration.
Local councils at all levels may pass a vote of no confidence in the heads of the executive branch. To
date, rural councils have impeached ten executive committee heads and removed them from office.
No such cases are reported at the raion, city or oblast levels, however.
Village Headman. In order to manage local affairs in separate villages within the jurisdiction of a rural
council, the council may decide to add the position of village headman (aiyl bashchysy) to the payroll
of the executive committee. The village headman is nominated by the executive committee head
and elected for a four-year term by open vote at a general assembly of village residents. The village
headman answers to this general village assembly, which is convened as necessary or once per quarter.
In addition, the headman may form a voluntary, unpaid executive commission of five to seven
members, as defined by simple majority vote at the general assembly. The headman’s functions are
organizational and interpretive.
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Table 10.2
Size of Aiyl Okmotu Staff According to Population Size Categories*
Position 0–5,000 5,000–10,000 10,000–15,000 15,000+
Inhabitants Inhabitants Inhabitants Inhabitants
Council chairman/ 1 1 1 1
head of rural council
Deputy chairman/ — 1 1 1
deputy head of rural council
Executive secretary 1 1 1 1
Chief specialist/ 1 1 1 2
social protection specialist
Cleaning staff 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Guard 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Stoker 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance
* Staff may also include a military registration officer, a tax inspector and a land inspector.
The sphere of rural committee activity is quite extensive and includes delegated state powers. But, as
seen in table 10.2 above, the committee lacks sufficient staff or organizational capacity to exercise
those delegated functions. The development of rural committee capabilities through cooperation
with private and public organizations has attracted rising interest by local state adminis-trations of all
levels. Changes being planned to strengthen confidence in local authorities include developing
procedures for increasing the accountability of governors and akims to local councils and representatives
of civil society through public hearings. They also include involving NGOs and private businesses
in implementing plans for social and economic development and exercising control over local budget
expenditures.
4.7 Control, Audit and Supervision of Local Governments
Internal Control. Enterprises that provide housing, utilities, water, sewage, heating, energy and other
services are directly supervised or managed by local state administrations and local self-governments.
In general, these enterprises are in the ownership of the local self-government.
Kyrgyz legislation does not refer to the supervisory functions of local self-governments. The chairman
and commissions supervise the implementation of local council decisions. Branches and divisions of
local state administration supervise organizations under local government control.
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The local state administration approves the establishment or transformation of entities with economic
and social importance, as well as the use of natural resources on local territory. Enterprises, organizations
and institutions, regardless of ownership, are not permitted to alter their plans regarding issues
stipulated by agreement with the local administration. Thus, all enterprises are obliged to come to
agreement with the corresponding local state administration concerning activities that may cause
environmental, demographic or other consequences.
Currently, local self-governments are only in force at the aiyl okmotu and rural township level and
thus supervise only territorial community self-government bodies.
Public Supervision. The president, government, central ministries, central administrative agencies
and higher-level local administrations exercise control over compliance with the law by local govern-
ment bodies. Legislation does not stipulate procedures for the supervision of local self-government
bodies, but merely establishes the general right of national supervisory bodies to request and receive
necessary information.
According to Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration, the president and
government have the right to abolish acts of the head of local state administration. Oblast heads may
abolish acts of raion heads, and raion heads may abolish acts of rural council chairmen related to their
executive and regulatory powers.
In addition, ministries and agencies approve internal regulations affecting local state administrations
and local self-government bodies. For instance, the Ministry of Finance issues regulations regarding
procedures for formulating local budgets. The Ministry of Justice monitors the legality of statutory
acts approved by local state administrations or local self-government bodies and registers these acts
with the state. The Accounting Chamber of the Kyrgyz Republic exercises financial and economic
control through periodic audits of local government expenditures.
The Office of the Prosecutor exercises control over strict and uniform compliance with the law.
These issues are then decided in court after claims or actions are filed. The oblast may suspend local
self-government acts until the court reaches its decision. Likewise, the local council chairman may
suspend acts of community self-government until the court makes a final decision, if those acts
violate the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of local inhabitants.
5. Public Service Provision
5.1 Decentralization of Public Services
The formation of local self-government is primarily defined by the delegation of state powers.
Within the framework of decentralization, many ministry functions were transferred to state adminis-
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trations at the oblast and district levels and the corresponding structures in ministries and agencies
were abolished. However, central executive bodies continue to exercise control over these functions
under the system of dual subordination.
Frequently, the delegation of state powers is not reflected by a similar decentralization in funding.
Accordingly, public service delivery is primarily financed by the state budget and administered by
territorial structures of state administration.
As noted above, local self-governments are currently functioning in rural areas, eleven cities of raion
subordination and the capital city. The delegation of public functions and powers to local self-
governments is proceeding very gradually. This is due to many factors: the lack of experience in self-
governments, the inertia of state agencies and the complicated social and economic situation in the
republic. When functions are transferred to local self-governments, they are often accompanied by
instructions to perform them “jointly with the local state administration, territorial divisions of
ministries and agencies.” Local self-government bodies are accountable to the corresponding state
bodies for delegated functions.
5.2 Trends in Public Service Delivery
To illustrate trends in the development of public services, let us turn to the most important sectors:
healthcare, education and social security.
Health Care. The Ministry of Health Care defines standards for medical services, ensures that they
are followed and implements structural reforms. Starting in 1996, medical service providers have
been paid from the state budget and the Mandatory Medical Insurance Fund (MMIF) and medical
institutions are compensated in proportion to the number of people that they serve. In another
direction of health care reform, the Group of Family Doctors (GFD) system has been established.
This group, financed from MMIF and central and local budgets, treats a variety of patients and
provides consultative aid. This is the first structure where payments have been made on a per capita
basis. The development of GFDs has been especially effective in rural areas.
Thus, the health care sector is moving towards mixed methods of service delivery. On one hand, the
state is departing from the ineffective system of fixed wages and the per capita principle will allow
real control of the public through local self-government bodies in the future. However, the state
retains the sole power to license these activities and exercise control over their compliance with
established standards. Local self-government bodies themselves are responsible for maintaining and
renovating medical institutions, such as obstetric clinics, village dispensaries and village hospitals, at
the expense of the local budget.
Education. There are approximately two thousand public secondary schools and forty private schools
and lyceums in Kyrgyzstan. Teachers’ wages are paid from the national budget according to rates set
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by the Ministry of Education. All other expenditures are covered by local budgets. In terms of higher
education, approximately 160,000 students study at twenty-seven state institutions and thirteen
private establishments. About thirty percent of students in state institutions of higher education
study at the expense of the state. The Ministry of Education regularly certifies schools and institutions
of higher education to ensure state educational standards. In 346 city schools, subjects are studied at
a higher level, due to a variety of educational programs financed both by the government, which pays
an additional twenty percent to teachers, and by parents, who contribute through school boards.
Similarly to the health care sector, the education sector is displaying a tendency towards decentralization
and the ministry is assuming the role of coordinator rather than administrator. Local authorities in
the capital city and oblast capitals are also gradually developing relations with the private sector,
which is ready to respond to the growing demand for quality services. The situation is more
complicated in rural areas, where the government only provides teachers’ wages and local authorities
lack other resources. One possible solution is instituting a system of grants to public organizations;
however, this method is supported only sporadically, by international organizations.
Social Protection. State administrations and local self-governments also provide assistance to socially
vulnerable segments of the population. It must be noted that if the bottom five percent of the
population is defined as “poor,” then about two-thirds of the population in rural areas live under the
poverty line. Methods for performing the means test are constantly being improved. Village councils
issue social documents for low-income families and persons, based on which regional “maps” of
poverty are to be developed. Starting in 1998, the position of social worker was introduced in the
structure of the village council. The social worker is responsible for the following functions in the
sphere of social security and social protection in accordance with relevant legislation:
• defining the needs of the population and drawing up maps of poverty
• assistance to orphans and the disabled;
• administration of social security, i.e. pensions and social benefits.
State agencies responsible for social security, such as the Social Fund and the Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection, have raion-level divisions which function under the traditional budget scheme. In
another form of mixed service delivery, the State Employment Department may coordinate its work
with the employment centers of town councils. In small towns in Kyrgyzstan, the problem of
unemployment is especially acute. Paid public works are often organized jointly by town councils
and the subdivisions of the State Employment Department.
Municipal Services. In 1996, social sphere facilities,1 housing and utilities maintained by industrial
enterprises began to be transferred to municipal ownership. Local self-government bodies are
responsible for delivering the following services: maintenance and repair of roads, street lighting,
waste disposal, water supply and sewerage. These services are financed by local budgets and performed
by special divisions of town councils. In the capital, for instance, the city budget finances twenty-
two structural divisions and twelve self-sustaining departments.
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5.3 Private Sector Role in Service Delivery
Legislation on local self-government leaves open the possibility for expanding the list of issues
delegated to local governments. For instance, militia precinct inspectors were transferred to village
supervision, though without the corresponding financing. In general, there is no strict distinction
between delegated state powers and own local government powers.
The practice of contracting with the private sector for service provision is generally more widespread
in economically stable cities. However, this process is hampered by meager local budgets and the lack
of a legislative basis. Local self-government bodies cannot grant preferences to encourage private
businesses to provide public services, as inter-budgetary relations are not regulated. Nevertheless, the
existing practice of cooperation with the non-government sector is proving to be effective.
6. Local Finance, Local Property
6.1  System of Local Finance
Local government finance is regulated by the Constitution, the Law on the Budget System, the Tax
Code and orders and regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance.
The Law on the Budget System, adopted 11 June 1998, specifies the principles for local budget
formation, the procedures for drafting and executing local budgets, the budget structure and the
composition of revenues and expenditures.
Local budgets are independent components of the budgetary system and possess own revenues, as
assigned by legislation. In 1997, a presidential decree stipulated that budgets at the first tier of local
government be entered as a separate line in the central budget.
Table 10.3
Oblast Budget Expenditures
1997 1998 1999
[KGS million] [%] of Central [KGS million] [%] of Central [KGS million] [%] of Central
Budget Budget Budget
Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
Oblast 168.4 19.8 176.4 21.0 123.9 12.0
budget ex-
penditures
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance
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Table 10.4
Central Budget Expenditures
1997 1998 1999
[KGS million] [%] [KGS million] [%] [KGS million] [%]
GDP 30,440.0 100 34,181.4 100 45,470.0 100
Central 681.9 2.2 838.3 2.4 919.9 2.0
budget ex-
penditures
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance
6.2 Revenues
The first tier of local government is financed through the central and local budgets, as well as other
sources assigned by law. Town and village budgets are drafted by the aiyl okmotu and submitted to the
local representative authorities for approval. First-tier local self-governments have the right to determine
the list of fixed revenues and levy local taxes and duties on its territory, in compliance with tax legislation.
Local budget revenues at all levels of local government consist of:
• deductions from national taxes and other revenues;
• land tax;
• tax on the lease of land;
• state duty, in amounts established by law (excluding fees set up by economic courts or the
Ministry of Internal Affairs for issuing passports);
• local taxes and fees stipulated by the Tax Code;
• non-tax payments such as local duties;
• revenues from local budgetary organizations and special resources.
In developed countries, personal income and property tax are the main sources of financing for local
community activity. In Kyrgyzstan, these suffice to cover only a small part of the local government’s
financial needs, while local budgets are responsible for the greater part of expenditures on housing
and utilities.
However, this type of funding is supervised not at the municipal level but at the oblast state
administration level. Deductions from national taxes and other revenues, such as fines, surcharges
and other sanctions imposed by tax authorities, are transferred to local budgets of all levels in
accordance with uniform rates.
Starting from 1997, it was envisioned that local budgets would receive thirty-five percent of deductions
from the national profit tax, income tax and excise tax on domestic products. Parliament would
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approve uniform rates for allocations from the central budget, while higher-level councils would
approve allocations to subordinate local budgets. These rates would not be subject to change for a
period of three years.
In practice, the higher-level administration determines the amount of deductions from national taxes
to be transferred to raions and aiyl okmotu. Although revenues are assigned according to legally
accepted formulas at the oblast level, there are no such transparent methods of assignment at the raion
level. Instead, this process becomes dependent on political, personal and other unforeseen factors.
In addition, the Law on the Budget System prohibits the establishment of extra-budgetary funds by
ministries, administrative agencies, government commissions, other central executive bodies, local
state administrations, local self-government bodies and aiyl okmotu. The only exceptions are the Social
Fund and extra-budgetary funds formed from voluntary contributions by individuals or legal entities.
Currently, payments for the lease of land form the main source of aiyl okmotu revenues. However,
local authorities cannot fully administer these resources. Some revenues from the land tax and tax on
rendering payable services to population and retail sale may be centralized at higher-level local budgets.
Table 10.5
Share of State Subsidies in Local Budget Revenues 1997–1999
1997 1998 1999
[KGS [%] [KGS [%] [KGS [%]
million] million] million]
Local budget 1,048.7 20.8 1,263.6 20.1 1,350.7 17.1
excluding
state subsidies
Local budget 2,034.2 40.4 2,358.6 37.5 2,660.3 33.7
including
state subsidies
State subsidies 985.5 19.6 1,095 17.4 1,309.6 16.6
to the local budget
Bank loans — — —
Other sources — — —
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance
The minimum budget needs of local communities are covered by the system of transfers between
the national and local levels.
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6.3 Financing of Public Services
At the local level, basic education and health care services are financed through categorized grants.
These grants are calculated according to population size, taking into account the presence of
disadvantaged groups and the varying costs of service provision in different environments. Grants to
oblasts are assigned purely based on population size.
The fund for categorized grants for education and health care is established according to local
budget needs, calculated by local financial bodies. Accordingly, the sum of categorized grants from
the state budget made up 45.3 percent of total local budget expenditures in 2000.
In addition to assignments from national taxes and other revenues, the system of equalization transfers
is designed to reduce differences between the tax and budget capabilities of various regions.
Equalization transfers in 2000 account for 9.4 percent of total local budget expenditures.
Similarly, certain shared grants have been established to encourage local governments to attract new
sources of revenue in order to replenish local budgets. These grants are allocated in the form of shared
financing, and fund a percentage of local budget expenditures on certain priority goals. The list and
size of these grants is reviewed annually by the Law on the State Budget.
6.4 Expenditures
Some activities for which the Kyrgyz government is also responsible are jointly funded by local
budgets and grants from the state budget.
Local budgets finance activities ensuring the general level of education, health care and welfare of the
population, and local state administrations and local self-government bodies bear absolute respon-
sibility for their implementation. This category includes expenditures for:
• general public services;
• maintenance of local institutions and organizations in the fields of education, health care,
social insurance, sports, television, broadcasting, publishing, housing and utilities, agriculture,
water resources, forestry, fishing and hunting;
• transport;
• other activities.
Higher-level councils distribute expenditure obligations between local budgets of different levels,
based on the subordination and social importance of institutions and organizations.
Aiyl okmotu are responsible for maintaining comprehensive schools, local hospitals, rural medical
dispensaries, obstetric clinics, recreational centers, libraries, municipal facilities and paying salaries to
council personnel in its territory. Teachers’ wages, however, are paid from categorized grants through
education departments at the raion level.
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Table 10.6
Relative Size of Local Budget Expenditures and Central Government Expenditures
1996 1997 1998 1999
[KGS [%] [KGS [%] [KGS [%] [KGS [%]
million] million] million] million]
Central — — 1,061.9 49.8 1,266.8 50.4 1,507.2 52
government
expenditures
Local budget — — 1,073.6 50.2 1,250.2 49.6 1,396.0 48
expenditures
Total 1,873.2 100 2,135.5 100 2,517.0 100 2,903.2 100
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance
Figure 10.1
Structure of Aiyl Okmotu Expenditures
SOURCE: Congress of Local Communities
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6.5 Budget Process
Financial departments in local state administrations or local self-governments prepare draft local
budgets. Aiyl okmotu develop draft budgets for towns or villages based on forecast indicators and
submit them to the town or village council.
Higher-level councils approve rates for allocating regulated taxes to aiyl okmotu budgets, as well as
the size of categorized grants, equalization transfers and economic stimulus grants, according to the
Law on the Budget System. Local self-governments are highly dependent on the central government
for resources. Because of the resulting unpredictability of revenues, they are effectively prevented
from developing a medium-term budget strategy.
Although legal provisions assign local self-government bodies broad rights in forming and
implementing local budgets, these rights are not fully exercised. Village and town councils continue
to form their budget on the “residual principle.” Oblast, district and city governments accumulate
the bulk of financial resources, while local self-government budgets receive the leftovers. This
outmoded “top-down” approach to forming local budgets at the village level is preserved in spite of
the law, which prohibits public bodies from intruding in the local council or aiyl okmotu budget
process.
A draft Law on the Financial and Budgetary Foundations of Local Self-government is currently
under development. When passed, it should define the main principles governing the structure of
local finances, the budget process and local self-government relations with banks, financial institutions
and businesses. The draft law designates part of the budgetary surplus for strengthening the material
and technical basis of local governments, increasing wages of municipal employees and other needs.
Starting from 2001, Ministry of Finance has promoted a new approach to local budgets, introducing
program-oriented budgeting and a new administrative classification for budget items.
6.6 Local Taxes
The Law on the Budget System grants local self-governments the right to independently determine
the list of regulated funds and levy taxes and duties in accordance with the Tax Code.
The Tax Code defines the following types of taxes and duties for local self-government bodies:
• resort tax;
• advertising tax;
• tax on pets;
• fee for holding auctions, lotteries, contests or exhibitions;
• parking fee;
• fee for the use of local symbols;
• tax on transactions (commercial or commodity exchange);
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• fee for waste disposal;
• tax on commercial greenhouses;
• hotel duty;
• fee for hunting and fishing;
• tourist tax on local citizens travelling abroad;
• amusement tax on video arcades, concerts and shows;
• tax on services and tax on retail sales;
• tax on unused production space;
• tax on motor vehicles.
Replenishing the local budget poses an acute problem at the village level, where only two or three out
of the sixteen types of local taxes and fees can be collected. Local tax payments comprise a small
portion of municipal revenues, insufficient for covering even the basic needs of local self-government.
For instance, the tax on motor transport is allocated to a national fund, according to the Law on the
Uniform Road Fund, and local authorities are left with no resources with which to repair their roads.
The system of local taxation is riddled with inconsistencies. Many taxes yield insignificant revenue,
even though their calculation and collection requires considerable organizational and legal effort. In
addition, the legislation on municipal taxation is frequently contradictory or illogical, including
elements such as the double taxation of some entities, the lack of taxable entities in many municipalities,
and the substitution of taxes by duties.
Taking local taxes into consideration when assigning funds from the central budget will not promote
the financial autonomy of local self-governments. It may seem that evaluating local taxes is necessary
for municipal establishments themselves, since they can overspend their guaranteed minimum. In
fact, local taxes are included into the system of other revenues to cover minimal expenditures and are
not reflected in any way in standard allocations for balancing the municipal budget.
In practice, it is impossible for local governments to utilize the method of municipal borrowing,
stipulated by article 53 of the Law on the Budget System, since they lack the means to eventually
settle the debt.
Credit Unions. In an experimental move, the Kyrgyz Republic created a system of credit unions to
promote practices of credit, self-financing and mutual lending. This system is unparalleled in Central
Asia. A credit union is a non-commercial financial intermediary established to provide assistance to its
members through pooling personal savings and providing loans at acceptable interest rates. In
addition, the credit union provides other financial services. At the beginning of 2001, Kyrgyzstan
contained 172 credit unions. Of these, 116 are fully operational and the rest are under development.
Their activities facilitate the creation of new workplaces, the development of small and medium
businesses and increased agricultural output. Currently, the government of Kyrgyzstan is formulating
a concept for developing regional banks, which envisages expanding the role of credit unions to act
as village banks.
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Table 10.7
Share of Local Budgets in Central Budget Revenues and Expenditures
[percent of corresponding item in the central budget]
1996 1997 1998
Revenues
Gross revenues and official transfers 41.4 41.5 38.1
Taxes 43.1 19.0 20.2
Income tax 59.0 38.9 36.2
Profit tax 45.1 34.2 42.1
VAT 47.1 — —
Excise tax 33.3 22.5 21.5
Personal and tax 100.0 100.0 100.0
Corporate land tax 100.0 100.0 100.0
Non-tax revenues 29.7 36.3 24.8
Expenditures 36.0 31.9 32.7
Public services 17.2 19.8 17.4
Defense 2.2 1.2 1.5
Law enforcement 5.2 4.0 5.8
Education 71.7 65.8 65.4
Health care 72.4 60.4 68.5
Social protection 6.1 6.6 6.4
Housing and utilities 58.5 56.0 51.3
Culture, leisure and religion 44.8 41.6 35.8
Industry 16.6 8.5 5.5
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance
6.7 Local Property
The Presidential Decree on the Organization of Local Self-government, issued 22 September 1994,
introduced the concept of municipal property and initiated its establishment.
Local self-government property is comprised of property owned by the local community and local
community associations. Local self-governments control and administer municipal property, although
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they may also assign it to the management of municipal enterprises or institutions, based on business
principles.
The government resolutions of 30 October 1995 and 11 November 1996 defined the first state-
owned facilities to be transferred to the municipal ownership of Bishkek and aiyl okmotu. In
accordance with the Provisional Regulation on Procedures for the Transfer of Property to Municipal
Ownership, a special commission was established for this purpose.
Table 10.8
Number of Facilities Transferred to Village Councils by Oblast, 1996
Chuy Talas Osh Naryn Ysyk-Kol Jalal- Total
Abad
Vocational schools — — — — — — —
Schools (including 101 100 617 126 164 366 1,474
boarding schools and
centers for children,
youths, sports and music)
Health care institutions 157 121 499 118 152 238 1,285
(including village hospitals,
dispensaries, pharmacies,
obstetric clinics)
Kindergartens and nurseries 62 28 240 33 58 74 495
Recreational centers 142 45 203 68 111 104 673
Libraries 114 67 237 132 112 155 817
Museums 4 6 13 1 6 5 35
Sports facilities 11 13 41 13 6 45 129
Cinemas and video arcades 3 1 6 1 — — 11
Others 13 9 — — 22
Total 594 394 1,865 492 609 987 4,941
The situation in Bishkek is somewhat different. The government transferred over three thousand
facilities, but transferred them to the management of city authorities rather than municipal ownership,
thus abridging the rights of the capital city. After three years, this issue still remains to be settled. So,
while it may be said that there is municipal property in Bishkek, the local self-government cannot
exercise the full rights of municipal ownership. In a few cases, disputes between the mayor’s office
and the government have reached the Higher Arbitration Court.
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In 1998, sub-raion city governments became local self-governments and city council heads consequently
acquired new powers. The government correspondingly determined the facilities to be transferred to
municipal ownership, approved transfer procedures and defined the structure and organizational
chart of city councils. However, heads of local state administrations are in no hurry to implement
these decisions.
6.8 Financing Communal Structures
Traditionally, it has been difficult to resolve issues of financing for the maintenance of municipal
facilities, including water supply, roads and bridges, the surrounding environment and others. These
expenditures are currently financed mainly from revenue from the lease of land redistributed to
municipal ownership.
Table 10.9
Number of Businesses by Oblast, 1998
Oblast Total Number of Businesses in Businesses in
Businesses Municipal Ownership Municipal Ownership
[number] [% of total]
Jalal-Abad 3,814 431 11.3
Ysyk-Kol 2,384 248 10.4
Naryn 1,495 255 17.1
Osh 5,582 499 8.9
Batken ... ... ...
Talas 946 208 22.0
Chuy 4,419 243 5.5
City of Bishkek 17,455 247 1.4
Kyrgyz Republic 36,095 2,131 5.9
SOURCE: National Committee on Statistics
Public hearings on city budgets are clearly a progressive step towards increased transparency and
municipal autonomy. These are aimed at increasing citizen participation which, according to the
Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration, is a key form of exercising the rights
of local self-government. Three cities held public budget hearings in 1999 and 2000. Both citizens
and leaders of NGOs made proposals regarding priorities for social and economic development. The
establishment of public supervisory boards is yet another measure intended to increase citizen
interest in the budget process.
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Inter-budgetary relations are as follows. The center approves uniform rates for allocations from national
taxes to oblast budgets, as well as additional resources in the form of transfers. A fixed portion of national
and regional taxes is used for forming budgets of raions, cities and aiyl okmotu. In practice, there are no
procedures for obtaining the requisite financial compensation for the performance of delegated powers.
Rates for allocations from national taxes are the main instrument of control over municipal revenues.
Administrative-territorial units in the republic have widely varying tax bases, making it impossible
for the city of Bishkek and other raions in Chuisk to establish budget surpluses and they consequently
become forced recipients. The hierarchical imbalance in the budgetary system means that the national
budget provides financial aid to all regions.
7. Relationship between Different Levels of Government
7.1 Oblast, Raion and Village Levels
The current structure of government in Kyrgyzstan entails duplication of functions and the absence
of control procedures over the execution of decisions. At the same time, a hierarchical system prevails
for local public administration, territorial units of ministries and agencies and local self-government
bodies. This significantly complicates the work of local self-government bodies and local state
administrations and strengthens features of personal leadership.
Oblast Level. Government at the oblast level consists of the oblast state administration and its head,
or governor. The governor is a state official of the executive branch, appointed by the president
upon nomination by the prime minister and approved by the oblast council. Governors are appointed
for a four-year term and may only hold office on that territory for a single term.
The Presidential Decree on Increasing the Role of Heads of Local Public Administration and Local Self-
governments, adopted 20 March 1996, invests oblast governors with the following additional powers:
• to exercise public control over compliance with statutory acts of Kyrgyzstan by local administra-
tions and local self-governments, and to suspend any law containing violations and inform the
prosecutor’s office;
• to submit important issues of local life for consideration to local councils;
• to mobilize labor, material, financial and other resources through the traditional method of
ashar in order to solve pressing social, economic, environmental and other problems;
• to request necessary information or materials from territorial authorities in order to analyze
various processes in the oblast;
• to participate in activities of territorial authorities and local self-government, either directly or
through representatives; to be present at meetings, conferences and other forums carried out in
the oblast;
• to manage state-owned shares in enterprises and organizations located in the oblast.
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The governor is personally responsible for control over the legality and efficiency of local administration
and local self-government activities.
The oblast administration represents the central government in the region and is responsible for
regularly informing the central government on the political situation. For this purpose, a General
Information Department is established to monitor events in the oblast. It is especially active during
periods immediately preceding and during elections.
As head of the system of state power at the oblast level, the governor performs the following tasks:
• to control compliance with laws, presidential decrees and government resolutions and maintains
public order in the region;
• to perform administrative control over activities of oblast and raion administrations;
• to implement economic and social policies developed by the central government.
Governors are essentially dependant on the central government, which must approve oblast budgets
and principal decisions before governors may begin to organize activities and coordinate implementation
at the oblast level. The oblast government’s functions duplicate either those of the central government
or of raions. Its responsibilities and powers appear to be primarily based on the personality of the
oblast leader, rather than on an objective distribution of powers.
Raion Level. The raion-level government is represented by the head of the raion or city state adminis-
tration, or akim, who possesses the following powers:
• to implement economic and social measures developed by the central government and
implement decisions of central agencies;
• to perform various administrative functions;
• to exercise administrative control over local community activities within the given district.
Analysis of raion administration functions reveals that they duplicate the powers of both oblast
administrations and local self-government bodies.
Village Level. This level is composed of local self-government bodies which are entitled to decide
upon all issues of local interest. Their financial powers include the annual approval of the local
budget and programs of social and economic development by the local council.
7.2 Methods of Appointing or Electing Local Self-government Heads
Council Chairmen in Oblasts and Raions. Oblast and raion councils elect a chairman at their opening
session to act as head of self-government in the corresponding territory. Candidates for raion council
chairmen are nominated by the oblast governor and candidates for oblast council chairmen are
nominated by a representative of the president in consultation with council members.
562
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
City Mayors. The mayor is a member of the city council, appointed for a four-year term by the oblast
governor upon nomination by the head of the raion administration and approved by a majority of
council members. If the administration and the council do not agree on a candidate, the chairman of
the oblast council appoints an acting mayor for up to six months. In extraordinary circumstances, the
chairman may appoint a mayor from outside the city council. Mayors may be dismissed by oblast
governor with the approval of the city council and the head of the raion administration. If the
council and the oblast and raion administrations cannot agree on dismissing the major, the oblast
governor makes the final decision.
Council Chairmen in Towns and Villages. Council chairmen in towns and village simultaneously
perform the functions of local public administration and local self-government. According to the
Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration, these chairmen are nominated by
the head of the raion administration and elected by secret ballot at the council session. According to
the Presidential Decree on Increasing the Role of Heads of Local State Administration and Local Self-
government, the head of the aiyl okmotu is appointed by the head of the raion administration and
approved by the chairman of the raion council and members of the village council. In addition, this
decree stipulates that responsibilities of the head of aiyl okmotu and the chairman of the rural council
may be combined in an ail where council and aiyl okmotu territories coincide. If the parties cannot
agree on a candidate for such a combined position, the chairman of the oblast kenesh has the right
to appoint an acting head of the village council.
The statutory acts on first-tier local self-government contain obvious inconsistencies concerning the
status and functions of ail head. The same documents stipulate that heads of representative and
executive bodies should be combined into one position and yet separate the functions normally
performed by these offices. Due to this unclear separation of powers, rural councils are subordinated
to various bodies, occasionally producing a situation when an outsider is appointed as chairman,
rather than a member of the village council, and is therefore not accountable to the local council.
The creation of bodies of local self-government is clearly an internal issue to be decided by the local
community. All such bodies should be accountable to the population or a representative body of
local self-government. The established practices of forming local self-government and appointing
heads contradict the very foundations of local self-government. This is all the more flagrant when it
is the head of the representative body, not only the head of the executive body, that is appointed by
the executive branch.
Recent decrees have begun to diminish these accumulated contradictions. For instance, a presidential
decree adopted on 17 January 2001 approved the Provisional Regulation on Pilot Elections of Local
Self-government Chairmen in Villages and Sub-raion Cities. From March to May of 2001, pilot
elections were held in all oblasts, in settlements where the position of the head became vacant at the
beginning of the year. Thus, the possibility for elections of both representative and executive bodies
of local self-government (heads of village and city councils) was finally realized.
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Although this presidential initiative received wide support, the public strongly criticized the suggested
procedures for the multi-stage selection of candidates and the direct elections of the heads of village
councils and city councils. In accordance with the approved regulation, eligible candidates must be
Kyrgyz citizens older than twenty-five and younger than sixty; they must have received higher
education or specialized secondary education; and they must have served in public administration or
local self-government for at least two years. The head of local self-government is elected for a four-
year term.
Pilot Election Procedures. After nomination, a list of the nominees and their backgrounds is to be
submitted for consideration to the village council, whose members rank the nominees by secret
ballot. The five most highly ranked nominees are approved by the village council and submitted for
consideration to the raion-level administration. In case of grounded objections, the board of the
raion-level administration may strike a candidate from the list. In no cases may the board leave fewer
than two nominees. The village council has the right to substitute the next highly ranked candidates
for candidates rejected by the board.
The raion-level administration then submits a resolution on the list of candidates to be included on
the ballot to a special oblast commission on elections to aiyl okmotu. This commission includes the
governor, the oblast council chairman, the oblast prosecutor, the chief of the oblast justice department
and the chairman of the oblast election commission. After the commission has considered all relevant
materials, the governor shall approve a list of no fewer than two and no more than five candidates.
Upon fulfillment of these conditions, all further procedures will be performed by election commissions
in accordance with the Code on Elections in Kyrgyz Republic.
A total of seventy-nine candidates ran for the position of village head. Twenty-one percent of these
were barred from the elections due to various reasons: either they lacked the required two years of
work experience in public service, they had outstanding convictions, they failed to meet the age
qualification or they lacked necessary documents for registration. Only one woman was registered as
a candidate, in Osh oblast. The average age of nominees was forty years old. In Chuy oblast, the
special oblast commission struck two candidates from the list. None of the political parties nominated
candidates for that post and only four self-nominated candidates had been registered, leaving the
minimum number of two candidates.
It is too early to assess the long-term effects of the new election procedures. However, based on the
results of the pilot elections, the Election Code will be amended to include a separate chapter on
elections of heads of local self-government, which will exclude numerous restrictions.
Election financing remains a complicated issue. The recent elections were totally financed by the
state budget, while elections of local self-government heads scheduled for the autumn of 2000 will
primarily depend on the state budget as well.
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7.3 Problems in the Transfer of State Powers
The concept of an effective state presupposes a state ready to acknowledge its own limitations and
delegate a part of its powers to other institutions of government or civil society which are capable of
realizing them more effectively. In reality, there is no such understanding of the essence or limits of
delegated state powers, leading to the permanent intrusion of the state into local self-government affairs.
Since 1995, when the city of Bishkek was transferred to a system of local self-government, executive
bodies have impeded the transfer of powers to local authorities in the republic. Even though two
years had passed at the time of writing since the relevant presidential decree had been issued in 1997,
many ministries and agencies still had not submitted their proposals to the government regarding
delegation of some functions to city and rural executive committees. Other agencies, such as the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, considered it inexpedient to transfer their services to municipal
governments. High-ranking public officials are generally reluctant to part with their powers of
governing and regulating public resources.
In the future, public powers should be delegated by the government exclusively on a contractual
basis, between the administration and local self-governments. Otherwise, the principle expressed in
the Constitution—that local self-governments should receive the necessary material, financial and
other resources in support of their delegated powers—will remain unfulfilled.
7.4 Distribution of Functions among Tiers of Government
Regional authorities depend on the central government administratively and politically, since they
are not democratically elected. This is clear evidence of the lack of confidence from the center in the
democratic process in regions. The practice of appointing the leadership of aiyl okmotu, raion and
city administrations results in frequent changes in leadership, mostly ungrounded: the turnover of
local government leadership was 58.8 percent in 1998–1999.
Relations between the oblast, raion and aiyl okmotu levels are strictly hierarchical. Disputes, if any,
are resolved extra-judicially; top-down appointment procedures reflect the system of bureaucratic
centralism and generate no publicity. Since these heads are appointed, there is no strict accountability
to local councils.
In cases with different administrative-territorial levels of power, the local administration may only be
effective if each level of government has own powers that do not duplicate those of other levels—as
sometimes occurs with the oblast and district levels. At the local level, an illogical hierarchy between
the state government and local self-government prevails, resulting in poorly delineated functions
and dual subordination. Many experts point to the long-standing necessity of unifying the territorial
power structure and approving a national registry of functions for different levels of territorial
administration.
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Figure 10.2
Structure of Public Administration in Kyrgyzstan
As noted above, the position of the Minister of Local Self-government and Regional Development
has been introduced. In accordance with the provisional regulations approved by the government of
the Kyrgyz Republic, the minister implements state policy in the sphere of government democratization
and is responsible for developing an optimal system for interaction and distribution of functions
between state administration and local self-government.
Since the position of minister was not accompanied by the creation of a separate ministry, a group of
advisors and a board of representatives from ministries, agencies and local self-government bodies are
being formed.
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Figure 10.3
Structure of the Ministry of Local Self-government and Regional Development
This group of advisors will be engaged in producing and analyzing data and formulating proposals,
projects and programs on developing local self-government, improving relations between local self-
governments and the state and on-site control. The minister’s office will be located together with the
group of advisors, the Congress of Local Communities and international organizations providing
assistance in the sphere of local self-government.
The minister is responsible for the following functions:
• to ensure the coordination of activities between the state and local self-government bodies in
issues of democratization and local self-government, including the development of draft state
and local budgets;
• to develop draft statutory acts concerning local self-government, methodological recommenda-
tions and materials on the practical implementation of methods of democratic government in
local communities;
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• to analyze, monitor and exercise control over the development of relations between tiers of
state administration and local self-government bodies and oversee their joint activities for
regional development in order to develop measures in anticipation of problems;
• to study local council activity at all levels in order to forecast and fulfill the need for organizational
and legal assistance, to train council members through workshops and short-term courses and
exercise control over the use of local council powers;
• to monitor and resolve disputes between local self-governments and state bodies, between
representative and executive local self-government bodies and between local self-government
bodies of different tiers.
Some experts feel that many problems of regional policy will be resolved more effectively when the
Minister of Local Self-government and Regional Development is installed, with the appropriate
support.
8. Local Government Employees
8.1 Municipal Service
The Law on Civil Service, adopted November 1999, introduced several important reforms: prohibiting
civil servants from party affiliation, ensuring equal opportunity for employment in the civil service,
promoting civil servants according to merit and other reforms. This law recognizes civil service as an
independent and complex legal institution and laid the foundations for civil service law as a new
branch of national legislation. The law also stipulates that the legal status of local self-government
officials is determined by the Constitution and special laws.
Currently, Kyrgyzstan lacks both the concept of municipal service and any special statutory act to
determine the legal status of municipal servants, the structure of municipal service and its procedures.
However, the constitutional distribution of functions to local self-governments and the nature of
local self-government activity make legislation of this nature an urgent issue.
Staff members of local councils, city and rural executive committees and other bodies of local self-
government exercise their professional functions based on the Provisional Regulation on the Funda-
mentals of Civil Service in Kyrgyz Republic, approved by presidential decree in 1996.
Local council personnel are considered civil servants if they are vested with powers in accordance
with Article 94 of the Constitution. Based on local budget capabilities, heads of self-government
in oblasts and raions present the staff structure and organizational chart to the local council for
approval and hire staff on a contractual basis to implement council decisions and exercise vested
executive and regulatory powers. Other staff workers of local self-government are not deemed to
be public servants.
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The List of Civil Service Positions, approved by government resolution, classifies the positions of
oblast council chairman and head of oblast administration as “highest ”; the positions of first deputy
chairman of the oblast council and first deputy head of the oblast administration as “major”; and the
positions of city head, raion council chairman, raion-level administration head, the head of the aiyl
okmotu and their deputies as “principal.” This list determines that staff workers of the corresponding
self-government bodies and local administration are considered specialists and civil servants as well.
Table 10.10
Local Government Employees, 1999
Civil Servants Employees Technical Total
Without Civil Personnel
Servant Status
Oblast  councils 53 11 12 76
Raion councils 241 60 97 398
Village and town councils 3,327 1,466 1,025 5,818
and executive committees
Oblast and raion state 875 210 372 1,457
administration personnel
Total 4,496 1,747 1,506 7,749
SOURCE: National Committee on Statistics
The draft Law on Municipal Service, currently under development, will stipulate the professional
basis for the constitutional distribution of powers between the state and local self-governments.
Civil service reform faces many obstacles due to the unwritten rules of the bureaucratic machinery,
national traditions and established custom. Kyrgyz bureaucracy has inherited many features of
Soviet public service. Positions with a greater possibility for abuse of power are more highly valued:
a junior position in a government institution with auditing functions is more prestigious than a higher
position in a public institution without such powers.
8.2 Personnel Training
Staffing civil service positions poses a problem, since Kyrgyzstan lacks a state personnel policy. The
constant reorganization of staff and the hiring of incompetent heads in state administrations are clear
proof of the absence of any system for forecasting needs, selecting personnel and training strategies.
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In order to increase the knowledge, responsibility and professional skills of local self-government
leadership, the first personnel certification was held at the end of 1997, in accordance with the Order
of the President of Kyrgyz Republic (17 June 1997). All public officials were liable to certification
from lower-ranked officials to deputy heads of state administration. Out of 529 civil servants eligible
for this process, 452 persons underwent certification, and 395, or 87.3 percent, passed successfully.
This process revealed that the existing personnel and structural organization of local authorities
reflects neither their assigned responsibilities nor the particulars of the oblast, raion or city.
In May 2000, the state conducted another certification of local self-government leadership at the
village level. The certification commission was composed of representatives of central public bodies
responsible for reforming local self-government, including the Office of the President, the Office of
the Prime Minister, central ministries and agencies and the Congress of Local Communities.
During the certification process, the heads of the raion administration and raion council chairmen
submit references to the commission for aiyl okmotu chairmen awaiting certification, along with a
document testifying whether the candidate has a criminal record. The certification commission
assesses the level of knowledge, experience, professional and personal qualities of candidates through
testing and interviews. If employees fail the test, they are not invited to interview and do not receive
certification. The failure to receive certification is grounds for dismissal. Through the certification
held in 2000, the state determined that 9.5 percent of aiyl okmotu chairmen were not professionally
qualified for their positions.
A major priority for local state administrations at all levels is the continued training of the local self-
government personnel and creation of a personnel reserve. With this objective in mind, workshops
and trainings teach modern governing techniques under the aegis of various international donor
organizations. For instance, the Congress of Local Communities is currently engaged in training
specialists from aiyl okmotu and local administrations in several pilot oblasts, within the framework
of a decentralization project financed by the UNDP.
At the Academy of Management, in the Office of the President, an education and methodological
association has been established, specializing in public and municipal government. This association
carries out advance training of personnel for local self-government bodies through short-term courses
and workshops, within the framework of joint projects with international organizations. Several
higher educational institutions train specialists in the sphere of municipal government. However,
low salaries, the absence of material incentives and the decline in status of local self-government
employment has resulted in a drain of skilled specialists from the system of local self-government.
In summary, purposeful efforts aimed at selecting and educating local self-government personnel for
local self-government are not yet being implemented. With respect to leadership positions, personnel
issues are still settled in private, without reference to the professional capabilities of the candidate.
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9. Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
State Support to Local Self-governments. In accordance with the Program for State Assistance to Local
Self-government, adopted by presidential decree in May 1997, all executive bodies were ordered to
create conditions for the establishment and development of local self-government and to ensure
sufficient material and financial resources for local communities to carry out legally established local
self-government functions.
In 2000, the President established a Commission on Local Self-government Reform with broad powers.
Although the commission members work on an unpaid basis, the commission has the right to inves-
tigate appeals from local community members, local self-government staff and local council members
regarding unlawful acts by administrations or the misconduct of local self-government officials.
There are two opposing approaches in attempts to improve administration of local affairs. One approach
is to strengthen the administrative hierarchy, justified on the grounds of reinforcing statehood; the
other approach is to broaden local council powers. Local administrations currently possess the advantage
over local self-governments, and their approach is gaining ground.
Even after establishing constitutional guarantees of local self-government, central authorities strive
to establish direct rule, arguing that this is beneficial for the functioning of local government as well
as the political system in general. In the future, this tendency may lead to the substitution of local self-
government by public administration, paving the way for a Soviet type of local self-government. It is
thus crucial to resolve the relationship between the state administration and local self-government bodies.
In order to ensure that local self-governments are informed of legal developments, the Presidential
Decree on Providing Rural Self-governments with Statutory Acts was passed in the summer of 2001.
Raion and city administrations and councils were ordered to include an item for subscriptions to
published statutory acts in the expenditures section of local budgets. The government is required to
develop procedures for providing local self-governments at the village level with copies of statutory acts;
this includes defining the central government body responsible for the subscription and purchase of
statutory acts for all first-tier local self-government bodies as well as for their regular and prompt delivery.
Legal Guarantees for Local Self-government. The relationship between local self-government bodies
and central authorities is based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Central
public authorities and their departments have no right to interfere into issues of local self-government
competence. The legal basis of local self-government may be divided into two groups. The first is
national legislation, or the system of statutory laws adopted by higher public authorities. This system
includes the Constitution, other legislation, such as the Law on Local Self-government and Local
Public Administration, presidential acts and government resolutions. The second level includes local
council resolutions and community charters, which comprise a set of rules for communal life.
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Decisions resulting from referenda, citizen assemblies, local councils and territorial self-government
must comply with national legislation. Local councils and local state administrations do not have the
right to act on issues in the competence of the other body. Local council decisions on issues within
its competence are approved by simple majority of elected members and are issued in the form of
resolutions. Local self-government bodies exercise their functions in the name of the local population,
based on legislation.
Legal Guarantees for Elected Council Members. A local council member’s authority may not be abridged,
except in cases stipulated by law. Members may form factions, which function in accordance with
the local council rules. Local councils and their subordinate bodies should ensure the necessary
conditions for the effective exercise of authority by its members.
Local council members may request that the session hear reports on issues within local council
competence from officials or institutions accountable to the local council or from other officials or
institutions acting on its territory. The council member may file a request to any government
institution, local self-government institution or organization, regardless of ownership, on issues
related to council activities. The recipient of the request is obliged to answer orally or in writing
within the period stipulated by the local council. Local council members enjoy the right of unimpeded
access to government bodies, local self-government institutions and organizations on the local territory,
as well as the right to meet with their heads or other officials without delay.
By instruction of the local council or council chairman, council members may take part in audits
requested by the council. If violations of law are discovered, council members may apply to the
relevant government body. Council members may require officials or the local militia to take immediate
measures to stop violation, and if necessary, bring the violator to account. Officials failing to act when
requested bear disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability under the law.
Council members fulfill their duties while continuing to perform their principal employment. Members
may not be penalized for their service by being dismissed or transferred to a lower paying position
without the approval of the corresponding local council. In addition, the time period spent serving
as member is counted as part of their continuous length of service in their outside careers. Council
members retain all rights and benefits that the workers of their enterprise, institution or organization enjoy.
Local council members do not possess legal immunity. However, law enforcement authorities are
obliged to immediately take measures to protect council members and their families in case of
violence or other threats in connection with their functions as council members.
Rights and Duties of Local Self-government Bodies. Local councils and raion-level administrations have
the right:
• to demand the cancellation of acts of government bodies, local self-government bodies,
enterprises and organizations if they violate the rights and interests of local citizens, the local
council or the local state administration;
572
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
• to take measures stipulated by law to ensure public safety and order and protect public rights
and interests in case of natural disaster, ecological catastrophe, epidemic or riot.
Government authorities are obliged to consider proposals by local self-government and local state
administration bodies. If a bylaw issued by central executive body is counter to regional interests, the
oblast governor or mayor of Bishkek has the right to request the president or government to cancel
or suspend the law.
The head of local administration may be dismissed by the president upon proposal by the prime
minister. The local council may pass a vote of no confidence in the head of local administration by
a two-thirds majority of total members and request his or her dismissal. The president should decide
upon the issue within one month of receiving the application.
Legally established rights of local self-government bodies and local state administrations cannot be
infringed upon or restricted, except in cases of public necessity stipulated by law. Legal entities and
individuals are liable to local self-government bodies and local state administrations for damages
caused by their decisions, actions or failure to act in the interests of the local population, economy or
environment. They are also liable for damages caused by non-compliance with the decisions of local
self-government bodies or the local administration.
The judicial system enforces protection of the rights and legitimate interests of local self-governments
and local administrations. Disputes between central authorities and local self-government bodies are
resolved through conciliation commissions or in court. Thus far, there are no regulations or set
practices to resolve disputes; all disputes have been resolved at the pre-trial level.
10. Next Steps in the Transition Process
Kyrgyzstan has accumulated comprehensive experience on decentralizing administration and
developing local self-governments through various pilot programs. In the long run, these organizational
activities should begin to yield effective results. In the long-term Complex Strategy for the Develop-
ment of Kyrgyzstan through 2010, local self-government will have a special place in administration
reform. Parliamentary committees have begun to discuss draft laws on local self-government and
municipal property. If they are adopted by the end of 2001, as expected, this will settle many issues
concerning the further development of local self-government. Draft laws on municipal service, on
the financial and economic basis of local self-government and on public initiative are awaiting
discussion as well.
In May 2001, a nationwide meeting of local self-government representatives, entitled “Local Self-
government is the Foundation of the Kyrgyz System of Grassroots Democracy,” was held in Bishkek,
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with the participation of the president. This meeting discussed and defined new prospects for the
development of local self-government.
The president, government and Parliament plan to undertake the following measures:
• to implement elections of local self-government heads and officials of other territorial levels;
• to restructure cities of oblast subordination along principles of local self-government;
• to enhance the role of local councils and other local self-government bodies in administering local
affairs and exercising control over the activities of executive bodies;
• to ensure actual financial decentralization through regulation of the system of inter-budgetary
relations;
• to distribute administrative issues by law between central authorities, regional administrations
and local self-governments;
• to conclude the delegation of administrative functions from ministries and agencies to local
self-governments. The law should include a provision stipulating that functions should be
transferred on a contractual basis between the local self-government in question and the
government;
• to abolish some territorial subdivisions of central executive bodies for the sake of efficiency and
decentralization of authority. Heads of local state administrations should be personally
responsible for the social and economic development in their territory;
• to establish a system for the continuing training of civil servants, including short-term professional
development courses for local state administrations and local self-governments;
• to take measures to improve budgetary relations between local and state budgets and establish
the economic and financial basis of local self-government by law.
It is expected that these reforms will optimize the administrative-territorial structure in order to enhance
the effectiveness of public administration. Currently, districts and oblasts maintain a dual administrative
structure comprised of local administrations and local self-governments, represented by local councils.
However, local self-government reform is an issue of such importance that it should be resolved only
through broad public discussion. State administrations should not be the ones to implement reform
of local self-government, since they will be influenced foremost by their own interests. Rather, they
should accommodate themselves by first of all reforming their own structure in accordance with
democratic principles.
The main obstacle confronting local self-governments is their limited financial and economic capability.
A key issue in local government reform will be the introduction of a new mechanism for inter-budgetary
relations, one which provides local authorities with the incentive to increase local revenues. Local
councils should be granted the authority to collect local taxes and determine revenues and expenditures.
At the same time, transparency should be ensured at all levels. In addition, it is necessary to develop
the real estate market, including a standard system for land appraisal, and support small and medium
business development in the sphere of municipal infrastructure and service delivery.
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The government should develop a program to strengthen the organizational, legal, financial and
economic basis for local self-government activities. To do so, is essential to define the powers of different
tiers and complete their transfer to local self-governments. In addition, the government must define
procedures for calculating sufficient transfers to local self-governments to enable them to fulfill their
functions and delegated powers.
This summary of the issues and prospects of local self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic cannot
claim to be comprehensive; a paper of this length can only reflect key aspects of this multi-faceted
process. Moreover, this process is a dynamic one, and will becomes more so as both civil society and
government acquire more experience. The coming years will doubtless be critical for the system of
local self-government in Kyrgyzstan, as proved by the recently intensified political dialogue and decisions
on the issue. It is important to consider both domestic and international experience, in order to bring
the existing social relations into harmony with the expectations of citizens.
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Contacts for Further Information on Local Government
in the Kyrgyz Republic
Government Bodies in the Kyrgyz Republic
• Office of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic
Department of Staff Planning, Organization and State Policy in Public Administration
Commission on Support for Local Self-government Reform
• Office of the Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic
Department of Staff Planning, Organization and State Policy in Public Administration
Minister on Local Self-government and Regional Development
• Ministry of Finance
576
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
• Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, Legislative Assembly
Committee on State Structure
Subcommittee on Local Councils and Local Self-government
• Office of the Mayor of Bishkek
Bishkek City Council
• Central Commission on Elections and Referenda
• National Committee on Statistics
Local Government Organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic
• Association of Cities in Kyrgyzstan
• Congress of Local Communities
NGOs and International Donors in the Kyrgyz Republic
• Agency on the Development of Local Self-government
(a joint project between the Bishkek mayor’s office and the Soros-Kyrgyzstan Foundation)
• Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society
• Regional Association of Condominium Owners
• Soros-Kyrgyzstan Foundation
• United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
• United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
• Urban Institute
Glossary of Kyrgyz Terms
Ail — A rural settlement which, together with towns and towns of raion subordina-
tion, makes up the primary administrative-territorial unit in the Kyrgyz
Republic.
Ail okmotu — The rural executive committee, or executive branch of the rural or village
kenesh, which administers local community functions.
Akim — The head of an executive agency or local state administration at the regional
level.
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Ashar — A traditional method of social mobilization, whereby members of the
community assist each other in preparing funerals, constructing houses or
schools and in performing labor-intensive and lengthy works, such as
cleaning irrigation systems. This method is highly efficient, since each
participant understands the importance of rendering assistance to these
projects.
Citizen assembly — A direct form of citizen participation in managing local issues through
meetings of all citizens who live in a given neighborhood (such as a street,
quarter, small district or village). These assemblies may issue recommenda-
tions to local authorities.
Governor — The head of oblast public administration and the highest state official in
the oblast. The governor exercises control over activities of executive
authorities and local self-governments within the oblast.
Kenesh  — The local council, elected by local inhabitants through direct ballot for a
term of five years.
Kurultai — A form of representative participation by local community members in issues
of local importance; the community elects kurultai members to hold dis-
cussions on vital community issues, such as reports from the heads of local
self-government or local state administration regarding the performance of
their duties.
Shaar bashchasy — The head of city government and the highest government official in the
city. The shaar bashchasy acts as chairman of the city council, head of the
executive council and first deputy head of raion state administration.
Shaar bashkarmasy — The city executive council, established by the city council, which acts as the
executive and regulatory branch of local self-government in cities of raion
subordination.
Zhogorku Kenesh — The supreme legislative authority in the Kyrgyz Republic, a bicameral
Parliament consisting of the standing Legislative Assembly (sixty members),
and the Assembly of National Representatives (forty-five members), which
convenes regularly. In the Legislative Assembly, fifteen seats belong to
representatives of political parties.
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Annex 10.1
Major General Indicators
Table 10A.1
Population by Gender, Age and Place of Residence, 1996–1999
1996 1997 1998 1999
[Thous- [%] [Thous- [%] [Thous- [%] [Thous- [%]
ands] ands] ands] ands]
Gender
Male 2,276.2 49.2 2,310.0 49.3 2,346.2 49.3 2,392.5 49.3
Female 2,348.9 50.8 2,379.7 50.7 2,413.9 50.7 2,458.2 50.7
Age
Pensioners 544.3 546.4 540.5 539.1
Senior citizens 9.7 9.7 9.5 9.2
School-age 1,159.7 1,189.0 1,216.2 1,248.6
children
(aged 7–17)
Children 39.4 38.9 38.3 38.1
aged 0–15
Place of Residence
Rural 2,972.6 64.3 3,020.9 64.4 3,076.2 64.6 3,136.9 64.7
Urban 1,652.5 35.7 1,668.8 35.6 1,683.9 35.4 1,713.8 35.3
Total 4,625.1 100.0 4,689.7 100.0 4,760.1 100.0 4,850.7 100.0
Table 10A.2
Population Density by Region
Area [Thousand sq. km.] Population Population Density
[People/sq. km.]
Kyrgyz Republic 199.945 4,850,700 24
City of Bishkek 0.127 787,800 6,203
Chuy 20.189 772,200 38
Ysyk-Kol 43.144 415,500 10
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Table 10A.2 (continued)
Population Density by Region
Area [Thousand sq. km.] Population Population Density
[People/sq. km.]
Naryn 45.202 248,700 6
Talas 11.446 200,300 17
Jalal-Abad 33.648 869,500 26
Osh 29.193 1,176,600 40
Batken 16.996 380,100 22
SOURCE: 1999 Census
Table 10A.3
Ethnic Composition of the Kyrgyz Republic*
 [%] of Total Population
Kyrgyz 64.9
Uzbeks 13.8
Russians 12.5
Dungane 1.1
Ukrainians 1.0
Uigur 1.0
Kazakhs 0.9
Tajiks 0.9
Tatars 0.9
Turks 0.7
Germans 0.4
Koreans 0.4
Azerbaijani 0.3
Belarussians 0.1
Other 1.1
SOURCE: 1999 Census
* Overall, members of over one hundred nationalities permanently reside in the Kyrgyz Republic.
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Table 10A.4
Ethnic Composition by Region [percent of total population]
Kyrgyz Russians Uzbeks Ukrainians Other
Kyrgyz Republic 64.9 12.5 13.8 1.0 7.8
City of Bishkek 55.2 33.2 1.6 2.1 10.9
Jalal-Abad 69.8 2.1 24.4 0.3 3.4
Ysyk-Kol 79.5 13.2 0.8 0.7 5.8
Naryn 98.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.7
Osh 63.8 1.3 31.1 0.1 9.0
Batken 74.3 2.2 14.4 0.1 9.0
Talass 88.5 4.0 0.9 0.7 5.9
Chuy 43.8 31.9 1.8 3.3 19.2
Table 10A.5
Historic Exchange Rates for the Kyrgyz Som (KGS), 1996–1999
1996 1997 1998 1999
Average At Average At Average At Average At
Year-end Year-end Year-end Year-end
KGS/ 10.83 16.70 13.0 17.42 20.94 29.38 39.09 45.43
USD
Table 10A.6
Per Capita Gross Domestic Product, 1996–1999
1996 1997 1998 1999*
Per capita GDP under PPC 2,101 2,264 2,299 2,374
(purchasing power capacity)
[USD]
Per capita GDP [KGS] 5,024.1 6,494.5 7,125.6 9,933.2
GDP in current prices 23,399.3 30,685.7 34,181.4 48,321.1
[KGS million]
Real GDP growth rate 107.1 109.9 102.1 103.6
[% of the previous year]
* data for 1999 are estimated.
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Table 10A.7
Structure of the Central Budget, 1996–1998 [percent of GDP]
1996 1997 1998
Total revenues and 16.8 16.6 18.1
received official transfers
Tax revenues 12.6 12.5 14.4
Income tax 1.2 1.1 1.2
Profit tax 1.6 1.1 1.3
Value added tax 5.3 5.6 5.8
Excise duty 1.1 1.5 2.1
Foreign trade and 0.8 0.8 1.1
external transaction tax
Non-tax revenues 2.2 2.8 2.9
Revenues from transactions 1.2 0.4 0.3
with capital
Received official transfers 0.9 0.6 0.6
Expenditures 22.2 21.8 21.1
General public services, defense,  5.5  5.9  5.5
public order and security
Education 5.2 4.9 4.8
Health care 3.1 3.2 2.8
Social protection and insurance 3.8 3.4 2.9
Housing and utilities 1.3 0.9 1.1
Subsiding industry branches 1.8 2.2 2.5
Budget deficit 5.4 5.2 3.0
Domestic financing 2.5 0.9 0.1
External financing 2.8 4.3 2.4
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Table 10A.8
 Structure of Local Budgets, 1996–1999 [million KGS]
1996 1997 1998 1999
Total local revenues and received 1,628.4 2,113.2 2,388.5 2,828.0
official transfers
Expenditures 1,873.2 2,135.5 2,386.5 2,809.4
Table 10A.9
Local Budget Revenues, 1996–1999 [percent]
1996 1997 1998 1999
Total revenues and received 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
official transfers
Total revenues 87.7 49.6 52.9 49.8
Current revenues 87.5 49.3 52.9 49.8
Tax revenues 78.0 34.4 41.1 37.3
Income tax 10.4 6.1 6.1 6.8
Profit tax 10.3 5.4 8.0 7.4
Value added tax 36.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tax on retail and services 3.5 0.0 6.3 6.6
Excise duty 5.2 4.8 6.5 8.0
Transport vehicle tax 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
(levied on physical persons)
Land tax on natural persons 1.0 1.9 0.8 0.7
Land tax on legal entities 6.5 11.1 11.3 6.3
Non-tax revenues 9.6 14.9 11.8 12.6
Revenues from transactions with capital 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0
Received official transfers 15.2 51.3 47.7 50.0
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Table 10A.10
 Local Budget Expenditures, 1996–1999 [percent]
1996 1997 1998 1999
Expenditures 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
General public services
Defense, public order and security 6.8 9.1 8.7 8.9
Education 46.8 46.6 46.1 48.2
Health care 28.3 27.6 27.6 27.5
Social protection and insurance 2.9 3.3 2.6 2.6
Housing and utilities 9.3 7.3 8.0 6.6
Recreation, culture, religious activities 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.1
Financing industry branches 3.8 2.7 1.9 2.6
Other expenditures –0.8 0.5 2.1 0.5
Table 10A.11
Social Fund Budget, 1996–1999 [million KGS]
1996 1997 1998 1999
Total revenues 1,868.9 2,281.6 2,583.1 3,025.8
Expenditures 1,948.3 2,289.6 2,491.8 2,957.4
584
D E V E L O P I N G  N E W  R U L E S  I N  T H E  O L D  E N V I R O N M E N T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T S  I N  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E ,  I N  T H E  C A U C A S U S  A N D  I N  C E N T R A L  A S I A
Table 10A.12
Social Fund Budget, 1996–1999 [percent]
1996 1997 1998 1999
Total revenues 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pension fund 85.6 87.0 85.5 82.8
Social insurance fund 10.8 7.5 6.1 6.2
Unemployment fund 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.4
Medical insurance fund 0.0 1.8 4.4 6.6
Expenditures 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pension fund 91.5 90.3 90.8 90.9
Social insurance fund 5.4 6.1 5.2 4.2
Unemployment fund 3.0 3.3 3.5 2.5
Medical insurance fund 0.0 0.4 1.2 2.5
Table 10A.13
National Debt, 1996–1999
1996 1997 1998 1999
Internal debt [million Som] 4,927.6 7,663.1 5,705.9 5,322.9
The National Bank of the Kyrgyz 2,206.5 1,940.5 — —
Republic debt (principal)
Interest on credits of the National 1,524.5 2,064.8 — —
Bank of Kyrgyz Republic
State treasury bonds 1,008.7 1,476.2 1149 1,141.8
State treasury bills 186.6 351.4 418.3 165
On savings in Elbank — 1,389.4 1,356.8 1,316.2
(former Savings Bank)
On 15% bonds of the Kyrgyz Republic 1.3 — 0.2 0.2
Debt instruments, total — 440.8 2,781.6 2,699.7
Including restructured public bond — 440.8 2,781.6 2,699.7
External national debt [USD, million] 631.48 808.61 965.07 1148.7
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Table 10A.14
Unemployment Rate, 1996–1999 [percent]
1996 1997 1998 1999
End-of-year registered 4.3 3.1 3.1 2.9
unemployment rate
End-of-year total unemployment rate 7.8 5.7 5.9 7.4
Table 10A.15
Unemployment Registration and Benefits by Region, End of 1999
Officially Individuals Average [%] of Average Official
Registered Receiving Amount of Monthly Wage Unemployment
Unemployed Unemployment Benefit [KGS] Rate [% of Eco-
Individuals Benefits nomically Active
[Thousands] [%]  Population]
Kyrgyz 54.7 5.4 180 17.1 2.9
Republic
City of 11.3 0.4 158 11.1 3.8
Bishkek
Chuy oblast 7.6 0.9 173 19.2 2.6
Ysyk-Kol 4.8 0.4 138 7.6 3.2
oblast
Jalal-Abad 11.5 1.8 190 22.4 3.5
oblast
Naryn oblast 5.1 0.3 280 34.4 8.1
Osh oblast 9.9 0.8 174 27.3 1.8
Batken oblast 4.4 0.7 174 30.2 2.9
Talas oblast 1.9 0.1 190 32.3 2.4
Table 10A.16
Inflation Rate, 1995–1999 [percent of the previous December’s rate]
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Consumer 132.1 134.8 113.0 116.8 139.9
price index
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Annex 10.2
Population, Settlements and Administrative Units
Table 10A.17
Settlements by Population Size Categories in Kyrgyzstan, 1999
Population Size Category Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Settlements Settlements Inhabitants Total Population
0–1,000 819 44.17 434,900 9.02
1,000–2,000 546 29.45 781,500 16.20
2,000–5,000 364 19.63 1,071,300 22.21
5,000–10,000 70 3.78 489,400 10.15
10,000–50,000 50 2.70 892,900 18.51
50,000–100,000 3 0.16 194,100 4.03
100,000–1,000,000 2 0.11 958,800 19.88
1,000,000+ — — — —
Total 1,854* 100.00 4,822,900 100.00
SOURCE: 1999 Census
* The data include 1805 villages (ails), twenty-nine townships and twenty cities.
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Table 10A.18
Local Self-governments by Population Size Categories in Kyrgyzstan, 1999
Aiyl Okmotu and Cities with Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of
Over 1000 Inhabitants Local Self- Local Self- Inhabitants Total
governments governments Population
0–1,000 9 1.88 8,800 0.18
1,000–2,000 41 8.56 64,700 1.34
2,000–5,000 170 35.49 612,000 12.69
5,000–10,000 134 27.97 947,800 19.65
10,000–50,000 120 25.05 2,036,700 42.23
50,000–100,000 3 0.63 194,100 4.03
100,000–1,000,000 2 0.42 958,800 19.88
1,000,000+ — — — —
Total 479** 100.00 4,822,900 100.00
SOURCE: 1999 Census
* Including population size of villages (ails) subordinated to city or township keneshes.
** Includes 459 village councils (aiyl okmotu) and twenty cities.
Table 10A.19
Average Population in Aiyl Okmotu by Oblast
Number of Aiyl Okmotu Total Inhabitants Average Number
in Aiyl Okmotu of Inhabitants
per Aiyl Okmotu
Kyrgyz Republic 459 3,279,593 7,145
Batken oblast 34 336,238 9,889
Jalal-Abad oblast 76 722,196 9,503
Issyk-Kul oblast 63 298,634 4,740
Naryn oblast 58 208,840 3,601
Osh oblast 81 905,539 11,179
Talas oblast 36 167,234 4,645
Chuisk oblast 110 633,035 5,755
City of Bishkek 1 7,877 7,877
SOURCE: 1999 Census
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Table 10A.20
Number of Aiyl Okmotu, Ail Keneshes, Settlements, Cities and Districts by Oblast
Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
Residents Districts Cities Townships Ail Keneshes Aiyl Okmotu
Kyrgyz 4,822,900 40 20 29 430 459
Republic
City of 762,300 — 1 1 — 1
Bishkek*
Chuisk 770,800 8 4 5 105 110
oblast
Issyk-Kul 413,100 5 3 5 58 63
oblast
Naryn 249,100 5 1 2 56 58
oblast
Talas oblast 199,900 4 1 1 35 36
Jalal-Abad 869,300 8 5 8 68 76
oblast
Osh oblast 1,176,000 7 3 2 79 81
Batken 382,400 3 2 5 29 34
oblast**
SOURCE: 1999 Census
* Excluding districts in Bishkek.
** In 2000 Bishkek was granted the status of city subordinated to district (not included in this
Table).
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Table 10A.21
Number of Civil Servants in State Bodies*
1997 1998 1999
Total Civil Total Civil Total Civil
Staff Servants Staff Servants Staff Servants
Kyrgyz Republic 26,592 18,987 27,787 18,893 28,554 18,970
Jalal-Abad oblast 2,002 1,427 2,166 1,438 2,227 1,442
Issyk-Kul oblast 1,620 1,155 1,805 1,173 1,856 1,176
Naryn oblast 1,194 854 1,367 946 1,399 949
Osh oblast 3,289 2,401 3,181 2,344 1,723 1,274
Batken oblast ... ... ... ... 1,532 1,134
Talas oblast 2,421 1,728 2,487 1,723 2,570 1,792
Chuisk oblast 3,714 2,652 3,975 2,651 4,083 2,757
City of Bishkek 12,352 8,770 12,806 8,618 13,164 8,446
* Excluding those involved in maintenance of the public order. Changes in the 1997–1998
data are related to changes in the structure of state authorities. The 1999 data on Osh oblast
excludes data on Batken oblast.
Table 10A.22
Civil Servants in Different Tiers of Local Government
Local Self-governments and Average Number of Staff Average Number of Inhabitants
Local State Administrations
First-tier 7.2 7,145
local self-governments
and executive bodies
Second-tier 14.0 71,086
local self-governments*  and
local state administrations
Third-tier 36.0 602,867
local self-governments and
local state administrations**
* Excluding districts in the city of Bishkek.
** Including the city of Bishkek.
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Chui Oblast
Jalal-Abad
Issyk-Kul Oblast
Naryn Oblast
Osh Oblast
Talas Oblast
Batken Oblast
Talas
Bishkek
Jalal-Abad
Naryn
Karakol
Batken
Osh
Table 10A.1
Administrative Map of the Kyrgyz Republic
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Annex 10.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
Legislation on Local Self-government in the Kyrgyz Republic:
• The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (adopted 1993, amended on 16 February 1996,
by Law No. 1, and 21 October 1998 by Law No. 134)
• Law on Local Self-government and Local Public Administration (adopted 19 April 1991,
amended on 19 December 1991, 4 March 1992, 3 July 1992, 17 December 1992, 27 May
1994 and 21 January 1998)
• Law on the Status of the Capital City (16 April 1994)
• Law on Condominium Associations (28 October 1997)
• Law on Referenda (28 June 1991)
• Law on the Budget System (11 June 1998)
• Law on Political Parties (12 June 1999)
• Law on the Status of Local Council Members (13 January 2000)
Decrees and Orders of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic:
• on the Reform of Local Self-government (adopted 18 August 1994, No. UP-188, amended
on 24 October 1996, No. UP-309)
• on Approval of the Regulation on the Organization of Local Self-government (22 September
1994, No. UP-246)
• on Elections of First-Tier Local Council Members (22 September 1994, No. UP-247)
• on Priority Measures for the Organization of Local Self-government in Bishkek (4 July 1995,
No. UP-171)
• on Increasing the Role of Heads of Local State Administrations and Local Self-governments
(20 March 1996, No. UP-103)
• on the Further Development of Local Self-government (24 October 1996, No. UP-309)
• on Certification Procedures for Aiyl Okmotu Chairmen (5 January 1997, No. RP-2)
• on the Program of State Assistance for Local Self-government and the Outline of Local Self-
government Reform (12 May 1997, No. UP-127)
• on Certification Procedures for Municipal Servants in Bishkek (12 May 1997, No. RP-156)
• on Targets for Budget Formation in First-tier Local Self-governments and Establishing
Permanent Revenue Sources (19 September 1997, No. RP-228)
• on the Organization of Local Self-government in Sub-raion Cities (23 June 1998, No. UP-200)
• on the Elections of the Mayor of Bishkek (9 July 1998, No. UP-228)
• on the Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-200 (23 June 1998) in the Cities of
Karakol and Kok-Zhangak (adopted 31 March 1999, No. UP-90, amended 4 March 2000,
No. UP-47)
• on the Further Development of Local Self-government (2 August  1999, No. UP-196)
• on Calling Elections of City, Settlement and Rural Councils (11 August 1999, No. UP-206)
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• on the Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-200 (23 June 1998) in the City of
Tokmok (2 October 1999, No. UP-244)
• on the Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-200 (23 June 1998) in the City of
Batken (20 April 2000, No. UP-93)
• on the Regulation on the Certification of Chairmen of Aiyl Okmotu and Sub-raion Cities (4
May 2000, No. 120)
• on Certifying Chairmen of Aiyl Okmotu and Sub-raion Cities in the Second Quarter of 2000
(4 May 2000, No. 120)
• on the Commission for the Promotion of Local Self-government Development, in the Office
of the President (12 May 2000, No. UP-117)
• on the Reorganization of Central Public Bodies (28 December 2000, No. 363)
• on Improving the Response of Executive and Local Self-government Bodies to Citizen
Applications and Complaints (17 January 2001, No. 027)
• on Approval of the Provisional Regulation on Pilot Elections for Local Self-government Chairmen
in Villages and Sub-raion Cities (17 January 2001, No. 028)
• on the Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-200 (23 June 1998) in the City of
Isfana (26 February 2001, No. 062)
• on Amendments to Presidential Decree No. UP-103 (29 March 1996) (9 March 2001, No.
071)
• on Providing Rural Self-government with Statutory Acts (2 May 2001, No. 150)
• on Increasing the Role of Territorial Self-government Bodies (2 May 2001, No. 151)
• on Increasing the Role of Kurultais in the Management of Local Affairs (2 May 2001, No.
152)
• on the Organization of Local Self-government in Cities of Oblast Subordination (2 May
2001, No. 153)
• on the Schedule of Elections for Mayors of Cities of Oblast Subordination and the List of
Representatives of the President for Nomination for Mayors of Cities of Oblast Subordination
(6 June 2001, No. 180)
Resolutions of the Government of Kyrgyz Republic:
• on Local Self-government Activities in Bishkek on Resolving Problems of Individual Dwelling
Areas (August 1995, No. 338)
• on the List of Facilities to be Transferred to Local Self-government of the City of Bishkek
(adopted 30 October 1995, No. 460, amended 6 January 1996, 17 June 1996, 2 December
1996, 27 September 1999, 24 January 2000, 17 May 2000, 22 May 2000, 31 May 2000,
15 June 2000 and 18 August 2000)
• on the Allocation of Lands to the Local Self-government in Bishkek (17 December 1995, No.
573)
• on the Establishment of Aiyl Okmotu (24 April 1996, No. 187, amended 6 September
1999, No. 482)
• on Procedures for Transferring Utilities to Municipal Ownership (adopted November 1996,
No. 531, amended February 1997, No. 84)
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• on the Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-188 (24 October 1996) (2 December
1996, No. 569)
• on the Program of State Assistance to Local Self-governments and Guidelines for the Reform
of Local Self-government at the Oblast, Raion and City Level, 1997–1998 (28 April 1997,
No. 254)
• on the Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-200 (23 June 1998) (21 July 1998,
No. 484)
• on the Transfer of Utilities into Municipal Ownership and the Structure of City Executive
Committees in Sub-raion Cities (adopted 16 December 1998, No. 827, amended 3 July
2000, No. 397 and 28 August 2000, No. 533)
• on Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-90 (31 March 1999) (adopted 23 April
1999, No. 228, amended 19 April 2000, No. 214)
• on the Further Development of Credit Unions by Local State Administrations and Local Self-
governments (13 May 1999, No. 256)
• on Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-196 ( 2 August 1999) (12 August 1999,
No. 439)
• on Approval of the Action Plan on the Organizational, Legal, Financial and Economic Basis of
Local Self-government (7 October 1999, No. 550)
• on the Implementation of Presidential Decree No. UP-244 (2 October 1999) (29 October
1999, No. 589)
• on Approval of the Regulation on Notary Procedures by Officials of Executive and Regulatory
Bodies of Local Self-government (29 November 1999, No. 650)
• on Improving the Structure of Local Public Bodies (11 January 2000, No. 10)
• on the Structure and Staff of Oblast State Administrations (4 February 2000, No. 63)
• on Issues of Public Bodies and Government in the City of Sulyukt, Batken Oblast (24 April
2000, No. 234)
• on Transferring Utilities to Municipal Ownership in the City of Batken, Batken oblast (23
June 2000, No. 370)
• on the Delegation of Separate Powers to Local Self-government Bodies (12 September 2000,
No. 563)
• on the Structure of the City Council of Isfahan, Liaylaik Raion, Batken Oblast (26 April
2001, No. 197)
• on the Draft Law on Public and Municipal Lands (27 April 2001, No. 200)
• on the Model Structure and Staff Chart for Mayoral Offices in Cities of Oblast Subordination
(2 August 2001, No. 406)
• on the Activities of the Minister on Local Self-government and Regional Development (8
August 2001, No. 420)
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Note
1 Social sphere facilities were defined as 1) services or functions provided both to the enterprise
employees and other persons, 2) actual property that is used for service delivery, and 3)
personnel, administration and responsibility for service delivery.
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Local Government in Tajikistan
Mamadsho Ilolov & Mirodasen Khudoiyev
1. Major General Indicators
The Republic of Tajikistan is situated in southeastern Central Asia, bordering on the People’s Republic
of China, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The country declared its
independence on 9 September 1991 and approved the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan
in November 1994. According to the Constitution, Tajikistan is governed through a presidential
system of power. The president of Tajikistan simultaneously acts as chairman of the government and
appoints the prime minister as well as other members of government, who are consequently approved
by Parliament. E. S. Rakhmonov is currently serving as president, after winning the national elections
in both 1994 and 1999.
Tajikistan consists of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAR), the regions of Leninabad
(recently renamed Sogdian) and Khatlon, the capital city of Dushanbe and thirteen districts (raions)
directly subordinate to the central government. The largest political parties include the People’s
Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Communist Party of Tajikistan, the Islamic Party for the Rebirth
of Tajikistan, the Socialist Party of Tajikistan and the Party of Justice (Adolatkhoh).
Tajikistan is a mountainous country, with over half of its land area situated three thousand meters
above sea level. Ethnic groups include Tajiks, Uzbeks, Russians and Kyrgyz. Major general indicators
and an administrative map of Republic of Tajikistan may be found in annex 11.1 and annex 11.2.
2. Legal and Constitutional Basis
2.1 Brief History of Local Government Reform
The Law on Local Self-government and Local Finance, passed on 23 February 1991 by the Supreme
Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, initiated the establishment of local self-government and
the revision of the administrative-territorial structure according to principles of decentralization. The
resulting organization of local government was thus based on Soviet legal traditions. Upon the
declaration of independence and the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, it
became necessary to institute a new legal framework. Accordingly, in December 1994, Parliament
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adopted the Constitutional Law on Local Public Administration and the Law on Self-government in
Towns and Villages.  Further changes and amendments were passed by national referendum and
added to the Constitution in September 1999.
Article 6 of the Constitution stipulates the functions of local government institutions and establishes
norms for the division of power at the local government level. Major local council powers include approving
local budgets and reviewing budget execution reports, determining the direction of social and economic
development within the territory, setting local taxes and fees and managing communal property.
The heads of the regional, city or district state administration (khukumat) simultaneously wield
executive authority and act as local council chairmen. These heads are appointed and dismissed by
the president and presented to their respective councils for approval.
The current system of governance emerged only after a period of turmoil in Tajikistan’s recent
political history. Immediately following independence, the country was drawn into civil war by the
various factions vying for power. A major source of conflict was the disparity between the poorly
developed regions in the south and those in the north, which had continued under the Soviet era.
The invasion of neighboring Afghanistan in 1979 by the Soviet Army exacerbated the situation
further, giving the opposing forces access to a vast supply of arms, often unregistered. Civil war
continued in southern Tajikistan from 1992 until 1994, when the Tajik government and the
United Tajik Opposition agreed upon a cease-fire. Negotiations, which took place under the auspices
of the United Nations, were difficult and prolonged, stretching over a three-year period. Russia and
Iran, among others, participated as guarantor countries. The General Agreement on Restoration of
Peace and National Consent in Tajikistan was finally signed on 27 July 1997 in Moscow by the
President of Tajikistan, E. S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition, S. A. Nuri.
An annex to the agreement contained the Provision on a Commission for National Reconciliation to
address the political, legal, military and civil issues arising from the conflict and to develop solutions.
This commission guided the reintegration of opposition military units into the national army, the
return of refugees to their homes and the incorporation of opposition representatives into the government
of Tajikistan. In addition, the commission also drafted constitutional amendments, based on which the
president later submitted a draft law to Parliament. These amendments were subsequently passed by
a national referendum held on 27 September 1999.
According to the Constitution, the Republic of Tajikistan possesses a bicameral Parliament, composed
of a lower house, the Majlisi Namoyandagon (Assembly of Representatives), which acts on a permanent
and professional basis, and an upper house, the Majlisi Milli (National Assembly), which is convened
at least twice a year.  In December 1999, Parliament passed two new laws, a Law on Parliamentary
Elections and a Law on Local Council Elections.
Elections to the Assembly of Representatives and local council elections were held on 26 February
2000. Elections to the upper house of Parliament were held one month later, on 23 March 2000.
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The Assembly of Representatives was elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage
through secret ballot. The National Assembly is constituted differently. Three fourths of its members
are elected indirectly through secret ballot at local council meetings of the GBAR and its cities and
districts, the regions and their cities and districts, Dushanbe and its districts and the cities and districts
of national subordination. The three oblasts and the city of Dushanbe, which has oblast status, all
have equal numbers of representatives, regardless of population size. The remaining fourth of the
National Assembly is appointed by the President. In addition, former presidents of Tajikistan have
membership for life in the National Assembly, although they have the option to decline the privilege.
These elections were the first multi-party elections to be held in Tajikistan. A total of six political
parties participated, including the Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the People’s Democratic
Party, the Party of Justice, the Islamic Rebirth Party and the Socialist Party. The following parties
qualified for seats in the Assembly of Representatives by surpassing a required minimum of five
percent of the vote: the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, which won fifteen seats; the Communist
Party of Tajikistan, which won five seats; and the Islamic Rebirth Party, which won two seats. These
parties then competed in single mandate electoral districts for the remaining forty-one seats in the
Assembly of Representatives.
These steps towards political stabilization contribute to economic, cultural and social development,
as well as to the progress of both democracy and decentralization in Tajikistan. Further reforms are
expected in the near future, including the separation of the functions and positions of local council
chairmen and heads of local administration.
2.2 Legal Basis of Local Government
Local government institutions derive their legal basis from the Constitution, the Law on Local Public
Administration and the Law on Local Self-government in Villages and Towns.
According to legislation, local governments have a real financial base. The Constitution grants local
governments the right to develop and implement their own budgets and to establish local fees, taxes
and duties. In addition, the Law on Local Public Administration allocates income tax to local budgets,
to be utilized for the social needs of the territory in keeping with the Law on Social Insurance.
The Law on Local Public Administration defines the governing principles and functions of local self-
government in Tajikistan. According to this law, local self-governments are institutions of legislative
and executive authority elected by the citizens of a given administrative territory. These institutions
freely and independently govern the community, serving the needs of the local population in accordance
with the Constitution and legislation. The main principles of local self-governance include:
• coordination of local and national interests;
• direct citizen participation in local council elections, referenda and public hearings;
• the accountability of local self-government institutions and their employees to the local population;
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• legality and social justice;
• local financial autonomy.
Local governments possess own authorities in addition to those delegated by the central government,
and autonomously propose initiatives, make decisions and implement activities. Any issue not
previously delegated to other authorities and involving local interests are referred to the competence
of the local government.
According to the Constitution, a jamoat is an institution of self-government in towns and villages.
The framework for their authority is set forth in the Law on Local Self-government in Towns and
Villages. In this law, local self-governance is described as “the system of organizing public activities to
address issues of local importance autonomously and at their own discretion, directly or indirectly, in
accordance with the legislation of Republic of Tajikistan. Local self-governments resolve issues within
their competence directly or through their representatives.”
Jamoats are formed on a territorial basis and possess legal status and an official seal. Community
property may include means of transportation, equipment and other facilities, public or social,
which these governments have built, purchased or otherwise transferred to their ownership. Town or
village self-government revenue sources include budget allocations from city or raion councils,
voluntary donations of citizens and working collectives.
The Law on Local Self-government in Towns and Villages does not address other grassroots institutions
of local self-governance that are currently active, such as makhallia (community) committees, micro-
raion councils, housing block committees or other kishlak (village) organizations. These bodies
operate according to their own statutes and provisions. Although legislators and lawyers are currently
discussing legislation in this field, it will be a challenge to address the variety of these institutions and
their activities comprehensively through one or even several laws.
2.3 Territorial Structure, Levels of Self-government
The administrative-territorial division of the country is established by Parliament and consists of
three tiers of local government:
• First tier, community level: village and town governments in rural areas (jamoaty shakhrak and
dekhot)
• Second tier, district level: administrations of cities and raions subordinated to oblasts, those of
Dushanbe city districts as well as those of thirteen raions directly subordinate to the republic;
• Third tier, oblast level: administrations of Dushanbe, the GBAR and Khatlon and Leninabad
oblasts, all of which are directly subordinate to the national government.
The Republic of Tajikistan is comprised of into the capital city, three oblasts (the Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region (GBAR), Leninabad oblast and Khatlon oblast) and sixty-two raions. These
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are in turn divided into fifty-eight rural districts as well as four Dushanbe city districts. The GBAR
is subdivided into seven raions and one city, Leninabad oblast into fourteen raions and eight cities
and Khatlon oblast into twenty-four raions and four cities.
In total, there are twenty-two cities, forty-seven towns, 354 villages, and 3570 settlements. Of the
twenty-two cities, four are located in raions of central subordination, thirteen in oblasts and five
in raions. Of the forty-seven towns, twenty of them are in Leninabad oblast, eighteen in Khatlon
oblast and nine in raions of central subordination. Of the 354 villages, forty-two are in the GBAR,
ninety-three in Leninabad oblast, 128 in Khatlon oblast and ninety-one in raions of central
subordination.
Each oblast, raion and city has its own khukumat. Consequently, there are three oblast khukumats
and one Dushanbe khukumat; fifty-eight khukumats of rural raions; sixteen khukumats of oblast
and raion cities; and four Dushanbe city district khukumats. In addition, there are 401 jamoats,
forty-two of which are in the GBAR, 113 in Leninabad oblast, 146 in Khatlon oblast and one
hundred in raions of central subordination. Nationwide, there are eighty-two khukumats and
seventy-seven local councils.
The authority to dissolve or amend administrative-territorial boundaries is vested in the upper house
of Parliament.
2.4 Status of the Autonomous Region of Gorno-Badakhshan
The legal status of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAR) is addressed in the
Constitution. According to article 7, the GBAR is an integral and indivisible component of the
republic. The GBAR Assembly initiates legislation within its territory and its consent is required for
any alteration of GBAR territory. One of the deputy chairmen of the Tajik National Assembly is a
member of the GBAR Assembly, and one of the judges of Constitutional Court is a representative of
the GBAR. Other specific authorities of the GBAR and its areas of social, economic and cultural
competence are determined by the Constitutional Law on the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous
Region, adopted in November 1999.
Tajik is the official language. However, the state fosters conditions for the free use and development
of the Shugnan, Rushan, Vakhan, Yazguliam, Russian and Kyrgyz languages in secondary schools
and mass media within the territory.
The GBAR chairman has the right to issue and cancel licenses for private educational institutions,
private clinics, medicinal spas and other medical institutions in coordination with the government of
Republic of Tajikistan.
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2.5 Status of the Capital City
The capital city, Dushanbe, is the only city divided into subordinate districts. Consequently, the
Dunshanbe council and local administration have the status of an oblast government, according to
the Law on Local Public Administration. The Law on the Status of the Capital City details the
organizational, legal, economic and social requirements for the performance of local government
functions in the capital city. Dushanbe government institutions ensure the necessary conditions for
national and international events, establish representative offices abroad, and provide for the
establishment of representative offices in Dushanbe of oblasts, cities and raions as well as those of
foreign partner cities.
Expenditures of the Dunshanbe local government are fully compensated from the national budget
through payments for services provided by the city, and through the fees paid by the embassies of
foreign countries and representative offices of international organizations in Tajikistan. The city of
Dushanbe leases municipally owned buildings and facilities to various Tajik government institutions,
as well as to representative offices of the GBAR, oblasts and raions, as established by legislation.
2.6 Forms of Community Self-government
As noted above, legislation does not address local self-government activity below the level of villages
and towns. However, grassroots organizations of community self-government are widespread and
play an important role in Tajik society. These organizations, which include makhallia committees,
micro-raion councils, apartment block councils, kishlak organizations in the Pamirs and local citizens
associations such as guzar and tabagy, all facilitate law and order, assist in the process of democratization,
protect citizens’ rights and interests and exercise autonomy in solving local issues. These organizations
are instrumental to the implementation of the European Charter of Self-government (15 October
1985) and the Model Legal Act of the Interparliamentary Assembly of CIS Countries on Common
Principles of Local Self-government Organization (24 November 1995).
Makhallias, or community groups, have long existed in Tajikistan, founded on traditional Islamic
concepts of social justice and the behavior of individuals in the community. Traditionally, makhallias
are governed by a council of elders (shura) that helps resolve social problems and conflicts within the
community.  The community elects a chairman (makhallia rais), who consults with the elders when
making decisions. The makhallia assists in organizing the major events in the lives of individuals and
their participation in community life. For instance, makhallias organize khashar, the traditional
Eastern form of mutual aid in which the community comes together to build a house or to sow or
harvest crops. Makhallias also care for orphans and the elderly.
The Agha Khan Foundation has launched a program to support mountain communities, targeted
at stimulating self-governments in mountain villages, through creating village-based organizations.
One such organization in the Shugnan district of the GBAR, Manem, has been in existence for five
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years. Its structure is transparent, consisting of a chairman (kishlak rais), who is elected in a general
assembly of residents to act on a voluntary basis. The chairman supervises the organization of
springtime fieldwork, the harvest and processing of crops and the distribution of humanitarian aid
and micro-loans. A council of elders, which includes all citizens over seventy-five years of age, may
summon the chairman to report on village activities. Villagers help him with his daily needs, for
instance caring for his livestock. The chairman works in close cooperation with the jamoat and raion
chairmen.
Although it is difficult to standardize the diverse forms of makhallia committee activities, they
obviously qualify as local self-government activity. Local governments are unable to exercise full
control over makhallia activities, although the makhallia chairman should be paid a salary from the
local government. In Tajikistan, chairmen of raion or city local governments do not generally delegate
administrative functions to makhallias, which vary greatly from community to community. However,
in some raions, the makhallias cooperate closely with the state government; there have even been
attempts to merge the powers of the two institutions.
The following examples illustrate different methods of cooperation between established local
governments and other forms of community organization.
1. Developing initiative: transforming the makhallia into an NGO.
The makhallia of the Zheleznodorozhny district in Dushanbe actively participates in solving
social and communal issues.  When the community suffered from a shortage of cooking fuel,
the makhallia decided to build a gas pipeline and turned to TASIF (Tajik Association of Social
Investment Funds) for assistance with the required materials. As a result, residents now have
natural gas in their homes. Spurred by this success, residents created a micro-projects committee,
which has since improved the water supply system, constructed an electric main and
accomplished other joint projects. This committee was established as an NGO to support low
income and indigent families.
2. Cooperation with the local government.
In the Ganchin raion of Leninabad oblast, the khukumat has encouraged the role of jamoats
and makhallia committees in organizing folk festivals and other events in order to reduce
expenses for individual families. Acting in accordance with the Presidential Decree on Folk
Festivals, Traditions and Customs and the Provision on the Exercise of Traditions and Customs,
makhallia committees, women’s councils, veterans, clergymen and elders all worked together
with the public. By decision of the raion administration, a commission was established to
oversee festivals, weddings, funerals and other traditional events. Similar commissions operate
in all jamoats, and makhallia committees perform all related work. Due to this close cooperation
between khukumats and makhallias, communities have been able to practice their traditions
with significantly reduced cost to households. The raion administration has made further
recommendations to strengthen the role of makhallia committees; these include establishing a
paid position for the chairman of the makhallia committee; granting the makhallia committee
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legal status; reviewing reports from makhallia committees at raion council sessions; publicizing
the best practices of makhallias in mass media; publishing information and promotional booklets;
organizing street makhallia and kishlak festivals as well as seminars, workshops and competitions;
and generally promoting the best makhallia committees.
3. Cooperation with NGOs.
Working together with makhallias improves the targeted assistance of NGOs to vulnerable
populations, as the chairman of each makhallia is best placed to understand individual situations
within the community. According to Counterpart Consortium, 118 NGOs were operating in
various sectors in September 1999. Of these, twenty-two NGOs focused on women and
human rights issues, twenty on issues of peace and development, eighteen on children and
youth and sixteen on social protection.  Each of these endeavors relied upon makhallia activities.
Parvin, an NGO created in 1999 to focus on women’s issues, offers one such example. During
the civil conflict, people in the valley, primarily women, found themselves cut off from develop-
ment processes and the flow of information. Parvin’s mission was to assist vulnerable populations,
to develop civil initiatives to increase the standard of living, to increase awareness and to achieve
social and economic independence for women. In each of these goals, Parvin has worked closely
with local self-governments. The branch office in Karategin Valley organized seminars on the
topic “NGO and Communities,” resulting in demonstrably increased public awareness. Parvin
is also planning to hold a series of educational seminars on human rights and violence against
women, on civil education and on the establishment of democratic institutions. In order to
address unemployment, they created an educational project to teach farming and develop
entrepreneurial skills, targeted at sixty vulnerable families in the Darband district, a project
which received support from the local administration and the Eurasia Foundation. The general
public, especially women, is actively participating in NGO activities, and women’s centers are
currently being established. In addition, Parvin has supported the establishment of Djavshan,
an organization for orphans and children from low-income families in the city of Rogun.
4. Education.
In April 2000, a national seminar on “Democracy through Makhallia Councils” was organized
by the NGO Fund to Support Civil Initiatives. Participants included representatives from
makhallias and local governments as well as officials from the Office of the President, Parliament
and the Dushanbe city administration. Topics of discussion included the role of local
governments in the protection of human rights; the role of traditional institutions and local
self-government in the development of civil society and the solution of social and economic
issues; and possibilities for partnership between makhallia committees and khukumats. Safargul
Adylova, the chairman of a makhallia committee from the city of Kurgan-Tiube, narrated her
experience of working with the city khukumat to help the needy cover expenses for public
services and described the activities of her makhallia to improve yards, support the elderly,
help troubled teenagers and open sports facilities. The seminar was continued in the commu-
nities, closely analyzing the activities of Nilufar, an NGO associated with a makhallia council
in Varzob district.
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3. Local Politics, Decision Making
According to article 6 of the Constitution, the people of Tajikistan are the sovereign source of state
power, which they exercise directly and indirectly through representatives. People of Tajikistan are
citizens regardless of ethnicity.  No community organization, group of people or individual has the
right to usurp state power.
3.1 Internal Structure of Local Government Decision Making
Local councils and chairmen of second- and third-tier local governments exercise the rights of self-
government in their respective territories. Decisions of the local council and the chairman are binding
upon all enterprises, institutions and organizations in the territory. In addition, local government
bodies may enter into contracts with enterprises for their mutual advantage.
Local councils exercise their authority through council sessions, standing and temporary commissions
and designated members, as well as through other powers assigned to council members by law.
The executive branches in the GBAR, oblasts, cities and raions are headed by chairmen. The
government of Tajikistan establishes the structure and staff of the chairman’s office. The activity and
organization of other administrative divisions, such as directorates, committees, departments and
other bodies are determined by relevant provisions approved by the central government.
Local councils are charged with the following powers:
• to approve the local budget, submitted to them by the chairman, and report on its execution;
• to report on long-term social and economic development programs and on general plans and
regulations governing land development;
• to establish local taxes, fees and duties and stipulate privileges for local taxes, fees and payments
allocated to the local budget according to legislation;
• to approve the appointment of the chairman and deputies, dismiss the chairman or deputies
from office and review reports of their activities;
• to approve the chairman’s decisions in cases stipulated by law;
• to approve or amend the council agenda and provisions on standing and other commissions;
• to establish standing and temporary commissions and review reports on their activities;
• to certify newly elected council members, terminate their powers or consent to their criminal
prosecution if they violate the law;
• to review reports from the heads of directorates, committees, departments and other divisions
of the local administration;
• to approve the necessary expenditures for council activities;
• to approve regulations establishing courses of disciplinary action for administrative infractions;
• to address initiatives or inquiries made by council members;
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• to establish administrative and supervisory committees, a commission on juvenile delinquents
and other commissions or approve them upon the recommendation of the chairman;
• to decide upon issuing local loans and bonds or holding lotteries;
• to revoke any decisions of the chairman or subordinate councils that contradict Tajik legislation.
Local councils may also resolve other local issues within its competence and in accordance with Tajik
legislation. These include ensuring the rights and legal interests of citizens, social and economic
development, environmental protection, the preservation of the historical and cultural heritage,
organizational issues and control. The local council may also issue a vote of no confidence in the
chairman and request his dismissal with a vote of two thirds of all council members by secret ballot.
The president of Tajikistan must then decide upon the issue within the period of one month.
The chairman possesses the following powers:
• to organize implementation of laws and other parliamentary acts, presidential or government
decrees, local council decisions and decisions of higher government bodies;
• to convene local council sessions.
The chairman may also resolve other issues within his legal competence in the following spheres:
• planning, budget, finance, accounting and management of local property;
• cooperation between enterprises, institutions, organizations and agricultural enterprises on the
use of land and other natural resources, environmental protection, construction, transport, roads
and telecommunications;
• oversight of communal, trade, social and cultural services;
• social protection, the enforcement of law, order and security and protection of rights and
freedoms of citizens.
3.2 System of Local Elections
On 10 December 1999, Parliament adopted a Law on Local Council Elections, which took into
account the new political realities created by the resolution of conflict within Tajikistan. Unlike the
previous Law on Local Elections (1994), the new law provides for the free participation of political
parties and community organizations in the election process.
On 26 February 2000, local council members were elected for five-year terms in the GBAR, oblasts,
cities and raions. The elections were general, equal and direct, held by secret ballot on single-mandate
electoral districts. All Tajik citizens over eighteen on the day of elections are eligible to vote or run for
office, regardless of social status, property ownership, race, ethnic identity, gender, language, education,
religious belief or occupation. Previously, only citizens over twenty-five were able to run for office.
The changes introduced by the new Law on Local Council Elections thus offer young people
broader opportunities for participation in political life.
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The Law on Local Council Elections establishes the number of electoral districts as following: no
more than seventy for the councils of oblasts, Dushanbe and the GBAR and no more than forty for
city and district councils. Each electoral district may elect one representative to the council. Political
parties may nominate candidates for oblast, city, raion and GBAR councils. Individuals may also
declare their own candidacy, provided they have gathered at least one hundred signatures from
voters of the relevant electoral district.
The following categories of citizens are prohibited from running for local council seats:
• individuals whom the court has declared incompetent, sentenced to prison or sent for
compulsory medical treatment;
• individuals in active military service; soldiers, corporals or personnel of the Armed Forces;
personnel of the Ministry of Security, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Emergencies,
Presidential Guards, State Border Committee or the Committee on the Provision of Special
Materials; tax officials, customs officials or members of other uniformed services of Tajikistan;
• individuals convicted of grave premeditated crimes, regardless of whether they have served
their sentence or received a pardon;
• individuals under investigation for criminal activity, as well as those being prosecuted for
crimes against the Constitution, against state security or other especially grave crimes. Members
of the political-military opposition were amnestied and do not fall under this category.
The president declares elections no later than seventy-five days prior to the expiration of the local
council mandates. The central election commission, regional election commissions and district and
divisional election commissions inform citizens about election procedures and ensure uniform
observance of the Law on Elections on the respective territory.
There was a high level of citizen participation in the February 2000 local elections, with over ninety-
six percent of citizens voting. It must be noted, however, that these elections were held at the same
time as those for the lower house of Parliament. Although political parties had the opportunity to
nominate candidates, they did not enjoy much success in these elections, as over ninety percent of
elected council members ran as independents. Tables 11.1 and 11.2 contain the breakdown of
council members by age and level of education.
As shown in table 11.1, Dushanbe had the greatest proportion of younger council members,
comprising almost one third of the local council, whereas this proportion was only 3.68 percent in
Khatlon oblast.
Council members from Dushanbe city and four Dushanbe districts have the highest levels of
education. The overwhelming majority of local council members are men, with women counting for
fewer than thirteen percent of all local council members.
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3.3 Forms of Direct Democracy
The Constitution and legislation of Tajikistan do not envisage local or regional referenda. Local
governments and community governments can organize assemblies or public hearings to change the
name of the territory or to merge or reduce the executive bodies. The results of these hearings or polls
shall be submitted to upper house of Parliament for consideration. Some local governments also
organize public hearings in order to debate concepts or determine the plans for territorial development.
3.4 Ethnic Issues, Multicultural Government
Tajikistan is a multinational and multicultural country. As of 1 January 2000, Tajiks accounted for
69.1 percent of the population, a small increase from 1989, when they accounted for sixty-eight
percent of the population. Other national groups include Uzbeks (25.0 percent), Russians (2.7
percent), Kyrgyz (0.8 percent) and other nationalities (2.4 percent) The population of Dushanbe is
59.9 percent Tajik, 21.3 percent Russian and 10.7 percent Uzbek, with the remaining 7.1 percent
composed of other nationalities.
Other nationalities are also represented in the composition of the Parliament (7.1 percent) and local
councils. The ethnic composition of the thirty-four members of the National Assembly includes
Tajiks (ninety-one percent), Russians (3.4 percent), Uzbeks (3.4 percent) and Kyrgyz (3.4 percent).
Representation of national minorities is also taken into account in the oblast and city administrations.
For instance, there are Uzbek deputy oblast chairmen in both Sogdian and Khatlon oblasts and a
Kyrgyz deputy oblast chairman in the GBAR.
4. Functional Structure of Local Government
4.1 Local Councils
Local representative power is exercised by oblast, city and district councils elected by citizens residing
in the respective territory. These councils are authorized to express and implement their will with
due consideration of national interests. Local councils approve the local budget and its implementation,
determine the direction of local social and economic development, set local taxes and fees, establish
methods for the management and transfer of communal property, approve the appointment of
chairmen and their deputies and review reports on their activities. Councils carry out their activities
through council sessions, commissions and through the exercise of council member powers. Local
councils may also issue a vote of no confidence in the chairman with a two-thirds majority of total
council members by secret ballot.  This is considered to initiate his or her dismissal from office, and
the President of Tajikistan must decide upon the matter within one month. Local council chairmen
are charged with convening local council sessions and making any necessary preparations, submitting
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proposals on the general direction of economic and social development, nominating candidates for
state awards and other responsibilities.
Local councils independently perform duties within their competence. Councils of higher-tier
governments may delegate responsibilities to those of lower-tier governments. Conversely, they may
assume functions of the lower-tier government by mutual consent. Local councils may enter into
contractual relationships with local government entities in other territories to pool financial resources,
jointly solve issues of mutual interest or coordinate work in different sectors.
Local councils and chairmen of the GBAR, oblasts, cities and districts ensure the rights of self-
governments within their respective territories. According to the government of Tajikistan, there are
seventy-seven councils throughout the country.
4.2 Local Administration
Local executive authority at the second- and third-tiers of local government is exercised by the
chairman of the local administration, as the representative of the central government. Khukumat
chairmen are appointed and dismissed by the president, and approved by their respective councils.
Khukumats consist of boards, committees and departments, the organizational structure and activities
of which are determined by relevant regulatory acts.
At the first level of local government, the chairman of the jamoat represents the executive branch of
local government. According to the Law on Self-governments in Towns and Villages, the main
functions of jamoat chairman are as follows:
• to ensure the implementation of jamoat decisions and manage its everyday activities;
• to organize implementation of the Constitution, legislation, acts of the president, Parliament
or the government of Tajikistan as well as local government decisions;
• to dispose of funds, enter into contracts with legal and physical entities and sign financial,
banking and legal documents on behalf of the local government;
• to represent the interests of citizens to state administration bodies, in court and in relations
with enterprises, institutions and organizations in cases stipulated by legislation;
• to undertake measures to improve the material well-being and living conditions of citizens.
The jamoat chairman makes and signs his own decisions within his competence.  Activities of a
jamoat chairman may be appealed at the city or raion council or in court.
4.3 Structure and Operation of Local Administration
The legal status of local administration is established in the Law on Local Public Administration and
the Law on Town and Village Self-governments. Figure 11.1 illustrates the relationships between
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different administrative tiers. Oblast, city and raion administrations usually operate through boards,
committees, departments, sections and similar divisions. Jamoat dekhots and shakhraks have a much
simpler structure, with staffs of five to seven employees. Each local administration has its own
management structure.
Figure 11.1
Structure of Local Administration in Tajikistan
According to the Law on Civil Service, employees in local self-government administrations are
considered to be public servants. Local government employees are thus legally required to pass
qualifying exams and are encouraged to participate in training programs for civil servants.
The jamoat chairman is nominated by city or raion chairman and elected by the jamoat. Chairmen
of GBAR, oblasts, cities and raions are appointed or dismissed from office by the president of
Tajikistan, who presents them to their respective councils for approval.
4.4 Control, Audit and Supervision of Local Governments
Local councils elect an auditing commission for a five-year term to carry out internal control over local
government financial activity. Auditing commission members are chosen so that all districts within
the territorial unit are represented according to population.
Local Council
Council Chairman
Budget
Commission
Standing
Commissions
Temporary
Commissions
Working
Group
Administration
Boards,
Departments
Institutions Organizations Sections
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The main duties of the auditing commission include:
• monitoring the use of local government funds in accordance with the adopted budget;
• ensuring the legality and efficiency of financial activities conducted by managers and officials
of local enterprises and organizations;
• ensuring the use of finances, movable and immovable property and other resources in the
implementation of local council decisions;
• conducting audits together with representatives of the Department of Control in the Office of
the President and the Department of Control and Auditing in the Ministry of Finance.
The auditing commission may not carry out an audit of a local government institution more than
once a year. Other institutions supervising local governments include the Control sector in the
Office of the President and the Department of Control and Auditing in the Ministry of Finance. If
a council chairman violates the Constitution, legislation, government resolutions or court decisions,
then the president or the court may dismiss him or her from office.
5. Public Service Provision
5.1 Distribution of Functions
Local governments in Tajikistan carry out the following general duties:
• administrative, social, cultural and economic functions permanently assigned by the Law on
Local Public Administration;
• administrative, social, cultural and economic functions assigned to them by other legislation
for a specified period of time;
• public administration functions delegated to local governments by the central government in
accordance with the procedures established by the Law on Local Public Administration;
• functions delegated to local governments by a superior local government in accordance with
the procedures established by the Law on Local Public Administration;
• voluntary initiatives.
These functions, together with their legal basis, responsible institutions and sources of funding, are
detailed in table 11.3.
Responsibilities specifically assigned to local government by the Law on Local Public Administration
are funded entirely from local budgets. If the central government delegates other functions, it must
also ensure adequate funding to cover expenditures. However, local governments are then responsible
for the timely and efficient performance of these additional responsibilities. Currently, the most
important additional functions assigned to local government include privatization of communal
property and land relations.
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Table 11.3
Functions of Local Self-governments in Tajikistan
Type of Function Relevant Legislation Responsible Institutions Source of Financing
1. Mandatory
functions
Permanent Law on Local Public Local governments Local budget
Administration
and Law on Local
Self-government
Temporary Other laws State administration Additional funding
body specified
in the relevant law,
and local governments
State Laws, presidential State administration Budget of the
administration decrees and institutions relevant state
government administration
resolutions institution
Individual Presidential decrees Local governments State and
local budgets
2. Delegated Agreement between Local Funding source
functions different levels of self-governments specified in the
local self-government agreement
3. Voluntary Decision of the Local governments Local budget
functions local council
Local self-governments may carry out state administration duties if stipulated by law or government
resolution. In such cases the state budget must allocate the requisite funding to cover related
expenditures. The local government manages performance of these duties and government institutions
ensure their implementation.
Local governments, through written agreement with higher level governments, may assume any
executive functions within the competence of the higher government. In cases such as these, the
central government is not permitted to delegate any responsibilities to local governments without
designating a source of funding in the written agreement. The local government bodies that have
been delegated additional functions will supervise their implementation.
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5.2 Methods of Service Delivery
In order to guarantee local service delivery, local governments may set up organizations and enterprises,
cooperate with the state-owned and private companies, contract with private sector companies and
privatize communal property.
For instance, between 1991 and 1999, local governments privatized a total of 2,218 trade, public
catering and provision companies, 1,953 housing and utility companies and 427 agricultural
enterprises. Most of the privatized entities are now owned by individuals. At this time, 70.7 percent
of state objects have been privatized. Detailed information about privatization may be found by
sector in table 11.4 and by territorial unit in table 11.5. Due to the fact that oblasts, Dushanbe city
and twelve cities and raions of central subordination have Departments on Destatization and Property,
the information on privatization is given primarily by regions.
Jamoats and local khukumats are responsible for education, social security, health care, the local
economy and cultural and leisure services (see annex 11.4 for a detailed breakdown of local government
functions). In the field of education, khukumats are charged with the organization, reorganization
and liquidation of secondary schools in coordination with the Ministry of Education. Local government
activities in the field of social insurance are generally limited to the provision of social services and
benefits, although they may offer additional social protection services if they have the financial
resources to do so. Local governments also gather and analyze data about citizens in need of social
protection. In terms of health care, local governments arguably manage more medical institutions
today than the Ministry of Health and have also established communal institutions for public health.
Local governments maintain libraries, museums, cinemas, theaters and other cultural facilities.  Since
these institutions are under the jurisdiction of government bodies of different levels, local
administrations are responsible only for those that they established themselves. However, they
cannot reorganize or liquidate these institutions without authorization from the Ministry of Culture.
Public utilities, such as gas, electricity, heating and engineering facilities are also maintained by local
governments.  In addition, local governments provide public transport, construct and maintain local
roads and carry out other construction projects.
As stated above, private companies have undertaken delivery of public services. Many public utility
institutions have already been privatized, and certain public transportation services are currently
undergoing privatization.  Generally speaking, privatization of local services is one of the main
methods by which local governments try to counteract the existing monopoly situation.
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Table 11. 5
Privatization of Objects by Territorial Unit
Regions 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
GBAR 10 6 7 13 30 30 96
Leninabad oblast 1 336 8 165 74 200 238 480 373 1,875
Khatlon oblast 5 146 20 63 92 258 168 350 590 1,692
Dushanbe 22 160 22 73 141 117 216 218 201 1,670
R A I O N S  A N D  C I T I E S  O F  C E N T R A L  S U B O R D I N A T I O N
Kofarnikhon city 10 1 5 2 5 13 21 19 76
Tursun-zade city 30 14 7 3 20 40 114
Rogun city 5 2 10 12 29
Leninsky raion 1 18 5 27 15 27 39 36 168
Gissar raion 24 2 5 4 5 35 42 117
Garm raion 10 4 13 27 54
Darband raion 5 5 10
Shakhrinau raion 22 2 23 14 61
Faizabad raion 3 12 44 59
Tajikabad raion 18 18
Varzob raion 3 7 8 18
Total 29 739 68 312 355 640 697 1,258 1,460 5,558
6. Local Finance, Local Property
6.1 Legal Basis of Local Finance
The legal foundations of local finance can be found in legislation, presidential decrees, government
resolution and other regulations. Legislation currently addressing issues of local finance can be
grouped into the following categories:
1) Basic laws of Republic of Tajikistan. These include the Constitution, constitutional laws on
government, on local public administration, on local self-government, on the Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region, on the status of the capital city, on the administrative-territorial composition
of Tajikistan and other acts related to the establishment and competence of local self-government
bodies or territorial tiers. These include some budgeting and financial authorities.
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2) Laws and acts directly related to budgeting and finance. These include the Law on the Basic
Principles of Budget System and Budgeting Process; the Law on the State Budget, which is
adopted annually by the lower house of Parliament; tax and customs codes; and other acts that
address budget policy, regulate revenues and expenditures of central and local budgets and
establish procedures for submitting budgets and budget execution reports.
6.2 Local Budgets
Local budgets refer to the budgets of oblasts, cities and raions. Local budgets are drafted and
approved by the local council, which also reviews budget execution reports. In recent years, the scale
and volume of local economies have grown, due to the transition to a market economy and the
growth of diversified forms of ownership. At the same time, the influence of local government bodies
on the social and economic development of their territories has increased. Under these circumstances,
local budgets have assumed an increasingly important role.
In Tajikistan, local budgets currently comprise one-third of all budget revenues. Local revenues and
expenditures increased considerably between 1996 and 1999 (see table 11.6).  However, the size of
local revenues relative to GDP and consolidated budget revenues has remained the same. Within the
structure of oblast government budget, the share of subordinate local government expenditures
decreased from 22.6 percent in 1996 to 12.1 percent in 1999. Raion and city government
expenditures did not experience significant change. All of these statistics confirm the reduction of
real opportunities for local governments to invest in social, cultural and economic development, as
their financial dependence on the central government becomes more entrenched.
First-tier local governments, or jamoats, do not have budgets in the true sense of the word. Instead,
their financial resources are specified in a separate line of the raion budget. The allocated finances are
transferred to the jamoat treasury account from which all jamoat expenses are funded. Own revenues
for first-tier governments include fees, revenues from economic activities and voluntary contributions
from enterprises or individuals for cultural, educational and other events. These are kept in special
ruble accounts and are spent on the social and economic needs of residents. Due to the recent
establishment of jamoats, statistics on jamoat budgets are not yet available, preventing further
analysis of the financial basis of first-tier local governments.
The relationship between central and local budgets is determined annually, based on defined
principles. After taxes and expenditures funded from local budgets are forecast, Parliament establishes
the local share of national tax revenues and fees as well as the amount of targeted transfers to cover
local budget deficits. These figures are entered in the annual Law on the State Budget for the
upcoming year and distributed to all local administrations. Local budget revenues and expenditures
are determined after the approval of the State Budget.  Draft budgets are discussed by oblast, city
and raion administrations and approved by their respective councils.
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The central government supervises the implementation of local budgets.  The forms of control at its
disposal include:
• preliminary control, placing central financial bodies under the treasury system and financing
budget recipients on the basis of approved cost estimates;
• reviewing monthly reports on the implementation of local budgets
• comprehensive audits of local budget procedures, such as drafting, discussion, approval and
implementation;
• reviewing audit results through khukumats and the Ministry of Finance Collegium.
Local budgets are sufficiently independent, possessing own sources of revenues which may be
allocated at their discretion. Own revenues include a) legally established sources of revenues for
different budget levels; b) allocations from centrally collected taxes and duties.
Table 11.6
Structure of Local Budgets in Tajikistan, 1996–1999
 Indices Year
1996 1997 1998 1999
1. Revenues, including subsidies and
subventions as a percent of:
a) 1996 revenues 100.0 136.0 250.2 316.5
b) GDP 8.1 6.6 6.0 5.8
c) the consolidated budget 41.5 31.2 34.1 31.3
2. Revenues without subsidies and
subventions as a percent of:
a) 1996 revenues without subsidies 100.0 111.9 196.4 295.3
b) GDP 7.1 4.3 3.8 4.4
c) the consolidated budget 32.8 20.2 21.4 23.2
3. Total expenditures as a percent of:
a) 1996 expenditures 100.0 136.9 247.7 314.1
b) GDP 20.7 20.6 17.4 17.6
4. Central government expenditures 12.1 14.2 11.6 11.9
as a percentage of GDP
5. Oblast government expenditures 22.6 18.6 20.4 12.1
as percentage of the consolidated budget
6. Raion and city government expenditures 19.0 12.4 13.1 19.9
as a percentage of the consolidated budget
7. Jamoat expenditures as a percentage of — — — —
the consolidated budget
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan
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Khukumats have the right to amend budget revenues and expenditures during budget execution
within limits assigned by budget category. Any budget surplus or additional revenues received after
approval of the budget is used by the administrations to finance the budget deficit, economic sectors
or social programs and other expenses.
The Law on the State Budget establishes protected budget categories, such as salaries, social insurance
deductions, scholarships, pensions and benefits, which may not be reduced regardless of deficit.
After assessing all expenditures by oblasts, cities and raions, the Ministry of Finance calculates the
total amount of local budget revenues and normative deductions from central taxes and fees. Local
expenditures not covered by own revenues are financed by subventions from the central budget.
These are allocated on a monthly basis, taking into account incoming budget revenue, in order to
pay salaries, fund capital investments and similar expenditures.
6.3 Revenues
Local budget revenues usually consist of tax and non-tax revenues, targeted funding and bank loans.
Local tax revenues include the following:
• VAT and excise tax (excluding those collected by customs);
• income and profit taxes, including enterprise profit tax, personal income tax, taxes paid by
small businesses under a simplified scheme and others;
• property taxes, including the enterprise property tax, personal real estate tax, tax on vehicles,
tax on the use of natural resources or water and other taxable property fees;
• state duty;
• other taxes, including sales tax (for example, on cotton and aluminum), public transport tax,
and other taxes.
Non-tax revenues and duties include the proceeds from privatization, the sale of shares, patent fees,
dividends on government shares, interest on state capital investments, administrative fees, fines and
penalties. Local budgets also receive revenues in the form of targeted funds, bank loans and transfers
for mutual settlement or the reduction of budget deficits. Beginning in 1999, local budgets also
included a road fund.
The structure of local budget revenues changed significantly in the second half of the 1990s (see
table 11.7).
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Table 11.7
Local Budget Revenues in Tajikistan, 1996–1999 [percent]
Type of Revenue Year
1996 1997 1998 1999
Taxes 47.3 57.1 54.7 61.2
Value added tax 7.2 0.4 12.5 15.4
Excise taxes 4.5 0.1 0.7 0.6
Income tax, profit tax, 26.0 34.8 28.5 27.2
capital appreciation tax
Property tax 8.5 19.6 11.2 13.5
State duty 1.0 2.1 1.7 1.9
Other taxes 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.6
Non-tax revenues 5.7 7.2 7.2 7.6
Road fund — — — 4.5
Balance of budget means 1.0 1.7 2.2 1.8
Targeted funds 5.6 24.7 23.2 16.9
Mutual settlement transfers 40.4 9.3 11.4 7.4
Bank loans — — 1.3 0.5
Assignments to reduce the budget deficit — — — 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total tax revenues have increased considerably as a percentage of local budget revenue, from 47.3
percent in 1996 to 61.2 percent in 1999. Within tax revenues, the VAT and property tax comprise
almost one third of all local budget revenues in 1999, up from 15.7 percent in 1996. The share of
excise tax has fallen sharply. The share of income and profit taxes designated for local governments
has remained stable and composes a substantial share of local revenues.  Non-tax revenues and duties
have also remained steady. Finally, it must be noted that the share of mutual settlement transfers has
drastically decreased, from 40.4 percent in 1996 to 7.4 percent in 1999.
Tax revenues are particularly significant in the budgets of oblasts and cities with high levels of
industrial activity (See table 11.8).  For instance, taxes accounted for eighty percent of local revenues
in Leninabad oblast, where a third of all state industrial enterprises is concentrated, and sixty-seven
percent in Dushanbe. Income and profit taxes in particular play a significant role, comprising 31.9
percent of total budget revenues in Leninabad oblast and 41.2 percent in Dushanbe.
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Table 11.8
Local Budget Revenues in Tajikistan by Region, 1999 [percent]
Type of Revenue GBAR Khatlon Leninabad Dushanbe DRS
Oblast Oblast
Taxes 12.6 60.2 77.8 67.0 39.6
Value added tax 2.6 14.0 20.0 19.4 7.8
Excise tax — — 1.8 0.2 —
Income tax profit tax and 6.6 18.6 31.9 41.2 20.7
capital appreciation tax
Property tax 2.2 24.4 18.5 3.2 8.6
State duty 0.2 0.8 2.8 3.0 0.8
Other taxes 1.0 2.4 2.8 3.6 1.7
Non-tax revenues 3.1 7.2 8.9 9.8 4.6
Road fund — 5.9 9.0 1.5 0.1
Balance of budget means 0.1 2.5 — 2.5 3.1
Targeted funds 81.4 20.4 — — 46.6
Mutual settlement transfers 2.8 2.8 3.5 19.2 5.2
Bank loans — 1.0 0.8 — —
Assignments to reduce — — — — 0.1
budget deficit
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
6.4 Local Taxes
Local taxes are mandatory payments collected by local governments from physical and legal entities
within its territory in accordance with national legislation. Local taxes include the tax on retail trade,
personal real estate tax and tax for public transport, all of which are paid entirely to the respective
local budget. Local councils are entitled by the Constitution to establish local taxes, set methods of
tax collection and declare exemptions or reduced rates for certain categories of taxpayers. Local tax
bodies issue instructions on the application of local taxes in coordination with the Ministry of
Finance and the Committee on Tax and in cooperation with the local financial departments. In
1999, the proportion of local taxes in the local budget revenues was 3.1 percent.
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In addition, councils establish non-recurring payments, such as penalties, sanctions, business
registration fees, road inspection fees, proceeds from the sale of state property, auctions, local lotteries
or the issue of premium bonds and other payments.
Local budgets are also allocated a share of centrally collected taxes. In accordance with the Law on the
State Budget for 2000, shares of the following taxes are to be transferred to local budgets: VAT
(excluding those collected by the customs), income tax, profit tax, personal income tax and one
hundred percent of enterprise property tax. Leninabad oblast, Dushanbe and the city of Tursun-
zade cities are exceptions to this rule. Their shares in national tax collections are as follows:
• Leninabad oblast is allocated fifty-three percent of VAT, thirty-two percent of excise tax, forty
percent of profit and property tax and eight percent of personal income tax;
• Tursunzade is allocated eighty-three percent of VAT, one hundred percent of excise tax and
forty-five percent of personal income tax;
• Dushanbe is allocated one hundred percent of excise tax and thirty-seven percent of the VAT
from the Barki Tochik State Joint Stock Holding Company.
Local budgets collect one hundred percent of tax on small businesses paid under a simplified plan,
tax on the use of natural resources, state duty, tax on vehicle owners, patent fees and other non-tax
fees and eighty-five percent of land tax.
At the same time, it should be noted that distribution of a particular tax among different tiers of
government limits the opportunities to develop local financial autonomy, undermines the unity of
the tax and budget system and decreases local government responsibility for budget implementation.
It is thus important to differentiate clearly between central and local taxes and grant local government
more autonomy in defining taxes and fees within their competence.
The procedures for adopting the annual budget create further instability in the budgeting process.
Currently, major budget categories are defined only when the budget itself is adopted.  Because local
governments are dependent on these categories, they do not have the opportunity to forecast
potential revenues or develop their draft budgets until approval of the state budget at the end of the
year, which greatly weakens their financial autonomy. If the system were changed so that major
budget categories are adopted prior to the passage of the state budget, local governments would be
able to participate in the early stages of budgeting process.
Municipal loans and municipal banks are still nonexistent. The Law on Bankruptcy has been
adopted, but these procedures have only just begun to be practiced in oblasts, cities and raions. For
instance, cases have recently been filed in the Supreme Economic Court against Pakhtai Khatlon, a
cotton company in Khatlon oblast, and Zafarabad, a cotton company in Leninabad oblast, for
failure to pay debts.
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6.5 Expenditures
The main categories of local budget expenditures are the economy, the social and cultural spheres,
law enforcement and civil defense, administration and other expenses. Social and cultural costs form
the bulk of local budget expenditures, amounting to 49.8 percent of total expenditures in 1999, an
increase from forty-six percent in 1996. This relative growth is due to increased funding of education
and culture. From 1996 to 1999, the share of these sectors in expenditures grew from 28.5 to 34.9
percent, while expenses on health care diminished from 17.1 to 14.4 percent.
Table 11.9
Local Budget Expenditures in Tajikistan, 1996–1999 [percent]
Area of Expenditure Year
1996 1997 1998 1999
Economy 12.5 19.8 19.2 22.8
Agriculture 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4
Transport 1.3 1.8 2.6 1.4
Housing stock and public utilities 9.4 15.8 14.7 20.0
Trade 0.1 0.2 0 —
Other expenditures 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.0
Culture and society 46.0 58.2 49.8 49.8
Education 27.1 34.5 31.4 32.4
Culture 1.4 1.9 1.7 2.5
Health care 17.1 21.0 16.3 14.4
Sports 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
Social security 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3
Science 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Law enforcement and civil defense 5.6 0.6 7.2 7.8
General administration 4.2 8.2 6.8 6.2
Compensation of employees 25.0 5.1 7.5 1.8
Road management — — — 4.2
Other expenditures 6.6 8.0 9.4 7.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Local budget expenditures 7.8 6.3 5.8 5.6
as a percentage of GDP
Local budget expenditures as a percentage 41.6 30.9 33.5 32.0
of state budget expenditures
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The local economy was the second largest component of local budget expenditures, with spending
in this sphere rising to 22.8 percent from 12.5 percent in 1996. Housing and public utility services
are the major expenses in this category, accounting for 87.9 percent of expenditures on the economy
and one fifth of total expenditures. Two other major spending categories are law enforcement and
civil defense, which increased from 5.6 to 7.8 percent of local budget expenditures and public
administration, which rose from 4.3 to 6.2 percent. Salaries, compensation and other expenses also
form a substantial proportion of local budget expenditures.
Table 11.10
Local Budget Expenditures in Tajikistan by Region, 1999 [percent]
Area of Expenditure Total Region
GBAR Khatlon Leninabad Dushanbe DRS
Oblast Oblast
Economy 22.7 12.9 10.9 11.4 62.5 10.2
Agriculture 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.6 — 0.3
Transport 1.3 — 0.2 — 5.8 —
Housing stock and 20.0 11.6 9.3 10.4 56.7 6.1
public utilities
Other expenses 1.0 0.3 0.9 0.4 — 3.8
Culture and society 49.8 55.0 59.0 54.0 24.0 62.4
Education 32.4 33.8 39.3 34.0 13.0 45.8
Culture 2.5 3.6 4.0 1.8 2.6 1.4
Health care 14.4 17.0 15.3 17.4 8.2 15.0
Sports 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
Social security 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1
Science 0.1 — 0.1 0.1 — —
Law enforcement and 7.8 14.2 8.9 7.5 6.2 6.9
civil defense
General administration 6.2 9.9 9.3 5.7 2.0 7.1
Compensation for employees 1.8 2.5 1.1 0.3 0.6 7.4
Other expenses 11.4 5.5 10.7 21.0 4.5 5.2
Funds transferred for 0.2 — — — 0.2 0.8
mutual settlements
Total expenditures 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Dushanbe is an exception to the generally high levels of local spending on social and cultural programs,
with these expenses amounting to only one-fourth of the city budget (see table 11.10).  Most schools,
health care and cultural institutions located in the city are financed directly from the central budget.
However, housing and public utilities expenditures composed 56.7 percent of the city budget.
All of this happens at the time when local governments are facing a multitude of urgent problems.
For this purpose it is necessary to increase the expenditures section of the local budgets, which will
be possible based on a steady growth in GDP and increased allocation of national funds. It is equally
important to increase local government responsibility for budget execution and eliminate the misuse
of funds, thus improving the efficiency of allotted expenditures
6.6 Local Property
Local property refers to the property of oblasts, cities, raions and other administrative-territorial
units, as well as property of the GBAR. The main law regulating the ownership rights of local
governments is the Law on the Property of the Republic of Tajikistan. Under this law, local property
falls into the following categories:
• property of oblast, city and raion councils;
• property of jamoat self-governments;
• property of the GBAR.
Property of oblast, city and raion councils includes local budget means, housing stock, public utilities
and industrial enterprises which utilize local raw materials or whose products or services are used by the
oblast, city or raion. Council property also includes securities and enterprises operating in construction,
transportation, trade, agriculture, public services, education, health care and culture institutions,
including property needed for the social and economic development of the oblast, city or raion.
Jamoat property includes community objects, social amenities and other facilities built or purchased
by the community governments. It also includes transport vehicles, communal equipment and other
property transferred through legally established procedures; funds and assets allocated from local
budgets; and voluntary contributions from individuals or charities. Jamoat property may not be
withdrawn. Communal self-governments have broad rights to lease or use their property, as well as
discretion over the use of their money and assets.
Administrative-territorial units where most enterprises have been privatized are generally in a better
financial position and require fewer subsidies from the national budget. Typically, the more
conservative the raion, the higher its level of centrally allocated targeted funds and subsidies. Currently
many territorial enterprises are operating at less than one-third of capacity or stand idle due to poor
cash flow and the unavailability of loans. Since they are not generating profit, their contribution to
local budgets is insignificant.
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7. Relationships Between the State Administration
and Local Governments
The structure of government power in Tajikistan is composed of the central state administration and
the three tiers of local government. The distribution of powers between the central and local govern-
ments is based upon the following principles:
• subsidiarity, which dictates that issues are to be addressed at the level of government closest to
the people, involving higher levels only when necessary;
• decentralization of power;
• clear differentiation of responsibilities;
• direct correlation between responsibilities and financial resources.
The principle of subsidiarity also prevails in the division of power between tiers of local government.
Whenever it is necessary to consolidate the financial, material, informational and human resources of
several raions, the oblast or city administration has jurisdiction over the matter.
Oblast, city and raion khukumats consist of various units, whose structure, organizational pattern
and activities are defined by specific provisions approved by the central government. The established
structure of local administration may be changed by the head of local administration within its assigned
budget in coordination with central government and subject to approval by the local council.
The structure and staff of local khukumats are established by the government.  This results in dual
subordination, with local executive bodies simultaneously subordinated to a central ministry and
accountable to the chief of staff in the oblast, city or raion government. Figure 11.2 illustrates the
structure of executive authority and decision making at the oblast level. It should be noted that the
president of Tajikistan is also chairman of the government.
The head of an oblast government department is accountable both to the respective minister and the
chief of staff in the office of the oblast chairman. This system also exists between officials at lower
levels of government. Fifteen ministries and five other central government bodies have divisions at
the oblast and raion levels.
The current distribution of responsibility between the central and local governments and among
different local self-governments is far from perfect. Some sectors, such as education, health care and
other social services, remain completely under the control of the central government. This situation
is unlikely to change in the near future, due to the following serious obstacles:
• The system of local self-governments is not fully integrated;
• Many jamoats and sub-raion cities are financially weak;
• The system of public services at the local level is very unstable, a consequence of the subsidy-
oriented system under Soviet administration. Inefficiency in distribution, technical inefficiency
and huge internal debt have devastated the state industrial sector.
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• Self-governments have not yet been established in oblasts and raions, making it problematic to
delegate larger responsibilities, such as secondary education, to local administrations.
Some forms of cooperation exist between local khukumats and self-government bodies.  Local
governments participate in the selection and placement of personnel for jamoats.
Figure 11.2
Sectoral Responsibility at the Oblast Level
The oblast administration bears responsibility for the economic and social development of its territory,
in particular by preparing development concepts for individual raions. Raion khukumats have direct,
daily contact with the jamoats in their jurisdiction, especially with respect to the following issues:
• jamoat participation in territorial development plans;
• developing programs for social and economic development throughout the raion and
coordinating initiatives to this end;
• reviewing the performance of a given jamoat in response to complaints, according to the
relevant law.
Sectoral Admininistration
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8. Local Government Employees
Article 1 of the Law on Civil Service defines a civil servant or official as a person who holds a paid
governmental position and executes professional duties to implement government authority. The
administrative organization of government employees is determined by the Registry of Government
Employment Positions in Tajikistan, professional grade and qualification requirements. There are
five professional grades accorded to government positions: supreme, major, leading, senior and
junior. The annex to the Registry lists the specialization of government employees and their specific
qualification requirements. In general, requirements for government positions are based on the
following:
• a certain level of professional education, determined according to the professional grade and
type of specialization;
• work history and experience in the profession;
• knowledge of the Tajik Constitution, legislation and other norms and regulations, as relevant
to the performance of professional functions.
Principles of civil service in Republic of Tajikistan include:
• the sovereignty of the Constitution and laws of Tajikistan;
• a commitment to the people of Tajikistan;
• humanity and social justice;
• protection of human rights and freedom;
• democracy and openness;
• a nonpartisan and secular basis;
• professionalism, competence and honesty;
• legality, professional responsibility and discipline in the performance of official duties;
• the accountability of civil servants;
• the legal and social protection of civil servants;
• equal opportunity for citizens to enter civil service.
Civil servants are prohibited from organizing or operating political party structures, religious organiza-
tions and other public associations on government premises, with the exception of trade unions.
In the first and second tiers of local government, civil servants are considered to be individuals
holding official positions in local executive bodies and their structural divisions; in offices of the
chairmen of the GBAR, oblasts or Dushanbe; and in offices of village and town self-governments. In
addition, the status of civil servant is also accorded to notary publics; employees of the prosecutor’s
office, the regional divisions of the National Bank of Tajikistan, police and civil defense services; tax
and customs administrations; and public attorneys of raions, cities, GBAR and oblasts and their
deputies. The legal status of civil servants is determined by the duties, rights and limitations related
to their positions.
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In addition to their obligation to follow general principles of civil service, government employees also
have specific rights and duties reflected in their terms of reference, which are approved by the heads
of respective governmental structures within the limits of the law. Civil servants are prohibited from:
• sitting on the board of any commercial organization;
• appropriating assets or technical, financial, information and other government resources for
personal use;
• accepting gifts for services provided in the course of their professional duties. Should employees
receive a gift in their capacity as an official person in the country or abroad, they are to hand it
over to the state according to established procedures.
Guarantees and incentives for civil servants are established in the Law on Civil Service. Government
bodies create a personnel reserve for the timely replacement of civil service positions, as well as to
promote efficient civil servants. This reserve personnel is formed from:
• civil servants who have upgraded their qualifications through additional training and are
recommended for promotion after official assessment;
• experts from village or town local governments and self-governments, experts from industrial,
social, cultural and scientific circles or academics from relevant fields.
Civil servants do not include the technical and support staff that ensures daily functioning of
government bodies and their offices.  The register of these employees is defined by the government
of Tajikistan.
9.  Legal Guarantees for Local Autonomy
Guarantees for the establishment of local khukumats and the autonomy of self-governments are
defined in Section 7 of the Constitution on Local Government, the Law on Local Public Administra-
tion and the Law on Local Self-government in Villages and Towns and the Administrative Violations
Code of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.
Decisions of the council chairman in the court may be appealed in court by citizens; community
associations, enterprises, organizations and institutions; public administration and government bodies
and self-government bodies. The public prosecutor initiates proceedings against decisions that do
not conform to the Tajik Constitution and legislation; these must subsequently be reviewed by the
local government body itself or by a higher council or chairman.
The local council can prematurely dissolved by Parliament in cases of recurring violations of the
Constitution, legislation or rights and freedoms of citizens. Parliament may also decide to dissolve a
local council before the expiration of its term upon the recommendation of a higher council or a
National Assembly committee in the following instances:
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• if a newly elected council has failed to establish the structure of its subordinate bodies within
a month of its opening session;
• if the council fails to convene the necessary quorum of its members for a period of over two months.
Local councils may also vote to disband voluntarily by a two-thirds majority.
The president of Tajikistan may dismiss a chairman from office before the expiration of his or her
term under the following circumstances:
• if the chairman loses Tajik citizenship;
• upon the chairman’s conviction in court;
• upon personal submission of the chairman’s resignation.
Chairman, deputies and heads of executive divisions are prohibited from holding other paid positions
or participating in the management of joint stock companies, limited liability companies or any other
non-governmental economic entities.
Local councils and administrations in the GBAR, oblasts, cities and raions have the authority to
establish courses of disciplinary action for administrative violations in accordance with the Administrative
Violations Code and within the limits established by Tajik legislation. Infractions include illegal or
negligent actions against the public order, the rights and freedoms of the citizens or the established
government order.  These are subject to legally established penalties. Provided that these violations do
not entail criminal responsibility, disciplinary action is then pursued through administrative channels.
Physical or legal persons who commit an administrative infraction are subject to the penalties in force
at the time and place of the act. Legal acts that mitigate or revoke the penalties for administrative
violations may take effect retroactively, whereas acts declaring or increasing penalties may not. Legal
proceedings are carried out according to the legislation applicable at the time and place of the legal
investigation. Raion or city courts oversee investigation of administrative cases, provided they fall
under their jurisdiction. The order of legal proceedings on administrative violations is established by
the Administrative Violations Code and other laws of Tajikistan.
According to the Law on the Office of Public Prosecutor, an attorney in the Office of the Public
Prosecutor who monitors observance of the law during the administrative proceedings has the
following rights:
• to initiate proceedings on administrative violations;
• to study case documents;
• to monitor the legality of actions by law enforcement bodies during the proceedings;
• to participate in the investigation;
• to submit petitions and offer conclusions on issues arising during the investigation;
• to verify the legality of the disciplinary actions applied by law enforcement bodies;
• to appeal decisions on the case;
• to suspend execution of the court decision and other actions envisaged by the law.
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Outside lawyers may also take part in investigations. According to the authority vested in them by
the Bar, the lawyers have the right to study all case papers, submit petitions and initiate appeals on
behalf of their clients.
10. Next Steps in the Transition Process
In order to create the foundations for future local government reform, the current division of power
between the central and local governments must be reviewed and amendments must be made to the
Law on Local Public Administration and the Law on Local Self-government in Villages and Towns.
The president of Tajikistan has recently submitted two draft laws to Parliament, the Law on the
Administrative Proceedings Code of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Law on Territorial and
Administrative Structure. These initiatives proposed the following reforms:
• democratic reform of the administrative-territorial structure;
• developing the local budget system;
• improving the territorial statistics system;
• improving social and economic planning methods;
• introducing principles of strategic governance, quality management and business administration;
• broader participation of local residents in the decision-making process;
• direct elections for raion, city and oblast chairmen;
• amendments to the Constitution regarding the division of local representative and executive
powers;
• developing a Code of Ethics for deputies and employees of executive bodies;
In addition to the reforms proposed by the president, further steps could be taken to strengthen the
institution of local self-government in Tajikistan. These include:
• making the khukumat chairman an elected position rather than an appointed one, thus
separating the representative and executive branches of local government;
• discussing a potential new law on communal self-governments and grassroots organizations
such as makhallia committees and kishlak organizations, in order to increase their role, status
and authority;
• amending legislation on community associations and non-profit organizations in order to
extend their application to makhallia councils and committees;
• establishing preconditions for an Association of Makhallia Councils;
• inviting local and international NGOs to work together with makhallia councils to solve social,
cultural and economic problems;
• encouraging the relevant NGOs to implement educational programs for heads of makhallia
councils in order to promote leadership skills, share the methodology of social partnership,
train them in the basics of market economy and civil law and resolve community problems
through makhallia councils.
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Glossary of Tajik Terms
Dekhot — Extremely rural settlements, often sparsely inhabited. Together with
shakrak, these comprise the first (jamoat) tier of local government
Jamoat — The local self-government body that has recently emerged to replace
the former village and town councils and exercise local self-government
functions in towns and villages
Khashar — A traditional Oriental method of mutual support when people assist
each other to build a house and to sow or harvest crops
Khukumat — The local executive authority at the city, district or regional level
Kishlak — Village
Kishlak rais — Village chairman
Majlis — Assembly or council
Majlisi Milli — The National Assembly, or the upper house of Parliament, convened
at least twice annually
Majlisi Namoyandagon — The Assembly of Representatives, or the lower house of Parliament,
which operates on a professional basis
Majlisi Oli — “Supreme Assembly,” or Parliament, of Tajikistan. The highest represen-
tative and legislative body, composed of two chambers, the Majlisi
Namoyandagon and the Majlisi Milli
Makhallia — A localized community group
Makhallia rais — The chairman of the community council
Shakrak — Rural settlements with some urban elements. Together with dekhot,
these comprise the first (jamoat) tier of local government
Shura — The committee of elders which heads the makhallia
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Annex 11.1
Major General Indicators  (1 January 2000)
Size of territory 143,000 square kilometers
Population 6,127,000
Pensioners 960,000
School-age children 1,479,000
Population density 42.8 people per square kilometer
Major ethnic divisions
Tajiks 69.1 percent
Uzbeks 25 percent
Kyrgyz 0.8 percent
Russians 2.7 percent
Other 2.4 percent
Per capita GDP USD 178.50
Consolidated budget revenues 100.0 percent
National budget 70.04 percent
Local budgets 29.96 percent
Social security fund 11.46 percent
Unemployment rate 3.1 percent
Inflation rate 12 percent
Average population per local government 12,655
Number of public employees: 15,702
Employed by the state government 9,026
Employed by local governments 6,776
Territorial autonomies with special status Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAR)
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Annex 11.2
Population, Settlements and Administrative Units
Table 11A.1
Raions and Cities by Population Size Categories in Tajikistan
Population Size Categories Number of % of Total Number of % of Total
Khukumats Khukumats Inhabitants Population
0–10,000 1 1.27 8,000 0.12
10,000–20,000 8 10.26 146,000 2.37
20,000–30,000 12 15.37 250,000 4.07
30,000–40,000 8 10.26 284,000 4.69
40,000–100,000 25 32.08 1,726,000 28.16
100,000–200,000 21 26.91 2,961,000 48.33
200,000+ 3 3.85 752,000 12.25
Total 78 100.0 6,127,000 100.0
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Table 11A.2
Urban Population in Tajikistan by City
City Number of Inhabitants % of Total Urban Population
Gafurov 15,000 1.2
Gissar 20,000 1.6
Dushanbe 562,000 44.1
Isfara 37,000 2.9
Kayrakum 10,000 0.9
Kanibadam 45,000 3.5
Kofarnikhan 44,000 3.4
Quliab 78,000 6.1
Kurgan-Tiube 60,000 4.7
Nurek 19,000 1.5
Penjikent 33,000 2.6
Piandj 8,000 0.6
Rogun 8,000 0.6
Sarband 11,000 0.9
Taboshar 12,000 0.9
Tursun-Zade 39,000 3.0
Ura-Tiube 51,000 4.0
Khorog 28,000 2.2
Hudjand 149,000 11.7
Chkalovsk 22,000 1.7
Shurab 4,000 0.3
Yavan 20,000 1.6
Total 1,275,000 100.0
SOURCE: State Statistics Agency
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Table 11A.3
Types of Administrative-territorial Units in Tajikistan
Type of Administrative-territorial Unit Number of Units
Jamoaty shakhraks and dekhots 401
City and raion khukumats 78
Oblast and Dushanbe khukumats 4
Table 11A.4
Administrative-territorial Structure in Tajikistan
Local and Regional Governments Average Number of Average Number of
Inhabitants per Unit Settlements per Unit
First tier (jamoaty shakhrak and dekhot) 15,279 12
Second tier (city and raion khukumats) 78,299 112
Third tier (GBAR, oblast and 1,531,750 712
Dushanbe khukumats)
Figure 11A.1
Administrative Map of the Republic of Tajikistan
Khatlon
Region
Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region
Leninabad
Region
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Annex 11.3
Major Laws on Public Administration and Local Government
• Law on Administrative Violations (adopted by the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic on 1 June
1986)
• Law on Local Public Administration  (1 December 1994)
• Law on Local Self-government in Villages and Towns (1 December 1999)
• Constitutional Law on the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan (4 May 2000)
• Constitutional Law on the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (2 November 1995)
• Law on Civil Service (20 May 1998)
• Constitutional Law on Local Council Elections (10 December 1999)
• Constitutional Law on Elections to the Majlisi Oli of Republic of Tajikistan (10 December
1999)
• Constitutional Law on the Status of the GBAR (2 November 1996)
• Constitutional Law on the Status of the Capital City (12 November 1998)
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Annex 11.4
Responsibilities of Administrative Tiers
Table 11A.5
Specific Functions of Local Government Tiers in Tajikistan
Functions Jamoats Raion and City GBAR, Oblast
Khukumats and Dushanbe
Khukumats
I .  E D U C A T I O N
1. Pre-school X X X
2. Primary X X X
3. Secondary X X
4. Technical X
5. Higher X
I I .  S O C I A L  W E L F A R E
1. Nurseries X X X
2. Kindergartens
3. Welfare homes X X X
4. Services for low income families X
I I I .  H E A LT H  S E R V I C E S
1. Health protection X X X
2. Hospitals X X
3. Public health system X X
IV.  C U LT U R E ,  L E I S U R E ,  S P O R T S
1. Theaters X
2. Museums X
3. Libraries X X
4. Parks X X
5. Sports, leisure X X
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Table 11A.5 (continued)
Specific Functions of Local Government Tiers in Tajikistan
Functions Jamoats Raion and City GBAR, Oblast
Khukumats and Dushanbe
Khukumats
V.  E C O N O M I C  S E R V I C E S
1. Water supply X X
2. Sewage X X
3. Electricity X X
4. Gas X X
5. Central heating X X
V I .  E N V I R O N M E N T,  P U B L I C  S A N I TAT I O N
1. Waste collection X X
2. Waste disposal X X
3. Street cleaning X X
4. Cemeteries X X
5. Environment protection X X
V I I .  T R A F F I C ,  T R A N S P O R T
1. Roads X X X
2. Public lighting X X
3. Public transport X X X
V I I I .  U R B A N  D E V E L O P M E N T
1. Town planning X
2. Regional planning X X
3. Local economic development X X
4. Tourism X X X
I X .  G E N E R A L  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
1. Security, militia X X
2. Fire brigades X X
3. Civil defense X X
4. Justice X X X
5. Civil status registration X X
6. Statistics X
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